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Nepal occupies a unique global position as a peripheral social formation subject to decades of 
relative isolation from capitalism.  Although the agrarian sector has long been understood to be 
dominated by pre-capitalist economic formations, it is important to examine whether contemporary 
changes underway in the country are transforming the rural economy.  There has been an expansion 
of capitalist markets following economic liberalization and improvements in the transport 
infrastructure.  Furthermore, neo-liberal commercialisation initiatives such as the Agriculture 
Perspective Plan provide the ideological justification and pre-conditions for the broader process of 
capitalist expansion, despite the pro-poor rhetoric.  However, just as neo-liberal poverty alleviation 
strategy is flawed, there are also shortcomings in many Marxian understandings of the transition from 
pre-capitalist to capitalist agriculture in peripheral social formations. There is a tendency for 
political-economic theorists to assume the inevitable ‘dominance’ of capitalism, contradicting 
considerable evidence to the contrary from throughout the world.   The central objective of this thesis 
is to understand how pre-capitalist economic formations have been able to ‘resist’ capitalist 
expansion in rural Nepal.  There is a necessity to understand the mechanisms through which older 
‘modes of production’ are reproduced, their articulations with other economic formations – including 
capitalism – and how they are situated globally.  As a case study, one year’s fieldwork was completed 
on Nepal’s eastern Terai using both qualitative and quantitative methods.  The research suggested 
that surplus appropriation through rent in a mode of production which can only be described as 
‘semi-feudal’, has for a majority of farming households impeded accumulation and profitable 
commercialisation, a precondition for the emergence of capitalist relations.  Semi-feudalism has been 
reproduced for decades internally by the political control over land and externally by Nepal’s 
subordinate position in the global economy.  The latter process has constrained industrialization and 
rendered much of the peasantry dependent upon landlords who have no incentive to lower rents.  The 
economic insecurity which has arisen in the context of semi-feudal production relations has allowed 
further forms of surplus appropriation in the sphere of circulation to flourish, through for example, 
interest on loans and price manipulation on commodity sales.  This further hinders profitable 
commercialisation amongst both semi-feudal tenants and also owner cultivators who farm under what 
can be termed an ‘independent peasant’ mode of production.  Even wealthier independent peasant 
producers who could potentially become capitalist farmers are constrained both by high cultural 
capital expenses, oligoposnistic activity by industry in the capitalist grain markets, and Indian rice 
imports which depress local prices.  Furthermore, development initiatives which could potentially 
facilitate capitalist transition through the introduction of productivity boosting techniques have had 
limited success under the prevailing relations of production and the associated ideological relations 
of caste and gender.  The above findings are of crucial significance if one is to develop policies and 
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ADB – Agriculture Development Bank (The main government run microfinance 
bank in Nepal) 
 
APP – Agriculture Perspective Plan 
 
APP-IAP – Agriculture Perspective Plan Implementation Action Plan 
 
APP-ISP – Agriculture Perspective Plan Implementation Status Report 
 
APROSC – Agricultural Projects Services Centre (Consultancy firm responsible for 
APP) 
 
CPN(M) –  Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
 
CBO – Community Based Organisation 
 
DDC – District Development Office (District level government office responsible for 
development activities.  Its local level counterpart is the VDC) 
 
DAP – Diammonium Phosphate (Variety of fertiliser) 
 
IPM – Integrated Pest Management 
 
LSMS – Living Standards Measurement Survey 
 
RRN – Rural Reconstruction Nepal, (Nepali NGO involved in some development 
activities in Jhorahat). 
 
SRI – System of Rice Intensification 
 
VDC – Village Development Committee (A division of local governance in Nepal.  



















Glossary of local terms* 
 
Acr – Chutney  
 
Adhiyã – Literally ‘half’, a sharecropping arrangement whereby half the crop is given 
to the landlord as rent. 
 
phno mnche – Literally ‘one’s own people’, referring to those within the power 
laden social networks individuals use to access resources, often in return for favours 
at a later date. 
 
Asr – Monsoon month in Hindu calendar between June-July when rice is planted 
 
Bandh – Literally ‘closed’, a political strike.  Although they can occur when just one 
sector goes on strike, general strikes, when called by political actors, compel other 
businesses and sectors to close.  General strikes are often enforced through violence 
and intimidation. 
 
Baniy – A Maithili speaking middle-caste present on both sides of the border.  They 
traditionally have strong involvement in business activities. 
 
Bantar – Indigenous ethnic community of the eastern Terai.  They are one of the 
largest ethnic groups in Bhaudaha and Thalaha VDC. 
 
Basmati – An aromatic variety of rice.  It yields a high price in the market, and is 
rarely consumed by producers, instead being sold for eventual consumption by 
wealthy urban classes. 
 
Bigh – Predominant measure of Land common in the Nepal Terai and India.  One 
bigha = 0.67 hectares 
 
Birt – A form of tax free land tenure offered to members of the Rana ruling elite 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
 
Birtwala – Hill based elites who were recipients of tax free Birta land grants. 
 
Chait – Spring month in Hindu calendar between April and May.  The term is also 
used to refer to a variety of early paddy planted during this month and harvested at 
the beginning of the monsoon. 
 
Cmal – Processed uncooked rice. 
 
 
*System of transliteration from Devanagari script to roman script based upon that used in Turner, R. 
L., 1931. A comparative and etymological dictionary of the Nepali language. K. Paul, Trench, 






Chaudhari – Tharu tax collector and administrator in the pre-Rana years.  The 
position was replaced with that of the jimidar.  Today chaudhari is often used to 
refer generically to the members of the Tharu ethnic group, many of whom use the 
term as a surname alongside the name of their sub-caste. 
 
Chuira – Beaten rice, a popular snack which is often made from lower quality Chaite 
paddy. 
 
Dhmi – Faith healer/traditional doctor 
 
Dhn – Nepali term for paddy as it appears in the field and following harvest.  After 
it is processed and husked it becomes chamal, and after it is cooked it becomes bhat. 
 
Dhimal – Indigenous group of the eastern Terai residing in the northern half of 
Morang and Jhapa districts.  
 
Duro – Firewood for cooking. 
 
Gobar – Cow Dung (dried and used for fuel) 
 
Guthi – A form of land ownership associated with religious institutions.  This is the 
only form of non raikar tenure which remained legal following the abolition of birta 
tenure. 
 
Ht Bajr or Htiya – Nepali term for a periodic market.  Each rural locality usually 
holds a htiya once or twice a week in a set location. 
 
Hariyo mal – An effective form of organic fertiliser derived from the leaf fodder of 
the plant Ipil-Ipil (Leucaena leucocephala). 
 
Haruwa – A bonded labourer who works for a household for a set period of time. 
 
Jana ndolan – Literally ‘people’s movement’, the Jana Adolan I refers to the 
uprising to overthrow the Panchayat regime in the early 1990s.  The Jana Andolan II 
refers to the 2006 uprising against the resurgent monarchy which culminated in the 
ceasefire between the Nepal Army and CPN (M) and the declaration of Nepal as a 
republic. 
 
Jhagar – Indigenous community of the Northern India/Nepal who reside in small 
populations in the eastern Terai.  They are traditionally forest dwellers who are 
thought to have migrated to Nepal in the last few hundred years from the 
Chotanagpur plateau region of India.  Known in India as Munda. 
 
Jimidr – Tax collector during the Rana years.  They were generally resident in the 
community and were responsible for collecting tax from the peasantry.  Farmers 








Jirayat – Taxable lands granted to Rana tax collectors or jimidars as payment for 
their services. 
Kamat – Large landed estate. 
 
Kamtiya – Village based functionary for absentee landlords, responsible for 
overseeing the estate and collecting rents. 
 
Knchi – Most commonly consumed variety of rice in the Terai.  It is also the main 
crop produced and sold by the farming households. 
 
Kah – Measure of land common in the Terai. There are 20 kah in one bigha. 
 
Kahwala – Merchant specialising in the purchase and distribution of grain. 
 
Khawas – Ethnic group residing in northern and central parts of Morang district who 
are believed to have ‘separated’ from the Tharu community.  They is controversy as 
to whether or not they constitute a separate ethnic group from the Tharu. 
 
Kushuwaha – Maithil speaking middle caste who are traditionally vegetable 
producers and reside in both Nepal and India. 
 
Madesi ndolan – Mobilisation which included Maithili and Bhojpuri speaking caste 
Hindus and some Terai indigenous groups in the Spring of 2007 and again in 2008 to 
mobilise for greater rights and representation for Terai ethnic groups in the 
constitution writing process.  
 
Maithil – An Indo-European language spoken in the historical region of Mithila on 
the plains of Northeast Bihar, India and the Eastern Nepal Terai.  Morang is on the 
fringes of this region.  The Mithila region has a rich artistic culture and complex 
caste system. 
 
Malpot – Office during Rana years where jimidars would take the grain collected as 
tax for channelling to Kathmandu. 
 
Mlik – Respectful reference to somebody in a position of authority or power, 
usually in an employment context. 
 
Mansuli – The next most commonly consumed variety of paddy after Kanchi. 
 
Marwari – Powerful business community of Indian origin who own many rural 
businesses (including money lending and grain trading) and factories in Morang. 
 
Mauja – Administrative sub-division during early Gorkhali and Rana years. There 







Maund – Most common unit of weight used by farmers and merchants on the Nepal 
Terai.  1 maund is equal to approximately 40 kg. 
 
Mohi – Tenant farmer holding official tenancy rights to their cultivated land 
 
Morang Bypr Sangh – Translates literally as ‘Morang Business Organisation’ –  an 
organisation for businessmen and industrialists in Morang. 
 
Muluki Ain – Rana state’s civil code, which institutionalised the caste system. 
 
Musahar – Dalit community that resides throughout the eastern Terai and north 
Bihar.  They prefer to be referred to by the more respectful term Rishidev. 
 
Parganna – Administrative sub-division during early Gorkhali and Rana years.  
 
Rdh 12 – A variety of rice very similar to Kanchi in character and price.  
 
Raikar – Form of land tenure where the state is the official landlord and cultivators 
make tax payments to the government.  Today, all land except guthi is officially 
raikar, although tax is low and cultivators have effective private property rights to 
their land. 
 
Ranas – Series of feudal hereditary Prime Ministers who ruled Nepal from 1846 to 
1950. 
 
Rajbanshi – Indigenous community who inhabit the Terai plains from Morang to 
West Bengal, India, where they are also known as Koch.  They were historically 
from a very powerful nation, the Kochila state, with the capital in Koch Bihar in 
present day West Bengal.   
 
Rishidev – More respectful term for Dalit community more commonly known as  
Musahar, residing throughout eastern Terai and north Bihar. 
 
Rop – The process of transplanting rice seedlings from nursery to main plots 
 
Roi –Bread, the unleavened variety is a major staple in the Terai of Nepal and much 
of Northern India.  
  
Rupee (Rs) – Nepali currency.  1 = Rs 120 ~ 
 
Satar – Indigenous community of the Northern India who reside in small numbers in 
the eastern Terai.  In India they are known as the Santhal.   
 
ekkh – Form of land rental contract whereby a fixed rate of a chosen crop (usually 








Terai – Nepalese term for the plains that skirt the foot of the Himalaya, including 
Morang district.  
 
Thru – Largest indigenous community of the Terai.  They are traditionally forest 
dwellers but now live a largely sedentary life. 
 
Vijayapur – Historical kingdom encompassing much of the Terai east of the Koshi 
up until its annexation by the Shah dynasty of Gorkha. 
 
Zamindr – Indian term for large landlord.  Not to be confused with jimidar, who is a 






























Metric / Local measurement conversion table 
 
 
Local unit of measurement Metric conversion 
 
1 kah  
 
0.17 hectares  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Political transition and underdevelopment in Nepal 
Nepal has undergone dramatic political changes over the last two decades.  In 1990, 
mass protests fuelled by disaffection with the ruling elite culminated in Nepal’s 
monarchy restoring elected, multiparty democracy.  The events of the period brought 
much hope amongst the population that the development failures of the last half a 
century could be rectified (Thapa, 2004).  However, a decade on, limited economic 
growth and persisting, deeply entrenched poverty and structural inequality drove an 
escalating People’s War by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist).  The 
authoritarian backlash against civil society by the Nepali state in the context of the 
escalating conflict in the countryside fuelled a wave of republicanism and an urban 
uprising against the monarchy.  This set the groundwork for a coalition between the 
CPN (M) and mainstream parties and an end to armed conflict on the conditions that 
the monarchy would be overthrown and a new constitution written. 
 
Nepal is now at a unique political and economic juncture, with the establishment of a 
republic and the impending re-writing of the constitution.  In this context there has 
been an intensification of debate over the root causes of underdevelopment over the 
last two centuries and the reforms necessary to reverse these trends.  It is not yet an 
appropriate time to discuss whether the new government will succeed in reversing 
these processes.  However, growing public disillusionment with the increasingly 
unstable coalition which continues to serve elite interests, violent excesses by all 
political factions, and ethnic unrest, suggest otherwise.  Nevertheless, a case study on 
the trajectory of agrarian change from Nepal’s eastern plains and the continued 
dominance of pre-capitalist formations, can offer some insights into the fundamental 
causes of underdevelopment in Nepal, given the importance of agriculture to 
livelihoods throughout the country.  It can also identify shortcomings of strategies 
which seek neo-liberal agrarian transformation such as the Agricultural Perspective 
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Plan.  An analysis of agrarian change can identify the macro and micro level 
structural social relations which must be challenged for the emergence of a more 
equitable economic formation in the ‘New Nepal’. 
 
1.1.2 Agrarian transition in an era of globalisation 
The claim to know the trajectory of transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist 
economic formations has been fiercely contested since the days of Marx, a debate 
with important political consequences for millions of rural people in lower income 
countries.  However, interest in the subject and Marxism in general has declined 
significantly in recent years as scholarship has increasingly fallen under the influence 
of both post-structural cultural theories on the one hand and neo-liberal approaches 
on the other.  Nevertheless, the 2008-09 financial crisis which has revealed some of 
the contradictions of the global capitalist economy has in some ways served to 
remind scholars of the importance of Marxian understandings of change and 
continuity.  Meanwhile, the contemporary social and economic transformations as 
well as stagnation in peripheral countries under neo-liberal restructuring suggest that 
it is also a suitable juncture in which to re-engage with debates on economic 
transition.   
 
However, any re-examination of Marxian theories of agrarian transition also requires 
a consideration of the flaws in scholarship on the subject up until the present.  The 
most notable is the tendency for theorists to assume the inevitable dominance of an 
‘all powerful’ capitalism (Gibson-Graham, 1996).  Where the preservation of pre-
capitalist economic formations or ‘modes of production’ is acknowledged, it is often 
assumed to be functionally articulated with a dominant capitalism.  However, some 
studies, particularly from the Althusserian tradition, have more adequately 
understood the mechanisms through which pre-capitalist formations have been 
perpetuated through time and to a greater or lesser degree have been able to resist full 
capitalist subordination (Dupré & Rey, 1979;  Meillassoux, 1980;  Singh, 2007;  van 
Binsbergen & Geschiere, 1985;  Wolpe, 1982a;  1982b).  It is necessary to draw 
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upon some of these insights to understand the micro level processes through which 
pre-capitalist economic formations continue to perpetuate themselves locally in the 
economic context of the early 21
st
 century, with significant political and economic 
consequences.  However, it is equally important to understand the contradictory 
nature of the global economy, whereby capitalist processes at a worldwide scale 
themselves perpetuate the preservation of older economic formations at a local level 
through both economic, political and ideological mechanisms. 
 
1.1.3 Why study transition? 
Why, one may ask, is it important to understand the trajectory of capitalist 
development in the periphery?  Firstly, one can better understand how it differs from 
the historical European national experience by introducing the context of 
imperialism. It can be argued that any ‘capitalist’ development under imperialism 
which does occur in industry or agriculture will be largely subordinate to capital 
from more developed regions.  This blocks ‘full’ capitalist transition and often 
facilitates a ‘drain’ of profits out of peripheral social formations.   
 
An examination of these processes allows one to better understand the ideologies 
which facilitate the expansion of this subordinate form of capitalism and the 
intensification of global inequality.  Neo-liberal theories and their manifestation in 
both national economic strategy and rural development strategy are particularly 
relevant in this context.  In low income countries throughout the world, government 
and donor led development strategy seeks to integrate rural populations into global 
markets, particularly through the commercialisation of agriculture (Akram-Lodhi, 
2008;  Ellis & Biggs, 2001;  Sugden, 2009).  The pro-poor rhetoric of these policies 
however, glosses over the exploitative class relations associated with capitalist 
subordination.  By exposing the real processes these ideologies seek to mask, one can 
better formulate alternative strategies for policies which act in the interest of the poor 
and vulnerable.   
 
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction                                                                                                                           4 
Secondly, and most crucially, it is important to understand why particular economic 
formations are able to ‘resist’ capitalist development.  There are forms of surplus 
appropriation within these pre-capitalist formations which constrain peasant units of 
production from engaging in profitable commercialisation and accumulating in the 
first instance.  This can perpetuate relations of production, exchange and circulation 
and associated forms of surplus appropriation which further the impoverishment of 
vast strata of rural populations in peripheral regions.  Ironically, neo-liberal theories 
gloss over not only capitalist class relations, but those associated with pre-capitalist 
formations may block capitalist development of any kind.  Pre-capitalist economic 
formations may even achieve stability through articulating with capitalism (Dupré & 
Rey, 1979;  Meillassoux, 1980;  Singh, 2007;  van der Klei, 1985). 
 
An examination of the complexities of economic transition in the periphery whereby 
there may be complex combinations of capitalist and pre-capitalist economic 
formations reinforced both internally and externally, allows one firstly, to formulate 
policies capable of improving the economic wellbeing of the majority.  Secondly, it 
also allows one to better understand the complex ways in which class power is 
exercised.  By doing so it reveals the multiple contradictions against which ‘class 
struggle’ must be directed, as well as the class alliances necessary to carry this 
through. 
 
1.1.4 Agrarian transition in Nepal 
Nepal presents an ideal case study to examine these processes in an extreme form.  It 
is a country which has long been situated at the periphery of the South Asian as well 
as the global economy where capitalist development has thus far remained limited 
(Blaikie et al., 2001;  2002;  Seddon, 1987).  For generations it was ruled by a feudal 
monarchy, which until the mid-twentieth century did little to encourage growth in 
industry or agriculture and benefited from an unequal dependent relationship upon 
India which intensified underdevelopment (Blaikie et al., 2001;  Mishra, 2007).  In 
the last ten years, as with most developing countries, Nepal has been subject to an 
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aggressive programme of economic liberalisation (Rankin, 2004).   In this context 
the 1996 Agriculture Perspective Plan envisaged a transformation of Nepali 
agriculture (APROSC, 1995;  Cameron, 1998).  Although it did not explicitly seek to 
develop ‘agrarian capitalism’ as it is traditionally understood, by seeking to expand 
commodity production by smaller farmers through ideologies of self-help and 
entrepreneurship, it justified the broader process of capitalist expansion under neo-
liberal globalisation.   
 
Based upon previous research experience in Nepal, my initial objectives were to 
challenge the APP’s credentials as a poverty alleviation strategy.  I hoped to 
highlight the problematic assumption of the APP that profitable petty commodity 
production could emerge without differentiation and the development of capitalist 
and proletarian classes.  It was anticipated that this thesis could subsequently 
examine the process of capitalist transition in Nepali agriculture in the context of 
economic liberalisation and how it differed from the European transition in terms of 
its impact on poverty alleviation and livelihoods.  The ideological bias of the APP 
could then be revealed as diverting attention from the forms of exploitation which 
accompany capitalist expansion.  Meanwhile it would also be possible to examine the 
potential for class struggle under emerging rural capitalism or the state led strategies 
for a more equitable rural development. 
 
However, initial probing in 2006 which formed part of my MSc thesis suggested that 
altogether different processes explain the limited impact of Nepal’s agrarian strategy 
on poverty alleviation, particularly in my field site on the eastern lowlands, or Terai.  
The evidence suggested that pre-capitalist modes of production were constraining 
households from producing a surplus which could facilitate profitable 
commercialisation, with or without capitalist differentiation.  This not only discredits 
the assumptions of the APP, but the failure in the first instance of profitable 
commodity production to emerge also rules out many of the assumptions of classical 
theories of capitalist transition.   
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Based upon an understanding of pre-capitalist economic formations or ‘modes of 
production’ which acknowledges complex mechanisms of reproduction and 
relationships with capitalism and other economic formations, this study seeks to 
understand the dynamics of agrarian change in Morang.  The insights raised will 
have broad implications for development policy in Nepal as well as strategies for 
class mobilisation by progressive political forces.  This contribution is particularly 
significant in the context of Nepal’s recent political changes.   
 
1.2 Researching ‘modes of production’  
A central Marxian concept that this thesis seeks to examine is the appropriation of 
surplus.  This refers to the proportion of the physical product or value produced by a 
labourer in a set period of time which exceeds what is required to meet the 
subsistence needs of themselves and his/her family (Marx, 1974).   In peasant based 
pre-capitalist economic formations, it is the accumulation of a surplus which is 
necessary for profitable commercialisation and capitalist development.  In order to 
understand what has constrained capitalist development therefore, one must examine 
the mechanisms preventing households from accumulating a surplus.  This can be 
best understood through an analysis of the ‘mode of production’, the system of 
production and set of social relations that characterises all societies in one form of 
another, and determines to a greater or lesser extent, what happens to the surplus 
product (Althusser & Balibar, 1968, 212-216).   
 
The component parts of a mode of production which must be examined include 
firstly, the ‘relations of production’, or the producers’ access to the means of 
production, which in turn has a tendency to determine the primary mechanism 
through which surplus is appropriated and used.  Crucially, under modes of 
production where the surplus is appropriated by a dominant class, the subordinate 
class from whom it is extracted face difficulties accumulating.  Secondly it is 
necessary to identify the ‘forces of production’ which refers to the type of labour and 
technology utilised which influence the level of output (Althusser & Balibar, 1968).  
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction                                                                                                                           7 
Thirdly, the ‘mode of production’ concept must be extended to encompass the 
mechanisms which reproduce these relations and associated forms of surplus 
appropriation after each productive cycle.  This entails an examination of the sphere 
of ‘circulation’, within which there may be secondary forms of surplus appropriation, 
as well as the ‘political’ and ‘ideological’ levels of the social world.  In order to 
understand the types of surplus appropriation which may hinder accumulation and 
capitalist development in both the sphere of production and circulation, it is 
necessary to identify how modes of production are articulated, and how these 
formations are situated in the broader global economy.   
 
For this analysis, the key concern is to identify exactly how the pre-capitalist 
appropriation of surplus conditions household’s capacity to engage in profitable 
commercialisation, shaping the trajectory of capitalist development.  If surplus 
appropriation represents a constraint to accumulation, it is necessary to examine 
whether or not producers can escape from the current production relations or the 
power of pre-capitalist surplus appropriating classes can be undermined.  
Conversely, it is important to identify whether households can yield a surplus 
without structural transformation, through for example, increasing output by 
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1.3 Objectives 
This research aims to identify the trajectory of agrarian transition in rural Morang 
and how this differs from the changes envisaged in both Nepal’s agrarian strategy 
and classical Marxian theories of capitalist development.  These issues are 
approached through two primary research questions: 
 
 
1) What are the existing ‘modes of production’ in rural Morang? To examine 
this three sub-questions are asked:  
a. How have these modes of production and the shifting levels of 
dominance between them evolved over time? 
b. What is the character of each mode of production?  In particular, what 
are the ‘relations of production’ and the associated forms of surplus 
appropriation? 
c. How do productive units under each mode of production interact with 
the market or ‘sphere of circulation’ and which mechanisms of 
surplus appropriation exist through these relations? 
 
2) How have these forms of surplus appropriation both shaped the capacity for 
farms to engage in profitable commercialisation and blocked the transition to 
a new (capitalist) mode of production? 
 
In addressing these questions, attention is paid to the internal complexity of each 
mode of production and its forms of surplus appropriation, including economic, 
political and ideological processes, how they interact with other modes of 
production, and how they are situated globally. 
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1.4 Field Site 
The study is based upon one year’s research in Morang district, located in the sub-
tropical Terai (plains) in the South – East Nepal (See Figure 1-5 and 1-6).  Research 
was conducted in three Village Development Committees (subdivisions).  My base 
VDC was Jhorahat, 10 km from central Biratnagar, the second largest town in Nepal 
and an industrial hub.  Jhorahat is centred on a small bazaar settlement that is home 
to shops, agricultural merchants and two large weekly markets or htiyas (see Figure 
1-7).  A tarmac road passes through, linking the bazaar to Biratnagar to the South and 
the East-West highway and forested frontier to the North.  The bazaar area is home 
predominantly to Nepali speaking Brahmin and Chettri castes whose ancestors 
migrated to the region from the hills two generations ago.  The southern portion of 
Jhorahat VDC meanwhile is home to the smaller indigenous Jhagar and Bantar 
communities.  To the north meanwhile is the large village of Pidarboni, home to the 
indigenous Thru ethnic group and a smaller settlement of the dalit Rishidev 
(Musahar)
1
 community.  I was based in Pidarboni village for much of the year’s 
fieldwork with four separate field assistants, whose contributions to the research 
have been extremely valuable.   
 
Aside from conducting research in Jhorahat VDC itself, we travelled out during the 
daytime for fieldwork in a further two VDCs.  The first is Bhaudaha, a neighbouring 
VDC of smaller more scattered villages to the southeast which is away from the road 
and entirely rural, served by only one htiya in the small bazaar of Jhostol (Figure 1-
1).  It is home predominantly to the Bantar community with smaller settlements of 
Jhagar in the village of Mandirtol and another indigenous group, the Rajbanshi, in 
the village of Sitpur.  The second is Thalaha which lies to the east of Jhorahat and 
like Bhaudaha, is mostly rural, with remote scattered villages home once again, to 
primarily the Bantar community with smaller Thru, Brahmin-Chettri and Jhagar 
settlements.  There is only one small htiya and tiny bazaar in the centre of the VDC 
and another in the remote village of Hurhuriya on the banks of the Lohandra river. 
                                                 
1
 Most of these individuals prefer their community to be referred to by the more respectful term 
Rishidev, over the more commonly used term Musahar, which contains negative connotations.  
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Figure 1-1: Plains of Morang: The region is one of the most fertile in Nepal, and grain staples 





Figure 1-2: Jhorahat bazaar: This is the focal point of the VDC, with a pitched road connecting 
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Fig 1-6: Map of Morang District 
Fig 1-5: Location of Morang in Nepal 
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The plains are waterlogged for half of the year, and agriculture is thus dominated by 
paddy cultivation which occupies most of the cultivated land during the monsoon in 
all VDCs.  The landscape is partially transformed again in the winter when a crop of 
wheat, pulses and mustard is grown, and in spring a smaller paddy crop is cultivated 
by some farmers.  Other crops include jute, vegetables, mangoes, and betel nuts.  
Given the accessibility of the area, the cost of transporting goods to the market does 
not create as much of a constraint for commodity producing farmers as it does in 
other parts of Nepal.  Similarly, agricultural services from the government and NGOs 
are more easily available than elsewhere in the country.  As a consequence, Jhorahat, 
Bhaudaha and Thalaha have arguably much potential for the profitable 
commercialisation envisaged in Nepal’s agrarian strategy. This may in the long run 
encourage capitalist development.  Given that the focus of this study is on the impact 
of class relations on agrarian transition rather than geographical isolation, it is useful 
to choose a region that, at least in the vision of neo-liberal policy makers, already has 
many of the pre-conditions for market expansion. 
 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
The first two chapters are theoretical.  Chapter 2 identifies key concepts such as the 
‘mode of production’ and ‘social formation’, and stresses the importance of 
understanding their reproductive mechanisms through time and how they are situated 
in the broader global economy.  Potential trajectories of agrarian transition in Nepal 
based upon such an approach are subsequently outlined.   Having identified the 
global dynamics which have undermined capitalist development of industry in Nepal, 
the potential for capitalist development in agriculture is discussed.  While capitalist 
differentiation within the peasantry may occur, other possible outcomes are reviewed 
such as the articulation between pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production.  It 
is argued in this context that pre-capitalist forms of surplus appropriation allow older 
economic formations to persist in the context of capitalist expansion.  Pre-capitalist 
reproduction is facilitated by both articulations with other modes of production and 
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political-ideological processes.  Examples of pre-capitalist modes of production 
relevant for Nepal such as semi-feudalism are reviewed.   
 
Chapter 3 examines Nepal’s Agriculture Perspective Plan and identifies the neo-
liberal ideologies behind it which render the plan ‘functional’ for an expanding 
capitalism, despite the ‘win-win’ rhetoric.  It also outlines fundamental ironies as the 
APP not only diverts attention from the negative impact on the poor as a 
consequence of the capitalist exploitation which may emerge following its 
implementation.  It also ignores the resilience of pre-capitalist modes of production 
which may hinder capitalist expansion in the first instance.  
 
Chapter 4 summarises and justifies the methodological approach utilised to examine 
the research questions outlined above and identifies the trajectory of agrarian 
transition and modes of production in Nepal.  It examines both epistemological 
issues and the process of data collection, while engaging with issues of reflexivity 
and ethics. 
 
Chapter 5 addresses research question 1a which seeks to identify the ‘modes of 
production’ and their shifting levels of dominance and historical evolution over time.  
It begins with a historical analysis of the Morang economic formation from the mid-
18
th
 century onwards, and the means through which feudal lords have maintained 
their control over landed property on a political and ideological as well as economic 
level.  This provides richer understandings of the pre-capitalist mode(s) of 
production present in the study area today, which are named as either ‘semi-feudal’ 
or ‘independent peasant’.   
 
Chapter 6 begins by identifying three categories of farmer according to their capacity 
to meet their subsistence needs or accumulate through agriculture.  From the outset 
therefore it is possible to identify those who have the potential to become capitalist 
farmers or the profitable middle farmer class the APP envisages.  The chapter goes 
on to address research question 1b, by examining the ‘relations of production’ which 
shape how surplus is appropriated.  The majority of households are tenants without 
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their own access to land who are therefore subject to high surplus appropriation by 
absentee landlords through rent.  Only those owner cultivators under the independent 
peasant mode of production are found to retain their surplus at the stage of 
production.     
 
Question 2 is subsequently addressed and seeks to understand how these forms of 
surplus appropriation hinder profitable commercialisation within large segments of 
the rural population.  It suggests that the ‘semi-feudal’ relations of production and 
surplus appropriation through rent are the most significant factor hindering the 
production of a profitable surplus.  While the urban elite’s control over land impedes 
profitable commercialisation, the lack of alternative employment outside agriculture 
reproduces their class power and prevents any fall in rents over time which could 
allow limited accumulation without land redistribution.  Rather than industry pulling 
farmers out of agriculture, the sector remains underdeveloped, and there is an 
articulation of modes of production, with the aggregate surplus being shared between 
landlords and industrial employers. 
 
The chapter proceeds to examine the potential for farmers to boost productivity and 
develop the ‘forces of production’ through input investment to compensate for semi-
feudal surplus appropriation.  It is suggested however that the relations of 
production, combined with a necessity for cultural capital investment, present a 
fundamental barrier to the development of the productive forces.  Cultural capital 
investments present a constraint even to those independent peasant cultivators not 
subject to ground rent and are associated with older relations of production.  The 
availability of institutional credit fails to reduce investment barriers, with households 
instead falling into non-repayable debt for basic inputs to both micro-finance 
institutions and merchant capital.  This chapter also explores the impact of different 
type of rental contract for tenants and the role of landlords in encouraging 
technological change. 
 
Chapter 7 address question 1c and seeks to examine the sphere of circulation through 
which productive units are linked to the market, and to identify the associated forms 
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of surplus appropriation.  The economic and political processes which determine the 
share of surplus appropriated by commercial and interest bearing capital, which 
together constitute ‘merchant capital’ are identified.  It is suggested that semi-feudal 
relations of production significantly impact the rates of exploitation in this context.  
The chapter also recognises the economic and political mechanisms of surplus 
appropriation by industrial capital, offering evidence of another limited articulation 
between capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production.  The final section  
identifies indirect forms of surplus appropriation through the market which occur as 
a result of the higher productivity of farmers in India in the context of an open 
economy, which depresses local prices.  This is intricately connected with the geo-
political weaknesses of the Nepali state.  These multiple forms of surplus 
appropriation through the sphere of circulation further hinder households from 
accumulating and engaging in profitable commercialisation. 
 
Chapter 8 examines issues which are also of relevance to question 2.  It seeks to 
understand means through which households can develop the forces of production 
and boost productivity without the need for investment.  It singles out  a number of 
non-economic knowledge resources which have the potential to significantly boost 
yields.  However, it is found that differential access to new agricultural knowledge is 
associated once again with the dominant pre-capitalist relations of production, while 
the gender dynamics of agricultural knowledge dissemination and the intra-
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2 Capitalist expansion and pre-capitalist reproduction 




This chapter engages with the crucial debate on the transition from pre-capitalist 
subsistence based agrarian economies to capitalism.  Classical developmentalist 
Marxian theories have assumed the inevitable differentiation of the peasantry in the 
context of expanding commodity production, processes one may expect to be 
occurring in Nepal in the context of economic liberalisation and commercialisation 
initiatives.  However, it is argued that in order to understand the trajectory of 
agrarian change it is necessary to firstly examine the complex structure of ‘mode(s) 
of production’ on the ground and the mechanisms of surplus appropriation which 
impede profitable commercialisation and accumulation.  To do so not only requires 
an analysis of the combination of ‘relations’ and ‘forces’ of production, but the 
mechanisms through which the mode of production and the associated forms of 
surplus appropriation are reproduced after each productive cycle.  Secondly, it is 
necessary to understand how modes of production interact with each other a 
structured whole or ‘social formation’.  Thirdly, it is crucial to understand how social 
formations are situated globally.  An important consequence of such an analysis is 
that class is a complex entity, and sites of struggle entail an alliance of actors 
positioned at multiple positions in the class structure. 
 
To apply these concepts to Nepal, section 2.3 proceeds to briefly examine the 
extensive literature on the blocked development in industry in Nepal.  It is essential 
to understand these processes given that the character capitalist transition in 
agriculture is intricately connected with developments in industry.  Most notable in 
frustrating industrial development in Nepal is the class alliance between foreign 
capital and a comprador bourgeoisie which has dominated the bureaucracy.  This has 
blocked the organic development of capitalism in Nepali industry up until the 
present, processes which have been intensified under economic liberalisation.  
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Section 2.4 subsequently examines the literature to identify possible paths of agrarian 
transition in Nepal.  A body of scholarship has emphasised the dissolution of pre-
capitalist modes of production under neo-liberal globalisation as capital expands to 
realise new sources of surplus value.  In the context of distorted industrial 
development in peripheral social formations such as Nepal where there are few 
alternative livelihood options, full or partial differentiation would release a vast 
‘reserve army’ of cheap labour into the global economy.  Alternatively, pre-capitalist 
modes of production, most notably those based upon petty commodity production, 
would persist.  However, there would not necessarily be accumulation, with peasant 
households supplying the capitalist sector with surplus through the sphere of 
circulation in a functional ‘articulation’ with capitalism. 
 
Nevertheless, by assuming the inevitable dissolution of pre-capitalist economic 
formations or their ‘functional’ articulation with capitalism, inadequate attention is 
paid to situations whereby pre-capitalist modes of production are able to retain 
relative autonomy so they are not subordinated to capitalism.  The peasant farm for 
example, has a tendency to resist differentiation through overwork and may even 
avoid commercialisation in the first instance.  However, the most significant process 
which has impeded the subordination of older economic formations to capitalism is 
the perpetuation of pre-capitalist forms of surplus appropriation.   
 
For example, influential studies of ‘lineage’ modes of production in Africa have 
identified forms of surplus appropriation and distribution which ‘block’ the 
expansion of capitalism to the point that extra-economic coercion is sometimes 
necessary for their subordination (Dupré & Rey, 1979;  Meillassoux, 1980;  Singh, 
2007).  In the context of Nepal on the other hand, a mode of production with a 
propensity to resist capitalist expansion is semi-feudalism (Bhaduri, 1973;  
Bharadwaj, 1985).  Under semi-feudalism, surplus appropriated through the relations 
of production and circulation obstructs peasant accumulation.  These relations are 
often reproduced through political and ideological processes, as well as through 
articulations with other modes of production.  However, even if articulations remain 
limited, it is argued that the perpetuation of semi-feudalism can only be understood 
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in the context of the uneven dynamics of capitalism.  In the context of industrial 
stagnation in peripheral regions, the failure of industry to draw households out of 
agriculture increases their dependence upon feudal exploiting classes, thus 
reproducing the older economic formation.   
 
The chapter concludes by emphasising the need to understand the internal 
complexity in modes of production and their mechanisms of reproduction if one is to 
adequately understand the trajectory of agrarian transition in Nepal.   This requires 
an analysis of class relations both between and within households.   
 
 
2.2 Theorising modes of production 
 
 
2.2.1 Pre-capitalist economic formations in Nepal 
 
Nepal is a country commonly understood to be dominated by pre-capitalist economic 
formations, particularly in agriculture, with capitalism only existing in an 
underdeveloped and dependant form in urban areas (Bhattarai, 2003;  Blaikie et al., 
2001;  Seddon, 1987).  In recent years however, a series of policies have been 
introduced to commercialise the agrarian sector, through initiatives such as the 
Agriculture Perspective Plan.  The liberalisation of the Nepali economy and 
expanding transport networks have simultaneously served to open up previously 
isolated sectors to new markets (Rankin, 2004).  
 
In this context, classical Marxian theory would assume that expanding capitalist 
markets would set out the preconditions for the disintegration of older pre-capitalist 
economic formations in agriculture.  The peasant enterprise, defined as the 
subsistence oriented family farm utilising primarily family labour (Shanin, 1973), is 
the basic unit of production in Nepal’s pre-capitalist agrarian economy.  To Marx the 
peasant is destined to be disintegrated through differentiation and concentration of 
the means of production, separating labour and capital (Marx, 1974, 713-715).  The 
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inevitable demise of peasant production is summed up as an almost apocalyptic 
prophesy in Volume 1 of Capital where Marx stresses that:  
 
“It must be annihilated; it is annihilated.  Its annihilation, transformation of the 
individualized and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones, of the 
pigmy property of the many into the huge property of the few, the expropriation of the great 
mass of the people from the soil, from the means of subsistence, and from the means of 
labour, this fearful and painful expropriation of the mass of the people forms the prelude to 
the history of capital” (Marx, 1974, 762).  
 
In agriculture therefore, the emergence of a class of landless proletarians and an 
agrarian bourgeoisie of large farmers would represent the development of true 
agrarian capitalism.  Referring to the proletarianisation of the population Marx 
earlier states that: “The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, 
from the soil, is the basis of the whole process” (Marx, 1974, 716).  
 
Lenin for example, developed an influential theory of agrarian transition whereby the 
peasantry is separated from the land through the natural economic dynamics of 
capitalist development.   Basing his analysis on the Russian agrarian transition, Lenin 
(1960, 172-187) argued that the peasantry in the late 19th century was composed of 
commodity producing large farmers, a majority of middle peasants and a rural 
proletariat composed of land poor farm workers.  It was argued that the poorer 
middle peasants did not have the technology or assets to profitably commercialise, 
producing just enough to survive and a marginal surplus.  Being often heavily in debt 
and highly vulnerable, they were forced into selling their land to emerging 
capitalists.  These marginal producers entered the landless proletariat, while those 
who could accumulate entered the growing agrarian bourgeoisie.  The destruction of 
pre-capitalist economic formations in both agriculture and industry were said to 
occur simultaneously and support each other.  The development of urban industry 
destroyed traditional village industries through the provision of cheaper 
manufactured commodities.  This simultaneously created the need for cash, driving 
more farmers to commercialise and encouraging further differentiation.  Meanwhile, 
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the dissolution of subsistence farming contributed to the development of a “home 
market” for commodities, thus further supporting the development of capitalist 
industry as well as agriculture (Lenin, 1960, 312), a point also raised by Marx (1974, 
745-749).   
 
This has often been interpreted as representing a universal trend in pre-capitalist 
economies.  In a South Asian context, studies in India (Byres, 1981) and Pakistan 
(Niazi, 2004) have provided evidence of such differentiation whereby the promotion 
of new agricultural inputs offers commercialisation opportunities.  Land poor farmers 
who lack capital to invest in commercialisation are forced to sell their land to 
growing class of ‘capitalist’ farmers (Byres, 1981;  Niazi, 2004).  However, if 
differentiation naturally follows the expansion of commodity markets, how does one 
explain the considerable evidence of non-capitalist economic formations persisting in 
agriculture throughout the world, with weaker tendencies of differentiation (Aguilar, 
1989;  Bernstein, 1977;  2001;  de-Janvry, 1981;  Mann & Dickenson, 1978)?   This 
raises serious questions regarding how one understands the transition to capitalism, 
particularly in less developed countries. 
 
With regards to Nepal, while there has been some acknowledgement of the limited 
extent of capitalist social relations (Bhattarai, 2003;  Blaikie et al., 2001;  2002;  
Seddon, 1987), there is a shortage of recent scholarship which has examined the 
changes in the agrarian sector following the liberalisation of the economy, 
agricultural commercialisation efforts, and expansion of infrastructure.  Most 
importantly however, there is a need for more research which seeks to understand 
how pre-capitalist modes of production themselves have achieved stability over time 
in Nepal.  Essential to understanding these processes is an examination of the 
mechanisms of surplus appropriation which have hindered accumulation amongst 
peasant units of production (Banaji, 1977;  Bernstein, 2003;  1977;  Bhaduri, 1981;  
1986;  1977;  Bharadwaj, 1985). 
 
In order to better understand what these processes of surplus appropriation are and 
how they have impeded agrarian transition, it is necessary to explore the dynamics of 
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pre-capitalist modes of production.  Such an analysis requires firstly, an examination 
of how they are reproduced through time on an ideological, political as well as 
economic level.  Secondly it requires an exploration of how pre-capitalist modes of 
production connect with other economic formations, relations which may result in 
further mechanisms of surplus appropriation.  Thirdly, it is crucial to understand how 
Nepal is positioned in the worldwide capitalist economy and how this is connects 
with the preservation of these older modes of production.  In other words, Nepal’s 
very non-capitalist character arises from its particular form of integration into the 
complex hierarchy of social formations subject to the laws of motion of a global 
capitalist mode of production.    
 
 
2.2.2 Modes of Production and Reproduction 
 
Modes of production and mechanisms of reproduction 
 
It is necessary now to engage with the key conceptual framework through which one 
can understand these three issues.  Only then can one engage with debates on 
agrarian transition in peripheral regions and identify which processes may have 
shaped the ‘pre-capitalist’ character of Nepali agriculture.  
 
Important theoretical insights can be gained from the Structural Marxian tradition.  
Louis Althusser pioneered the school of Structural Marxism which sought to 
reformulate Marxian political economy to counter critiques of economism and 
essentialism (Resch, 1992, 70-74).  A central concept of Structural Marxism is the 
‘mode of production’, which refers to the mechanism through which material 
production takes place, a universal feature of the social world.  To Althusser and 
Balibar (1968, 215) the ‘mode of production’, is constituted by three functional 
‘elements’, the labourer or producer, the means of production, and the appropriator 
of surplus labour.  These three elements are structured by two ‘connections’ which 
were touched upon in chapter 1 (Althusser & Balibar, 1968, 215).  Firstly, there is 
the relation between the labourer and the means of production, or the forces of 
production.  Secondly, there is a property relation or the relations of production, 
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which defines the how surplus is appropriated and how it is used.  The specific 
combination of these ‘elements’ and ‘connections’ are what determine the historical 
specificity of a mode of production (Althusser & Balibar, 1968, 212-216).  Implicit 
in the analysis, is the fact that each ‘mode of production’ is driven by particular 
‘imperatives’, or as Singh (2007) terms it a ‘teleology’.  This can include for 
example, the accumulation of surplus value under capitalism, elite consumption 
under feudalism, or subsistence under modes of production based upon independent 
owner-cultivation. 
 
Reproduction and the three ‘levels’ of the social world 
 
Althusser and Balibar (1968, 264) state that in order to understand ‘modes of 
production’ it is insufficient to simply examine the variations in the combination of 
relations and forces of production.  One must also understand how particular 
configurations are reproduced.  This is essential if one is to understand the 
perpetuation of particular forms of surplus appropriation which block the 
development of capitalism. 
 
The analysis of reproduction requires an analysis of not just one production cycle or 
‘circuit of capital’ whereby labour and the means of production are purchased to 
produce a commodity which is sold.  It is instead necessary to understand how each 
individual circuit of capital within the mode of production is linked, relying upon one 
another and being united in a systemic relationship (Althusser & Balibar, 1968, 258;  
Wolpe, 1982b, 8).  It is necessary to examine: “the relation between the totality of 
social production and its particular forms (branches) in a given synchrony” 
(Althusser & Balibar, 1968, 264).  To Marx (1956) for example, under capitalism, 
units of production in different ‘departments’ support one another, i.e. department I 
produces the means of production and department II produces wage goods.  Other 
forms of capital such as merchant enterprises play a mediating role between 
departments (Marx, 1956). 
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The process of capital circulation through which enterprises sharing particular 
relations and forces of production are linked may therefore represent an effective 
‘extension’ of the mode of production, providing a material basis for its 
reproduction.  Perhaps more significantly however in understanding reproduction, 
are non-economic processes (Althusser & Balibar, 1968, 258).  To Althusser and 
Balibar there are three levels of the social world, the economic, the political and the 
ideological.  The political and ideological levels, representing the superstructure are 
an integral part of a given mode of production aside from the economic level, which 
represents the base or structure (Althusser & Balibar, 1968, 216-224).   
 
The more specific role played by the three levels in the reproduction of a mode of 
production is clarified in Althusser’s essay Ideology and State Apparatus. Althusser 
(1971, 128) states that under capitalism the continued accumulation of surplus value 
depends upon the reproduction of both the forces and relations of production.  The 
reproduction of the forces of production entails the reproduction of both labour 
power through subsistence wages and the renewal of the means of production 
through investment in constant capital.  It is here the sphere of circulation as a 
reproductive mechanism becomes apparent.  It allows the capitalist to purchase raw 
materials from department I to reproduce the means of production while reproducing 
labour power by paying wages, which in turn depend upon the production of 
consumer goods in department II (Althusser, 1971, 128-131).  Ideological processes 
also reproduce labour power through educational institutions which teach workers 
behaviour and skills for the workplace (Althusser, 1971, 131-134).   
 
However, it is in the reproduction of the relations of production and the associated 
mechanisms of surplus appropriation that the role of non-economic processes is most 
significant.  The relations of production are reproduced primarily through property 
rights and the ideological and political mechanisms which support them (Althusser, 
1971, 148).  This is particularly important as to Althusser; the relations of production 
are the determinate ‘connection’ in a mode of production.  Control over the means of 
production determines how the productive forces are reproduced.  The processes 
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which reproduce the relations of production therefore constitute the primary 
reproductive mechanism of the mode of production as a whole.   
 
‘Extended’ concept of the mode of production 
 
Wolpe (1982b) builds upon the work of Althusser and Balibar to draw a distinction 
between the concept of an extended mode of production and a restricted mode of 
production.  The mode of production in the restricted sense refers simply to a 
combination between relations and forces of production within individual enterprises 
but does not encompass the mechanisms through which this mode is reproduced.  
The mode of production in the extended sense meanwhile refers to a wider structure 
which includes specific mechanisms of reproduction.  These include the relations 
with other enterprises and ideological and political mechanisms which ensure the 
reproduction of the entire mode of production as an economic system (Wolpe, 
1982b, 38-39).  It is the latter definition of the mode of production which will be 
used throughout this study. 
 
Modes of production and social formations 
 
As was suggested above, modes of production do not exist in isolation, but coexist 
and articulate with others, often with flows of surplus between them.  These links are 
essential to examine if one is to understand the trajectory of economic change.  
Althusser refers to a broader entity than the mode of production, the social 
formation.  A social formation, is understood as a ‘totality’ under which there are the 
three ‘levels’ of the social world and several co-existing modes of production 
articulated in a functional unity (Althusser & Balibar, 1968).  It is asserted that one 
mode of production is normally ‘dominant’, although this can be either capitalist or 
non-capitalist.  Althusser and Balibar (1968, 207) thus define a social formation as a 
“totality of instances articulated on the basis of a determinate mode of production.”   
 
In order to understand the reproduction of an economic formation therefore, one 
must not only examine its interaction with other circuits of capital under the same 
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mode of production, but its relation with circuits which falling different modes of 
production.  In this context the sphere of capital circulation is not simply the 
extension of a single mode of production but can mediate articulations which 
facilitate the reproduction of multiple economic formations.  For example, a pre-
capitalist producer may rely upon capitalist markets to sell commodities or purchase 
inputs and reproduce.  Furthermore, political and ideological processes can support 
particular articulations between modes of production just as they facilitate the 
perpetuation of individual economic formations. 
 
A global hierarchy of social formations 
 
Connected with the need to understand how a mode (s) of production relates with 
others is a requirement to understand how each mode and the ‘social formations’ 
they constitute, are situated globally.  This requires an examination of processes such 
as imperialism and uneven development and is particularly important if one is to 
understand agrarian transition in Nepal.  To Blaikie et al (2002, 20), the Nepali 
economic system represents “…the incorporation, combined with enforced 
preservation, of non-capitalist modes of production within a global system dominated 
by capitalism.”  In other words, Nepal’s very ‘non-capitalist’ character can only be 
understood with reference to where the country is situated in the global and regional 
capitalist system.   
 
To the French Marxist Charles Bettelheim, all national scale ‘social formations’, are 
situated within a broader “world wide capitalist mode of production” composed of a 
complex hierarchical structure of national economies (Bettelheim, 1972, 295).  The 
level of dominance and character of the capitalist mode of production within each 
social formation is however, variable, and in peripheral social formations pre-
capitalist modes of production may dominate.   
 
This global capitalist mode of production is subject to a “twofold tendency” 
(Bettelheim, 1972, 293).  Firstly, it reproduces the relations and forces of production 
at the scale of each national social formation, including the reproduction of specific 
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forms of domination between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production.  
Secondly, at an international scale it reproduces the unequal relations between these 
social formations.  As with the reproduction of modes of production themselves, the 
reproduction of these broader relations between social formations, mediated by the 
worldwide capitalist system, are ‘overdetermined’ by political and ideological 
processes (Bettelheim, 1972).  It is therefore essential to understand how each mode 
of production is positioned globally and how this both affects its character and 
shapes its relations with other modes in the social formation. 
 
Modes of production and essentialism 
 
Thus far it has been argued that to understand the forms of surplus appropriation 
which shape the dynamics of agrarian change, one must examine the complex 
constitution of relations and forces of production and how they are reproduced on an 
economic, political and ideological level.  It is also necessary to examine relations 
between modes of production and how these articulations are situated globally.  The 
complex means through which these multiple processes in the social whole are 
constituted by each other is known to Althusser (1969) as overdetermination. 
 
While this is a useful framework for understanding the trajectory of agrarian 
transition in Nepal, it is necessary to engage with some of the criticisms the 
Structural Marxian position has been subject to in recent years.  A body of work 
within the post-structuralist Marxian tradition has sought to re-conceptualise the 
Althusserian understanding of overdetermination to challenge the structural 
certainties of concepts such as ‘mode of production’ (Chakrabarti & Cullenberg, 
2001;  2003;  Gibson-Graham et al., 2001;  Gibson-Graham, 1996;  Resnick & 
Wolff, 1989;  19822).  They seek to identify the complexity and fluidity of the 
economic world.  Economic structures are reframed as ‘processes’, and doubt is even 
cast upon the presence of a unified global capitalist economy, which is instead 
represented as constituting a decentred totality of ‘multiple capitalisms’ (Gibson-
Graham, 1996).  
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While the move by poststructuralist Marxism to identify complexity in economic 
formations is useful, Glassman (2003) stresses the need to maintain a notion of 
structure in understanding economic processes.  To Harvey (1996) the dialectic 
mode of enquiry within which Marxism is embedded, requires an understanding of 
the social  relations and processes which create structures and ‘things’.  This 
exploration of processes and flows contrasts with positivism, which understands 
material ‘things’ and structures as self evident and fixed.  However, while such 
dialectic approaches by their nature reveal heterogeneity and fluidity in the systems 
of the social world, one must still seek to identify the structures within which such 
complexity is realised.  An approach which fails to do so in Harvey’s (1996, 58) 
words “appears to have little chance of producing anything except a vast panoply of 
insecure and shifting concepts and findings”.  It is necessary to identify what are 
termed “generative processes”, relations which share a common character in time 
and space.  As Harvey (1996, 58) suggests,  the scholar must: “try to identify a 
restricted number of very general underlying processes which simultaneously unify 
and differentiate the phenomena we see in the world around us”.  Although they may 
produce diverse outcomes, they also produce “permanences,” or particular structures 
which persist through time.   
 
In this context the extended concept of ‘mode of production’ represents one such 
permanence, a set of social relations which persists through time and space.  It is 
through an analysis of ‘reproduction’ that the utility of the concept becomes more 
apparent as it explains how the mode of production becomes a ‘permanence’.  To 
Althusser and Balibar (1968, 259) “reproduction appears to be the general form of 
permanence of the general conditions of production, which in the last analysis 
englobe the whole social structure, and therefore it is indeed essential that it should 
be the form of their change and restructuration too”.  Importantly, one is no longer 
simply examining combinations of relations and forces of production, but how 
economic formations reproduce themselves through ideological and political 
relations and the economic mechanisms which link multiple enterprises. 
 
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Chapter 2: Capitalist expansion and pre-capitalist reproduction in peripheral 
economies 
30 
It must be emphasised however that the ‘mode of production’ is an abstract tool for 
understanding social formations rather than constituting a ‘model’ of societal 
evolution (Raatgever, 1985;  Resch, 1992).  Thus while Althusser and Balibar’s 
Structural Marxism is interested in “periodisation”, the ways in which historical 
successions of structures are organised, it is approached in a radically different way 
from developmentalist (largely Stalinist) interpretations of Marxism.  It must be 
emphasised that Structural Marxism does not intend to classify societies into a pre-
ordained set of modes of production, or arrange them into an evolutionary set of 
‘stages’ (Raatgever, 1985).  Instead it seeks to examine the dominant mode of 
production in a social formation at a given historical conjuncture and understand the 
processes through which it is preserved or undermined.  To Resch (1992, 84) “The 
problem addressed by the concept of mode of production is one of producing 
knowledge rather than classifying data.”    
 
This study therefore will proceed to use the ‘mode of production’ concept as an 
analytical instrument to understand the reproduction and transition between 
particular economic structures in rural Nepal over time.  In this context however, it 
will not attempt to distort empirical observations so they fit into a universal trajectory 
of transition from peasant production to capitalist agriculture, as many interpretations 
of Marx and Lenin have proclaimed.  Instead it will seek to identify ‘modes of 
production’ on the ground to identify concrete structural ‘permanences’, and from 
there understand the dynamics of both reproduction and change.   
 
Modes of production, class and crystallised power 
 
Of significant political importance when using mode(s) of production as an analytical 
tool is how it affects one’s understanding of class.  ‘Class’ can be defined as a 
particular social group within which individuals share some commonality.  In 
Marxism this commonality is understood to arise from three criteria, firstly, whether 
or not one owns the means of production, secondly, the degree to which one has 
control over the labour process, and thirdly, whether one either produces or 
appropriates the product of surplus labour, a  process commonly termed 
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‘exploitation’ (Gibson-Graham, 1996, 49).  It is generally understood that the first 
condition, access to the means of production, plays an important role in determining 
the latter two, a phenomena summed up in the term ‘relations of production’.  As was 
established above, the relations of production imply a property relation and a mode 
of appropriation of the social product.  As Resch (1992) points out, class power is 
exercised through direct ‘intervention’ by an individual who owns to the means of 
production to collectivity control the labour process and appropriate the product of 
surplus labour.  However, there are complex issues to be resolved in understanding 
‘class’ in the context of specific modes of production 
 
Firstly, in some modes of production there may not be social control over the means 
of production and an ‘exploiting’ class per se.  There may be initial appropriation of 
surplus, but redistributive mechanisms which compensate for this at a later stage 
(Resch, 1992).  Examples include adivasi (indigenous) mode of production in India 
prior to capitalist and feudal subordination, whereby the mode of production is 
driven by reciprocity and survival of the community (Singh, 2007).   
 
Secondly, one must also acknowledge that households or even individuals may 
occupy more than one class position (Chakrabarti & Cullenberg, 2001;  2003;  
Gibson-Graham, 1996).  In fact, the ‘articulation’ of modes of production itself often 
occurs as a result of individuals labouring in more than one economic formation (van 
Binsbergen & Geschiere, 1985b, 260).  In this context even if the pre-capitalist mode 
of production does not entail the appropriation of surplus labour, the individual may 
still be subject to exploitation through labouring part time in the capitalist sector (van 
Binsbergen & Geschiere, 1985b).  Furthermore, surplus can be appropriated outside 
the relations of production in the sphere of circulation, when for example pre-
capitalist producers supply commodities to capitalist markets and are unfavourably 
remunerated (de Janvry, 1981;  Deere & de-Janvry, 1979).   
 
A number of scholars from the post-structural Marxian tradition have proposed in 
this context that class be presented not as a category but as a ‘process’, defined by 
the appropriation of surplus labour, which appears in multiple forms, and is 
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something fluid and shifting (Gibson-Graham et al., 2001;  Gibson-Graham, 1996;  
Resnick & Wolff, 1989).  Glassman (2003, 686) however, criticises this tradition by 
stressing that while class can be effectively understood as a ‘process’, in many 
contexts it also represents a permanence, a manifestation of forms of “crystallized 
power”.  In such contexts a particular configuration of class relations 
‘overdetermined’ by economic, political and ideological relations may persist over 
time and space.   
 
This understanding is not incompatible with the structural concept of ‘mode of 
production’.  It simply means that a configuration of class relations may involve not 
only a single but multiple modes of production which are structured in relations of 
dominance and achieve relative stability over time and space.  Therefore, while the 
dominant mode of production may not in itself define the class position of the 
individual or household based upon singular ‘relations of production’, the structure 
of the broader social formation can determine the multiple forms of surplus 
appropriation they are subject to.  The household or individual therefore still inhabits 
a ‘position’ within the broader class structure and it is still possible to identify 
collectivities of shared interests.  While acknowledging the fluidity of both modes of 
production and their relations with others in Nepal, it is thus crucial to understand the 
structures setting the boundaries within which this these shifting relations operate. 
 
Glassman (2003) stresses that identifying the relative importance of particular sets of 
class relations which persist over time is of strategic political significance for 
identifying sites of class mobilisation.  By identifying forms of ‘crystallised power’ 
one can identify the relative importance of class struggle in one site as opposed to 
others.  Central to this argument is Althusser’s analysis of the Russian revolution.  
Classical readings of Marx have assumed that revolutionary change occurs in the 
context of a single basic ‘contradiction’ between the forces and relations of 
production which is embodied in a contradiction between two classes.  However, 
Althusser (1969, 99) follows Lenin himself to argue that the Russian revolution was 
‘overdetermined’ by an accumulation of multiple economic and non-economic 
contradictions, both of global and local origin, that fused to form a ruptural unity, a 
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single national ‘crisis’.  As a consequence, revolutionary struggle was led by an 
alliance of classes, or as Althusser (1969, 99) terms it the “class-divided popular 
masses”.   
 
A third and final intervention necessary to expand the understanding of class and 
‘modes of production’ is the need to acknowledge that class relations exist within the 
household.  Although intra-household relations are central to lineage based modes of 
production where the primary form of surplus appropriation is between the youth and 
the elders (Dupré & Rey, 1979;  Meillassoux, 1980;  1973b), they also occur under 
modes of production such as capitalism where the primary form of surplus 
appropriation is from a class external to the household.  For example, the 
disproportionate share of labour performed by women  represents an additional form 
of exploitation and ‘class position’ individuals are integrated into within the 
household (Benholtd-Thomson, 1982;  Deere & Leon de Leal, 1982;  Folbre, 1982;  
Gibson-Graham, 1996;  1992).  While this study is concerned primarily with the 
broader relations between peasant units and exploiting classes, it is still crucially 
important to understand intra-household class relations.  They increase one’s 
understanding of the operation of the mode of production itself and can on some 
occasions can shape the trajectory of agrarian transition, particularly given that 
women’s work is essential for the reproduction of family labour power (Benholtd-
Thomson, 1982).  Unequal relations within the household represent another form of 
‘crystallised power’ against which class struggle can be directed. 
 
 
2.3 The Development of Capitalism in Nepali Industry 
 
2.3.1 The ‘blocking’ of the development of the productive forces in 
industry under the Ranas 
 
It is now necessary to more directly apply the conceptual framework outlined above 
to understand the economic formation in Nepali agriculture and the processes of 
reproduction and change.  As was suggested above, this requires an analysis of how 
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modes of production interact within a social formation.  In the Nepali context, it is 
important to examine the dynamics of capitalist development in industry, a process 
which exercises a powerful influence over the trajectory of agrarian transition in 
many peripheral regions (Bharadwaj, 1985).  An analysis of industrial development 
also offers important insights into how the trajectory of economic change in Nepal is 
intricately connected with the global processes of imperialism and uneven 
development.   
 
To reiterate Bettelheim’s (1972) argument, the worldwide capitalist mode of 
production serves to reproduce both uneven development between social formations 
and the modes of production within them.  The interesting contradiction in this 
context is that in peripheral regions, the reproduction of unequal relations between 
social formations tends to undermine the emergence of capitalist relations and forces 
of production at the national scale, particularly through blocking the development of 
industrial capitalism (Bettelheim, 1972, 293-294).  This in turn, impacts capitalist 
transition in other sectors such as agriculture.  In this context, social formations may 
be dominated by the worldwide capitalist mode of production “externally”, while as 
a consequence of the unequal relations between social formations, the degree to 
which capitalism has actually achieved dominance within a given social formation 
may remain limited (Bettelheim, 1972, 298).   
 
How therefore does one understand how these processes have shaped the character of 
Nepali industrial capitalism?  While there has been considerable literature on the 
topic (Bhattarai, 2003;  Blaikie et al., 2001;  Chitrakar & Weiss, 1995;  Khanal et al., 
2005;  Pradhan, 1984;  Sharma, 1997), it is useful to explore Nepal’s ‘blocked’ 
industrialisation through the Marxian conceptual framework outlined above.   
 
Emmanuel’s (1972) theory of unequal exchange has been influential in 
understanding processes of global uneven development.  It asserts that unequal wage 
rates between core and peripheral regions combined with immobility of labour means 
that poorer countries must pay more for goods they import than those they export, 
thus intensifying underdevelopment, particularly in industry.  While intricacies of 
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Emmanuel’s thesis are not important here, what is significant is Bettelheim’s 
critique.  To Bettelheim (1972), such theories which place the market at the centre of 
analysis divert attention from the fact that the underdevelopment resulting in so 
called ‘unequal exchange’ is rooted in production relations.  While Emmanuel 
assumes wages are an independent variable which ‘determine’ global uneven 
development, to Bettelheim low wages are associated with the particular relations of 
production and development of the productive forces in a given social formation1.   
Therefore, it is only through an examination of modes of production within 
peripheral and core social formations that global uneven development can be 
understood. 
 
Bettelheim (1972) stresses that the laws of motion of the worldwide capitalist mode 
of production reproduce in peripheral social formations, forms of economic 
specialisation, relations of production, and ideological and political processes which 
“block” the development of the forces of production (Bettelheim, 1972, 293-294).  
This process of global uneven capitalist development was established towards the 
end of the middle ages when transformations in the relations of production allowed a 
superior development of the forces of production to be established in what was now 
to become the imperialist core (Bettelheim, 1972, 290).  This structure was 
perpetuated through the colonial era and into the present day.  The higher 
development of the productive forces in the emerging capitalist industry of the 
developed regions allowed surplus to be extracted on a relative basis and the 
accumulation of a greater mass of surplus value, unlike the lower productivity 
peripheral regions.  Capital continues to converge in these regions of higher 
productivity, increasing the total mass of surplus value in the core economies, 
facilitating accumulation and the further revolutionising of the productive forces 
                                                 
1 Wages are determined by both the productivity of labour and the particular production relations 
within a social formation (e.g. coexistence of capitalist and pre-capitalist relations).  It is important to 
acknowledge however, that this does not mean wages are determined solely by the ‘economic level’.  
They contain ideological and moral elements and can vary according to the effects of class struggle, in 
turn shaping the particular production relations.  However, this does not mean they are an independent 
variable, but suggests they are simultaneously determined by economic, political and ideological 
elements (Bettelheim, 1972, 287).  If one accepts Althusser’s notion of determination ‘in the last 
instance’ by the economic level, one would acknowledge that lower wages are themselves associated 
with the unequal development of capitalism on a world scale its tendency to reproduce the particular 
relations and forces of production within the social formation. 
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(Bettelheim, 1972, 303).  It is in this context Bettelheim seeks to explain the 
international division of labour which is reproduced by the worldwide capitalist 
mode of production whereby core economies are able to dominate the production of 
manufactured goods while peripheral economies become oriented to produce low 
technology primary products (Bettelheim, 1972, 290).   
This ‘international division’ of labour has been complicated in recent years by the 
growth of manufacturing in many peripheral economies.  However, this more 
realistically represents a new manifestation of uneven development with the rise of 
transnational business and the export of capital to the periphery, rather than 
constituting a transformation in international economic relations2 (Kiely, 2005).  The 
actual degree of capital ‘redistribution’ remains limited, and the proportion of 
manufacturing imports originating in less developed countries remains less than 10% 
for all developed countries (Kiely, 2005, 42). 
 
Nepal in this context inhabits an unusual position within the global division of labour 
in that it lacks a formal colonial history and exports even of primary products are 
therefore comparatively low.  However, its industries have been subject to the same 
processes which have blocked the development of the productive forces as other 
peripheral economies.  The difference however, is that the predominant economic 
relationship behind this process is with capital from another peripheral social 
formation, India.  Although capitalism in India remains vastly underdeveloped when 
compared to the imperialist nations (Alavi, 1990;  1975;  Omvedt, 1990)3, this has 
not prevented a smaller scale but highly significant core-periphery relationship 
develop between Nepal and India (Blaikie et al., 2001). 
 
Nepal first appeared as a single state with roughly its present frontier following the 
expansionist campaigns of the Shah dynasty of Gorkha in the eighteenth century.  
The most important source of revenue for the feudal rulers of this new “tributary 
                                                 
2 This leads Kiely (2005) to critique theories of ‘post-imperialism’ claiming the ‘end of the third 
world’ whereby the mobility of capital is undermining uneven development. 
3 It has been argued that industrial development in India was constrained through its export orientation 
under colonialism, whereby agricultural production was oriented to producing food and raw materials 
for the imperialist economies (Alavi, 1975, ; 1990, ; Omvedt, 1990).   
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state” was the taxation of the peasantry4 (Blaikie et al., 2002;  Mishra, 2007;  Regmi, 
1988;  Seddon, 1987).  However, there were restrictions on imports, and some efforts 
to encourage local artisan and craft production (Pradhan, 1984;  Sharma, 1992).  
Revenues from trade however became increasingly important, particularly following 
a coup by the aristocratic Rana family in 1846, who were to rule as hereditary prime 
ministers for the next century (Mishra, 2007;  Sharma, 1992).  In this context, 
imports of British-Indian manufactured goods damaged many domestic cottage 
industries, stalling the precursors to capitalist manufacturing.  Blaikie et al (2001, 
2002) record how cottage industries such as metalworking and leatherworking were 
severely undermined in the West-Central region towards the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries as a result of the influx of imports from the south.   
 
In order to explain the early disintegration of Nepali industry, one can not understate 
the importance of the new political relationship between the Rana elite and the 
British imperialists.  Just as modes of production themselves are reproduced on both 
an economic and non-economic level, Bettleheim (1972) stresses that central to the 
reproduction of unequal relations between social formations are ideological and 
political processes, most notably class alliances.  This is important to understand as 
Bettleheim stresses that underdevelopment occurs not through one nation exploiting 
another, as is suggested by Emmanuel, but exploitation by specific classes in each 
respective region. 
 
To Bettelheim, the distorted development of industrial capitalism in peripheral 
regions which concentrates resources in sectors such as commerce, provision of 
services to imperialist firms and service enterprises, strengthens a ‘comprador 
bourgeois’ rather than a national industrial bourgeois.  The interests of the dominant 
classes of both the core and periphery thus coincide (Bettelheim, 1972, 307).  The 
state in conjunction with imperialist institutions therefore may actually be hostile to 
the development of national industry, and ensure the social-formation retains its 
subordinate place in the international division of labour.  This alliance served to 
                                                 
4 At the beginning of the nineteenth century it constituted four fifths of the total state revenue (Mishra, 
2007).   
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reproduce the unequal relationship not only between the Indian and metropolitan 
economies (Ghosh, 1988), but also between the Indian and Nepali economies. 
 
In Nepal under the Ranas, there was little evidence of an emerging domestic 
capitalist class, or ‘national bourgeoisie’ to challenge the ruling elite on a political 
level (Blaikie et al., 2001;  Mishra, 2007).  The Rana nobility represented a classic 
comprador class who benefited from the unequal relation between two social 
formations.  Blaikie et al (2001) coin Lenin’s concept of “semi-colony” to describe 
Nepal’s relationship with British ruled India from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards.  The British imperialists guaranteed the Rana’s a symbolic ‘sovereignty’ so 
long as they provided the colonial state troops at times of need and allowed the 
British limited access to Nepal’s raw materials such as timber.  Furthermore, the 
Nepali rulers were expected to allow them access to a captive market for British-
Indian manufactured goods (Blaikie et al., 2001).   
 
In a dependent relationship, the Nepalese feudal ruling classes were enriched from 
the imposition of taxes on the import of manufactured goods from India and exports 
of raw materials such as timber (Bhattarai, 2003;  Blaikie et al., 2001;  2002).  
Revenues were used to import luxury commodities for the ruling elite (Seddon, 
1987).  Up until the mid-twentieth century therefore, the feudal elite was primarily 
‘extractive’, collecting taxes and maintaining law and order rather than being 
‘productive’ and encouraging industry and development (Blaikie et al., 2001;  2002;  
Pradhan, 1984).  Most capital which could be potentially be mobilised remained in 
the hands of the Rana aristocracy and was primarily invested in land or in overseas 
accounts.  They had few incentives to generate other forms of wealth (Karan & Ishil, 
1996).  Although there was a growing merchant capitalist class, they were not 
involved in production but in the import-export business (Regmi, 1977a).  Many 
members of the Rana elite were themselves able to enrich themselves from these 
mercantile activities (Seddon, 1987).  Although there were some industrial 
establishments in the Terai towards the end of the Rana years, they utilised mostly 
Indian capital (Regmi, 1977a). 
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2.3.2 Rhetoric of ‘development’ and continued subordination of Nepali 
industry 
 
Industry during the Panchayat era 
 
The overthrow of the Ranas in the 1950s coincided with the global rise of 
independence movements throughout former colonies and the rise of notions of state 
led developmentalism.  A short lived multi-party ‘democratic’ period gave way to the 
restoration of the Shah monarchy that set up the partyless Panchayat system.  The 
Panchayat years saw the foreign aid  potential of state-led development, and a series 
of five year development plans were produced (Whelpton, 2005).  Efforts were made 
to encourage industrialisation, beginning with the 1960 Industrial Enterprise Act 
which provided numerous tax incentives for the establishment of new manufacturing 
industries (Karan & Ishil, 1996). 
 
Efforts at establishing import substitution manufacturing in the 1970s had some 
initial impact on the economy by facilitating an increased supply of domestic 
manufactured goods (Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2003).  However, the 
legacy of political alliances hostile to domestic industrialisation had put Nepali 
enterprises at a severe disadvantage in a competitive regional economy and many 
rapidly went into liquidation (Regmi, 1977a).  As Blaikie et al (2001, 197) suggest, 
“any industrial establishment in Nepal faces the immense disadvantage of being at 
the periphery of the Indian capitalist economy.”  Nepali producers could simply not 
compete with the cheaper commodities being imported from the south, and 
increasingly now, from China to the north (Blaikie et al., 2001;  Food and 
Agriculture Organisation, 2003;  Regmi, 1977a).   
 
Manufacturing establishments in Nepal suffered from low productivity, putting them 
at a disadvantage in the context of international trade (Pradhan, 1984).  In Volume 3 
of Capital, Marx (1967) states that within an enclosed capitalist economy variations 
in the rate of profit to capital advanced as a result of productivity differences would 
be equalised by competition.  However, Mandel (1975, 83) emphasises that 
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Chapter 2: Capitalist expansion and pre-capitalist reproduction in peripheral 
economies 
40 
equalisation of rates of profit often does not occur on an international scale.  Within 
certain branches of production, the much greater productivity of the industries in 
more developed regions mean that less productive firms in peripheral economies are 
unable to compete in the first instance.  This in turn prevents the generation of capital 
to develop the productive forces to levels which would yield profit rates equivalent to 
the economy wide average, thus reinforcing an international division of labour 
(Mandel, 1975). 
 
Similarly, in Nepal, the legacy of industrial stagnation left the country with 
economically obsolete second hand plants and machinery (Pradhan, 1984;  Regmi, 
1977a).  The difficulties competing with Indian industries in this context prevented 
the generation of capital to develop the productive forces, further reducing their 
competitiveness.  Bhattarai (2003) observes that the organic composition of capital in 
Nepali manufacturing industry remained low when compared to other countries, 
preventing increases in the productivity of labour.  It was recorded that the capital-
labour ratio in manufacturing increased only by 14.1% between 1965-1976/77. In the 
same period meanwhile, there was a 5% decline in the proportion of the total capital 
invested in machines and assets, with capital being predominantly invested in sectors 
such as construction (Bhattarai, 2003, 221).   
 
It was not only the problem of capital formation which prevented increases in 
productivity but that of capital utilisation.  Pradhan (1984) notes that investments 
were under-utilised, and between 1970-71 to 1980-81, reported that average capacity 
utilisation did not exceed 72%.  There were a lack of adequate maintenance facilities 
and skills and shortages of spare parts were commonplace (Regmi, 1977a).  In 
addition, Nepali industries remained at a competitive disadvantage as a result of high 
relative costs of production due to inadequate transport infrastructure and power 
supply, not to mention bureaucratic constraints (Pradhan, 1984).  There were also 
shortages of raw materials, many of which had to be imported (Pradhan, 1984) 
 
In 1974-75, the manufacturing sector contributed to just 4.2% of Nepal’s GDP 
(Karan & Ishil, 1996).  According to Bhattarai (2003), the sector remained 
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“distorted”, representing Nepal’s position in the international division of labour and 
its unequal trade relationship with India.  Using ‘use-based’ classifications (see EPW 
Research Foundation 2009)5, it was noted that the few manufacturing industries 
present were dominated by low value non-durable consumer goods such as the 
processing of agricultural commodities, with only marginal development in the 
durable consumer goods and intermediate goods sector and virtually no production of 
capital and basic goods, all of which had to be imported (Bhattarai, 2003). 
 
On a political level, industrial stagnation continued to be reproduced by a 
bureaucracy which serves the interests of a comprador mercantile elite in alliance 
with Indian capitalists.  There was limited evidence of an emerging domestic 
capitalist class, or ‘national bourgeoisie’ to challenge the ruling elite on a political 
level (Blaikie et al., 2001;  Mishra, 2007).  The ruling elite and the merchant 
capitalist class with which they are allied continued to benefit from the structure of 
economic dependence, often being involved in the import-export trade, with no 
incentives to break it, despite the official government rhetoric (Blaikie et al., 2002;  
Neupane, 2003;  Thapa, 2004).  Nepal was thus far from acquiring a 
‘developmentalist state’, with severe consequences for initiatives which sought to 




To Bettelheim, the process of industrial retardation in peripheral regions is reinforced 
further by direct appropriation of surplus by firms from more developed regions.  
While higher rates of profit can be captured by industries from developed regions 
through productivity differentials, these are a result of the ‘normal’ functioning of the 
                                                 
5 ‘Use based’ classification include firstly, consumer non-durable goods, representing products which 
are consumed immediately, such as food products, cosmetics, textiles.  Consumer durable goods 
include those which are produced for consumption but have a longer life, such as furniture, bicycles 
and TVs.  Intermediate goods are semi-complete inputs for industry such as paints, assembled metal 
products, and individual components and accessories.  Capital goods represent those used to directly 
produce new goods and facilitate capital formation such as machines.  Finally, basic goods include 
bulk raw materials to be used for further production in agriculture, manufacture or construction such 
as chemical products, metals and fertilisers (EPW Research Foundation, 2009) 
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Marxian law of value on a global scale (de-Janvry, 1981)6,  Bettelheim (1972) 
distinguishes such indirect transfers of surplus from the ‘direct’ forms of surplus 
appropriation which occur when individual firms from the industrialised countries 
seek “exceptional profits” by taking advantage of the unequal global relations 
between social formations (Bettelheim, 1972, 305).  This can be compared with 
Lenin’s notion of ‘super-profits’, which refer to a “…surplus of profits over and 
above the capitalist profits that are normal and customary all over the world” (Lenin, 
1964).  Such processes can be better understood in the context of the expansionist 
tendencies of capitalism under imperialism as more industrialised nations seek to 
avert capitalist crises (Kiely, 2005;  Mandel, 1975).  To Harvey (1982;  2003), this 
entails a process whereby capital in the more developed regions expands into 
peripheral regions to seek a “spatial fix” for the crisis of falling rates of profit which 
is inherent to capitalism7.    
 
Direct transfers of surplus value sought by capital from more developed regions in 
these contexts include for example, the use of monopoly power by firms to 
manipulate the price of the commodities bought from or sold by the periphery to 
below their market values, yielding a monopoly rent, thus further worsening of the 
terms of trade for the subordinate economy (Bettelheim, 1972;  Mandel, 1975).  
Entire branches of production may be monopolised by firms from developed 
economies due to institutional arrangements or prohibitively high start-up costs 
                                                 
6 To Mandel (1975) commodity imports to peripheral regions from higher labour productivity firms in 
the core will lower the local market price, resulting in lower profits for local producers and a transfer 
of surplus value to the more productive firms of the core.  
7 To Marx (1967) there is a tendency within capitalism for the rate of profit to fall as the competitive 
drive to boost productivity increases the levels of investment in constant capital (means of production) 
in proportion to variable capital (labour).  Although this shift, termed the rising ‘organic composition 
of capital’, increases the amount of surplus value, it decreases the rate of surplus value to capital 
advanced, or the rate of profit.  This is because only variable capital or labour yields surplus value, 
not the means of production itself (Marx, 1967).  Harvey (1982) reiterates Marx’s emphasis however, 
that a fall in the rate of profit is of course accompanied by an increase in the total mass of profit 
across the economy.  The volume of surplus value in the economy therefore does not increase at the 
same speed as the amount of capital seeking to capture it, leading to a crisis of over-accumulation 
whereby capital is devalued.  Capitalism must thus expand to locate new sources of surplus value and 
new avenues for profitable investment. 
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(Mandel, 1975, 72)8.  In Nepal for example, Indian industries were themselves able 
to move into the distribution of goods within the country, allowing them to exercise 
monopoly power over these markets (Blaikie et al., 2001).   
 
Meanwhile, one of the most significant sources of such surplus profits to Lenin 
(1987) as discussed in Imperialism, is made available through the export of capital to 
peripheral regions.  While the lower average development of the productive forces 
combined with ideological and political factors result in lower average wages in the 
periphery, the introduction of more advanced technology can yield temporary surplus 
profits so long as wages remain low (Bettelheim, 1972, 286)9.  This process is 
particularly relevant in Nepal, given the high rates of foreign (particularly Indian) 
capital invested in Nepali industry (see Chitrakar & Weiss, 1995). Many of the 
industries which were established in Nepal during the 1960s and 70s did not reflect 
the investment of Nepalese but Indian capital, and most of the profits were 
repatriated, thus hindering accumulation and the long term development of the forces 
of production in Nepali industry (Bhattarai, 2003).  Capital was invested not only as 
shares but through granting loans to Nepali industrialists.  It was estimated by Regmi 
(1977a) that the Biratnagar Jute Mills Ltd, established at the end of the Rana years, 
had to pay an estimated 70 percent of interest on loans from Indian enterprises to 
purchase raw Jute.  
 
Economic liberalisation and Nepali industry 
 
Shortly before the restoration of multiparty democracy, Nepal was subject to an IMF 
imposed neo-liberal adjustment program.  The policies of structural adjustment can 
be interpreted as a political process which underlies the latest phase of the 
internationalisation of capital, whereby the remaining ‘obstacles’ to the further 
expansion of the capitalist mode of production are removed (Chandra, 2004;  
Harvey, 2003).    The opening up of capital markets offers firms from developed 
                                                 
8 This process began in the early stages of imperialism in the mid 19th century whereby unrestricted 
imports of manufactured commodities from the core destroyed traditional industries in peripheral 
colonial social formations (Mandel, 1975). 
9 Note that low wages are associated with the relations and forces of production and not an 
independent variable as Emmanuel suggests. 
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regions even greater sources of profit in the periphery to offset capitalist crises 
(Harvey, 2003;  Kiely, 2005).  In the context of Nepal, this process included the 
further encouragement of foreign capital investment from the mid 1980s onwards 
(Chitrakar & Weiss, 1995)10.  Firms continue to be attracted to Nepal by temporary 
profits arising from its lower labour costs11 (Khanal et al., 2005) and the inflow of 
Foreign Direct Investment increased from $US 11 million during 1990 to US$23 
million in 1997 (Khanal & Shrestha, 2008).  As of 2008, 28% of the registered 
foreign owned firms are Indian, 13% are Chinese and 9% are from the US 
(Department of Industry, 2008).   
 





































301 4258 699 1,430 0.009% 507 0.01% 
Intermed. 
goods 




207 7729 9,688 20,586 12% 4,795 12% 
Capital 
goods 
4 No data No data No data No data No data No data 
Other 20 
 
538 234 142 0.0008% 56 0.001% 
Total 3290 167,853 73,155 167,815 100% 40740 
 
100% 
*Adapted directly from Central Bureau of Statistics 2006-07 Census of Manufacturing Establishments 
dataset. 
 
Despite the significant increase in manufacturing establishments following economic 
liberalisation (Mahat, 2005) which has led to marginal development of capital goods 
and basic goods industries, the distorted structure identified by Bhattarai (2003) 
which was present in the 1960s and 70s persists into the present day.  Table 2-1 
                                                 
10 100% cent foreign equity participation in large and medium sized industry is now permissible in 
Nepal, with no restrictions on the repatriation of invested funds (Khanal & Shrestha, 2008). 
11 The index of labour cost per worker in Nepal is 77% lower than India and 56% lower than China 
(Khanal et al,. 2005) 
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displays how consumer non-durable goods such as food products and textiles 
represent 52% of the total value of manufacturing output and 65% of the value 
added.  Intermediate goods which include semi-complete inputs for industry such as 
timber, glass and metal building materials represent 35% of the total value of output 
and just 21% of the value added.  Basic goods such as bulk raw materials represent 
only 12% of both the total value of output and the value added. Similarly, consumer 
non-durable goods representing long lasting finished products constitute a mere 
fraction of the value of output and value added in manufacturing industries.  
Although there was no data on the value of capital goods, the fact there are only 4 
establishments suggest its development is also limited.   
 
The existing manufacturing industries remain subordinate to foreign capital.  Most 
inputs as well as machinery and tools still need to be imported, and many firms 
therefore appear effectively to be individual units of production with relatively 
limited local forward and backward linkages (Khanal et al., 2005).  Doubt has been 
cast on the capacity for foreign owned industries to facilitate the diffusion of 
expertise and know-how to domestic industrialists (Athukorala & Sharma, 2004).  
There is little involvement of foreign owned firms in deepening their involvement in 
the economy through for example research and technological ‘spin-offs’ (Chitrakar 
& Weiss, 1995).    
 
Foreign capital investment itself has been suggested to remain far lower than it could 
potentially be, with firms being deterred in the first instance by political instability 
(Mahat, 2005) and continued infrastructural constraints (Athukorala & Sharma, 
2004;  Khanal et al., 2005).  Meanwhile, the removal of trade barriers following 
economic liberalisation have increased the strain on those few domestically owned 
industries that have been established, reinforcing the dominance of Indian capitalism 
in Nepal (Khanal et al., 2005;  UNDP, 2002).  The remaining small scale ‘cottage 
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(Source: Nepal Rastra Bank, 2008) 
 
In the context of the constraints outlined above, Nepal’s trade deficit has continued 
to grow (See Table 2-2) (Khanal et al., 2005).  While the 1997-2002 Ninth Plan had 
projected an average annual industrial growth rate of 7.7% during the five year 
period, performance remained at an average of only 2.7% (Asian Development Bank, 
2003).  By the fiscal year of 2002 the growth rate had declined to -3.3%, mainly due 
to -10% growth rate in manufacturing (Asian Development Bank, 2003).   
 
 
2.4 Understanding the trajectory of capitalist development in 
peripheral agriculture: Insights for Nepal  
 
2.4.1 Differentiation and development of ‘reserve army’ of labour 
 
The argument thus far, based upon the literature, has suggested that unequal relations 
between ‘social formations’ and the associated political alliances have ‘blocked’ the 
development of the productive forces in Nepali industry.  While it is evident that as 
with many low income countries, Nepal is far from developing large scale industrial 
capitalism, how does one go on to understand the trajectory of capitalist development 
in agriculture in such peripheral regions?  This is a topic which has been the subject 
to considerable controversy in recent decades (Akram-Lodhi, 2007;  Alavi, 1990;  
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Bernstein, 2003;  2001;  Byres, 1981;  de Janvry, 1981;  Patnaik, 1999;  1990;  
Thorner, 1982).  While it is not necessary to re-examine this debate, it raises some 
important insights that must be reviewed in order to explore the potential processes 
of capitalist transition or stagnation in Nepali agriculture. 
 
As has been stressed thus far, in order to understand the trajectory of capitalist 
development in peripheral agriculture it is necessary to examine both the internal 
dynamics of older modes of production, and how they are situated in relation to other 
modes within the social formation and the broader global capitalist economy.  Even 
if the capitalist mode of production in industry is weak as a result of global uneven 
development, this does not imply that a capitalist mode of production will not 
emerge in agriculture.  Instead this mode of production is a primary site of capitalist 
development in peripheral social formations given the international division of 
labour and global demand for agricultural commodities.  This assertion can be 
backed up by a body of literature implying that capitalist development in agriculture 
is still ‘inevitable’ in peripheral regions.  In this context, the small scale family farm 
which is the central unit of production in many pre-capitalist agrarian formations is 
still destined to be dissolved, particularly under economic liberalisation (Akram-
Lodhi, 2007;  2008;  Glassman, 2006;  Oya, 2001).  Could this cast doubt over the 
future of pre-capitalist modes of production in Nepal?   
 
In Nepal, traditional peasant industries have already been broken down, making 
households increasingly dependent upon the market (Blaikie et al., 2001).  This was 
a precursor to commercialisation and capitalist development in Lenin’s classic 
theory.  Unlike historical Europe however, it is international imports which have 
completed this process rather than domestic industrial development, which is of 
course limited in many peripheral regions.  Aside from this there has been extensive 
government and donor led promotion of commercial production of new commodities 
for local and international markets through the Agriculture Perspective Plan, an 
explosion of microfinance schemes, and a rapidly expanding transport infrastructure 
(Blaikie et al., 2001;  Rankin, 2004).  In this context one may expect capitalist social 
relations to develop in Nepali agriculture.   
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It has been suggested that capitalist differentiation will be even more powerful under 
neo-liberal restructuring given the withdrawal of the state support mechanisms which 
offered limited protection for marginal producers.  Oya (2001) demonstrates how the 
effects of agricultural market liberalisation in Senegal vary according to the class of 
the farmer, intensifying the process of differentiation.  Furthermore, many of the high 
value export crops introduced under commercialisation programs have such high 
start up costs that they exclude more marginal producers (Bernstein, 2003, 13).   
 
An important suggestion is that differentiation in peripheral regions is accelerated in 
the context of the drive by capital from more developed regions to avert crises and 
locate ‘super-profits’.  Marx and Lenin’s analyses of agrarian transition were based 
upon ‘national’ capitalist development in historical Europe.  The process of class 
differentiation in the modern day periphery is similar, but the nature of the proletariat 
which emerges is suggested to be quite different and has been argued to provide an 
exceptional source of profit for an expanding capitalism (Bernstein, 2004).  The root 
of this phenomenon can be located in the relation between agriculture and industry.  
To Lenin (1960 545), the loss of employment which occurred through the destruction 
of peasant industry and agrarian class differentiation in Russia was compensated for 
by the growth of manufacturing industries, creating an industrial workforce which 
initially grows disproportionately to the agricultural workforce12.  In peripheral 
countries such as Nepal however, the development of manufacturing industry has 
been impeded by Nepal’s structural position within the worldwide capitalist 
economy (Bhattarai, 2003).    The process of proletarianisation thus releases a global 
‘reserve army’ of labour, often engaged in increasingly insecure and oppressive wage 
employment (Bernstein, 2004;  Walker, 2008), often under conditions of unfreedom 
(Brass, 1997).  Industrial development in such contexts is no longer able to generate 
sufficient employment to absorb the labour force released in the process of class 
differentiation and provide a ‘living wage’ to the population (Bernstein, 2004). 
                                                 
12 This occurs because the total labour force in industry increases on an absolute basis, (while 
declining relative to value of constant capital).  Meanwhile in agriculture, there is an absolute decrease 
unless cultivated area can be increased (Lenin, 1960, 40) 
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To Harvey (2003), the presence of this labour ‘reserve army’ is functional to capital 
under imperialism as it locates a ‘spatial fix’ to its crisis of falling rates of profit.  It 
is thus in the interests of capital from core regions of the global economy to intensify 
the spread of capitalist relations to previously isolated peripheral regions.  In order to 
ensure the release of this labour force he even goes as far as to argue that there is 
been an intensification of differentiation by extra-economic means.  In the 
contemporary periphery for example, this is characterised by the appropriation of 
land for capitalist investment and the privatisation of common property resources, 
often with the support of foreign capital (Harvey, 2003)13.  Akram-Lodhi (2007, 
1442), referring more specifically to agriculture, terms this process of forcible 
separation “neo-liberal enclosure”14.  He points to the growth of an export-oriented 
capitalist sub-sector in many less developed countries under the control of 
international agro-business.  This sector has flourished through the drive for cheap 
wage foods to increase rates of relative surplus value in core industry, and is 
increasingly displacing independent peasant producers in peripheral regions.  In 
countries such as India, dispossession of peasants can also make way for non-
agricultural services in Special Economic Zones (Patnaik, 2007).   
 
 
2.4.2 Articulation of modes of production and reproduction 
 
Articulation of modes of production  
 
While economic liberalisation, expanding markets and the drive by capital for new 
sources of profit may cast doubt over the stability of pre-capitalist modes of 
production in peripheral regions, does capitalist subordination necessarily require 
that older economic formations be ‘dissolved’?  It has been argued that surplus value 
                                                 
13 To Harvey, this process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ is not restricted to the periphery, but 
occurs in the core though for example, the intensification of privatisation and the creation of new 
property regimes.   
14 Examples include the privatisation of collective farms in former socialist countries and of 
communal lands such as the ejidos of Mexico, to make way for corporate agribusiness (Akram-Lodhi, 
2007).   
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can be located within pre-capitalist modes of production as capitalism expands in 
peripheral social formations.   
 
Bettelheim (1972) outlines a process he terms ‘conservation-dissolution’. He states 
that as capitalism increases its dominance “…non-capitalist forms of production, 
before they disappear, are ‘restructured’ (partly dissolved) and thus subordinated to 
the predominant capitalist relations (and so conserved)” (1972, 297).  While it is 
suggested that a process of rapid dissolution of non-capitalist modes is predominant 
in social formations dominated by capitalism with a greater development of the 
productive forces, ‘conservation-dissolution’ is the main tendency in social 
formations where capitalism is not yet dominant.  As Bettelheim (1972, 297-298, 
original emphasis) suggests:   
 
“Inside social formations in which the capitalist mode of production is not directly predominant, that 
is, in social formations that are capitalist social formations because they are subordinated to the 
capitalist mode of production through the world market (but in which other modes of production 
predominate), the main tendency is not to dissolution of the non-capitalist modes of production but to 
their conservation-dissolution”.   
 
Bettelheim stops short of specifying the actual mechanisms through which pre-
capitalist modes of production are restructured and conserved, as is observed by 
Wolpe (1982b).  Nevertheless, it is necessary to reiterate Althusser and Balibar’s 
conceptualisation outlined above that social formations consist of more than one 
mode of production, coexisting in structures of dominance.  Understanding change in 
one mode of production therefore requires an analysis of how it relates with others.  
To Althusser, the transition between modes of production is by no means linear and 
simplistic, but is characterised by complexity and historical specificity (Althusser & 
Balibar, 1968, 196-197)15.  This complexity emerges from the tendency for 
subordinate modes of production to persist as “survivals” articulated to the emerging 
                                                 
15 Althusser and Balibar (1968) for example, argue that Marx’s model of a dualistic class structure, 
drawn from the English example was never intended to reflect reality, but was an “ideal average” or 
“purified form” of capitalism.  He goes on to argue that “…he [Marx] analyses it on the assumption 
that there are only ever two classes present in his object (a situation that never existed anywhere), and 
that the world market is entirely subject to the capitalist mode of production, which is just far from 
reality” 
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dominant mode of production16.  In this context, pre-capitalist modes of production 
may coexist, supplying surplus to the capitalist sector.  As was discussed at the outset 
of this chapter, it is necessary to examine the forms of surplus appropriation which 
may have constrained accumulation in agriculture.    In this context, a drain of 
surplus between pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production may result in 
differentiation and the development of a capitalist class structure to be significantly 
more limited.  This set the theoretical framework for a body of work investigating the 
complex articulations between modes of production (Bradby, 1980;  Dupré & Rey, 
1979;  Foster-Carter, 1978;  Meillassoux, 1980;  Raatgever, 1985;  Singh, 2007;  van 
Binsbergen & Geschiere, 1985a;  van der Klei, 1985;  Wolpe, 1982b).   
 
‘Functional’ articulations and ‘disguised proletarians’ 
 
A first theory of articulation suggests that the peasant unit of production which 
characterises pre-capitalist economic formations persists without differentiation 
following commercialisation, but fails to yield a profit for producers given the 
pricing mechanisms of capitalist markets.  In this context, a number of studies have 
outlined means through which petty commodity production in peripheral social 
formations is functionally articulated to supply surplus to the capitalism (Alavi, 
1990;  1975;  Banaji, 1977;  Bernstein, 2003;  1977;  2001;  de-Janvry, 1981).  de 
Janvry (1981) terms this process “functional dualism”.  Marx himself hinted at this 
possibility in Volume 3 of Capital in his discussion of the destruction of rural 
domestic industry.  Although capitalist industry destroys the small scale village 
industries, intensifying the creation of a home market, it also relies upon it from time 
to time.  Marx suggests that: “in particular branches, at certain points, it [capitalist 
industry] calls them up again elsewhere, because it needs them for the preparation of 
raw material up to a certain point” (Marx, 1967, 748).   
 
To Banaji (1977, 34), the perpetuation of petty commodity production subservient to 
capital normally occurs when it is integrated to merchant or industrial capital as a 
                                                 
16 See for example, Balibar’s analysis of the ‘manufacturing’ mode of production as an intermediary 
stage between European feudalism and capitalism (Althusser & Balibar, 1968, 237-239)  
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“quasi-enterprise” through the sphere of circulation.  Rather than the small farm 
operating independently, a capitalist enterprise controls the input and outputs used 
and what is produced.  In this context the price is manipulated and depressed through 
monopsony power so it essentially represents a “concealed wage”.  Historical 
examples include the colonial enterprises which used coercion to set up particular 
commodity production regimes (Banaji, 1977).  In the contemporary context contract 
farming epitomises this trend, whereby smallholders are institutionally linked to 
larger capitalist enterprises, often under conditions of relative unfreedom in terms of 
control over what is produced and the prices received (White, 1997).  In such 
contexts, peasant farmers exploit their own labour, by working for more than is 
necessary for their own subsistence, and create a surplus which is initially 
appropriated by the household itself (Banaji, 1977;  Bernstein, 1977).  However a 
large proportion of the surplus may be extracted by the buyer, making them 
effectively “disguised proletarians” (Bernstein, 1977, 69).  The lack of accumulation 
meanwhile, prevents any capitalist differentiation. 
 
Again, these articulations can be understood in the context of the position of peasant 
producers within a broader worldwide capitalist mode of production, whereby the 
surplus appropriated provides a source of exceptional profits for firms from 
industrialised economies through the provision of cheap wage goods or raw 
materials.  Similarly, it may provide high rates of profit for local ‘capitalist’ firms, 
including those dominated by foreign capital (de Janvry, 1981).  Such processes have 
been intensified under neo-liberal globalisation, which both destroys petty 
commodity production in some circumstances while also preserving it in others 
(Bernstein, 2001).   
 
There is another circumstance in which peasant economies may persist under 
capitalist conditions through “conservation-dissolution”, which to de Janvry (1981) 
also represents a form of ‘functional dualism’.  This can occur when there is not 
necessarily commercialisation and an emergence of petty commodity production, but 
partial differentiation whereby the peasant producer maintains enough land to supply 
the capitalist mode of production with cheap labour (Bernstein, 2001;  de-Janvry, 
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1981).   Both Lenin (1960, 177-178) and Kautsky (1988, 166) observed the tendency 
for peasants to engage in labour outside as well as working on their own land.  As 
workers already have some security from subsistence farming, capitalist enterprises 
can pay less to their workers and maximise the appropriation of surplus in value 
form.  The presence of these “allotment holding wage workers” therefore prolongs 
the life of subsistence agriculture under capitalism (Lenin, 1960, 177).  Under neo-
liberal globalisation, Harvey (2003) suggests that the use of this cheap semi-
proletarian labour in peripheral regions represents another source of high profits to 
avert capitalist crises.  As Bernstein (2001, 39) argues, poor peasants “form part of 
an expanding reserve army of labour in the countryside and in the cities and towns of 
large areas of the imperialist periphery”.   
 
Dangers of assuming capitalist dominance 
 
Two possible outcomes of capitalist penetration into a pre-capitalist agrarian 
economy such as Nepal have thus far been identified: one whereby differentiation 
occurs and peasant producers are gradually split into wage workers and capitalist 
farmers, and another whereby they persist but only so long as they are ‘functional’ to 
capital, supplying surplus through cheap labour or commodities.  Is it possible 
however, that neither of these outcomes are realised in Nepal and that pre-capitalist 
modes of production are persisting in relative isolation, despite expanding markets, 
improved transport infrastructure, and commercialisation initiatives?  As of 1997-8 
Blaikie et al (2001, 2002) suggested that there was little evidence of either capitalist 
differentiation or middle-farmer led commodity production (with or without 
accumulation) in the West-Central region of Nepal, and doubted that Nepal’s 
Agriculture Perspective Plan would significantly alter this situation.   
 
The discussions on articulation or ‘functional dualism’ outlined above highlight the 
important idea that pre-capitalist modes of production can be preserved.  However, in 
many ways they have much in common with theories asserting the dissolution of the 
peasantry.  Both bodies of literature appear to assume the inevitable subordination of 
pre-capitalist economic formations based upon peasant farming to capitalism in the 
context of economic liberalisation, the monetisation of the rural economy and global 
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demand for agricultural commodities.  The use of terms such as ‘disguised 
proletarians’ or indeed ‘functional dualism’ itself suggest that the persistence of older 
economic formations is dependent upon capitalism.   
 
van Binsbergen & Geschiere (1985a) argue however, that in peripheral regions 
capitalism does not always emerge spontaneously and undermine older economic 
formations when they come into contact with expanding capitalist markets.  While 
there may still be loose articulations, with flows of surplus between modes of 
production and alliances between pre-capitalist and capitalist dominant classes, one 
can not assume the older economic formation is subordinate or functional to 
capitalism.   
 
Peasant overwork and resistance to differentiation and commercialisation 
  
There is evidence that pre-capitalist modes of production can effectively resist 
capitalist differentiation through internal mechanisms. As was suggested above, the 
political-ideological processes which reproduce the relations of production and their 
associated forms of surplus appropriation play an important role in reproducing the 
entire mode of production after each productive cycle.  One phenomena which could 
explain why differentiation does not occur under modes of production based upon 
peasant farming is the ideological value attached to land ownership, and the drive by 
peasants to retain their holdings, no matter how unprofitable they are (Shanin, 1973).  
This resistance to differentiation is often made possible through ‘overwork’ and 
‘under-consumption’ which in the long term can perpetuate relations of production 
based upon the independent land owning unit of production.  This phenomena was 
initially observed by Kautsky (1988, 142), who suggests that competition from 
modern industry will not necessarily lead to the dissolution of small enterprises, but 
may cause them to persist through the overwork and under-consumption of the 
workers.   
 
However, this may still entail the entire surplus being supplied to the capitalist 
sector.  It is suggested in this context that even when peasant farmers are integrated 
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into the market, they will continue to sell when prices drop to rates which yield a 
return far below the average rate of profit.  Even when output (and also input) prices 
cause an erosion of households’ subsistence needs, peasants may continue to produce 
by using their labour more intensively (Dyer, 2004), a process Bernstein (1977, 64) 
terms the “simple reproductive squeeze”.  Although such rates may cause capitalist 
farms to cease production, the peasant producer would intensify the use of family 
labour on the land through overwork in order continue production and retain their 
holdings (Bates, 1984;  de-Janvry, 1981;  Lehmann, 1982;  Shanin, 1973).  In fact, 
much of the literature on ‘functional’ articulation outlined above does acknowledge 
the presence of such a dynamic.  The tendency for overwork reinforces articulations 
with capitalism by intensifying the supply of cheap produce and labour to the 
capitalist sector17 (Banaji, 1977;  Bernstein, 1977;  de Janvry, 1981).  This is 
facilitated by the fact that unlike under capitalism, peasant producers are driven by 
subsistence rather than profit (Marx, 1967, 805).   The assumption remains however, 
that the peasantry inevitably becomes subordinate and functional to capitalism, 
giving away its entire surplus.  However, surely peasant producers can persist 
alongside capitalism through such mechanisms without such subordination.  In many 
cases for example, peasant producers may resist their transformation from 
subsistence producers into petty commodity producers in the first instance (Bates, 
1984). Furthermore, they may seek to avoid unnecessary ‘risks’ such as the 
introduction of innovations which could lead to the loss of land and differentiation 
(Shanin, 1973).   
 
This may explain why coercion is often required to subordinate peasant producers.  
For example, as Banaji (1977) noted, colonialism entailed small farmers being 
coerced into producing for the market, and direct political intervention to control 
prices ensured the supply of surplus for capitalism.  A similar argument applies to 
discussions of capitalist differentiation.  Although capitalist differentiation may 
occur through natural processes whereby capitalism develops within the pre-
                                                 
17 If there is a surplus product to sell therefore it is considered something which cost the farmers little, 
and is often sold at a value that does not remunerate them for the labour realised to produce it.  A 
portion of the surplus-labour of the peasants, is in Marx’s terms “bestowed gratis upon society” 
(Marx, 1967, 806).   
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capitalist mode of production in the context of market expansion, Harvey’s (2003) 
notion of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ suggests otherwise.  It refers to situations 
whereby extra-economic force is required to implant capitalist social relations.  
Although Harvey does not actually engage with the internal dynamics of pre-
capitalist modes of production, the fact that external force is necessary is evidence 
that pre-capitalist formations are often more stable than one may first assume, a point 
even echoed by Marx himself.     
 
Pre-capitalist forms of surplus appropriation: Lessons from the ‘lineage’ mode of 
production  
 
One can not assume however, that forms of surplus appropriation that block 
profitable commercialisation only occur through articulations with capitalism.  The 
second and most significant mechanism through which pre-capitalist peasant based 
modes of production persist is through the appropriation of surplus by pre-capitalist 
dominant classes, impeding accumulation.   
 
To identify these pre-capitalist forms of surplus appropriation it is necessary to 
examine the diversity of modes of production based upon the peasant unit.  In a 
given mode of production, the productive unit may still be the family farm, and it 
may still be reproduced in part by peasant ‘overwork’.  However, there may be more 
complex combinations of relations and forces of production and mechanisms of 
reproduction which distinguish it from other pre-capitalist formations also grounded 
in peasant farming.  A body of literature which includes an analysis of complex pre-
capitalist modes of production which can resist capitalist expansion is provided by 
the French radical anthropologists of the 1970s such as Pierre-Philippe Rey and 
Claude Meillassoux in their analysis of what are termed African ‘lineage modes of 
production’.  In early colonial Africa, although production was carried out primarily 
on family farms (the ‘peasant’ unit of production) and through hunting-gathering, the 
primary flow of surplus was between youth/women and the male elders (Dupré & 
Rey, 1979;  Meillassoux, 1973b).  These relations of production and the associated 
forms of surplus appropriation were reproduced not so much through control over the 
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means of production but through control over the means of labour reproduction in 
the sphere of circulation, i.e. the allocation of wives and the associated exchange of 
prestige goods.  Youth were compelled to produce a surplus for the elders in order to 
ensure they access a bride (Dupré & Rey, 1979;  Meillassoux, 1973b).   
 
Rey stresses that while articulations with capitalism occurred in African lineage 
modes of production; these articulations did not ‘explain’ the perpetuation of this 
economic formation.  In fact, the internal mechanisms of the lineage mode of 
production impeded capitalist expansion (Dupré & Rey, 1979).  The exchange of 
goods produced by capitalism initially facilitated the reproduction of the lineage 
economic formation leading to mutual co-existence (Dupré & Rey, 1979, 205).  
However, for the reproduction of this system, the primacy of exchange relations and 
their symbolic meaning rather than production relations meant that lineage elders 
who controlled the surplus had little interest in accumulating to expand the 
production of subsistence goods.  To Rey, this presented a fundamental obstacle if 
capitalism was to develop the forces of production, restructuring the ‘traditional’ 
economic system in order to yield surplus value in the form of labour or commodities 
(cf. Resch, 1992).   
 
Once again, it was only the coercive power of colonialism which was according to 
Rey, able to break the lineage mechanisms of reproduction by implanting capitalist 
relations of production, using primarily political mechanisms (Dupré & Rey, 1979).  
This occurred through the colonial state building infrastructure, establishing 
plantations and commodity production, while forcefully establishing taxes and 
monetising the economy so households require cash, thus encouraging wage labour 
(cf. Resch, 1992).  This destroyed the autonomy of the lineage mode of production, 
rendering it subordinate to capitalism.  van Binsbergen & Geschiere (1985a) thus 
stress that the diversity of pre-capitalist economic formations mean there is 
considerable variation in the mechanisms through which capitalism subordinates 
them.  Social formations dominated by older economic formations can follow 
unusual trajectories of change on contact with the market.  They stress that it is 
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necessary for the scholar to examine how capitalism was and is able to establish 
dominance, noting that this often requires complex measures, including coercion.   
 
It is important to acknowledge however, that even when pre-capitalist modes of 
production are successfully dominated by capitalism, their economic, ideological and 
political mechanisms of reproduction are never entirely dissolved.  While extra-
economic coercion may subordinate older formations to capitalism in the first 
instance, individuals may seek to preserve the older system, as Singh (2007) 
demonstrates with reference adivasi social formations in India18.  The economic and 
political reproduction mechanisms of the older mode of production may even be 
preserved on a political level to serve the interests of capitalism.  Rey for example 
notes that the colonial state in Africa sought to protect the hierarchy of chiefs which 
facilitated the control over land, enforcement of property rights, tax collection and 
the conscript of labour (cf. Resch, 1992)19.  Meillassoux (1980) similarly suggests 
that in the context of migrant labour in Southern Africa, it is not only in the interests 
of capitalism to sustain subsistence agriculture in the villages.   It seeks to preserve 
the entire tribal social structure and its familial institutions which offer social 
security for workers and cheapen the reproduction of their labour power.   A more 
recent example was the native reserve system under Apartheid South Africa (Wolpe, 
1982a). 
 
While it is yet to be established whether or not economic formations akin to the 
lineage mode of production are present in Nepal, the importance of examining the 
complex reproductive mechanisms of the pre-capitalist modes of production and 
their associated forms of surplus appropriation is of even greater importance in a 
                                                 
18 The requirement for cash amongst Madhya Pradesh adivasi households following the penetration of 
capitalism through extra-economic means undermines the traditional redistributive system of labour 
and commodities which once ensured the social formations’ survival.  Households attempt to counter 
labour shortages and maintain the traditional redistributive economy through increasing the number of 
family members.  However, this has the opposite effect by creating a shortage of subsistence goods.   
What is important to note here however, is the drive by households to preserve the older economic 
formation. 
19 Dupré and Rey (1979) suggest that following decolonisation in Africa, the social formation is 
characterised by a lineage mode of production and a politico-administrative system combining 
elements inherited from both economic formations.  The colonial capitalist mode of production 
however, remained dominant.  
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country such as Nepal.  Many of the direct political interventions to implant capitalist 
social relations seem less likely to have occurred on the same scale as some of the 
studies outlined above.  Nepal was never directly integrated into the colonial project 
in South Asia and thus was not subject to many of the coercive measures which 
subordinated pre-capitalist economic formations to capitalism.  Even in the present 
day, unfavourable terrain combined with a relatively weak developmentalist state 
mean that international agri-business and other institutions which could complete this 
process have yet to make significant headway in rural areas and Nepal lacks a strong 
export oriented sub-sector20.   
 
Pre capitalist forms of surplus appropriation: Semi-feudalism 
 
A powerful pre-capitalist mode of production which deserves particularly close 
attention is that of semi-feudalism.  Semi-feudal mechanisms of surplus 
appropriation are argued to be highly significant in hindering accumulation and the 
transition to capitalist development throughout South Asia (Bhaduri, 1981;  
Bharadwaj, 1985).  Such an economic formation is suggested to remain widespread 
in parts of Nepal, particularly in the Terai where this study is focussed (Bhattarai, 
2003;  Blaikie et al., 2001;  Seddon, 1987).   
 
The semi-feudal mode of production is primarily dominated once again by the 
peasant unit of production, but one in which the farmer does not own their land.  The 
relations of production are thus typically characterised by phenomena such as 
sharecropping, with high pre-capitalist ground rent paid to feudal landlords who 
appropriate much of the surplus (Bhaduri, 1973;  Thorner, 1982).  As with 
capitalism, the relations of circulation are necessary for units to reproduce their 
means of production and labour power.  However, under semi-feudalism, forms of 
surplus appropriation often flourish in this sphere as well, with merchant capital 
                                                 
20 Of course, this does not mean to say that capitalism can not emerge without extra-economic 
coercion in Nepal.  Bradby (1982) for example, criticises Rey for overlooking cases throughout the 
periphery whereby an expanding capitalism can undermine pre-capitalist modes of production through 
competition alone.  Nevertheless, by understanding the economic, political and ideological 
mechanisms through which a diversity of pre-capitalist modes of production are reproduced, one can 
better understand how they can potentially persist over time, even co-existing with capitalism. 
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playing a parasitic role.  This occurs through both usury and ‘compulsive’ market 
participation on highly unfavourable terms, often enriching a mercantile elite who 
sometimes are also the landlords (Bhaduri, 1981;  1986;  1973;  Bharadwaj, 1985).  
In such cases, the unproductive ‘drain’ of surplus by landowners and merchants to 
meet the needs of simple reproduction only, and the pauperisation of the poorer strata 
of the peasantry, block the development of the productive forces. This constrains the 
emergence of profitable commodity production from which capitalist development 
would emerge (Bhaduri, 1981;  1973).   
 
However, most analyses of semi-feudalism fail to adequately acknowledge the 
ideological and political mechanisms through which these relations of production 
and the associated forms of surplus appropriation are reproduced through time.  As 
was suggested above, to Althusser (1971), capitalist relations of production are 
reproduced through the ideological and political processes which separate labourers 
from the means of production.  Relations of production which can be characterised as 
‘feudal’ in character however, are reproduced primarily through the mechanisms 
which perpetuate control over land resources by an elite (Meillassoux, 1973a;  
Raatgever, 1985).  In the context of Nepal, one must be aware of not only legal 
property rights to land, but the integration of landlords into the bureaucracy since the 
Rana years (Regmi, 1988;  1977b;  Regmi, 1978), and how this may have facilitated 
their continued control over land resources.   
 
It is also important to be aware of ideological processes such as caste.  To 
Meillasoux (1973a), feudal exploiting classes could legitimate their control over land 
and the agricultural surplus by setting up a status order against the reality of class 
relationships.  Caste acts an “ideological screen” which hides the social reality which 
has evolved over Indian history with shifts in the character of feudal class power 
(Meillassoux, 1973a).  Caste plays a role in the relations of circulation as well as 
production such as in the patron-client jajamani networks of exchange.  Under this 
system, households specialising in particular trades are bound by material obligations 
by a patron from a higher caste.  In return the patron grants their clients the means of 
subsistence, protection and gifts.  To Meillassoux, (1973a) this is significant not as a 
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form of exploitation but through placing the patrons at the apex of the circulation of 
commodities, hindering the development of market exchange and preventing the 
emergence of a rival bourgeoisie class21.  However, jajmani exchanges can also play 
a more directly exploiting role.  By lower castes accepting ‘gifts’ from those higher 
in the hierarchy under the guise of moral obligation, mechanisms of exploitation are 
camouflaged, aiding semi-feudal reproduction (Rankin, 2004;  Vasavi, 1998). 
 
However, one can not assume that semi-feudal modes of production represent 
archaic economic formations which simply ‘co-exist’ with capitalism.  In 
understanding how they may affect the trajectory of agrarian change, it is necessary 
to examine once again, the articulations between semi-feudalism and capitalism.   
This can both protect such modes of production and their mechanisms of 
reproduction, or lead to their dissolution.  Rey points to articulations of feudal 
economic formations with capitalism in the context of historical Europe whereby the 
burgeoning capitalist class relied upon the feudal mode of production for the supply 
of agricultural produce to towns and for the extra-economic coercion which could 
separate the peasants from the land and release a labour force for urban capitalism 
(cf. Resch, 1992). 
 
In the Indian context, Alavi (1990;  1975) suggests that feudal landlords were 
supported by the British imperialists.  They were able to exercise coercion over their 
tenants to maximise the accumulation of surplus.  Meanwhile, the surplus which was 
not appropriated by landlords was absorbed into the economy of the imperialist core 
through the pricing system set up by the British, blocking expanded reproduction in 
agriculture and capitalist differentiation (Alavi, 1975).  In this context, the control 
over land and ability to exercise extra-economic power was of utility to the 
imperialists by maximising the supply of cheap produce.   
 
However, such forms of articulation once again, involved the extra-economic power 
of colonialism, whereby alliances were forged with the landed elites and the 
                                                 
21 Nevertheless, the expansion of markets from outside may undermine the autonomy of these 
relations (Vasavi, 1998). 
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peasantry was coerced into to entering the market, processes which are unlikely to 
have occurred in Nepal.  Nevertheless, looser articulations may emerge, and even if 
there is not a transfer of surplus, there is evidence that the capacity for semi-
feudalism to persist in rural South Asia is still intricately connected with the broader 
dynamics of capitalist development both within the social formation and in the 
worldwide economy. 
 
It has already been established how the capitalist mode of production already present 
in many peripheral social formations is distorted in character as a result of the global 
division of labour, with limited industrial development.  The stagnation of industry 
means that the huge surplus labour force released through capitalist development in 
agriculture will not necessarily be absorbed into a nascent industrial sector.  Instead 
there is under employment and the release of a huge ‘reserve army’ of labour subject 
to increasingly insecure and unfree forms of capitalist exploitation.  However, there 
is evidence that in the context of semi-feudalism, the processes which undermine 
capitalist development in industry can actually reinforce the power of pre-capitalist 
modes of production in agriculture. 
 
Bharadwaj (1985) for example, argues that an underdeveloped industrial base in 
certain regions of India can reproduce the power of landlords as farmers lack 
alternatives.  In the English case, the process of commercialisation dissolved 
feudalism.  This can be partly attributed to the simultaneous growth of capitalism in 
industry as well as agriculture, which acted as a pull for labour out of agriculture, 
undermining the reliance of farmers upon feudal classes (Bharadwaj, 1985).  In this 
context it was in the interests of feudal lords to develop the forces of production or 
lower rents in order to encourage more profitable tenants to remain as tenants, 
eventually becoming capitalist farmers.  Alternatively it may have provided the 
incentive for landlords to themselves become capitalist farmers and expel the 
peasantry. 
 
However, in the South Asian context, imperialism has undermined the industrial 
base, offering few alternative livelihood options for farmers in many regions.  Pre-
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existing inequalities in land ownership therefore results in a preponderance of 
marginal producers reliant upon land as a means of subsistence.  As the pauperised 
base of the agrarian structure can not raise the capital to access the land market, and 
the risk of not securing non-agricultural employment is so high, the only option for 
farmers is to bid for leases.  The high competition for tenancies forces up rates of 
rent above the value of land (Bharadwaj, 1985).   
 
Meanwhile, the parasitic role of usury and merchant capital under semi-feudalism 
can be better understood when one acknowledges the absence of alternative 
livelihood options.  Both Marx and Kautsky, although recognising the parasitic 
nature of merchant capital and usury under pre-capitalist conditions, suggest that it 
plays a ‘productive’ role for the long term process of capitalist development.  To 
Kautsky (1988), the increased dependence of households on the market and need for 
cash following the destruction of household industries facilitates the rise of the 
merchant and money lending class who act as intermediaries in expanding markets.  
Indebtedness increases the rate of differentiation as farming households sell their 
land, speeding up the process of capitalist development in agriculture.  However, the 
growing rural proletariat does not only obtain wages in the agricultural sector, but in 
the growing industrial sector, which pulls them out of agriculture.  Eventually small 
farmers do not even try to compete with larger farms as their main source of income 
is off farm labour, particularly in industry (Kautsky, 1988).   
 
In ‘backwards’ regions of India however, Bharadwaj (1985) maintains that 
handicrafts industries have already been undermined, creating a need for cash.  
However, this is a result of manufactured imports from abroad rather than domestic 
industrial growth.  This same process occurred in Nepal with the imports of both 
Indian and British made manufactured goods (Bhattarai, 2003;  Blaikie et al., 2001).  
However, in the absence of a growing industrial sector, Bharadwaj (1985) stresses 
that ties of dependence develop between peasant producers and merchant and usury 
capital whereby loans are taken to meet cash needs.  To settle debt, farmers are 
compelled to sell their produce, often at highly unfavourable rates (Bharadwaj, 
1985).  Although the presence of commercialisation suggests that there may still be 
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some articulations with capitalism through the sphere of circulation, capitalism is by 
no means powerful enough to undermine semi-feudal production relations.  
 
In such contexts, propertied classes such as landlords and merchants have few 
incentives to develop the productive forces in agriculture and invest capital when a 
dependant peasantry provides multiple sources of surplus (Bhaduri, 1981).  As 
Bharadwaj (1985 15) argues, “Where possibilities of exploiting labour become 
almost limitless there is less incentive to improve productive forces, that is, 
undertake productive investment”.    
 
This suggests a contradictory process, as the distorted development of capitalism 
which normally provides exceptional sources of surplus value can actually hinder the 
drive by capital to expand.  Blaikie et al (2001, 2002) note that urban and industrial 
employment in Nepal remains limited and temporary, and there is a chronic “absence 
of options” for farmers out with agriculture.  In order to subsist, households thus 
remain reliant upon agriculture or are forced to sell assets or migrate (Blaikie et al., 
2001).   It is therefore necessary to question whether or not in the context of Nepal’s 
underdeveloped industrial economy, there will be sufficient alternative livelihood 
opportunities which can undermine feudal relations. 
 
Internal complexity in modes of production  
 
In order to better understand modes of production in rural Nepal and the processes 
through which they are perpetuated, it is important to return to the argument at the 
outset of this chapter on the complexities of modes of production and associated 
class structures.  To Althusser, and Marx himself, the mode of production was only 
intended to represent an abstract entity, or ‘ideal type’.  It is important to leave space 
for fluidity in both the character of modes of production and their interactions with 
others.   
 
It must be re-emphasised however, that this does not mean rejecting concepts such as 
the ‘mode of production’ and the associated forms of ‘crystallised power’.  Instead it 
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entails giving space for complexity within a given set of structural relations or 
‘generative processes’.  By analysing articulation of modes of production itself 
without assuming capitalist dominance one acknowledges the complex constitution 
of the rural class structure and associated forms of power.  However, one must also 
examine complexities within the ideological and political mechanisms through which 
modes of production are reproduced, and the contradictory effects such mechanisms 
may have in the context of economic change.   
 
Althusser’s (1969) analysis of the complex role the non-economic levels of the social 
world can play in social reproduction highlights this point.  He argues for example 
that ideologies are not simple reflections of economic processes but have their own 
logic, and on some occasions can themselves shape the character of economic 
relations.  The classical Marxian approach considers the core concept of 
superstructure, represented by the state and its legal, political and ideological forms, 
as a simple reflection of the economic base, which constitutes the relations and 
forces of production.  To Althusser however, the superstructure is not a necessary 
condition of the base, but has its own essence and logic (Althusser, 1969).  For 
example, in the transition between modes of production, ideological “survivals” 
persist, even after the transformation is complete.  These survivals can continue to 
shape the relations of production under the newly constituted social formation 
(Althusser, 1969, 115).  With this understanding it is possible to occasionally 
uncover situations whereby ideological processes can have outcomes which 
contradict the reproductive mechanisms of the mode of production into which they 
initially emerged.  This has implications for any attempt to understand capitalist 
transition in Nepal. 
 
For example, Rankin’s (2004) study in the Kathmandu valley notes how lower 
castes’ capacity to perform ritually defiling work has offered them opportunities for 
better paid off-farm labour.  In the context of the Kathmandu valley, one of the few 
regions in Nepal undergoing moderate capitalist development, caste ideologies which 
once reproduced a particular set of pre-capitalist relations, now have a contradictory 
effect.  By facilitating the movement of low caste labourers into the non-farm 
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economy, they have undermined the ties of interdependence into which low caste 
people have been integrated for generations (Rankin, 2004)22.   
 
Similarly, van Binsbergen & Geschiere (1985b) point to religious cults and their 
associated ideologies in Zambia.  Although these initially arose in the context of an 
articulation of the lineage mode of production and colonial mercantile capitalism, 
they have now developed into exploitative structures in their own right.  While new 
ideologies have emerged in the context of modern articulations with capitalism, 
cultic formations continue to reproduce particular specific relations of exploitation 
within the lineage mode of production.  Such religious practices sometimes even take 
on an impetus of their own, and autonomously ‘create’ new relations of production.  
It is therefore important not to jump to conclusions as to the associations between the 
symbolic and material worlds (van Binsbergen & Geschiere, 1985b). 
 
Althusser argues however, that complex non-economic relations still emerge in the 
context of the overall process of material production and social reproduction, and 
thus economic processes are “determinate in the last instance” (Althusser & Balibar, 
1968, 216-224).  For example, although the ideologies in the above examples such as 
caste or cultic religions may appear autonomous from the mode of production, they 
both still arose in the context of a particular set of economic relations.  With regards 
to caste in Nepal, one would expect that in the long term, new ideologies may 
emerge to reflect the new class relations, and this has already been observed in 
Kathmandu with a class based social status slowly displacing that of caste (Liechty, 
2003). 
 
The notion of ‘determination in the last instance’ does not imply that the social world 
is ‘reducible’ to the economic, but instead this understanding “sees the material 
process of production and social reproduction as conditioning (enabling and 
constraining) various kinds of overdetermined outcomes in various social domains” 
(Glassman, 2003, 685).   In other words, the economic system and the process of 
reproduction creates the objective conditions for the political system (Althusser & 
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Balibar, 1968, 224).  While this notion is still open to debate, it highlights the 
importance of in depth analysis to identify the economic structures which may 
underlie particular ideological and political formations, no matter how complex or 
‘autonomous’ they may appear on the ground. 
 
 
Intra-household relations and the mode of production 
 
Understanding complexity within the modes of production into which Nepali farmers 
are integrated into also entails addressing the silence on behalf of decades of Marxian 
scholars on class relations and flows of surplus within the household (see Benholtd-
Thomson, 1982;  Deere & Leon de Leal, 1982;  Folbre, 1982;  Gibson-Graham, 
1996;  Kabeer, 2001).  Studies in agrarian communities in India (Agarwal, 1992), 
and Nepal (Nightingale, 2006;  Rankin, 2004) have identified how the performance 
of culturally defined gender identities shape a particular exploitative distribution of 
labour within the household whereby women perform a distributionally greater share 
of labour while reaping less of the rewards.  The ‘overwork’ of women, while not 
necessarily influencing the reproduction of the relations of production, may facilitate 
the reproduction of the forces of production.  For example, unpaid female 
reproductive labour in agrarian communities can ‘cheapen’ a households’ labour 
power, either under capitalism or in an articulation between a subsistence based 
mode of production and capitalism (Benholtd-Thomson, 1982).  This has important 
consequences for understanding the trajectory of agrarian transition and the types of 
articulations which emerge.  Similarly, the dynamics of labour allocation under 
particular gendered divisions of labour may constrain the introduction of particular 
technologies or crops, as Schroeder (1997) demonstrated in the Gambia, affecting the 
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In sum, it is evident that in order to understand the trajectory of agrarian transition in 
Nepal, it is crucial to be aware of the processes which have hindered the 
accumulation of surplus and capitalist development in agriculture.  This requires 
firstly, a broader understanding of pre-capitalist modes of production themselves, 
accounting for the multiple mechanisms of surplus appropriation through both the 
relations of production and circulation.  It is also necessary to understand the 
economic, political and ideological mechanisms which facilitate the reproduction of 
these pre-capitalist formations after each productive cycle. 
 
Secondly, it is important to understand how older formations articulate with 
capitalism and the new forms of surplus appropriation which may emerge, without 
assuming they are subordinate or functional to capital.  Thirdly, it is necessary to 
examine how the relations and articulations between pre-capitalist modes of 
production and capitalism (and their impact) vary according to the broader processes 
of the worldwide capitalist mode of production.  In Nepal, the distorted development 
of industrial capitalism is intricately connected with the broader dynamics of the 
worldwide capitalist economy and historically established political alliances between 
a comprador bourgeoisie and foreign capital.  The limited development of capitalism 
in industry however suggests that there are likely to be few alternative livelihood 
options for farmers.  While on the one hand this may provide sources of exceptional 
surplus value in the context of capitalist differentiation in agriculture, on the other 
hand it may reinforce the power of semi-feudal exploiting classes, and actually 
hinder the expansion of capitalism. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to recognise the potential for complexity and contradictory 
processes within pre-capitalist modes of production, and of the class structures, 
ideological and political formations which may be present.  For example, one must 
acknowledge that the superstructure can have relative autonomy from the base.  
However, an appreciation of complexity also requires an analysis of class relations at 
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the household scale, most notably intra-household flows of surplus such as those 
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3 The Agricultural Perspective Plan, neo-liberal 





It has been established that in order to understand the trajectory of agrarian transition 
in Nepal it is necessary to explore the complex mechanisms through which pre-
capitalist modes of production are reproduced both internally and through their 
position within the worldwide capitalist economy.  In this context however, how 
does one understand the policy interventions by the Nepalese state and donors which 
have sought to promote agrarian development?  Before examining the actual 
dynamics of agrarian transition on the ground, this chapter seeks to better understand 
the ideological processes behind Nepal’s development strategy and how these 
policies may potentially shape the trajectory of rural  change in Nepal. 
 
One of the most significant development strategies released by the Nepalese 
government in recent years is the Agricultural Perspective Plan.  It comes at a time 
when small farm commercialisation figures centrally in rural development policies 
throughout the world, and envisages a transformation of the agrarian sector and the 
emergence of profitable middle farmer led commodity production.  However, this 
chapter demonstrates that while the APP is cloaked in optimistic pro-poor rhetoric, it 
reflects on an ideological level, the broader process of capitalist expansion under 
neo-liberal globalisation.  The APP expects the rural poor to perform an 
entrepreneurial subject position and participate in markets and lift themselves from 
poverty.  However, in reality, it glosses over the forms of exploitation associated 
with the emergence of capitalism in peripheral social formations.  It overlooks two 
potential outcomes of agrarian commercialisation which release new sources of 
profit for capital to the detriment of producers.  These include the differentiation and 
the release of a ‘reserve army’ of labour and the articulations between petty 
commodity production and capitalism.  The APP also reinforces ideologies of 
comparative advantage that reproduce the position of the Nepalese social formation 
within the global division of labour. 
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The chapter concludes however, by examining initial evidence which suggests that 
the impact of the APP on the agrarian sector is limited.  The framework for this 
research is thus laid out by suggesting that the APP, although glossing over capitalist 
modes of exploitation, also diverts attention from pre-capitalist modes of production 
and their associated  forms of surplus appropriation.  These pre-capitalist class 
structures can potentially both reproduce the impoverishment of large segments of 
the rural population while also preventing accumulation and the expansion of 
capitalist social relations in the first instance. 
 
 
3.2 The Agriculture Perspective Plan 
 
 
In 1996 the Nepalese government along with its international donors introduced the 
Agriculture Perspective Plan (APP), which outlined a 20 year plan for rapid 
agricultural growth and general prosperity.  The APP was created with much 
optimism and populist pro-poor rhetoric and was a central aspect of Nepal’s 
reinvigorated development strategy in the period following the restoration of 
democracy.  The 9
th
 five year plan from 1997-2002, identified the APP as the 
principle policy instrument for achieving poverty reduction and pledged a 
commitment to its full implementation (Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2003).  It 
has figured in each subsequent national development plan up until the present.    
 
The APP’s primary aim is to encourage smallholders to shift from subsistence 
production to the production of high value, market orientated agricultural produce 
(APROSC, 1995, ; Cameron, 1998).  It simultaneously aimed to increase the 
agricultural growth rate from less than 3 percent in the past twenty years to 5 percent 
during the next 20 years, and to increase per capita food production from 277 kg to 
426 kg by 2017.  The APP promotes the market orientated production of both 
traditional grain staples such as rice and wheat, and higher value cash crops and 
vegetables (APROSC, 1995).  The strategy for promoting smallholder 
commercialisation in the Terai has been largely ‘technology driven’.  The focus has 
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been on facilitating commercial production through irrigation and transport 
infrastructure and extension services to promote new technologies and commodities 
(APROSC, 1995).   
 
The APP evolved from earlier unsuccessful attempts at agrarian development in 
Nepal from the 1960s onwards when ‘development’ first began to figure in Nepalese 
government rhetoric.  International donor agencies in Nepal, alongside the Panchayat 
government of the time, made several efforts to promote smallholder agricultural 
development and commodity production through plans such as the FAO’s 
Perspective Study of Agricultural Development for Nepal in 1974 and the 
Governments Ten Year Agricultural Development Plan in 1973 (APROSC, 1995).  
These policies can be understood in the context of broader trends in rural 
development policy over the years.  Throughout much of the 1950s and 60s, state 
development policy in peripheral countries was dominated by the Modernisation 
School, whereby the emphasis was on encouraging growth in the modern industrial 
sector (Peet, 1999).  Government policies were heavily biased towards urban areas.  
Agricultural development was restricted to large scale plantations and the rural 
peasantry was expected to play a ‘passive’ role in economic development, whereby 
they would supply resources to the modern sector which would eventually expand to 
replace them (Ellis & Biggs, 2001).  However, the late 1960s and 1970s saw an 
increased recognition by policy makers that the ‘top down’ growth strategies were 
not meeting the needs of the poorest households, particularly in rural areas where it 
was argued that most poverty is concentrated (Corbridge & Jones, 2005), and there 
was a rise in the concept of ‘development from below’ and an interest in agricultural 
led strategies of economic growth (Stöhr, 1982).   
 
Rather than focussing wholly on the development of the few key industrial sectors 
through import substitution industrialisation, which in Nepal was largely 
unsuccessful, donors and national policy makers increasingly sought to mobilise the 
resources of all the sectors of the national economy (Stöhr, 1982).  This involved 
projects that utilise the potential of individuals or groups at the micro level through 
small scale, labour intensive activities capitalising on local people’s skills.  It was 
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claimed by policy makers that mobilising the resources of the vast population of 
households engaged in subsistence orientated smallholder or ‘peasant’ agriculture 
would be an effective means through which to offer economic opportunity to the 
poor (Ashley & Maxwell, 2001, ; Ellis & Biggs, 2001).  These policies were justified 
on the premise that they would facilitate poverty reduction while simultaneously 
stimulating national economic growth from below, alongside large scale ‘urban 
biased’ projects (Ellis & Biggs, 2001, ; Stöhr & Taylor, 1982).  The shift in policy 
towards favouring smaller family run units rather than commercial estates led to the 
birth of what Elliss and Biggs (2001) term the “small farm paradigm,” a theme which 
has persisted in discourses of rural development in various manifestations up until 
the present.   
 
The major question which arises in this context is how one should interpret the 
Agriculture Perspective Plan.  It has been argued that the increased emphasis 
throughout the world on utilising the smallholding family farm as an engine for so 
called ‘development from below’ is connected with the broader dynamics of neo-
liberal globalisation (Bernstein, 2001, ; Ellis & Biggs, 2001).  While it is cloaked in 
pro-poor rhetoric, it appears that the APP is intricately connected with neo-liberal 
restructuring and the drive by capital to expand into previously isolated regions of 
the periphery.  The question is therefore, whether or not the implementation of the 
APP will facilitate the development of capitalist class relations in rural Nepal, or the 
subordination of pre-capitalist modes of production to capitalism. 
 
 
3.3 Ideology and capitalist expansion under neo-liberalism 
 
3.3.1 Structural Adjustment and capitalist expansion 
 
As was established in chapter 2, Nepal has been subject to economic liberalisation 
since the mid-1980s.  Neo-liberalism, the ideology which underlies the restructuring 
process, is as a political theory grounded in neoclassical economics.  It understands 
unrestricted markets as being the most effective way to deliver people’s needs, as 
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opposed to forms of state led central planning and market regulation (Dasgupta, 
1998, ; Peet & Watts, 1993).  The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
have played a significant role in ensuring that less developed countries are integrated 
into this new global economic order (Gore, 2000, ; Peet, 1999, ; Rankin, 2004).  
Crucial to structural adjustment are cut backs on public spending to reduce fiscal 
deficits while encouraging private enterprise in service provision (Ghosh, 1998, ; 
Oya, 2004, ; Peet, 1999).   Akram-Lodhi (2007, , 1445) summarises restructuring as 
an endeavour to “compress the state, to enhance the role of markets in social and 
cultural life, and in doing so broaden and deepen the role of capital and the capitalist 
mode of production in the countries of the South”.  As was suggested in the previous 
chapter, by opening up new sites for investment by multinational capital, 
restructuring serves the interests of capitalists in imperialist regions as they search 
for new sources of surplus value to counter falling rates of profit (Harvey, 2003).   
 
Of greatest significance for understanding the APP however, are the micro-level 
policies associated with neo-liberalism.  They mediate the shifting relations between 
the global capitalist mode of production dominated by the core industrialised 
economies and pre-capitalist modes of production within peripheral social 
formations.  These micro-level policies can intensify the subordination of pre-
capitalist modes of production to capitalism through their destruction as well as 
‘conservation–dissolution’.  In Nepal, there is evidence that the APP and its 
associated ideological framework facilitates the intensification of this process 
whereby capitalist markets are extended into previously more isolated social 
formations.  It is to these ideologies we now turn. 
 
 
3.3.2 Neo-liberal ideologies of rural development 
 
Mobilisation of ideology through rural development policy 
 
As was outlined above, political and ideological relations support the reproduction of 
global unequal relations between social formations.  In Nepal and elsewhere, long 
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established political alliances between the foreign and ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie have 
for example, reinforced the subordination of Nepalese industry to foreign capital.  
However, just as the British Empire was collapsing there was an emergence of new 
foreign interests through ‘aid.’  The volume of aid to Nepal from major donors such 
as India, China and the West increased substantially from the 1960s onwards (Blaikie 
et al., 2001).   
 
The direct imperialist interests of foreign enterprises and many outside governments 
(especially India) in Nepal are obvious.  However, the international development 
sector represents a more complex set of imperatives.  At one extreme the rural 
development agenda of the World Bank and IMF, who were of course instrumental 
in restructuring Nepal’s economy, represent interests compatible with those of 
imperialism.  However, at the other extreme are the micro-level rural development 
policies introduced through donors and INGOs, within which policies such as the 
APP have emerged.  At first glance the latter appear to represent a separate set of 
class interests from those associated with IMF and World Bank sanctioned capitalist 
expansion.  They may include some more ‘progressive’ agendas representing the 
struggles of the peasantry.  However, an in depth analysis of the ideologies behind a 
significant number of ‘pro-poor’ rural development policies and programs suggest 
the class interests they serve are not entirely different.  Despite the rhetoric, many 
offer what is simply a more ‘subtle’ ideological justification for both the further 
subordination of Nepal within the global economy and the further subjugation of pre-
capitalist modes of production in the search by capital for new sources of profit. 
  
Hall (1980) usefully combines the Althusserian notion of ideology with Gramsci’s 
notion of hegemony to understand the means through which the ideological and 
political levels of social formations interact with the economic level.  Hegemony is 
defined as a system through which a dominant class achieves “total social authority,” 
often through non-coercive means, not only at the economic level, but at the political 
and ideological level (Hall, 1980, , 331).  Hegemony is constantly reshaped as it 
seeks to adapt the superstructure of society in order to ensure the expanded 
reproduction of capital (Hall, 1980, ; Rankin, 2004).  At the national scale, it is 
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exercised in its political and ideological forms through both state and civil society 
institutions.   
 
However in the context of capitalist globalisation, Peet (2002) notes how neo-liberal 
hegemony can be exercised at a supra-national level.  It can be imposed upon 
peripheral social formations through what he terms academic-institutional-media 
complexes
1
 representing the power blocks in the global economy (Peet, 2002, , 57-
60).  In the context of less developed countries, while poverty alleviation policies are 
implemented domestically through the institutions of the nation-state, they are 
informed considerably both directly and indirectly by the ideologies of institutions 
such as the World Bank and major bilateral donor agencies.  The assertion that neo-
liberal ideology is exercised through infiltrating the existing state structures in 
peripheral countries is compatible with Gramsci’s claim that hegemonies are 
exercised through a process of negotiation which encompasses an alliance of classes, 




3.3.3 Ideology of the agricultural entrepreneur 
  
Self-help and neo-liberalism 
 
Larner (2000) argues that neo-liberalism is more than just an economic policy 
framework, but is a “system of meaning,” that frames people’s subjectivities in 
particular ways.  Althusser introduced the notion of interpellation, which is regarded 
as central to the process through which hegemonic ideologies are exercised and 
social formations are reproduced.  Althusser (1971) states that “…all ideology has 
the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects.”  
Ideology confers people with a seemingly natural subject position which governs 
how they are expected to perform.  Korteweg (2003) for example, utilises 
                                                 
1
 According to Peet (2002, 57-60) organisations subsumed under the concept “academic-institutional-
media (AIM) complexes” include not only institutions such as the World Bank and development 
agencies, but media institutions and universities who diffuse ideologies through reports, articles and 
popular media.    
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Althusser’s concept to examine how American single mothers are encouraged to 
perform the subject position of a self-sufficient masculine worker-citizen in the 
context of welfare reform.  This parallels a number of Foucauldian inspired studies 
that suggest neo-liberalism has led to the replacement of the welfare state with a 
form of governance that encourages individuals and institutions to behave in 
conformance with the norms of the market (Larner, 2000, ; Rose, 1999).  They 
encourage people to see themselves as entrepreneurial subjects responsible for their 
own welfare (Rose, 1999).   
 
In the context of countries such as Nepal, there is evidence that it is through donor 
led neo-liberal ideology that governments frame poverty alleviation strategies in the 
context of the withdrawal of state social support that characterised the ‘basic needs’ 
development initiatives of the 1970s and 80s (Peet, 1999, ; Stöhr & Taylor, 1982).  
As in most peripheral countries that are undergoing liberalisation, there have been 
cut backs in Nepal on the low levels of state social security that was made available 
prior to restructuring such as subsidised credit, and a privatization of key public 
services (Rankin, 2004)
 2
.  In this context, development policies expect citizens to 
perform an ‘entrepreneurial’ subject position based upon the values of individual 
autonomy and independence compatible with neo-liberalism, rather than an identity 
which embodies entitlement to social and political rights (Kamat, 2004, ; Mayer & 
Rankin, 2002, ; Rankin, 2004).  All citizens, including the poor, are encouraged to 
find their own solutions to their livelihood needs through utilizing their own skills 
and resources to ‘seize’ the opportunities made available by the global economy 
(Rankin, 2004, ; 2001).  As Kamat (2004, , 169) argues: “The individual is posited as 
both the problem and the solution to poverty rather than as an issue of the state’s 
redistribution policies or global trade policies”. 
 
In a similar vein, the smallholder commercialisation promoted in the APP provides 
the ideal means through which the rural poor can perform such an entrepreneurial 
                                                 
2
 Furthermore, in 1986, the government launched a short lived Basic Needs Program, which sought to 
meet the populations’ minimum needs in food, clothing, shelter, primary healthcare, education and 
security.  This was phased out following economic liberalisation (APROSC, 1995) 
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subject position.  At the time the APP was released, peasant farm commercialisation 
was viewed by key external funders as the ideal means through which small farmers 
could ‘liberate’ themselves from poverty through the market.  It was anticipated that 
the commercial production of high-value commodities would offer significant 
‘economic opportunity’ for small scale farmers, who could utilize their own skills to 
produce and sell cash crops to accumulate wealth (APROSC, 1995, ; Nepal National 
Planning Commission, 1997, ; 2004). 
 
This parallels global policy shifts.  The 2008 World Development Report by the 
World Bank is entitled “Agriculture for Development” and has placed considerable 
emphasis on the need to commercialise family farms to alleviate poverty through for 
example, the promotion of new crops and technologies, research and extension and 
enhanced access to credit (Akram-Lodhi, 2008).  On the first page, it states:   
 
“While the worlds of agriculture are vast, varied, and rapidly changing, with the right 
policies and supportive investments at local, national, and global levels, today’s agriculture 
offers new opportunities to hundreds of millions of rural poor to move out of poverty. 
Pathways out of poverty open to them by agriculture include smallholder farming and animal 
husbandry, employment in the “new agriculture” of high-value products, and 
entrepreneurship and jobs in the emerging rural, non farm economy” (World Bank, 2008, 1).   
 
Referring to the 2008 report, Akram-Lodhi (2003, , 1155) suggests that it seeks to 
“bring competitive entrepreneurial farmers further and deeper into better enabled 
markets.”   
 
Releasing the entrepreneurial potential of the peasantry: Implementation of the APP 
 
The APP proposed a number of interventions which would release the 
entrepreneurial spirit of the peasantry and encourage profitable commodity 
production.  As with many development initiatives, there is evidence that the 
understanding of human economic behaviour the APP mobilises is grounded 
squarely in the principles of neo-classical economics and rational choice theory.  
Such understandings of the social world state that individuals are self-interested and 
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act “rationally,” making decisions according to the likelihood that the outcomes will 
maximise their personal utility (Goldfield & Gilbert, 1995, ; Green & Shapiro, 1994).  
It is conventionally stated that “utility” refers to things that make one directly ‘better 
off’ such as wealth or power (Green & Shapiro, 1994).  It is assumed therefore in the 
APP that the provision of certain interventions will offer entrepreneurial ‘rational’ 
peasant households the incentive to commercialise.   
 
The implementation therefore included six proposed ‘priority inputs’ (APROSC, 
1995).  Many of these interventions were unsuccessfully implemented during the five 
year plans of the 1970s and 80s and it was anticipated in the APP that their effective 
provision today will offer commercialisation incentives to smallholders and pave the 
way for rapid rural economic growth and poverty alleviation (Nepal Department of 
Irrigation, 2005).  These include ‘transport’, such as the building of roads which will 
expand agricultural markets (see Figure 3-1), ‘irrigation’ to boost yields and ‘rural 
electrification’ which will cheapen the use of farm equipment.  A further three 
‘priority inputs’ include ‘fertiliser’ with initiatives to improve the supply of quality 
nutrients, and ‘technology’ with an emphasis on improved research and extension 
(APROSC, 1995).   
 
A final ‘priority input’ is ‘credit’.  Microfinance schemes have increasingly been 
promoted as important means through which to provide the conditions that encourage 
small farmers to commercialise in less developed countries (International Fund for 
Agricultural Development, 2006).  In Nepal, the schemes have increased 
considerably in rural areas throughout the country (APROSC, 1995, ; Maharajan & 
Takahatake, 2002, ; Shrestha, 2003).   Loans can be used for example, to purchase 
chemical fertilizer or shallow tube wells and to develop animal husbandry and high 
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Figure 3-1: Loading cabbages for transport to Indian market in Dhankuta district:  Expansion 
















Figure 3-2: IPM demonstration plot in Morang district: Agricultural extension to promote high 
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Many of the interventions designed to provide the incentives for commercialisation 
are specific to the neo-liberal era, being increasingly market led rather than state led.  
Although under neo-liberalism the state provides the infrastructure and services to 
encourage commercialisation such as the APP’s ‘priority inputs’, it has abolished 
many of the direct economic support mechanisms that were once regarded as crucial 
to agrarian development.  Such state support was central to the small farm paradigm 
of the 1970s and 80s which regulated prices, protected markets and offered subsidies 
to smallholders (Ellis & Biggs, 2001).  Nevertheless, such cutbacks are legitimated 
through arguments that suggest the competitive, entrepreneurial potential of 
smallholders is restricted due to state intervention in markets (Oya, 2001).  This 
argument is evident with regards to the withdrawal of state distribution of subsidised 
inputs in less developed countries (Barrett, 1997, ; Barrett & Mutambatsere, 2005).  
Rather than being reliant upon state run outlets, farmers can buy fertiliser in a 
‘competitive’ private sector.  Thus the farmer has a ‘choice’, allowing them to 
maximise utility through choosing the outlet that offers the most favourable prices 
and variety (Barrett, 1997).   
 
Interestingly, there is evidence that the policy makers formulating the APP sought to 
maintain some forms of direct state support for farmers, resisting the growing neo-
liberal orthodoxy.  The APP offered continual support for state subsidies in fertilizer 
and irrigation (APROSC, 1995, ; Deraniyagala et al., 2003)
3
.  Additional subsidies 
were also proposed for shallow tube well irrigation (APROSC, 1995).  However, the 
power relations inherent in the relationship between Nepal based policy makers and 
external donors have ensured the dominance of conventional neo-liberal ideology.  
Conditions attached to the 1998 Second Agricultural Program Loan (SAPL) from the 
Asian Development Bank required Nepal to eliminate these subsidies and promote 
private sector distribution of inputs (Deraniyagala et al., 2003).  It is stated that a 
liberalised private sector will more efficiently provide rural producers with high 
quality goods and offer greater choice, as well as leading to reduced government 
expenditure (Nepal National Planning Commission, 2003). 
                                                 
3
 It proposed for example that 13% of the priority input investment is to be allocated to fertilsizer 
subsidies.   
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As was outlined above, the development sector has complex objectives\ and in this 
context hegemony is not imposed, but is exercised through a process of a negotiation 
and alliance building by different interests.  As Rankin (2007) argues, the diffusion 
of neo-liberalism does not represent an imposition of a universalizing ideology.  
Instead, it articulates and negotiates with existing national networks and discourses
4
.  
In Nepal therefore, there was clearly some resistance to neo-liberalism, although it 
was unsuccessful.  When interviewing a policy maker involved in the formulation of 
the original APP, he stressed his frustration with this situation when I asked about the 
potential for subsidies being reintroduced: 
 
“Given the dependence of Nepal on donors, I see that only as a remote possibility.  Subsidies 
will not be introduced no matter how loudly the government yells… and even during this 
entire period of political revolution, all the finance ministers, yes all the finance ministers 
and the vice chairman of National Planning Commission, they are all supporters of the neo-
liberal market. They want a minimum role for the government… the government body’s role 
is only to facilitate, regulate, play a political role, and everything else is for the private 
sector... and I think donors also have a handle here in really influencing what the 
government emphasizes, I think it’s basically World Bank and IMF, supported by some other 
big donors. So they will not let Nepal reintroduce subsidies.” 
 
The respondent also suggests that orthodox neo-liberalism has been successful in 
shaping agrarian policy not only through coercion by international financiers but 
through the support for the free market offered by those at the top of the planning 
hierarchy.  This is could perhaps be associated with the history of alliances between 







                                                 
4
 Rankin (2007) identifies similar conflicting interests within the microfinance sector, whereby 
domestic policy makers have resisted the donor led imposition of neo-liberal discourses.  Policy 
makers schooled in an era which favoured state support for the poor attempted to accommodate social 
protectionist objectives in the context of economic reforms to the credit sector.   
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3.3.4 Ideological justification of capitalist expansion 
 
Thus far it is clear that the APP has introduced a series of interventions designed to 
unleash the entrepreneurial spirit of the peasantry.  While this reframing of the 
subject position expected of the rural poor can be understood as an effective ideology 
which justifies the withdrawal of state social support, there is evidence that these 
ideologies play a far more important role.  This is apparent when one observes that 
Nepal lacked a strong developmentalist state which provided significant social 
support to the poor in the first place.  A more noteworthy function of neo-liberal 
ideologies of ‘self-help’ and entrepreneurship is their capacity to legitimise and 
facilitate the expansion of capitalist social relations into previously isolated sectors.   
 
The APP can therefore be interpreted as legitimising and making possible the further 
integration of the Nepalese peasantry into global capitalist markets, realising new 
sources of surplus value for capital.  How though does this occur?  As was discussed 
in chapter 2, the commercialisation of agriculture can set forth a process of 
differentiation.  Peasants become dependent upon the market and the more successful 
farmers emerge into capitalist producers, while poorer farmers are reduced to 
becoming landless labourers.  In peripheral regions such as Nepal where there are 
few alternative livelihood options, this releases a ‘reserve army’ of labour willing to 
work for low wages.    
 
However, is this the actual ‘intention’ of the APP?  Amongst Nepal’s national policy 
makers, concepts such as entrepreneurship and self-help justify the withdrawal of 
state support.  However, it would be difficult to argue that they themselves directly 
seek full differentiation and the establishment of large farms and a release of a 
reserve army of proletarian or semi-proletarian labour.  Instead, the focus of the APP 
is largely on middle farmer led agricultural growth
5
.  It seeks poverty alleviation 
through the development of what Marx would term ‘petty commodity production’, 
whereby family farms produce for the market while still owning their means of 
                                                 
5
 Although it acknowledges that the more marginal farmers should join the labour force, the strategy 
seeks the consolidation of a commodity producing middle peasantry rather than the polarisation of the 
rural class structure. 
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production (Mann & Dickenson, 1978).  The APP could potentially justify the 
subordination of middle peasant producers whereby they supply cheap commodities 
to capitalism with few opportunities for accumulation.  However, this directly 
contradicts the APP’s pro-poor rhetoric. 
 
How therefore does one understand the ideological role played by the APP?  Most 
importantly, the APP is effective for capitalist expansion as it is depoliticising.  It 
diverts attention from the exploitative micro and macro class relations which emerge 
in the context of commodity production, regardless of their particular manifestation 
by promoting an unfeasible model of growth.  The popular notion in rural 
development policies such as the APP that profitable petty commodity production 
can persist without differentiation has been long criticised from a Marxian 
perspective (Bernstein & Byres, 2001, ; Byres, 1979).  It has been argued that small 
farm commercialisation strategies in a neo-liberal era are based upon notions of an 
“average representative farmer” (Oya, 2004, , 3).  They fail to account for 
historically specific forms of economic stratification in rural areas and the potential  
for differentiation (Bernstein & Byres, 2001, ; Oya, 2004).  This raises serious 
questions regarding the vision of a dynamic ‘middle farmer’ led agrarian 
transformation in the APP.  Similarly, the APP overlooks the possibility of 
articulations between capitalism and petty commodity production which would result 
in an appropriation of surplus through the market mechanism, impeding 
accumulation (de Janvry, 1981). 
 
The neoclassical economics in which the APP is grounded, with its roots in 
methodological individualism, neglects to understand the economy as embedded in 
social relations, assuming it is composed of abstract profit maximising individuals.  
Such theories therefore fail to acknowledge the role of deeply entrenched structures 
that condition individuals’ behaviour as much as profit maximising desires (Little, 
1991).  This separation of the social from the economic which is made to appear 
‘natural’, is thus a crucial element of the ideological process through which neo-
liberalism informs development policies and operates alongside the interpellation of 
entrepreneurial subject positions upon rural populations.  Brown (2006) suggests that 
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depoliticisation is central to the neo-liberal project.  Social problems such as 
economic inequality are framed in market terms and technocratic solutions are 
suggested, diverting attention from the exploitative social relations of capitalism 
itself (Brown, 2006).   
 
The APP in this context, by emphasising entrepreneurship as the core to poverty 
alleviation, glosses over the exploitative class structures associated with the 
integration of rural populations into capitalist markets.  However, it serves the 
imperatives of imperialist globalisation by not only providing the ideological 
justification, but the actual conditions which allow the expansion of capitalism.  
These include the institutions and infrastructure to facilitate the subordination of 
peasants to capital.  If this facilitates differentiation, it would increase the pool of 
cheap – often semi-proletarian – labour for firms seeking to invest in Nepal both 
today and in the future, as well as increasing the potential supply of migrant labour.  
The development of a peasant sector providing surplus to capitalism in a ‘functional’ 
articulation of modes of production appears unlikely to occur as an immediate 
consequence of the APP’s implementation, as little focus was placed on the likes of 
contract farming and agribusiness.  However, by expanding capitalist markets, the 
APP sets the conditions for such subjugation in the future. 
 
Comparative advantage, supply and demand-led linkages, and poverty alleviation 
 
The depoliticisation inherent in the APP not only justifies the integration of the 
peasantry into capitalist markets, it also reproduces the structural location of the 
Nepalese social formation within the global economy.  The emphasis on small farm 
commercialisation is compatible with ideologies of ‘comparative advantage’ which 
have been given renewed importance under neo-liberal globalisation (Bernstein, 
2001, ; Patnaik, 2007).  Rather than attempting to advance their position in the 
international division of labour through state ownership or protection of key 
domestic industries, natural resource rich, labour surplus low income countries, are 
expected to orient their economies to the export of primary goods and labour 
intensive manufactured products (Fonda & Gereffi, 1992, ; Patnaik, 2007).  Such 
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theories represent an effective ideology which underlies neo-liberal globalisation, 
grounded in the assumption that ‘the market’ will allocate world resources in the 
most efficient way possible (Piene & McMichael, 2003).  As was discussed in 
chapter 2, the further diversion of resources from industry further blocks capitalist 
industrial development (Harvey, 2003).  This of course also facilitates the realisation 
of ‘super-profits’ for firms from more developed regions, increasing their monopoly 
over peripheral markets and expanding opportunities for the export of capital.  
Furthermore, the combination of limited industrial development and capitalist 
differentiation in agriculture is essential if a ‘reserve army’ of labour is to be released 
in the first instance. 
 
In line with assertions by the World Bank (World Bank, 2008)
6
, the APP states that 
Nepal’s ‘comparative advantage’ lies in the production of higher value agricultural 
commodities and labour intensive agro-products (APROSC, 1995, ; Nepal National 
Planning Commission, 2004).  Such policies are further supported by the assertion 
that Nepal is a country with nearly 80 percent of its population employed in farming 
(Nepal National Planning Commission, 2004).  In this context the smallholder is 
central to national economic growth strategy.  The APP states that:   
 
“The engine of growth will be agriculture.  It dominates employment through its direct and 
indirect influences, is the largest component of Nepal’s gross national product, has great 
potential for technology-based increases in resource productivity, and has strong multiplier 
effects on other sectors of the economy” (APROSC, 1995, , xvii).   
 
With regards to agricultural exports, it is suggested that Nepal can take advantage of 
its vast altitude related climatic differences and produce off-season vegetables, which 
cannot be produced in India during the summer months. Meanwhile, the Terai can 
focus on the commercial production of grain staples, primarily for the domestic 
market, alongside some high value exportable commodities (APROSC, 1995).   
                                                 
6
 The 2008 World Development Report claims that while agricultural development is crucial to 
poverty alleviation, it can also be the sector most central to economic development.  In the context of 
less developed countries it states that:  “…comparative advantage in the tradable sub-sectors will still 
lie in primary activities (agriculture and mining) and agro-processing for many years, because of 
resource endowments and the difficult investment climate for manufactures” (World Bank, 2008, 8). 
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If Nepal’s comparative advantage lies in agriculture, and resources are to be diverted 
away from industry, how does the APP claim to be able to realise national economic 
development?  The work of economists such as John Mellor Bruce Johnston have 
been particularly influential in this regard, an unsurprising outcome given that 
Mellor’s consultancy firm operated alongside a Nepalese NGO, the Agricultural 
Projects Services Centre (APROSC) to develop the plan.  The first element of 
Mellor’s theory of agricultural led national development mobilised in the APP is the 
assumption that agricultural growth has a ‘multiplier effect’ on other sectors of the 
economy, and that industry emerges spontaneously from a dynamic agricultural 
sector (APROSC, 1995).  This is based upon the premise that the introduction of new 
technologies in agriculture increases rural incomes and boosts the demand for 
consumer goods, facilitating rural led industrialisation (Johnston & Park, 1995, ; 
Mellor, 1976).  The 2008 World Development Report itself mobilises an identical 
argument where suggests that:  
 
“When agricultural incomes are spent on domestically produced non tradable goods and 
services, it stimulates demand for domestic industry and services. Production links proceed 
forward by fostering growth in agro processing and food marketing and backward through 
demand for intermediate inputs and services (World Bank, 2008, , 34). 
 
The second element of Mellor’s strategy evident in the APP is the type of envisaged 
industrial development, which remains well in line with theories of comparative 
advantage.  The APP suggests that the government should focus on strengthening the 
existing industrial structure based upon agro-processing and other durable consumer 
goods industries.  It asserts that the sector will expand naturally through the rural 
growth linkages accrued from improved agricultural incomes (APROSC, 1995).  
These labour intensive industries where Nepal has a ‘comparative advantage’, 
include garments, tobacco and leather production
7
 (UNDP, 2002).  To Mellor (1976), 
such industries are both labour intensive rather than capital intensive, and have the 






 Plan’s industrial strategy is based upon the development of such industries, 
alongside sectors such as hydropower (Nepal National Planning Commision, 1997, 2003) 
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most potential to develop in the context of agrarian growth.  It is asserted that capital 
goods such as petro-chemicals, steel and fertilizers should be imported (Mellor, 
1976).   
 
The final element of Mellor’s argument in the APP is the assertion that such small 
scale industries offer indirect poverty alleviation benefits to more marginal 
households (APROSC, 1995).  Mellor argues that the growing demand for labour 
through the multiplier effect offers improved employment opportunities for poorer 
farmers and landless labourers who perhaps can not benefit directly from 
commercialisation (Mellor, 1976).   
 
Not only does Mellor’s vision of profitable petty commodity production appear 
highly unlikely given its failure to engage with class, the spontaneous development 
of a dynamic industrial sector appears equally misguided.  His prediction of rural 
growth linkages have been challenged on an empirical level (see Dunham, 1991).  
Furthermore, his approach fails to challenge foreign (primarily Indian) capital’s 
monopoly and dominance in manufacturing over the decades, and the diversion of 
resources away from industries producing higher value capital and basic goods.  In 
other words, such a policy would merely reinforce Nepal’s position in the global 
division of labour. 
 
 
3.4 Initial evidence of shortcomings in APP implementation 
 
3.4.1 The impact of the APP on poverty alleviation 
 
Despite the rhetoric and predictions, as one may expect, evidence suggests that the 
Agricultural Perspective Plan has had a questionable impact on poverty alleviation 
over 13 years after its initiation.  This is asserted in the APP Implementation Status 
Report (IDL Group, 2006).  Although aggregate reduction in the population living 
below the poverty line
8
 in the mountains and hills had between 1995-6 and 2003-4 
                                                 
8
 Poverty line determined by calorie requirement.  The minimum calorie requirement as the basis for 
the poverty line in the APP was 2256 calories. 
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exceeded APP targets by 17.3% and 10% respectively, the Terai had fallen short of 
targets by 3%, despite it having been the area with supposedly the greatest poverty 
reduction potential (IDL Group, 2006).  Much of the poverty reduction in the hills 
and mountains, has been attributed to remittances from male migration to the Gulf 
and Malaysia and not agrarian transformation (IDL Group, 2006).   
 
Furthermore, the poverty alleviation which has been achieved has not been shared by 
all socio-economic groups.  In the same period, the share of those classified in the 
report as ‘small farmers’ living below the poverty line increased from 45-54% and 
the share of ‘medium’ and ‘large’ farmers decreased from 26-18% (IDL Group, 
2006).  The APP-ISP goes as far as to question the degree to which the decrease in 
wealthier households living below the poverty line is attributable to agricultural 
development.  Despite the envisaged ‘rural led’ economic growth, the reduction of 
poverty was significantly greater in urban areas than rural areas, and the ratio of rural 
to urban poor has increased from 2:1 to 3.6:1 (IDL Group, 2006).   
 
As of 2006, the Human Development Index for Nepal remains the lowest in South 
Asia and is positioned at 138
th
 out of the 178 included countries (Nepal National 
Planning Commission, 2007).  Many in Nepal have held the state’s continued failure 
to guide national development as responsible for such conditions (Thapa, 2004).  It 
has also been a prime explanation for the resentment and disillusionment with the 
subsequent governments that served in the late 1990s and early twenty first century 
(Thapa, 2004).  Inevitably, this disillusionment led to the dramatic political changes 
which unfolded towards the turn of the century, such as the armed struggle by the 
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3.4.2 ‘Techno-fixes’ for perceived shortcomings in the APP  
 
In this context, solutions to the perceived failures of the APP to meet its poverty 
alleviation targets have focussed on removing the technical constraints which have 
prevented ‘rational’ farmers from receiving the incentive to enter the market, rather 
than engaging with structural relations of power at a macro or micro scale.  The 2006 
Agriculture Perspective Plan Implementation Action Plan (APP-IAP) for example, 
seeks to continue the work of the original APP, but with numerous modifications 
(IDL Group, 2006).  It suggests that development institutions did not successfully 
provide farmers with the ‘priority inputs’ such as infrastructure and services which 
would encourage commercialisation (IDL Group, 2006).  The APP-ISR explains 
these failed interventions primarily by citing overall organisational problems and 
lack of coordination between different departments responsible for plan 
implementation (IDL Group, 2006).  For example, between 1997/98 and 2003-4, 
although targets were exceeded in increasing the area under surface irrigation, the 
area under groundwater irrigation (mainly in the Terai) remained at only 25% of the 
APP target, despite the promotion of shallow tube well irrigation as a central element 
of the plan (see Table 3-1).  Similarly, the target for rural road construction for the 
first 10 years of the plan was for 3312km to be built, when in fact, only 840km was 
actually completed (IDL Group, 2006).   
 
In many cases, government budget allocations were well below those recommended 
in the APP.  For the first three years of the plan from 1996-1999, recommended 
government expenditure on agriculture, irrigation and forestry was targeted at Rs 
10,256 million.  The actual expenditure turned out to be Rs 6575 million (constant 
prices 1996/7 levels) (ANZDEC-Ltd, 2002).  Similarly, in 1997-98, investment in 
agricultural research and extension was 92% of the APP target, but by 1998-99, it 
had dropped to 57% (Deraniyagala et al., 2003).  Furthermore, The Agricultural 
Sector Performance Review (ANZDEC-Ltd, 2002) states that in 2002, 33 percent of 
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Table 3-1: Progress of APP in meeting irrigation targets 
 




Achievements as of 
2003/04 (hectares) 
% Progress of APP 
targets 
Surface Irrigation 90,400 
 
128,175 141% 






(Source: IDL Group, 2006) 
 
One can certainly not deny that there were significant institutional failures in the 
delivery of the APP.  It is even possible to situate these failures within the context of 
Nepal’s distorted capitalist development and the persistence of a feudal and 
comprador bourgeoisie within the bureaucracy, obstructing the emergence of a strong 
developmentalist state (Blaikie et al., 2001).  There is evidence that the old political 
culture of elitism, clientelism and corruption remains widespread within the state’s 
development institutions (Blaikie et al., 2001, ; Thapa, 2004).   Furthermore, the 
already weak states’ capacity to carry out vital development work such as 
agricultural service provision has been undermined by the increased emphasis on the 
role of NGOs in development under neo-liberal restructuring (Blaikie et al., 2001).  
There is now also a wide range of development activities being carried out by 
uncoordinated, unrepresentative private sector institutions.  The piecemeal nature of 
development work in Nepal has often resulted in an inability to strategically 
coordinate programs (Blaikie et al., 2001, ; Dhakal, 2006). 
 
However, a successful provision of the APP’s priority inputs would simply represent 
another ‘techno-fix’ to address agrarian development obstacles which are inherently 
structural and rooted in class relations.    Nepal’s 10 year Maoist insurgency which 
continued for much of the period of APP implementation was suggested to be an 
additional significant factor which had hindered the provision of ‘priority inputs’ 
(IDL Group, 2006).  Ironically however, the conflict itself was believed to be a 
product of Nepal’s long standing and deeply entrenched class inequalities (Thapa, 
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2004).  A meaningful engagement with the class structures within social formations 
such as Nepal therefore may reveal some of the deep flaws inherent in the APP.   
 
 
3.4.3. Pre-capitalist modes of production and the APP 
 
A Marxian theory of agrarian transition which accepts the presence of class relations 
suggests significant shortcomings in the APP.  The failure to acknowledge class 
differentiation casts doubt upon the APP’s capacity to alleviate poverty through 
middle-farmer led commodity production in the long run.  However, these 
approaches still predict some dynamic change in the agrarian economy.  
Acknowledging that some of the priority inputs have been implemented, albeit below 
the APP targets, one would expect that as a perquisite for full or partial capitalist 
differentiation, there would be an emergence of commodity production and the 
gradual displacement of less profitable producers.   
 
However, there is thus far limited evidence of this occurring.  One expected outcome 
of capitalist development in agriculture would be economic growth in the sector.  
The Ninth Five Year Plan from 1997-2002 set a target for the country to achieve 4 
percent agricultural growth in the first three years of the plan followed by steady 
growth above 5% (ANZDEC-Ltd, 2002).  In reality however, Figure 3-3 
demonstrates that the average growth rate of agriculture as a component of GDP 
from fiscal years 1995/6 to 1999/00, the first phase of the Agriculture Perspective 
Plan, remained at 2.94% (ANZDEC-Ltd, 2002).  Subsequently, with the exception of 
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Initial evidence thus casts doubt upon the capacity of the APP to stimulate the 
emergence of the small scale rural agrarian capitalism which it envisaged.  As 
Blaikie et al (2001, , 299) state:   
 
“The APP’s vision of a generalised dynamic agricultural transformation, creating new social 
classes and new patterns of investment and accumulation, as well as induced linkages and 
multiplier effects associated with rapid growth in manufacturing and services within Nepal-
shows no signs of being realised yet, more than five years after the Plan was initiated.”   
 
Blaikie et al (2001) point to the fact that much of the peasantry whom the APP has 
targeted, continue to live with livelihoods based primarily upon subsistence 
production, labouring and seasonal migration.  Even amongst the wealthier strata of 
the rural population, commodity production is low, and when it is prevalent, it is 
dominated by traditional methods and does not act as a major source of 
accumulation.   
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This brings us back to the arguments raised in chapter 2, that pre-capitalist modes of 
production are often able to resist the encroachment of capitalism, to the point that 
only extra-economic coercion is able to undermine them.  In the context of the APP’s 
policies, there was little evidence of extra-economic coercion.  Any capitalist 
differentiation one would expect to transpire would occur through ‘natural’ economic 
processes associated with the strengthening of more profitable farmers.  In this 
context, could it be possible that pre-capitalist modes of production in rural Nepal 
present a barrier to the expansion of capitalism through the APP? 
 
A fundamental irony of the APP’s neo-liberal ideologies is that not only do they 
divert attention from capitalist axes of exploitation, but of pre-capitalist class 
relations such as semi-feudalism, which may hinder the expansion of capital in the 
first instance.  A more rigorous analysis of pre-capitalist modes of production 
themselves, while acknowledging Nepal’s macro-economic situation, may cause one 
to doubt the APP’s capacity to promote any form of significant profitable commodity 
production in rural Nepal in the first instance, including forms which will lead to 
capitalist development.  This would challenge both the APP and classical 





The Agriculture Perspective Plan represents a drive by the Nepalese government and 
donors to expand the commercialisation of agriculture in rural Nepal, and envisages 
rural economic growth based upon profitable ‘middle farmer’ led commodity 
production.  The interventions associated with the APP arguably have the potential to 
stimulate some form of dynamic change in the agrarian sector.  While the middle-
farmer led agrarian transformation appears an unlikely scenario, one may expect the 
APP to expedite the emergence of capitalist dominance in Nepalese agriculture.  The 
focus on poverty alleviation through smallholder commercialisation is 
understandable in the context of World Bank and IMF hegemony in shaping rural 
development policy.  The neo-liberal ideologies inherent in the APP divert attention 
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from class relations and the potential subjugation of the peasantry to capitalism 
through either differentiation or articulation of modes of production.  On a subtle 
level therefore, the APP serves the interest of capitalist expansion within the 
periphery, realising new sources of surplus value.   
 
However, a fundamental paradox of the neo-liberal ideologies behind the APP is that 
they also have the potential to divert attention from the pre-capitalist modes of 
production in rural Nepal.  The APP envisages the spontaneous transition from a pre-
capitalist economic formation to one based upon profit oriented commodity 
production in the same way that classical Marxian readings of agrarian transition 
assume the automatic emergence of capitalism.  In order to examine the trajectory of 
agrarian change in Nepal and outcomes of the APP’s interventions, it is necessary to 
examine the modes of production on the ground and how they may resist the 
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This chapter initially provides a justification for the political-economic approach 
used, acknowledging its weaknesses, while outlining how these will be addressed.  
Section 4.3 describes how the epistemological approach taken merits a combination 
of both quantitative and qualitative data.  It justifies the choice of study villages, 
before describing the process of sampling, quantitative and qualitative data 
collection, and how access to the community was gained.  Section 4.4 engages with 
the issue of reflexivity and ethics in the research process. 
 
 
4.2 Methodological issues 
 
4.2.1 Non-essentialism and Marxian political economy 
 
In recent years Marxian political economy has been marginalized as a means of 
understanding changes in the human condition in favour of more post-structural 
epistemologies.  Its theories, which are based upon abstract fixed categories, have 
come under scrutiny for their failure to account for difference and complexity in the 
social world (Castree, 1999;  Corrbridge, 1990).  Marxism’s role has always been to 
destabilize the assumptions of neo-classical economics and the supposed 
benevolence of the “invisible hand” of the market (Castree, 1999).  However, there 
has been a move away from Marxian political economy at the very time when there 
has been a growing ascendancy of free market capitalism throughout the world and a 
consequent exacerbation of global inequality and uneven development (Castree, 
1999;  Corrbridge, 1990).  The crucial relevance of Marxian political economy also 
becomes apparent when investigating the dynamics behind the blocked capitalist 
development in Nepali agriculture, a process which I argue can not be understood 
without reference to Nepal’s structural position in the globalised capitalist economy.   
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Marxism is a theoretic approach uniquely suited to challenge the assumptions of neo-
classical economics that individuals will automatically respond to new marketing 
opportunities promoted in agrarian policy.  Through an engagement with class 
relations, it can identify the processes which have constrained the emergence of 
profitable commercialisation.  It can thus reveal how the “freedom of choice” so 
called “rational” individuals are assumed to exercise in neo-liberal economics is 
largely illusory, and the behaviour of agents is largely a function of their particular 
structural location.  Marxian engagement with neo-liberalism however, has been 
overly focussed on identifying the emergence of capitalist class relations (Akram-
Lodhi, 2007;  2008;  Harvey, 2003).  This study hopes to extend the scope of 
Marxian political economy itself in moving away from developmentalist 
interpretations which implicitly assume the inevitable dominance of capitalism.  
While still engaging with class relations, this thesis seeks to better understand those 
associated with pre-capitalist economic formations.  It examines how they achieve 
stability in ways which both limit the success of neo-liberal poverty alleviation 
strategy but also impede the emergence of capitalism.  
 
However, in order to investigate the constraints to profitable commercialisation at a 
village level in Morang, and the ‘reproduction’ of pre-capitalist economic 
formations, how does one attend to the criticisms Marxism has received for its 
perceived ‘essentialism’?  Two elements of the approach taken attempt to address 
these concerns, both of which were touched upon in the previous chapter.  
 
Firstly, this study follows the Althusserian tradition of Marxism in attempting to 
move away from interpretations which assume a universal trajectory of economic 
change.  Rather than superimposing pre-existing theoretical categories on the 
complex social reality it seeks to identify structures which persist in time and space, 
or forms of ‘crystallized power’ (Glassman, 2006).  As Harvey (1996) argues, a 
dialectic approach does not seek ‘ontological security’ or reductionism.  Instead it 
seeks to understand common generative processes and relations.  The ‘mode of 
production’ represents one of these structures or ‘generative processes’.  It is a 
particular set of social relations associated with the production process which 
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achieves some stability at particular geographical and historical junctures.  Given 
that the process of material production is a universal feature of all societies, the mode 
of production can be argued to represent an extremely important form of ‘crystallised 
power’.  The character of particular modes of production however, varies 
considerably in different societies and the task of the Marxist researcher is therefore 
to identify its unique character and the mechanisms through which the set of relations 
it constitutes achieves stability (Raatgever, 1985;  van Binsbergen & Geschiere, 
1985).   
 
The second associated element of the approach taken in this study which addresses 
the post-structural critique of Marxism is to be open to complexity within the ‘modes 
of production’ identified.  It is thus important to be aware of situations whereby 
individuals are able to exercise agency within the economic structures into which 
they are integrated.  Similarly, it is important to be aware of social processes which 
do not simplistically reflect the predominant mode(s) of production, particularly 
when examining ideologies associated with caste and gender and their material 
manifestation.  In other words the Marxist researcher must be aware of ways in 
which  the ‘superstructure’, representing the realms of politics and ideology, can 
have some autonomy from the economic ‘base’.  
  
 




The challenge to understanding the social world through concepts such as modes of 
production emerges from the fact that they are theoretical constructs which facilitate 
understanding particular structural relations but can not actually be ‘observed’ on the 
ground (van Binsbergen & Geschiere, 1985).  In order to avoid the temptation of 
either attempting to ‘fit’ the observed social world into a pre-existing evolutionary 
set of modes of production or glossing over their internal complexity, it was clear 
that an extended study would be necessary with an in-depth ethnography.  An 
ethnography would offer insights into the internal complexity of the observed social 
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formation and the temporally and geographically unique combination of social 
relations and trajectories of change.  For this reason it was decided to focus on a 
single set of communities rather than a broader district or regional level analysis.  I 
could therefore be immersed in the local culture and also generate rapport with the 
local population.  However, as local level modes of production are articulated at far 
broader geographical scales, it was also necessary to situate the processes in the 
broader context.  For this reason, while an ethnographic study of the village – the 
scale where production itself takes place – was the focus of the study, it was also 
necessary to carry out some analysis at the sites outside the community which shape 
the character of the local economic formation.  Most notably, these included  sites of 
exchange such as markets.  Even if fieldwork was not carried out at external sites, 
efforts were made to ensure the village level analysis examined how local processes 
interact with those at broader geographical scales. 
 
Morang was selected as a research district.  It is a region which arguably has much 
potential for profitable commercialisation, a precondition for the kind of market 
oriented production sought in the APP or capitalist development.  It has excellent 
transport connections, so the costs of transporting goods to the market do not create 
as much of a constraint for commodity producing farmers as they do in other parts of 
a country dominated by remote hill communities.  For similar reasons, agricultural 
services from the government and NGOs are more easily available than elsewhere in 
the country.  If profitable commercialisation and capitalist development can not 
occur in this region, its feasibility in more remote communities seems even less 
likely.   
 
After visiting numerous communities throughout Morang district, I chose to base 
myself in a Pidarboni, the large Tharu and Dalit village in Jhorahat VDC where my 
assistant and I rented a basic room with a local Tharu family.  I also researched in the 
neighbouring VDCs of Bhaudaha and Thalaha, where I travelled during the daytime 
and returned in the evening for a welcome plate of dhal bhat (rice, lentils and curry).  
The three adjoining VDCs were chosen to represent the ethnic diversity of the Terai.  
They lie on a frontier between the three main cultural regions which constitute 
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Morang and neighbouring Sunsari district.  The region to the north is predominantly 
former forest land with extensive settlements of hill migrants.  To the west and east 
the settlements are home predominantly to indigenous plains ethnic groups such as 
the Tharu, while the southern belt bordering India is dominated by Maithili speaking 
castes with cultural ties extending south of the border.  All three cultural groups are 




Once a community had been identified, the next stage of this research was to identify 
the most suitable techniques.  In terms of understanding the forms of surplus 
appropriation, a quantitative survey is an effective tool.  It offers the study some 
‘external validity’, producing data which is generalisable to the study area in ways 
which would not be possible through a series of in-depth qualitative case studies.  
This method must not however be interpreted as meaning the statistics claim to 
represent an objective truth in the positivist sense (Sheppard, 2001).    They are an 
essential tool to any study which seeks to understand what Lawson (1995, 452) terms 
“relational ontologies” through which objects take on meaning through their relation 
to others, which in this case are relations of class, caste and gender.  Statistical 
techniques can in this context be used in an exploratory sense to identify complex 
processes rather than to prove deductive models (Lawson, 1995;  Sheppard, 2001).  
Furthermore, statistical analysis can be used to critique positivist approaches such as 
the neo-classical economics used to justify neo-liberalism, “on their own terms” 
(Sheppard, 2001, 549). 
 
Given that the family farm is the basic unit of production from which one would 
expect profitable commercialisation and eventually capitalist farming to emerge, the 
household was naturally selected as the most suitable unit for analysis and data 
collection.  A household survey was therefore developed.  While I entered the field 
prepared to uncover complexity in the social relations observed, it was still required 
that the process of data collection in the survey be driven by my Marxian conceptual 
framework.  This was necessary if I was to address the research questions and 
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identify forms of ‘crystallised power’.  While compiling the survey form therefore, a 
checklist of issues to be addressed was created.   
 
Research question 1a) aims to identify the modes of production and their evolution 
over time, while question 1b) attempts to understand its composition and the forms 
of surplus appropriation associated with the production relations.  The quantitative 
survey proved particularly effective in identifying the components of the mode of 
production, providing an extensive bank of data on the ‘forces’ of production as well 
as the ‘relations of production’ though which surplus is appropriated.  In order to 
understand the diversity in forms of surplus appropriation, it was ensured that the 
survey covered the multiple stages of production (See Appendix 2).  Questions dealt 
with households’ access to land, the rent payments by (or to) the household and the 
labour performed by family members on other farms.  To gain an understanding of 
the forces of production, it was necessary to ask detailed questions regarding the 
inputs and tools used by households. 
 
In order to address question 1c), it was necessary to gather data on forms of surplus 
appropriation within the sphere of circulation.  This ensured that the survey covered 
data relating to prices received for crops and interest payments on loans.  To gain 
stronger insight into these relations, a second series of quantitative surveys of 
agricultural merchants who purchase crops from farmers was conducted, gathering 
information on both prices and market structure (See Appendix 3). 
 
The second research question examines how these forms of surplus appropriation 
shape the trajectory of agrarian transition.  It was therefore necessary to include 
questions which offered insights into whether or not profitable commercialisation 
was emerging (See Appendix 2).  Sections of the form attempted to identify signs of 
accumulation, such as the levels of market participation, investment in new 
technology, inputs or productive assets.  The form was also designed so as to identify 
signs of households making a loss, such as the selling of assets.  This data could then 
be compared with data on surplus appropriation.  Initial impressions when beginning 
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the fieldwork prompted me also to include questions on issues such as cultural 
capital investment. 
 
To address each of these questions it was necessary to identify the relationships 
between modes of production.  A starting point is to recognise the first form of 
articulation whereby households produce under the pre-capitalist mode of production 
while labouring in the capitalist mode of production.  Data was thus collected on all 
the outside forms of labour performed by household members (See Appendix 2).  As 
Van Binsbergen & Geschiere (1985, 260) argue, articulation of modes of production 
is “realised in the social life of the individual”.  The second type of articulation 
occurs when pre-capitalist producers sell their commodities in the capitalist market.  
The data on market participation and prices received was able to offer some insights 




It was clearly apparent when planning this research that the quantitative data 
collected in the survey could only give initial insights into the two main research 
questions.  For example, when dealing with the first research question and its sub-
queries, such data was insufficient to provide historical data on the evolution of the 
mode of production relevant to question 1a. Historical data can be most effectively 
gathered through qualitative oral testimonies.  Furthermore, quantitative data could 
tell me little about mechanisms through which particular forms of surplus 
appropriation and modes of production as a whole are reproduced after each 
productive cycle.  As discussed in chapter 2, this often occurs through political 
processes which are best observed qualitatively (van Binsbergen & Geschiere, 1985).  
Ideological mechanisms are also central to the reproduction of pre-capitalist 
economic formations.  Van Binsbergen & Geschiere (1985) stress that when 
examining pre-capitalist modes of production, ideology requires a particularly deep 
qualitative analysis.  By its nature it is something innovative which escapes the 
repetitiveness of social phenomena researchers have a tendency to search for.   
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However, it was not only the need for data on the non-economic reproduction of 
social relations which required qualitative data.  All the core economic relationships 
outlined in the survey required a deeper analysis.  This raises the issue of ‘internal 
validity’.  While quantitative data gives the study ‘external validity’, or a degree of 
generalisability which may be attractive to policy makers, research also requires 
‘internal validity’, an indication that the reported results are actually caused by the 
factors the data suggests (de-Vaus, 2001;  Robson, 1993).  This is particularly 
important when the study is seeking not to just identify relationships (such as forms 
of surplus appropriation), but to better understand the processes which give rise to 
these relationships (McKendrick, 1999).  For example, research question four seeks 
to identify how particular forms of surplus appropriation shape the trajectory of 
capitalist development.  In this context quantitative data only provides possible 
indications as to the causes, but qualitative data allows  people themselves to identify 
the impact of particular structural relations on their lives (Lawson, 1995).  As Yin 
(2003) argues, qualitative case studies are particularly suitable for studies where the 
research objectives are based upon explanatory “how” or “why” questions rather than 
exploratory “what” or “where” questions.  
 
It was therefore decided to ‘triangulate’, combining qualitative and quantitative 
methods (McKendrick, 1999).   An extensive quantitative survey was used to 
identify relationships, while qualitative techniques were used to understand some of 
the causal processes behind them.  The first form of qualitative data collection 
proposed was a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with farmers.   
 
When designing the questions, it was not simply a case of exploring in greater detail 
what was identified in the quantitative survey.  It was anticipated that entirely new 
processes would be uncovered, particularly when certain phenomena such as political 
and ideological reproduction can not be identified statistically.  Furthermore, it was 
likely that the qualitative analysis would uncover unexpected forms of production 
and surplus appropriation which it may not be possible to capture quantitatively.  In 
order to identify such processes however, it was evident that my qualitative 
interviews had to remain as open ended as possible.   
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It was also hoped that an open ended approach would allow me to identify potential 
fluidity within all of the structural processes identified.  In development research, 
Kabeer (2001) emphasises the importance of open qualitative personal testimonies in 
seeking to understand the complexities behind livelihood decisions.  Uncovering 
complexity in modes of production for example, entails the identification of unusual 
outcomes of particular economic relationships.  Individuals can for example exercise 
agency within the structures in which they are embedded.  This applies not only to 
economic relationships, but also to the ideological and political processes with which 
they are associated.  Nightingale (2006) for example, demonstrates how gender and 
caste ideologies in Nepal are contested and fluid, being influenced by other identities 
and being performed in particular ways in different contexts with complex outcomes. 
 
While the household was the unit of analysis for the quantitative surveys, it was 
hoped that qualitative surveys would allow me to gather data of more specific 
relevance to individual lives.  This is particularly important given that there may be 
deep divisions or even class relations within the household such as between men and 
women (Chakrabarti & Cullenberg, 2003;  Deere & Leon de Leal, 1982;  Folbre, 
1982;  Gibson-Graham et al., 2001;  Gibson-Graham, 1996;  Resnick & Wolff, 
1989).  Only individual testimonies can provide detailed insights into these intra-




Yin (2003) warns against being reliant upon only one source of evidence, which in 
this case, would be testimonials from villagers.  I therefore aimed to supplement the 
data gathered from the semi-structured farmer interviews with more informal 
discussions with merchants and with two urban based landlords.  I also planned a 
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Aside from this, informal discussions and three semi-structured interviews were also 
carried out with local and national government officials and staff from NGOs, who in 
many cases had a rich knowledge of my chosen study area and policy issues.  Most 
crucially, such exchanges proved particularly useful for understanding some of the 
processes occurring at broader geographical scales.  I also sought to triangulate my 
quantitative data with pre-existing national level data sets.  There was also a wealth 




Another form of data collection which I anticipated would offer further insights into 
the complexity within rural modes of production was participant observation.  By 
residing within a village I hoped to observe day to day farming practices and social 
interactions within the community and better understand the livelihood decisions of  
local people.  Even if participant observation did not offer me insights directly 
relevant to my research objectives it would provide me with a better understanding of 
the social dynamics of the community and provide valuable background information. 
 
4.3 Data Collection Process 
 




Clearly the complex nature of this study required a combination of techniques 
gathering both quantitative and qualitative data.  It is now necessary to outline the 
actual process of data collection, beginning with the collection of survey data.  
Although we carried out participation observation and qualitative research 
throughout the three VDCs, eight wards
1
 or subdivisions were selected to focus on 
for the survey, two each in Bhaudaha and Thalaha respectively, and four in Jhorahat.  
Out of these eight wards, 20% of the population were selected to be sampled (See 
                                                 
1
 Each VDC contains 9 wards.  We decided to use wards to delimit our clusters as it would make the 
work of greater use to local development agencies and government service providers, while making 
the results comparable to other ward level data which may be available on the VDCs. 
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Appendix 1).  The alternative option would have been for a smaller sample to have 
been collected from the entire VDC.  However, a number of reasons prompted me to 
focus on ‘clusters’.  Firstly, the process of data collection was difficult.  Each day it 
entailed cycling between my base village Pidarboni and the neighbouring villages 
both within Jhorahat VDC and in Bhaudaha and Thalaha VDCs and going by foot 
between households.  Remote Thalaha VDC was particularly difficult as it could 
only be reached by an indirect two hour round trip by bicycle from Pidarboni along 
rough tracks.  The collection of survey data was carried out during the mid-day heat, 
as this was the time when more local people were resting and therefore had free time 
to participate in the study.  Villages in Morang are often dispersed and repeated visits 
to homesteads were often necessary to find senior household members to request 
their participation.  These difficulties made a geographical cluster approach most 
practical.  Secondly, and most crucially however, by focussing on smaller 
geographical wards, we became better known in the communities, and better 
relations of trust could be built with local people in the process of carrying out the 
research. 
 
Based upon an examination of the census data for each VDC, these wards were 
selected to represent a roughly proportional share of the specific ethnic communities 
present.  Furthermore, they were selected so a reasonable geographical spread could 
be achieved to capture regional specificities within the three VDCs, such as differing 
access to transport facilities.  While the selected wards of the first VDC, Jhorahat are 
located on a secondary trading road between Biratnagar to the south and the main 
highway to the north, those in Bhaudaha lie several kilometres east of the road.  The 
selected wards from Thalaha are located a further several kilometres east of 
Bhaudaha.  The wards were also selected to cover the two separate marketing regions 
where farmers travel to sell their produce, firstly Naya bazaar and neighbouring 
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Sampling  
 
While many studies in Nepal use the electoral register as a sampling frame, this is 
not always reliable, as households that have been unable to gain citizenship rights are 
occasionally omitted from the list.  Therefore, to create a sampling frame, a map was 
made of the chosen wards, and each household was given a number (see Appendix 
4).  The process of drawing up the map generated considerable interest amongst local 
people, and proved an effective way to ‘break the ice’ with community members.  
Furthermore, a map made locating households much easier, especially if the 
household needed to be revisited and respondents requested not to have their names 
placed on the form.  Random sampling ensures the study is generalisable or 
maintains “external validity” (de-Vaus, 2001).  A random number table of 20% of 
the total was therefore generated using statistical software, and households were 
chosen based upon  numbers in the table.   
 
Conducting the survey 
 
The process of data collection involved visiting households marked on the map.  If 
adult household members were available, my field assistant and I would introduce 
ourselves and explain the purpose of our study.  We were generally welcomed 
warmly, and people were willing to participate in the study (see Figure 4-1).  
However, sometimes we were asked to return later to speak to a more senior (or 
male)
2
 household member who they felt would be able to give more accurate 
answers.   
 
Given the cultural diversity of the VDCs, multiple local dialects are spoken.  As 
there was a large population of hill settlers and the entire media, bureaucracy and 
education system is in Nepali, most people were proficient in the language.  As I am 
a competent Nepali speaker I chose to carry out most surveys in this language, while 
hiring a field assistant to facilitate.  Four field assistants were hired throughout my 
                                                 
2
 While women appeared to have considerable knowledge of issues relating to production, access to 
credit and farmer training, when we reached the section on the prices received for crops we were often 
asked to return to speak to a male household member.  This itself provided interesting data, suggesting 
that it is generally men who participate in marketing activities.  
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time in the field.  Three were from Kathmandu, while one was local.  The local field 
assistant completed the longest phase of research and as he was proficient in most 
local dialects, I chose to complete the survey of the more remote Thalaha VDC with 
him, as some people there were less comfortable with Nepali. 
 




By the end of the study, the total sample size was 181, and surveys were carried out 
with all but four of the sampled households.  One household opted out of the study, 
while we were unable to make contact with individuals to interview from the other 
three omitted households.  With regards to surveys with the merchants, we aimed to 
survey the entire population of grain traders in the four bazaars where farmers from 
the selected wards sell their produce, Katahari, Naya bazaar, Tetariya and Jhorahat.  
We completed surveys with 36 traders, omitting two traders who were unwilling to 
participate in the study. 
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Accessing secondary statistical data proved particularly challenging, and as a result, I 
was not able to use as much as I had hoped.  Some data was available online such as 
the Nepal Census of Manufacturing Establishments and the Nepal Living Standards 
Measurement Survey.  Meanwhile the Agriculture Office and INGOs had some 
published data reports which I received by email.  However, some of the most 
interesting district level data was not available in digital format, and was stored in 
offices in Biratnagar.  We were able to access some interesting price information 
from the Morang Merchants Association.  However, this required most of a day in a 
back room, copying and translating data recorded in hand written ledgers.  The staff 
from the Agricultural Inputs Corporation personally prepared us a record of fertiliser 
prices on request.  In both cases, accessing this material relied upon the goodwill and 
time of the staff, for which I am much indebted.  I had hoped to collect some data on 
land transactions from the Land Revenue office, but unfortunately staff were unable 
to  supply this data for practical reasons.  Although a digital database is being 




4.3.2 Qualitative Data Collection  
 
The process of participant observation was carried out throughout my time in the 
field and I kept a notebook with me at most times to record interesting findings.  
Given that continuous note taking may cause discomfort amongst research 
participants, I sometimes preferred to write up my findings in the evenings on my 
return from the field.  I also made efforts to observe particular events relevant to the 
research, such as farmer field schools and local political meetings.  Two days were 
also spent observing transactions with a grain merchant or katawala in the market of 
Naya Bazaar. 
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While qualitative data collection in this sense was a continuous process, one 
challenge I faced was deciding who to approach for semi-structured farmer 
interviews.  In order to understand intra-household class relations, I made efforts to 
interview both men and women farmers.  Furthermore, I endeavoured to interview a 
spread of households from different socio-economic groups (see Appendix 1-2).  
Potential interviewees were therefore in most cases selected from the sample already 
generated during the survey, so I already had detailed economic information about 
each household.   However, individuals with whom we had built strong relationships 
were often interviewed even if they were not part of the initial survey.   Interviews 
were generally arranged in advance, by approaching potential interviewees to request 
their participation in the study and to ensure they were in a position to give their 
time.  Often repeated visits were necessary.  It proved more difficult to arrange semi-
structured interviews in Bhaudaha and Thalaha and thus fewer were completed there 
(See Appendix 1-2).  These communities were further away, making repeated visits 
more difficult.  Furthermore, as a result of the greater levels of poverty in these 
VDCs, household members appeared to spend longer away from home to labour in 
the off-farm economy, making it more difficult to arrange the longer qualitative 
interviews.  However, rich qualitative insights were often gained while carrying out 
quantitative data collection, and discussions often emerged spontaneously following 
the completion of the survey. 
 
Although a provisional question order was set in an interview guide for the semi-
structured farmer interviews, this was adapted as appropriate to allow the interview 
to flow smoothly and facilitate open discussion (compare interview guide in 
Appendix 5 with sample transcript in Appendix 6).  Mikkelsen (1995) suggests that 
in order for development research to remain participatory, one must be flexible as to 
the order in which questions are asked, and allow the interviewee to talk freely about 
what issues are important to them.  An interview that flows smoothly generates better 
rapport and facilitates a more natural conversation, potentially giving the researcher 
access to richer data (Mason, 1996;  Rubin & Rubin, 1998).   Efforts were also made 
to ‘probe’ and create new questions when necessary, to learn more about interesting 
issues raised by the participants.  This was also used to display empathy towards the 
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interviewees, demonstrating that we were interested in what they have to say (Rubin 
& Rubin, 1998).  As with the quantitative surveys, most qualitative interviews were 
carried out in Nepali, with the exception of some of our focus group with women 
farmers, which was carried out in the local Tharu language. 
 
Several interviews were carried out following a ‘chance encounter’, such as the 
interview with an absentee landlord and merchant (see Appendix 1-3).  I therefore 
did not follow a set interview guide.  For my three interviews with development 
workers and the two interviews with Kathmandu based policy makers (see Appendix 
1-3) a set of appropriate issues for discussion was separately prepared for each 
interview, tailored according to the interviewee’s specific position.  I also engaged in 
a vast number of informal ‘chance encounter’ discussions with farmers, merchants, 
landlords, development workers and policy makers throughout my time in Nepal.  
These occurred in bazaars, on buses, at village tea shops and even in Biratnagar 
cafes.  Although they did not qualify as interviews per se and did not follow any set 





From previous visits to the region I had a number of acquaintances who were able to 
act as ‘gatekeepers’, introducing me to local people and explaining the purpose of 
my study once I had selected my study VDCs.  Some local NGOs also provided me 
with useful contacts.  However I was careful not to rely too much on such contacts to 
avoid the risk of being automatically associated with a particular development 
project. This would have potentially created false expectations about the outcomes of 
my research, leading to ethical dilemmas.   
 
Gaining access to the merchant community proved a little more difficult given that 
they are a well organised, close knit business community and somewhat more 
suspicious of unfamiliar individuals.  We therefore chose to do all the merchant 
interviews towards the end of the fieldwork period, giving the community an 
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opportunity to familiarise themselves with us, thus reducing potential suspicion.  The 
one exception to this case was Katahari bazaar, where I had lived with a merchant 
family during previous research.  Conducting interviews here was thus greatly 




4.4 Reflexivity and the research process  
 
4.4.1 Reflexivity and Marxism 
 
Critical social scientists have long challenged the positivist assumption that research 
can be ‘objective’ and value free, whereby the neutral academic seeks to uncover the 
‘truth’ of the social world (Denzin, 1998;  England, 1994;  Reinharz, 1997).  It is 
argued that researchers are not as England (1994, 85) terms it “dematerialised, 
disembodied entities”, but that the collection and interpretation of data is inherently 
personal.  A reflexive approach thus acknowledges the role that the researcher plays 
in shaping the knowledge produced.  This concern is intricately tied to the inherently 
unequal relationship between the ‘researcher’ and the ‘researched’ whereby the 
scholar has the power to appropriate and represent the voices of others (England, 
1994).  An engagement with reflexivity will not remove these power relationships 
from my research.  However, an acknowledgement of the situated nature of the 
knowledge I produce at least represents an admission that my findings are an 
‘interpretation’ of individual voices rather than a representation of an objective 
reality.  Furthermore, by engaging reflexively throughout my time in the field I was 
better able to engage with ethical questions associated with these power relations and 
take practical measures to address them. 
 
Unfortunately the issue of reflexivity has been largely overlooked in Marxian 
analyses of the social world.  However, a reflexive analysis is not necessarily 
incompatible with Marxism unless one takes a positivist approach to the discipline.  
As Kitching (2002) argues, while positivist interpretations of Marx have sought to 
‘explain’ the social world and uncover objective truths, this was never his actual 
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intention.   Instead, Marx’s work was an act of persuasion, an understanding of the 
social world that aims to identify political possibilities and encourage class 
mobilisation.   
 
In the context of this study, my Marxian understandings of the social world is utilised 
not to identify underlying truths but to explore some of the pre-capitalist and 
capitalist class contradictions present in rural Nepal, and in the process identify both 
sites of class mobilisation, while outlining the flaws in state policy.  However, I 
accept that my interpretation of these processes is only partial, and intricately shaped 
by my own positionality.  A reflexive admission of the situated nature of my 
knowledge does not entail a denial of structural phenomena such as modes of 
production and their associated forms of surplus appropriation.  Instead, it entails an 
acknowledgement that my own identity is likely in multiple ways to have shaped my 
interpretation of these structural relations and how individuals are positioned within 
them.  It is now necessary to reflect on my time in the field in order to understand 
means through which my positionality shaped the data produced.   
 
 





A body of literature has sought to understand how signifiers of identity such as the 
researcher’s race, gender or social status, can affect the way participants interact with 
them, and can subsequently influence the data collected (Denzin, 1998;  Reinharz, 
1997;  Richards & Emslie, 2000;  Sultana, 2007).  My position as a scholar from the 
Western world may in some ways affected my interactions with local people.  Pigg 
(1996) argues that development projects in rural Nepal are seen to represent a notion 
of development and progress, or what is locally known as bikas, which stands in 
opposition to the "traditional" village world.  She suggests that being seen as modern 
and cosmopolitan is valuable for many villagers, due to its symbolic and status value, 
and can help them in gaining access to social networks and even employment.   
During research on faith healers, she observed how local people adapted their 
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responses in ways that would represent them as being modern and "developed" 
(Pigg, 1996).   
 
I was particularly careful about how my positionality as a Western researcher would 
affect my interactions with respondents.  Even my three research assistants, although 
Nepali citizens, were from the Kathmandu valley and were therefore also viewed to 
some degree as representing the modern world.  The risk was certainly present that 
respondents would also seek to present themselves in ways which could be 
interpreted as ‘modern’.  While I was, in the words of many respondents, from a 
‘bikasi desh’ (developed country), the term bikasi was also used throughout the 
research to describe new techniques, agricultural inputs and even hybrid livestock.  
Many larger farmers spoke to me with pride regarding their use of certain bikasi 
inputs, and may certainly have exaggerated the benefits of using them to be 
perceived as ‘modern’.  Nevertheless, this was certainly not a universal trend.  Many 
more senior farmers we met appeared by no means ashamed to express their 
disappointment with new techniques and technology, and expressed pride in 
‘traditional’ methods of cultivation and inputs.   Both sets of testimonies themselves 
provide fascinating insights into the rural social and cultural dynamics. 
 
False expectations and political solidarity 
 
Intricately connected with my positionality as somebody representing ‘modernity’ 
are the underlying expectations of some respondents from my presence in the field.  
As a researcher from a western university, some local people thought I may have 
been associated with one of the many INGOs operating in Nepal.   I was often asked 
if I was planning a project in the study area.  This relationship is likely to have 
shaped the responses of research participants in many contexts.  However, false 
expectations are also a significant ethical dilemma in development research (Pratt & 
Loizoz, 1992;  Sultana, 2007).  This became more acute given the severe economic 
hardship many respondents were suffering.  Care therefore was taken by my field 
assistant and I to make it clear to participants that I was only a student researcher and 
was not planning any development project in the region.     
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Nevertheless, eliminating false expectations does not tackle the ethical dilemma 
raised by Gleeson (2000) and Chouinard (2000), that researchers are granted 
privileged access to the essential knowledge of marginalised groups, while the 
“researched” themselves often stand little chance that their lives will be improved 
through the study.  By taking up their time and giving nothing in return, this 
reinforces their marginalised position.   This is an issue I was particularly aware of 
when granted access to often quite moving and upsetting stories of people’s day to 
day hardships as they endeavoured to fulfil their basic needs.   
 
To reduce these unequal power relations, my field assistant and I made every effort 
to ensure participants were content to take part in the study.  I also attempted to make 
the research a two way process.  This involved giving respondents a chance to 
question me on topics of their choosing (see England, 1994;  Winchester, 1996).  
Interviews and surveys often switched around towards the end, where I would be 
asked lengthy questions from subjects ranging from lifestyles and weather in Europe 
to my family background.  Such conversations helped make the research a positive 
experience for both parties.   
 
However, I also felt that a degree of commitment to social justice would address 
some of these ethical dilemmas.  In conversations, respondents frequently made 
requests such as “tell our government and your government about our problems.”  I 
therefore made it clear to respondents that although I am by no means linked to any 
political movement, I will try to disseminate my findings at a level which can inform 
the political questions facing Nepal at this time of state building and transition.  
Given the unequal power relations inherent in research, I felt there was an ethical 
obligation to honour these demands of villagers, that their voices be heard, and 
ensure my research findings reach a relevant policy making and political audience.   
 
While acknowledging that research findings do represent a ‘situated’ form of 
knowledge, Scheper-Hughes (1995) stresses that this should not deter researchers 
from taking an explicit political stand in their outputs.  Although this itself entails 
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Chapter 4:Methodology and Techniques 116 
ethical concerns, in the context of clearly observable forms of oppression, it would 
be equally unethical for the researcher to remain neutral and disengaged (Scheper-
Hughes, 1995).  As discussed above, Marxism is by its nature grounded in 
identifying political possibilities.  I have therefore prepared a paper on land 
inequality in Morang which is to be published in Nepali to contribute to government 
political debate on land reform.  I have already contacted officials associated with the 
Ministry of Land Reform and Management with whom I will share my findings.  
Furthermore, efforts will be made to publish findings of my research not only in 
Western journals but in academic and non-academic publications within Nepal and 
South Asia which are read by a politically active population.   
 
On a more practical level, a short summary of key findings and issues raised by 
respondents was produced and disseminated amongst some of the larger NGOs 
working in Morang.  I frequently met staff from the agricultural office to share data 
on some of the agricultural problems facing the district.  Although their initiatives 
may not advocate radical structural change, they are involved in practical 
development activities within the district which impact the lives of local people in 
more subtle ways, and I wanted to ensure that some of the issues raised by 
respondents were heard by these institutions.  Once again though, I made it clear to 
those development staff that these were simply my interpretations of the social 
processes observed based upon a single case study.  I could not claim to speak for the 
local people, and my findings could not be read as an objective list of development 
problems to be addressed. 
 
 
4.4.3 Local politics in action and the research process 
 
‘Strategic’ use of the researcher by respondents 
 
While the power relations between the researcher and researched is inherently 
unequal, this not always a one way process.   Few (2002) observes that the arena for 
research can be one in which power relations are played out, noting that respondents 
may try to further a political goal through their interactions with the researcher.  
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While carrying out some interviews, respondents did not only expect something from 
us, but attempted to use our presence in the field to further their own political goals 
in ways which may have shaped individual responses.  This process was particularly 
evident on one occasion when my field assistant and I were asked by the 
management committee of a local development project to use ‘our contacts’ in the 
INGO funding the project to increase their budget.   
 
Again, the nature of these interactions appeared to be associated with my identity as 
someone from the Western world.  It was thus often assumed I would have some 
afno manchhe (literally, one’s own people) working for international aid agencies in 
Kathmandu or Biratnagar, a much sought after well paid field of work for educated 
rural people.  On several other occasions I felt that respondents were using their 
interactions with me strategically and requests to find a job for a relative or friend in 
Kathmandu were not uncommon.  I had to continually re-emphasise that I was in fact 
only a student researcher and by no means well connected to the Kathmandu 
development establishment and its circuits of power.  
 
Political unrest, suspicion and distrust 
 
The broader political situation in Nepal at the time of the research may also have 
affected my interactions with respondents and the knowledge produced.  This 
fieldwork was conducted in the aftermath of the ten year civil war between the Royal 
Nepal Army and Maoist revolutionaries.  The armed conflict initiated in 1996 had 
created numerous constraints for researchers.  Suspicion of outsiders had restricted 
the openness of people.  This limited the possibilities of data collection, especially 
with regards to politically contentious issues, discussion of which may have 
encouraged the participant to appear to be siding with a particular party.   
 
However, the dramatic political changes that have occurred over the last two years 
with the 2006 signing of a ceasefire between the Maoists and the government have 
changed this significantly.  Given that the armed conflict was over at the time of 
research, I was generally greeted warmly by local people, and experienced less 
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suspicion with regards to my motives than previous research I had carried out in the 
neighbouring hill district of Dhankuta during the conflict time.   
 
However, although the ceasefire was in effect for the duration of my time in the field 
and the Maoist fighters were in state recognised camps, unrest did continue.  The 
election to the constituent assembly, which had the task of writing the new 
constitution, was held while I was in the field.  Similar to many elections in South 
Asia, tensions and election violence did occur sporadically.  Meanwhile, there had 
been growing unrest over the last two years by political groups representing the 
ethnic groups of the plains.  Frequent protest programs and bandhs (general strikes) 
were organised by such groups who were campaigning for greater political autonomy 
in the ‘New Nepal’ following perceptions that the new government lacked 
commitment to reversing centuries of ethnic discrimination against Terai people.  
There were rumours of violence, and in some regions to the south of Morang, ex-
Maoists were said to have even split from the party to establish armed ethnic 
movements.   
 
Given the increasing influence of the Maoists in the post-conflict state there was fear 
amongst some wealthier villagers of Maoist reforms such as land redistribution and 
tax policies.  As a consequence, respondents from more prosperous households were 
very occasionally hesitant to discuss personal economic data such as the ownership 
of assets.  As we were often unknown, there was a fear that we may be developing 
records for the Maoist led coalition government.  The most significant risk of 
unreliable questionnaire data was probably that of deliberate misreporting, whereby 
wealthier respondents chose to under-estimate the size of their holdings as a result of 
these suspicions.  This however raised ethical concerns which are far more important 
that potential data limitations.  It was crucially important that I minimised any 
suspicion or discomfort caused by my presence amongst my respondents and the 
wider community.   
 
In farmer interviews I attempted to reduce suspicion by making it clear in our 
introductions that I was an independent student researcher.  Although I informed 
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respondents that my research will be used to inform policy, all data would be 
completely anonymous and treated confidentially.  I simultaneously made every 
effort to develop ‘rapport’ with research participants, to reduce unease, generate trust 
and facilitate a mutually beneficial interaction (Baxter & Eyles, 1997).  This proved 
easier given that I was living in the community and made an effort to spend time in 
each new village to get to know local people before beginning interviews or surveys.  
Having spent many months on the Nepal Terai in the past, I had a certain 
understanding of the culture as well as a good grasp of spoken Nepali.  This helped 
me considerably in building up trust with my interviewees, facilitating in the sharing 
of information.   Many participants who were initially hesitant quickly became more 
comfortable with my research later on in the fieldwork.  Friendships were also made 
with some interviewees and we frequently received invitations back to homes or 
even to events such as family weddings.   
 
With regards to interviews with merchants, I had prepared a letter using university 
headed paper in Nepali describing our research and its purpose, emphasising the 
confidentiality of any results.  This helped considerably in gaining their trust, and 
was also distributed to farmer interviewees on request.  The risk of unreliable results 
was also reduced by avoiding questions relating to asset ownership when examining 
market structure, and instead basing our analysis on the quantities of grain bought 
and sold over the last year and market rates.  Merchants showed little discomfort at 
divulging this information.     
 
I also made contact with the local authorities before beginning fieldwork to gain 
permission to work locally and informing them of the purpose of my research.  Visits 
were made to the Morang Chief District Officer in Biratnagar and the VDC offices of 
each of the three study VDCs.  In regions where my field assistant was unknown, I 
made every effort to ensure that people understood his role (i.e to help me with data 
collection and translation).  This was particularly important to minimise suspicion 
and also to ensure his own safety and security throughout the fieldwork.   
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Political unrest and direct harm 
 
There were more direct sources of harm to respondents from our research aside from 
discomfort and suspicion.  The direct discussion of sensitive issues such as illegal 
activity or the political unrest could potentially cause direct physical harm to 
respondents, who could be subject to retribution from the party against whom 
information is given.   My research was not dealing directly with sensitive issues, so 
participants were under no circumstances pressurized to reveal any such information.  
Even when sensitive information was voluntarily given by respondents, it still had 
the potential to cause them harm if it was revealed in findings which were made 
public.  Publication of information about local level disputes and conflicts may also 
carry similar risks.  I therefore made every effort possible to ensure the 
confidentiality of the data.  This involved keeping all cassettes and interview forms 
in a safe place in a locked room while in the field and removing everything when I 
left to be destroyed following the completion of data analysis.  No names will be 
mentioned on publications produced. 
 
I also made it clear to respondents that interviews could be terminated at any time if 
they were no longer comfortable.  This was particularly important given that 
bystanders were often present.  Furthermore, when using the cassette recorder, I 
ensured that participants knew they were welcome to turn it off at any time if they 
wanted to reveal delicate information.  Similar sensitivity had to be shown when 
carrying out participant observation.  One merchant had kindly invited us to observe 
his “business in action”.  However during a discussion on loan arrangements with 
one farmer we were requested not to take notes.  In this way we took care to avoid 
being viewed by our respondents as intrusive during the data collection. 
 
 
4.4.4 Gender relations and access to women’s voices 
 
Although we completed our statistical questionnaires and interviews with both male 
and female respondents, gaining access to knowledge on issues relating specifically 
to gender relations from women farmers proved more difficult as all my field 
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assistants and myself were male.  Not only did this make female respondents less at 
ease, but some interviews were also carried out within ear shot of male neighbours or 
family members.  Even access to interview women in the first instance proved 
difficult amongst some members of the Tharu community and the Maithili speaking 
castes, whereby contact between females and unknown males is less common, 
making it necessary to exercise appropriate cultural sensitivity.   
 
This in itself offered interesting insights into the participation of female farmers in 
public life, in some ways enriching my data.  However, in other ways this was a 
disadvantage, as it made it more difficult to access women’s testimonies and 
experiences of the social structures my research sought to understand.  To facilitate 
data collection, we employed a local female field assistant to help us arrange and 
carry out a series of interviews with women farmers in a private space, as well as two 
focus group discussions where we could specifically discuss gender issues (see 
Appendix 1-3).  As a local person she already had a strong level of rapport with the 
women we interviewed, and this facilitated a dialogue that gave us some insights into 
women’s lives, although arguably less than we would had achieved had all of us been 
female.  Nevertheless, my presence as a male and relative stranger may still have 
shaped.the character of the data I collected.  Furthermore, many of the women with 
whom interviews and focus groups were arranged were those with whom my 
assistant was familiar.  There was therefore a risk of only gaining information from 
particular socio-economic groups.  Nevertheless, we specifically requested our field 




4.4.5 Mistranslation in surveys 
 
Although the quantitative survey remained an essential research tool, several data 
collection and translation challenges arose from the attempt to use western 
quantitative methods to understand the complex social world of the Nepal Terai.  It is 
therefore important to acknowledge the possible ways in which this may have shaped 
the kind of data collected.   
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For example, when beginning the surveys I noticed there were several questions 
which appeared to supply inconsistent results.  For example, when asking farmers 
about the use of inputs over the last year, I discovered that some farmers had been 
reporting the use of inputs over the last season only.  This is because most farmers 
tended to think in terms of seasons rather than years when discussing their cultivation 
practices.  However, as I began to better understand the cultural world of the farmers 
I was able to fine tune the survey form and question format to deal with potential 
misunderstandings.  Households from the first round of data collection were 
subsequently revisited to repeat the problematic questions. 
 
A second challenge of quantitative data collection was the fact that respondents 
could not always easily recall or estimate economic data.  While most individuals 
had a fairly good idea of their yields of different crops over the last year, some 
displayed difficulties recalling exact amounts.  This applies particularly for crops 
such as vegetables which are not harvested all at once, instead being picked then 
consumed or sold according to household needs, making an estimate of total volume 
difficult.  Fortunately, such crops comprise only a small proportion of the annual 
harvest.  Estimating the volume of the grain crop which is by far the largest 
component of the total annual harvest was much easier for farmers.   Although it is 
not harvested all at once, each paddy or wheat crop is generally weighed at some 
point, either by the merchants to whom grain was sold or at the village mill where 
grain is husked for a small fee.   
 
 
4.4.6 Use of a field assistant  
 
Practicalities of working with a field assistant: Language 
 
As discussed above, I employed four field assistants, three of whom were from 
Kathmandu while one was local.  The use of a field assistant posed further data 
collection challenges and opportunities which may have shaped the knowledge 
produced.  My competence in Nepali was not sufficient for the discussion of 
complex issues and my field assistant therefore acted as a translator, especially for 
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qualitative interviews.  Women were often less familiar with the Nepali language, 
and therefore many of the interviews and surveys completed with women farmers 
were carried out in the appropriate local language.  While this was not a problem 
when I was working with my local field assistant and with the female field assistant 
who assisted us with interviews with women farmers, my outside field assistants 
were of course unfamiliar with local languages.   
 
Given the multiple language barriers, the risk of misinterpretation or missing 
important data is always present in such situations.  Nevertheless, if the respondent 
informed us that they were not comfortable in Nepali we would request if anyone 
else in the household would be interested in participating, returning to the household 
at a later stage if necessary.  Furthermore, most interviews were recorded with the 
consent of interviewees and later transcribed and translated into English with the 
assistance of a Kathmandu based translator (see Appendix 6).   
 
 
Use of a field assistant and ‘insider/outsider’ research 
 
The use of a field assistant may have shaped my understanding of the social world in 
more complex ways.  A number of studies have attempted to break down the binary 
division between the ‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ (Merriam et al., 2001;  Merton, 1972;  
Naples, 1996).  This literature stresses that every social grouping is characterised by 
internal diversity and the insider-outsider binary does not account for the countless 
differences and similarities which define the level of social and cultural distance 
between the researcher and researched. 
 
Although my ‘local’ field assistant who worked with me for the longest period was 
from within the community, being a male still posed difficulties in accessing 
women’s voices, which is why we employed a local female assistant for some 
interviews.  Similarly, my other three field assistants, although from Nepal, were 
from vastly different parts of the country, and had resided in the Kathmandu valley 
for much of their lives.  They could therefore be considered, like me, as much an 
‘outsider’ as an ‘insider’.  At the same time all my field assistants and myself 
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maintained a degree of political commitment and at many points we felt momentarily 
united with those research participants who shared our vision for social justice. 
 
However, rather than identifying the degree to which one is an ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’, 
it is more valuable to acknowledge and celebrate how the four field assistants’ 
specific and diverse positionalities contributed to the research in unique and valuable 
ways.  My ‘local’ field assistant,  from the Tharu community of a nearby village,  
had a rich knowledge of local customs and farming practices, providing me with 
valuable understanding about local life.  Furthermore, his knowledge of local 
language and pre-existing social connections facilitated considerably in gaining 
access to communities in many contexts.  On the other hand, being with a local 
person also increased levels of distrust.  We felt that respondents were quite 
justifiably less comfortable divulging personal information and testimonies in front 
of acquaintances.   
 
I did not face such distrust however, when working with my three field assistants 
from Kathmandu.  As one would expect, they did not have such a deep 
understanding of, and access to local communities.  Nevertheless, as individuals who 
have resided their entire lives in the country, each assistant contributed unique vision 
and understandings to the research, often from a comparative perspective based upon 
their own life histories in Nepal.  Furthermore, as relative ‘outsiders’ in the 
community, my assistants and I were able to view and interpret the observed social 
world from a more neutral ‘outsider’ perspective.  We also shared a passion to 
understand and compare the unique processes observed with those we were familiar 
with from our own backgrounds.  I was therefore able to benefit from lengthy and 
extremely valuable evening discussions with my field assistants where we sought to 
interpret the processes we had researched during the day.  This involved comparing 
our day’s observations in our Morang village with those for example, from my own 
childhood in rural Scotland or my field assistants’ upbringing in other parts of Nepal.   
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4.4.7 Location of interviews 
 
Elwood and Martin (2000) point out the impact that interview location has upon the 
process of the interview and the data which is collected.  I felt it was important where 
possible for dialogues to take place in quiet, private locations, so respondents felt 
relaxed describing their experiences or discussing personal economic information.  
Interestingly, whether or not this was possible often depended upon the architecture 
of the respondents’ homesteads and whether or not there was a ‘private’ space for 
visitors.  The Brahmin and Chettri homesteads are generally self-contained behind 
hedges and trees with a veranda where visitors could sit, while Tharu homes usually 
have a large central courtyard which is cut off from the street (see Figure 4-2).  
Although curious neighbours would occasionally visit, these sites proved excellent 
for interviews, and were quiet, private and cool.   
 
However, in the poorer, more densely populated Rajbanshi, Bantar and Jhagar 
villages, finding a quiet space for interviews proved much more difficult, with the 
exception of some wealthier households.  Courtyards were not always well enclosed 
and often very small, and visitors would sometimes be given a mat to sit on facing 
the street under the thatched eaves (see Figure 4-3).  Many interviews were thus 
carried out with a large number of people present, including crowds of children, and 
any effort to seclude ourselves would have been likely to cause suspicion in the 
community.  It is important to be aware in this context that interviewees may not like 
to publicly criticise certain people or practices, a problem raised by Elwood and 
Martin (2000).  Furthermore, interviewees may have downplayed their participation 
in practices which could be thought of as exploitative to appease bystanders 
(including myself).  There may have also been discomfort in divulging personal 
economic data in the surveys in front of others raising both ethical and data 
reliability issues, despite the fact that most villagers did appear quite aware of their 
neighbours’ economic status.  Nevertheless, for the quantitative surveys my assistant 
and I made extra efforts to ensure surveys were carried out in a more private 
location.  At one point we had to terminate a survey given the growing crowd of 
onlookers. 
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Figure 4-2: Tharu village in Dangraha VDC:  Tharu villages are normally made up of a 
network of enclosed courtyards linked by narrow lanes.  Such courtyards are excellent private 

















Figure 4-3: Focus group discussion outside temple in Rishidev community near Katahari:  In 
poorer communities private space is often scarce.  The informal discussion with some labourers 
that a visiting scholar and I had begun rapidly generated a large crowd.  With so many people, 
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There were however, some positive elements of ‘public’ data collection, particularly 
with regards to the qualitative interviews.  Many of such interviews gradually turned 
into focus group discussions, with multiple people contributing, offering richer 
insights.  For some interviews, my assistant and I were actually invited to public 
spaces such as village tea shops or chautaras (village resting place).  Such interviews 
generally attracted a number of participants and proved highly fruitful, and facilitated  






It has been established that Marxism remains a useful, politically committed means 
through which to understand the social world.  However, it is important to utilise a 
‘non-essentialist’ approach which emphasises the creation of knowledge rather than 
attempting to fit the social world into a pre-determined model.  This also entails an 
understanding of the complexity and fluidity within the modes of production 
identified at a given juncture.  For this study, an extended ethnography is necessary 
to examine the geographical and historical specificity of the modes of production 
present in rural Morang and their complexity.  This requires a combination of both 
quantitative and qualitative techniques.   However, by using abstract concepts such 
as ‘modes of production’, one can not claim the full complexity and fluidity of the 
social world.  Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that these structural 
understandings are not mobilised as a tool to represent reality, but remain a 
generalised interpretation of the social world that is strategically necessary if one is 
to identify relations of power which persist over time and space and identify sites of 
struggle. 
 
The data collection methods utilised to complete this ethnography included an 
extensive quantitative survey, participant observation and a series of qualitative 
interviews.  Although I made every effort to ensure that I generated a rich bank of 
data using rigorous techniques, it is important to recognise that the knowledge of 
structural processes produced from this study is not an objective reflection of a 
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concrete reality, but is ‘situated’.  My positionality and the relationship between 
research participants and myself has in numerous ways shaped my interpretations of 
the social world.  This raises numerous ethical dilemmas with regards to my power to 
represent excluded groups.  By critical reflection of my positionality and the research 
process, further ethical issues emerge such as false expectations by local people, and 
the fact that my research is unable to directly improve their lives.   
 
Although the unequal power relations in the research process can never be removed, 
there are measures which can be taken to mitigate them.  Firstly, I have realised the 
importance of remaining politically committed and ensuring that my research reaches 
an audience capable of bringing forth social change.  Secondly, by engaging 
reflexively with the research process I recognise that my knowledge is an 
interpretation and does not claim to ‘represent’ the reality of research participant’s 
lives.  It simply seeks to identify likely contradictions in the social structure and 
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Before analysing the economic processes which have constrained the emergence of 
agrarian capitalism in the case study villages of Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha, it is 
important to trace the political economic history of the far-eastern Terai region in 
which they are situated.  The evolution of the predominant feudal mode of 
production on the Morang and neighbouring districts over the centuries has been 
intricately connected with the changing in policies and interventions of the Nepali 
state.   
 
Although labour and tax obligations and the establishment of an early administrative 
apparatus are likely to have begun feudal subordination in rural Morang before the 
18
th
 century, it appears that the process was consolidated following the region’s 
annexation into the Kingdom of Nepal in 1774.  The new Nepali state under the Shah 
dynasty and then the Ranas, appropriated a large portion of the agricultural surplus as 
tax.  Meanwhile, the administrative system at a local level and land grants enriched a 
minority of indigenous cultivators and high caste Brahmin and Chettri members of 
the nobility.  They became a landlord class who extracted rent from tenants 
simultaneously with the appropriation of surplus by the state.  Their control over land 
was reinforced by their integration into the state apparatus, thus reproducing the 
feudal mode of production and its mechanisms of surplus appropriation. 
 
In the early twentieth century, the development of property rights and the 
monetisation and devaluation of land tax made it more profitable to rent land and 
encouraged a growing concentration in land ownership.  In this context rent, rather 
than tax, became the predominant form of surplus appropriation. While this 
consolidated a shift in the feudal mode of production, family cultivators with 
personal plots who paid taxes directly to the state rather than rent to landlords, gained 
effective ownership rights to their land.  While this consolidated a shift in the feudal 
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mode of production, an independent peasant mode of production emerged within the 
rural population who still had access to private plots of land. 
 
There were further changes following the fall of the Rana dynasty.  The indigenous 
landed classes lost much of their estates due to land reforms, population growth and 
indebtedness.  The Brahmin and Chettri landlords were more successful in 
maintaining their control over land resources, most notably as a result of their 
influence within the bureaucracy.  There was a simultaneous shift towards absentee 
landlordism as Brahmin and Chettri landlords, who once lived locally, migrated to 
urban areas, while a new class of wealthier members of the urban population made 
land purchases in the villages.  Although independent peasant cultivation persists, the 
new semi-feudal mode of production based upon absentee landlordism remains 
entrenched in large parts of rural Morang up until the present.  This economic 
formation and the associated forms of surplus appropriation have been reproduced on 
a political level through the influence of landlords on government policies, and 
ideologically through the relations landlords build up with tenants within 
communities.   
 
 
5.1. The development of feudalism in Morang 
 
5.2.1 Morang prior to the Gorkhali invasion 
 
The history of agrarian change in Morang, as in much of the Terai, is highly 
complex, and understanding the origins of the current social formation requires a 
piecing together of oral histories collected in the field combined with historical 
research such as compiled state records and Mahesh Chandra Regmi’s excellent 
series of studies.  The most significant period in shaping the present day agrarian 
relations was between the founding of the Kingdom of Nepal by the Gorkhali 
dynasty in the late 18
th
 century and the collapse of the Rana regime in the mid-
twentieth century.  This saw the consolidation of a feudal mode of production on the 
eastern Terai, important dimensions of which persist to the present day. 
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There are few historical records from the far eastern Terai prior to the founding of 
the Nepali state.  However, the region east of the Koshi river, which incorporates 
present day Morang
1
 district, is believed locally to have fallen under the influence of 
numerous kingdoms over the centuries.  The historical population of the far eastern 
plains is thought to have been sparse and composed primarily of adivasi ethnic 
groups such as the Thru, Bantar, Satar, Jhagar and Rajbanshi.  Which groups can 
trace an ancient ancestry to the region is unclear, as is the rigidity of these ethnic 
divisions (see Guneratne, 2002).  It has been reported that the Rajbanshi migrated to 
the region from present day Assam and Burma in the 10
th
 century (Bhattarai, 1996) 
while local Jhagar sources claim their community migrated to the region more 
recently from Chotanagpur in central India.  Regardless of their origins, it is evident 
that these communities are the earliest recorded inhabitants of the region. 
 
The lack of written records prior to the founding of the Nepali state makes it 
extremely difficult to reconstruct the historical ‘mode of production’ in earlier 
periods.  However, accounts of the region by an early East India company source, 
Francis Buchanan Hamilton,  shortly after the Gorkhali victory in the early 19
th
 
century, reported that the indigenous peoples of Morang carried out a form of slash 
and burn agriculture and hoe cultivation (Hamilton, 2007).  The present day relics of 
co-operative institutions such as collective labour regimes, and historical studies of 





early settlers in Morang may have originally been incorporated into a redistributive 
mode of production driven by the survival and reproduction of the clan rather than 
accumulation of wealth.   
 
                                                 
1
 Under the Sen and Gorkha dynasties, Morang was a larger district which encompassed the region 
from the Koshi river to the Mahananda river, just over the border in West Bengal.  It incorporated 
Sunsari, Jhapa and present day Morang district.  To this day these three districts share cultural and 
economic similarities, and thus my discussion of ‘Morang’ (in this chapter only) will refer to this 
broader geographical entity. 
2
 According to Singh (2007) the adivasi social formation in India traditionally produces little surplus 
product consisting only of necessary labour time.   The imperative of this economic formation is the 
survival of its members rather than accumulation of wealth.  Any potential accumulation which does 
take place is undermined by redistributive systems, which can be read as representing the reproductive 
mechanism of this economic formation.  He argues, like Rey, that it is only taxation and other 
coercive measures of capitalism and/or feudalism which restructure this mode. 
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The degree to which feudal centralized state formations had an influence over these 
early forest dwelling communities and their indigenous forms of economic and 
political organisation before the Gorkhali invasion, is unclear.  The Sen Kings of 
Makwanpur in central Nepal had annexed the region following the overthrow of the 
Koch kingdom
3
 in 1553, taking control of the old capital centred on Vijayapur near 
present day Dharan (Subedi, 2005).  Although the new Vijayapur based rulers were 
thought to have been Magar, an ethnic group of the central hills, they had relied upon 
the support of Limbu chieftains from the eastern hills as its ministers (Acharya, 
1973;  Subedi, 2005), thus representing the beginning of a pattern of hill dominance 
over the eastern Terai.  Historical studies of the Sen state contain some of the earliest 
recorded evidence of an administration system with feudal tax appropriation 
capabilities (Regmi, 1970)
4
, although this may have existed earlier.   
 
This is likely to have begun the subordination of the older mode of production to 
feudalism before the Gorkhali conquest.  The introduction of taxation and 
compulsory labour obligations would have hindered the redistribution of surplus 
within the community.  Meanwhile the emergence of an administrative bureaucracy 
to collect tax for the feudal rulers at a village level
5
  is likely to have led to the rise of 
a wealthier indigenous class and undermined redistributive norms.  Indeed, reports of 
cash crops exports from the eastern Terai to British ruled India from the early 18
th
 
century (Seddon, 1987, 9) suggests not only early articulations with mercantile 
capitalism, but indicates that some households were yielding a sizeable surplus above 
their subsistence needs and may have been accumulating wealth.   
 
 
                                                 
3
 Koch refers to the Kings’ origins in Kooch Bihar in West Bengal.  The term is also used to refer to 
the Rajbanshi ethnic group suggesting that the eastern Terai may have been part of an indigenous 
Rajbanshi state.   
4
 According to early East India company sources, the Vijayapur based kingdom had introduced a 
taxation system based upon that used by the Pathan rulers in northern India prior to the rise of the 
Mughal Empire (Regmi, 1970).  While tax was appropriated from the peasantry by the Sen rulers, a 
tribute was paid to the Nawabs of Bengal (Acharya, 1973) 
5
 Singh (2007) records this process amongst the Bhils of Madhya Pradesh following invasions from 
the outside and the penetration of an external state apparatus into the adivasi social formation.   
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5.2.2 Agrarian relations under the rising Gorkhali state 
 
It is, however, the rise of Privthi Narayan Shah’s Gorkhali state which appears to 
have consolidated the development of a feudal mode of production on the Morang 
plains.  The power of the bureaucracy in Morang and its capacity to appropriate 
surplus increased considerably following the overthrow the Sen kings in 1774 by the 
Shah dynasty (Regmi, 1969).   This era saw the far-Eastern Terai becoming, in 
effect, an internal colony of Kathmandu, the capital of the new kingdom of Nepal, 
whereby resources would be channelled to the centre to fund the dynasty’s 
expansionist campaigns.  According to Francis Buchanan Hamilton (2007), the state 
revenues were generated by the sale of forest produce and elephants, timber and the 
rental of pasture lands to Indian herdsmen.  However, it was the taxation of the 
peasantry which was of the greatest importance to Kathmandu.  As of 1851 it was 
reportedly contributing to 76% of total tax revenue (Regmi, 1988).    
 
The feudal tax collection machinery was expanded in rural areas and indigenous 
cultivators operated small personal holdings while making extensive payments to the 
state.  This was sanctioned by the legal classification of all land under a tenure 
known as raikar, which allows individual households to operate personal plots while 
the state remained the ultimate landlord (Regmi, 1977b;  Regmi, 1978).   The tax 
burden on the indigenous population increased considerably in the period, with the 
state absorbing much of the surplus of the peasantry, while reserving the right to 
extract compulsory labour service or jhara for work such as construction and defence 
(Mahat, 2005;  Regmi, 1977b;  Seddon, 1987).  This consolidated a feudal mode of 
production based upon state landlordism.  As discussed in chapter 2, feudal 
economic formations are reproduced after each productive cycle primarily by control 
over land, obliging tenants to continually re-enter the labour process.  In the context 
of the far-eastern Terai, the control over land resources was backed up by the 
political, legal and military authority of the Kathmandu rulers, a relation of power 
which would persist for generations.  This perpetuated forms of surplus appropriation 
which have hindered accumulation within a vast strata of the peasantry.
 
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Chapter 5: The evolution of feudalism on the far-eastern Terai 134 
The expansion of the rural administration also led to an intensification of social 
stratification within indigenous communities, facilitating the emergence of a 
powerful, but diverse, local nobility and further undermining the older indigenous 
mode of production.  On lands operated under the predominant raikar tenure, the hill 
based state employed wealthier families from the indigenous Thru, and sometimes 
Rajbanshi community, to act as tax collectors.  A chaudhari was placed in charge of 
each revenue collection division or parganna  to extract tax in kind from the 
peasantry, while a number of lower level functionaries operated at the level of each 
locality or mouja (Regmi, 1988).  The chaudharis and lower level functionaries were 
granted salaries and land assignments for their services (Regmi, 1988;  1970).  This 
created an indigenous nobility with large taxable personal lands.  These could be 
sub-let to poorer peasants without access to their own holdings, resulting in a 
division of the surplus product between the state and the local landlord. 
 
The period also saw the rise of an absentee landlord class.  Alongside the raikar 
system of state landlordism was a form of property right known as birt, where vast 
grants of forest land were distributed to members of the hill bureaucratic elites (see 
Figure 5-1) (Regmi, 1989;  1977b).  Birt owners had de facto private property rights 
to their estates, which essentially operated as semi-independent feudal vassals, often 
with their own administration.  They would extract rent and labour service 
obligations from the indigenous population, many of whom were encouraged into 
previously untouched areas to clear the forest and settle.  Some peasants would 
cultivate birt land alongside personal raikar holdings which were often too small to 
sustain a family (Mahat, 2005).  Most the actual birt landlords, however, were 
based in the hills, only visiting during the harvest (Feldman & Fournier, 1976;  Lal, 
2002).  Given the importance of land to income and social status in Nepal at the time, 
such land grants assured that the nobility who received them remained loyal, 
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Figure 5-1: The plains present day of Babiyabirta VDC: This region to the east of Thalaha was 
once part of an extensive birt estate.  Today the descendents of many former birtwalas 



























Figure 5-2: Ruins of former jimidr tax collection and administration office from the Rana years 
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As part of the policy to expand the cultivable area to meet revenue demands, 
immigration from India was encouraged, with landless peasants settling on the 
plains, driven by both famines and natural calamities in Bihar (Seddon, 1987).  The 
existing indigenous groups were now joined by Maithil speaking Hindu castes from 
the south that cultivated plots of land across the entire eastern Terai and paid tax or 
rent to their respective overlord (Guneratne, 2002;  Seddon, 1987).  The waves of 
immigration, bringing in new cultivation practices and forms of social organisation 
are likely to have further dissolved what remained of the older indigenous modes of 
production.  There was by now an emerging class of culturally and economically 




5.2.3. Agrarian relations under the Ranas 
 
Introduction of jimidri system  
 
Following the ascendancy of the Rana rulers in 1846, the economic importance of 
the Terai to fund the regime both through revenue from timber, which was sold to the 
British, and agrarian taxation, continued to grow (Guneratne, 2002).  A more 
rigorous form of tax collection in the Terai was introduced in this context.  A new 
post of tax collector known as the jimidr
6
 replaced that of the chaudhari, and had 
strict tax collection responsibilities for one or several moujas, alongside certain 
administrative duties.  Under each jimidr were several patuwaris, functionaries 
expected to assist in the collection of taxes and maintenance of accounts (Regmi, 
1978) (see Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3).   
 
It was recalled by respondents that in the mouja in which Jhorahat was once a part, 
there were around four patuwaris, one of whom resided in Pidarboni.  The patuwari 
collected the grain from villagers and transported it to the home of the jimidr, 
before being taken to the district tax, or Malpot, office.  Many of the original 
                                                 
6
 Regmi (1977) usefully clarifies that jimidr which means ‘functionary’, should not be confused with 
the term zamindr, used in India, which simply refers to a landowner.  
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chaudharis were converted into either jimidrs or patuwaris under the new system 
(Regmi, 1988;  Regmi, 1978).  However, Regmi (1988) notes that preference for 
these positions was often given not to the traditional landed gentry at the mouja level, 
but to elites with strong connections to the bureaucracy, usually from the dominant 
Brahmin and Chettri caste from the hills (Guneratne, 2002;  Regmi, 1988;  1977b).  
In some circumstances, Hindu castes of Indian descent were also given the positions 
(Regmi, 1977b).  Unlike the jimidrs however, it was required that patuwaris be 
from the local community under their jurisdiction, and thus an indigenous elite 
retained some power (Regmi, 1978) (see Table 5-1). 
 
Table 5-1: Different types of landholder by ethnicity in Morang under the Ranas 
 


































Figure 5-3: Simplified model of the distribution of the agricultural surplus during the Rana 
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In order to maximise tax revenues, incentives were given to jimidrs to intensify the 
clearing of the forests and bring in more peasants from India to cultivate the land 
where indigenous farmers were unavailable.  In return for their services, jimidrs 
were, like the chaudharis who preceded them, entitled to a percentage of the tax 
revenue collected while also being rewarded with land grants.  Yadav (1984) reports 
that a jimidr who clears the forest would be given 10 years tax exemption and a 
tenth of the reclaimed land as a personal tax free birt which could be let out to 
tenants.  They were also entitled to additional grants of uncultivated jirayat lands, 
which did not include full property rights, but allowed the jimidr, as well as 
cultivating them alone, to sub-let lands to new immigrants or local farmers to yield 
rents, as long as taxes were paid (Regmi, 1977b).  Patuwaris were also able to access 
land through their appointments (See Figure 5-3) and, together with jimidrs, they 
extracted rent from tenants on their private holdings as well as a portion of the tax 
appropriated from the remainder of the peasantry.  This local nobility also had the 
power to appropriate unpaid labour from the peasantry.  For example, to clear jungle 
from their jirayat holdings jimidrs reportedly were allowed to appropriate the 
unpaid labour of one ox team from each settler family each year (Yadav, 1984).   
 
During the Rana years, the forests continued to be felled (see Figure 5-4). Local 
people in the study area reported that during this period, hunting-gathering and 
shifting cultivation lost its significance as a form of subsistence.  By this stage most 
of the population had become sedentary subsistence farmers and labourers under the 
predominant feudal mode of production.  Market oriented production and 
accumulation, which could have facilitated capitalist development was hindered by 
the high rates of surplus extracted through taxation.   
 
Nevertheless, there was still some limited commodity production in Morang, 
particularly of jute (see Figure 5-5) the taxes from which made an additional 
contribution to government revenue (Regmi, 1988).  The export of these 
commodities to India combined with growing imports of manufactured commodities 
(Seddon, 1987) could be considered as a loose ‘articulation’ between the semi-feudal 
mode of production in Nepal and the emerging colonial capitalist economy in India.   
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Figure 5-4: Jalthal forest in Jhapa district: This is one of the few large areas of untouched forest 
in the far-eastern Terai, along with the Charkose forest along the foot of the hills.  The felling of 
the jungles intensified during the Rana years and continued up until the 1960s, with permanent 




























Figure 5-5: Fields of Jute near Katahari:  Although today only a small number of farmers 
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The Rana period also saw some development of the productive forces with the 
introduction of new techniques and increased agricultural output (Seddon, 1987).  
Although this may have been driven in part by Rana policies, population growth 
appears a more likely explanation.  Although jimidrs were supposed to encourage 
innovation and development in agriculture, Regmi (1977b) asserts that their 
operations remained primarily restricted to the parasitic activities of tax collection, 
rent collection from tenants and usury.   
 
Land inequality continued to increase under the Ranas.  The jimidrs were able to 
increase their personal holdings of taxable land to sub-let by illegally claiming land 
which should have been distributed to new settlers.  Aside from this, the Ranas 
continued to give out tax free birt grants to political elites from the hills, primarily 
from the Brahmin and Chettri ethnic groups, thus intensifying land inequality 
(Regmi, 1977b) (see Figure 5-3).  By now though, birt estates had lost some of their 
administrative autonomy (Regmi, 1977b).  It was reported locally that there had 
historically been several large birt estates in the study area, the most notable of 
which was the formerly forested region to the east of Thalaha VDC across the 
Lohandra river in Babiyabirta VDC (see Figure 5-1).   
 
Transition from state to private land ownership   
 
There was a shift in the character of the feudal mode of production from the end of 
the 19
th
 century whereby individual tenant-landlord relations became more 
significant than the tenant- jimidr-state relations which had characterised the earlier 
Rana years.  In this context the primary mode of surplus appropriation in rural 
Morang and much of the Terai shifted from state tax payments to tenant-landlord 
relations.  Once again, this was facilitated, not through natural economic transition, 
but primarily through extra-economic interventions by the state.   
 
The first state intervention was the gradual development of property rights for raikar 
land.  These rights allowed cultivators to become the de-facto owners of their land 
rather than tenants of the state.  These new rights gave cultivators the ability to buy 
or sell the raikar land they operate so long as tax is still paid (Regmi, 1977b).  This 
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encouraged jimidrs to further expand their holdings while also providing an 
incentive for other wealthy individuals both from the hills and local communities to 
buy land.  As Regmi (1977, 192) argues: “Raikar landownership rights were now 
prized not because they yielded an opportunity for personal labour and subsistence, 
but because they created a new avenue for profitable investment and were therefore a 
source of unearned income.”  This further increased concentration of land and set the 
conditions for the intensification of the parallel set of feudal relations of production 
already established by birt owners and jimidrs, whereby land is sub-let to poorer 
tenants.   
 
The second significant state intervention however, was the monetisation of land tax 
for raikar lands.  Land taxes which became monetised by the start of the 20
th
 century 
remained static despite rapidly rising commodity prices, meaning that the raikar 
landowner needed a smaller quantity of grain to meet tax obligations (Regmi, 
1977b).  In Mahottari district to the west of Morang for example, Regmi (1977) notes 
how paddy prices increased nine fold between 1940 and 1961 despite static monetary 
tax rates.  This made it easier for landlords to rent out excess holdings, as tenants 
could more easily retain a surplus beyond their subsistence needs after paying tax, 
yielding a profit which the landlord could extract (Regmi, 1977b).  Devaluation of 
tax and the rising concentration in landed property which accompanied it 
consolidated ground rent as the primary form of surplus appropriation, and is the 
origin of the predominant form of landlordism in today’s Terai.   
 
The devaluation of land tax and the development of property rights to land, however, 
also facilitated the emergence of an entirely new mode of production.  Those 
indigenous and Indian settler peasants who were not working as tenants and 
cultivated personal raikar holdings, paying tax directly to the state, now became the 
effective owners of their land.  With falling rates of tax they were able to retain a 
large portion of any surplus for themselves.  There was therefore an emergence of a 
class what Seddon (1987, 142) terms “independent peasant producers” alongside the 
predominant tenant class.  From now this form of cultivation will be termed the 
‘independent peasant mode of production’. Although it is likely to have contained 
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relics of the older economic formation, the main production relations were now 
characterised by access to one’s own means of production and the retention of the 
surplus product for household use, with much smaller tax payments.  However, this 
group was small in number.  As of 1948 it was estimated that 23% of farmers in rural 
Morang owned less than one bigh each, while some jimidrs possessed up to 22,000 
bigh (Regmi, 1977b, 118).  While this group dominates hill agriculture (Seddon, 
1987), the evidence from Morang suggests that as of the mid-twentieth century, only 
a small number were fortunate enough to become independent owner cultivators.  
 
The blocked development of an independent peasant class can be understood when 
one observes that with the monetisation of land tax came the rise of debt, a new form 
of subordination.  Although the value of rents were declining, their monetisation 
created a need for cash, encouraging further commercialisation amongst the tax 
paying peasantry and often increasing levels of indebtedness to money lenders 
(Regmi, 1977b).  The simultaneous destruction of cottage industries by Indian 
imports was, however, likely to have been equally important in intensifying 
commercialisation and indebtedness.  While to Lenin (1960) and Kautsky (1988) 
monetisation often drives capitalist differentiation, on the Terai it led to further 
transfers of land from poorer farmers to larger feudal landowners.  The emergence of 
property rights for land also meant that land could now be left as collateral for loans, 
causing many peasants to lose their land if they defaulted (Regmi, 1977b).  Villagers 
in Jhorahat VDC also noted how jimidrs and even lower level patuwaris were able 
to expand their holdings by confiscating land from those tenants who were unable to 
pay their tax.  The family of one state functionary from the Thru community of 
Jhorahat had reportedly diversified into money lending themselves, further 
increasing their land holding in the process by acquiring the property of borrowers 
defaulting on loans.  Regmi (1977b) suggests that transfers of land also occurred 
through deception and coercion, turning many marginal farmers into tenants for the 
growing landlord class.   
 
By the mid-twentieth century, while the relations of production remained largely 
feudal in character, the distribution of surplus had now shifted in favour of a growing 
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landlord class rather than to the state.  There were two types of landlord.  Firstly, 
there was a locally based landlord class who had emerged from both 
Brahmin/Chettris and indigenous state functionaries such as jimidrs.  Although the 
powers of the indigenous elites were declining, many still had considerable holdings.  
The Thru landlords’ wealth was legendary in the villages of Jhorahat VDC.  In 
Pidarboni village, they kept elephants for transportation and ceremonial purposes on 
the outskirts of their homesteads.  Reportedly 8 bighs (5.4 hectares) of land was 
required to support one elephant alone.  This contrasts starkly with the normal 
holding size estimated by respondents to be sufficient to support a family of 6 which 
stands at 1.5 bigh (1.01 hectare).  Aside from the local landlords, there was also an 
absentee landlord class.   These included the predominantly Brahmin and Chettri 
birt owners.  There was also, however, an emerging urban-based absentee landlord 
class, as political elites from the growing industrial town of Biratnagar, many of 
whom had employment within the bureaucracy, began to purchase land in the rural 
hinterland (Regmi, 1977b).   
 
Another shift in the rural social formation in Morang during the later Rana years was 
growing articulation with capitalism.  Although crops had been exported to capitalist 
markets for generations, the development of early industries in Morang are likely to 
have led to a supply of labour to an emerging (albeit weak) industrial capitalist mode 
of production.  The first joint-stock company in Nepal, the Biratnagar Jute Mills, was 
established in Morang in 1936 with Indian capital (Karan & Ishil, 1996).  Other 
enterprises established locally during the period included the Morang Cotton Mills, 
the Judda Match Factory and the Morang Sugar mills (Regmi, 1977a).  It is likely 
that growing cash needs increased the imperative for wage labour as well as the 
production of crops for the market, as is observed by Singh (2007) amongst the 
Indian adivasi communities.  However, Regmi (1977a) reports that only a small 
portion of the peasantry were able to find work in the new industries in Nepal, and 
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Emergence of caste  
 
A change to the Morang social formation between its annexation by the Gorkha 
dynasty and the mid-twentieth century was the emergence of caste relations.  The 
communities of the Morang plains have always been diverse.  Although Maithil 
speaking middle and low castes were slowly settling the Morang plains from India, 
the population was predominantly composed of indigenous groups.  These diverse 
communities such as the Thru and Rajbanshi were never integrated into the South 
Asian ritualised caste hierarchy or varna
7
.  This stands in contrast to the regions of 
the Terai west of the Koshi river and along the Indian border where there have for 
generations been far greater populations of Maithil speaking caste Hindus from 
multiple positions in the classical hierarchy, allowing a more established caste 
system to develop.   
 
However, looser caste relations in rural Morang have still developed over the 
generations.  To Meillassoux (1973), the actual caste hierarchy in South Asia is far 
more complex than the classical categorisation of the varna.  New groups emerge 
within the bounds of the classical hierarchy, and the position of some groups is 
contested and flexible.  The varna emerged at a specific period of Indian history 
under particular production relations.  Subsequent transformations to this classical 
hierarchy at a given time and space is intricately connected with the historical 
evolution of the modes of production in the Indian social formation (Meillassoux, 
1973).  In the context of the Terai, there is evidence that caste emerged as an 
ideological mechanism to legitimise the control over land by the elite and facilitate 
the reproduction of the feudal mode of production.   
 
The first form of ideological stratification emerged through the Rana policies in the 
mid 19
th
 century.  The 1854 Muluki Ain or civil code, not only clarified legislation 
relating to land tenure and social practices, but sought to institutionalise the relations 
                                                 
7
 The varna divided the population in order of status.  At the top was the Brahman, who exercised 
religious functions, followed by the kshatriya or warrior caste.  In the middle were the vayshia’s who 
were traditionally merchants or farmers.  At the bottom were the sudra, the labouring or ‘servant’ 
castes, and below that were untouchables or dalits (Meillassoux, 1973). 
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between castes at a state level (Höfer, 1979).  In the classical varna hierarchy, the 
priestly Brahmins are positioned at the top, followed by the Chettri (known as 
kshatriya in India).  As the feudal elite were predominantly Nepali speaking Brahmin 
and Chettris they could place themselves at the top of the institutionalised hierarchy 
to justify their continued economic and political power.  Meanwhile, Nepali speaking 
occupational castes and numerous Maithil speaking low castes who had migrated 
from India were placed at the bottom, again based upon their position in the classical 
varna hierarchy, and were divided into ‘touchable’ and ‘untouchable’ (or dalit) 
categories (Höfer, 1979).  Indigenous communities of the hills and Terai meanwhile, 
who were not even part of the classical hierarchy, were granted an intermediate 
position.  They were broken down into ‘enslaveable’ and ‘non-enslavable’ alcohol-
drinking castes, which were placed above the touchable or untouchable low castes, 
but below the Chettri.  The Thru in this context were placed at the bottom of the 
enslavable alcohol drinker category in the Muluki Ain (Höfer, 1979).  While the 
Thru were important state functionaries, their lower position gave some 
legitimisation for the Kathmandu based Brahmin and Chettri ruling establishment to 
appropriate surplus from the Terai.  It could also justify the local level feudal 
relations between Brahmin and Chettri jimidrs and birt owners and indigenous and 
lower caste Indian tenants.   
 
The exact position of the other Terai indigenous groups such as the Rajbanshi, 
Bantar and Jhagar was not specified in the Muluki Ain
8
.  Nevertheless, it is clear that 
there is an informal caste hierarchy within the indigenous population of Morang 
which appears to have evolved in parallel to shifts in the mode of production.  Singh 
(2007) notes how in adivasi communities in India, communitarian principles and 
rituals were central to the reproduction of the earlier mode of production which was 
based upon hunter-gathering and shifting cultivation and driven by redistributive 
norms.  However, the subordination and articulations of these modes of production to 
both capitalism and feudalism undermined these imperatives and led to economic 
                                                 
8
 Interestingly, Hofer (1979, 100) notes how one Terai ethnic groups such as Meche, actually 
petitioned the government to have their caste status assessed and confirmed.  Their wish was fulfilled 
in a later amendment of the Muluki Ain. 
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stratification within communities.  This has also led to growing changes in ritual 
associations within adivasi groups and the creation of new divisions (Singh, 2007).   
 
A similar process appears to have occurred in rural Morang. Stratification between 
and within adivasi communities, on account of their historical subordination to the 
feudal mode of production, facilitated the emergence of an informal ‘caste’ 
hierarchy.  The Thru, who played the most significant role as functionaries for the 
state, and within which a land owning class had developed, began to consider 
themselves ‘higher’ status than poorer indigenous groups such as the Rajbanshi, 
Jhagar and Bantar.  Even within the Thru group, hierarchical divisions developed.  
For example, the Khawas sub-group, who reportedly had greater positions of power 
within the tax administration apparatus, apparently began to claim a separate 
‘superior’ lineage from the Thru.  Similarly, some reports suggest that the Rajbanshi 
split off from a broader ethnic group known as the Koch during the Rana years.  This 
was initiated by indigenous elites who wished to separate themselves and those other 
clans which had adopted the Hindu customs of the Brahmins and Chettris (Bista, 
1976, 134;  Höfer, 1979, 73).  The emergence of these pseudo-caste divisions within 
the indigenous Terai groups thus provided ideological justification for the feudal 
relations within and between these ethnic communities.  
 
 
5.2.4. Downfall of the Ranas and attempted land reforms 
 
Land Act of 1964 and further reforms 
 
The period following the overthrow of the Ranas in the mid-twentieth century saw 
further evolutions to the feudal mode of production in rural Morang.  After 1951, 
when ‘rural development’ began to figure more prominently in government rhetoric, 
a series of attempts were made at land reform, culminating in the 1964 Lands Act.  
The reforms abolished the jimidri system, while birt tenure, which comprised 36% 
of the total land in Nepal as of 1959, was outlawed (Regmi, 1977b).  All land was 
now officially raikar tenure with the exception of guthi lands, those owned by 
religious institutions.  The Lands Act set the ceiling for land ownership at 25 bigh 
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for the Terai, set agricultural rents at a maximum of 50% of the crop and made 
efforts to introduce tenancy rights (Adhikari, 2006;  Regmi, 1977b).   
 
Avoidance of reforms 
 
By 1972, the government had acquired approximately 50,000 hectares of land.  
However, this represented only 3% of the cultivable area, and it was estimated that 
only 22,000 hectares were actually redistributed, benefiting only 10,000 households 
(Regmi, 1977b).  Despite the rhetoric of land reform, as of the present day there has 
been only limited progress in reducing concentration of landed property and 
undermining the feudal mode of production on the plains of Morang, particularly in 
the study VDCs of Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha.  Many of the political elites of 
hill origin, such as the recipients of birt grants, and Brahmin and Chettri jimidrs 
were by various measures able to avoid reforms.  It was estimated by villagers in the 
study VDCs that some landlords still own holdings ranging from 20 to 70 bigh, 
especially in Bhaudaha VDC.  The only change is that many more of these Brahmin 
and Chettri landlords who were once resident in villages have now moved to urban 
areas. Many landlords, however, have always been absentee. 
 
There are a number of explanations for the persistence of this landlord class.  The 
owners of larger ‘class A’ birt grants were compelled to give up their estates and 
the tenants received ownership rights to the land, thus becoming independent peasant 
cultivators.  However, many owners of smaller ‘class B’ birt grants, retained their 
lands as it was simply converted into raikar tenure making landlords liable for taxes 
while cultivators continued to work as tenants under semi-feudal production relations 
(Regmi, 1977b).  While in the study area it was difficult to ascertain which lands 
belonged to the recipients of birt grants, it was reported locally that many of the 
descendents of these ‘birtwalas’ continue to own vast estates and collect rent from 
their homes in urban areas.   
 
The most significant mechanism through which large landlords retained their estates, 
however, was through conscious avoidance of the reform process.  In many cases, 
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landlords registered themselves as cultivators while renting out the land to tenants 
unofficially (Regmi, 1977b).  We were informed of a woman who married into a 
powerful landed family, and had inherited up to 70 bigh of land.  During the land 
reform she made papers in the name of some of the tenants, but continued to extract 
rent as a landowner.  While the original tenants have moved on, we were told with 
much amusement of how the son now wants to sell some of her land, but can not find 
the tenants in whose name it was originally registered!  Another practice said to have 
been widespread in rural Morang was the registration of land in the name of different 
family members.  There were even several rumours of married couples having legal 
divorces so some land could be registered in the husband’s name and some in the 
wife’s name, although these reports are difficult to verify.  One farmer from 
Bhaudaha described how a land owner from a neighbouring village was able to 
bypass the land reform process: 
 
“There was a landlord with 75 bigh of land.  He kept a kamtiya [locally based 
agent] to look after it.  After hearing the rumour of land reforms they named some in 
their daughter’s name and some in their relative’s name” 
 
Even high level staff in the Morang land office stated that ‘officially’, no landlord 
owns more than 5-6 bigh of land, but, as it is all registered in the name of different 
family members, their estates are likely to be far larger.  Khanal et al (2005) cites a 
lack of commitment and sincerity of the government and ineffective institutional 
arrangements for the  implementation of land reforms.  Furthermore, there has been 
inadequate policing of legislation relating to land ceilings (Blaikie et al., 2001).  
Understanding these implementation failures, however, requires a reiteration of the 
importance of land to political authority over the last two centuries.  As outlined 
above, birt grants incorporated the feudal lords within the state bureaucratic alliance 
(Mishra, 2007).  Furthermore, many of the jimidr posts were appointed to Brahman 
and Chettri’s loyal to the government during the Rana years.  Landlords continued to 
be the major support bases of the king during the Panchayat Era in which the first 
land reforms were  established, often influencing implementation agencies and 
personnel (Khanal et al., 2005).  Political power in this context remains central to the 
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reproduction  of feudal relations of production and the forms of surplus appropriation 
which hinder accumulation. 
 
Changing structure of the landlord class 
 
While Brahmin and Chettri political elites have been able to retain their control over 
land, a significant change following the collapse of the Rana regime, in particular in 
Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha, was the decline in the indigenous Thru nobility.  
The close links to the bureaucracy amongst the landlords of hill origin gave them an 
advantage over the indigenous landlords in avoiding land reforms.  Although there 
are still some wealthier Thru landlords in Morang, it was reported in Jhorahat and 
Bhaudaha that many of the indigenous nobility had lost much of their estates 
following the reforms.   
 
It was not only the land reforms, however, which led to the decline of the landed 
classes.  Firstly, land was lost over the last half a century through population growth.  
Unlike the Brahmin and Chettri landlords, many of whom were absentee, agriculture 
was the primary source of subsistence for indigenous households, and the land was 
often divided amongst sons.  Secondly, and most significantly, the former indigenous 
nobility had been selling their estates over the last few decades due to financial 
insecurity.  It was reported that just as the Thru landlords had been able to 
accumulate lands through money lending, they themselves had fallen into cycles of 
indebtedness in later years to urban based landlords and local money lenders.  The 
causes of growing indebtedness are difficult to verify, although the increasing 
monetisation of the economy and market expansion appears to be partially 
responsible.  There is in this context a growing culture of consumerism and rising 
expenditures for life cycle ceremonies such as weddings amongst indigenous 
landlords, many of whom had few other sources of cash income.  This will be 
explored greater detail in the next chapter. 
 
We met one marginal farmer from the Rajbanshi community of Bhaudaha whose 
grandparents had owned 360 bigh of land extending as far as Biratnagar, including 
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what is now some of the most expensive real estate in the district.  However, the 
family was in debt and unable to pay the land tax, resulting in much of the land being 
confiscated.  The remaining land was divided amongst the sons, and now his 
household owns a mere half a bigh.  It was also claimed that many indigenous land 
owners did not know the full financial value of their land and were mislead into 
selling it to urban based landlords, often for a marginal price.   
 
Just as the Thru landlords were losing their economic power, landlessness was also 
increasing rapidly amongst the remainder of the indigenous peasant population.  
Many of those who had property rights to small parcels of land under the 
independent peasant mode of production were now also losing their land through 
indebtedness, forcing them to become feudal tenants.  One elder in Pidarboni 
described how the smaller producers lost their land: 
 
“The farmers were poor and they could not even afford for food so they use to take 
loan from the rich people. The farmers were charged with interest which was very 
high, because of which the farmers could not pay it back. Instead they gave their 
land to the rich people”. 
 
It is important to ask who the traditional landed elite have sold their holdings to.  
While it is likely that some of the land was absorbed into the estates of the urban 
based landed elite such as the descendents of birt recipients and Brahmin and 
Chettri jimidrs, there has also been a rise of a new class of absentee landlords who 
are still purchasing land.  This echoes Regmi (1977b), who suggested that land 
remained a profitable source of investment following the land reforms.  It was 
estimated that the Lands Act maintained agricultural rents at a level that ensured 
landowners continued to receive an income equivalent to that which would be 
achieved had they invested in other sectors (Regmi, 1977b).  In this context, growing 
prosperity in Kathmandu and the town of Biratnagar have continued to encourage the 
purchases of land by town dwellers.  The rise of a new class of landlords also 
supports Regmi’s (1977) observation that the emergence of de facto ownership rights 
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in land has made ascriptive rights less important, and the traditional landed elite have 
been undermined by the rise of a non-ascriptive land owning class.   
 
Figure 5-6: Settlements on the forest fringe in Urlabari VDC, north Morang:  This was one of 
the most recent regions to have been settled from the hills, in the second half of the 20
th
 century. 




















The second half of the twentieth century also saw a demographic shift in the 
population of the villages throughout the Terai.  The government encouraged 
considerable migration of hill settlers to the Terai plains following the malaria 
eradication programs of the 1950s.  Most of this population comprised of 
enterprising peasants escaping poverty and overpopulation in the hills, and they 
generally colonised former forest land as owner cultivators (see Figure 5-6).  In the 
Western Terai in particular, many indigenous peoples such as the Thru lost their 
land to the new settlers either through fraud or sales due to debt (Guneratne, 2002).   
This may have occurred in Morang, although to a lesser extent than in the Western 
Terai.  At least in the communities where this research was carried out, it appears 
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that most land was lost to the absentee landlords, as the new settlements of hill 
people adjacent to Jhorahat bazaar were primarily in former forest land (see Figure 
5-6), having less impact on indigenous groups
9
.  Those whose ancestors have settled 
from the hills in the study area were generally not significantly more prosperous than 
the Thru.  Many migrants are Brahmin and Chettri and have retained their high 
caste status over the Thru and other indigenous groups.  Although this may have 
facilitated their access to more favourable and larger holdings of former forest land, 
it does not appear to have allowed them to ‘displace’ indigenous land owners. 
Furthermore, while most new migrants settled as owner cultivators, joining those 
farmers who cultivated under an independent peasant mode of production, many 
were unable to secure parcels of land and became tenants for the absentee landlords.   
 
In sum, there has been a change over the last half century from feudal system 
whereby the monopoly over land was shared between an indigenous landed elite and 
a predominantly Brahmin and Chettri political elite, to a new mode of production 
whereby surplus is appropriated by an absentee landlord class.  Although the 
relations of production are feudal, the absentee landlord class is increasingly diverse, 
and also now includes urban professionals as well as the traditional ‘feudal’ elite.  
This, alongside the increased influence of market forces in the rural economy mean 
that it is nowadays better termed a ‘semi-feudal’ mode of production.  This mode of 
production however, continues to be reproduced by the concentration of land 
ownership within this absentee landlord class and its political support mechanisms. 
 
Although the primary mode of surplus appropriation remains rent payments in kind, 
the rise in absentee landlordism has brought with it some smaller changes to the 
relations of production.  Until quite recently, each of the resident landlords from both 
                                                 
9
 It was however, evident from local discussions that some of the indigenous groups who had resided 
in the jungle fringe to the north of Morang may have been displaced by the new settlers.  It was 
reported that the population of indigenous groups such as the Dhimal and Satar had declined 
significantly in north Morang over the last half a century and the population is almost entirely 
comprised of ‘settlers’ in many VDCs.  However, these facts are almost impossible to verify, and it is 
unclear as to where this indigenous population migrated.  As most of the new settlers were (and 
continue to be) owner cultivators, while opportunities for tenancy were less, the indigenous groups 
may have migrated to the south to join the growing class of sharecroppers in the areas dominated by 
absentee landlordism. 
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the hill settler and Thru elites had a sphere of influence stretching beyond the 
boundary of their actual estate or kamat.  They may not actually own all the land, but 
within this sphere of influence they had much power locally and would each season 
draw labourers to work on those holdings which had not already been leased out.  All 
the workers would gather their harvest in the one place and receive a certain share of 
the crops for their labour.  Local elders recalled how in the past they were very afraid 
of the landlords, feeling that they needed to please them if they wanted work.  This 
system of employing local agricultural labour on their estates had however ended as 
existing landlords have relocated in urban areas and the indigenous landed class has 
declined.   
 
Nevertheless, existing absentee landlords continue to have a strong influence in their 
former kamats, and elements of the system have remained in the modern era.  
However, rather than working on the land which is primarily operated by tenants, 
workers from a kamat are provided with jobs in urban areas.  These favours, which 
facilitate an articulation of the rural semi-feudal with urban capitalist modes of 
production, often take the form of a classic patron-client relationship. By offering a 
perceived ‘favour’ to local people, their position can be legitimated.   
 
Later attempts at land reform and political power 
 
Land reforms did not cease after the 1960s.  There was renewed rhetoric of land 
reform in the 1990s following the restoration of democracy.  Could this have gone 
some way as to reduce the concentration of landed property?  The CPN-UML 
government of the mid-1990s instituted the Badal Commission to look into land 
reform issues, but little came of the report (Adhikari, 2006).  Under the government 
of Sher Bahadur Deuba in 2001, there was limited progress with a reduction in the 
Terai land ceiling from 25 to 10 bigh, while landlords were prohibited from renting 
out more than 4 bigh to any one household (Adhikari, 2006).  A rigorous 
implementation was promised in order to gain support at the time of the escalating 
Maoist insurgency (Adhikari, 2006).  However, none of these policies appear to have 
changed the land ownership structure in rural Morang.   
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Given the infiltration of landed interests into the bureaucracy, it is understandable 
that land reforms have failed, and policies have been ineffective.  One policy maker 
in Kathmandu, when asked about the prospect of land reform, stated:  
 
“It [land reform] is a very sensitive issue.  It is directly linked with the power 
structure of important families and power interests... and the donors themselves off 
and on they send some mission to look into the land issue… Their main mandate is 
poverty, and ending deprivation, but no one dares raise the land issue.” 
 
He went on to discuss the various land reform commissions which have come and 
gone over the last few decades: 
 
“The [land reform] commission submits the report to the government and then the 
government changes, and nothing happens.  And there were several land reform 
commissions.  Each comes out with a grand master plan, a land reform plan. There 
is no political commitment to change.  And it’s probably is not unique to Nepal… 
The power structures are incompetent, corrupt and are too preoccupied with 
scheduling for their own family groups.” 
 
This quote not only suggests a lack of commitment to land reform and the continued 
shaping of policies to meet elite needs, but offers insights into the social dynamics of 
the feudal bureaucracy.  The concept of phno mnche, which literally translates as 
‘one’s own people’, is widespread in Nepal and refers to one’s own social networks.  
If one offers favours to their phno mnche, particularly if the recipient is in a high 
status, they can expect a return in the future such as employment or access to 
essential services.  The operation of these often caste or kin based networks of 
patronage have been highly significant in shaping the behaviour of members of the 
bureaucracy since the Rana years (Bista, 1991).  In the case of the quote above it is 
suggested that policy makers are not interested in change, but in ensuring the needs 
of their elite social circles are met. 
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Landed classes are also able to shape policy at a local level through their control over 
the vote bank.  Villagers reported that landlords included leaders from all the 
mainstream political parties.  The landlords use patron-client relations with their 
tenants such as offering them menial jobs to encourage villagers to vote for their 
parties, (including parties against land reform), thus further reinforcing their 
economic power.  Similarly, it was reported that land owners from the major parties 
would give out ‘false’ ownership papers to tenants to win short term support.  Only 
after the elections would the tenants realise they were not valid. 
 
 
5.3. Agrarian structure today 
 
In order to understand the relevance of these processes for the focus VDCs of 
Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha, it is useful to examine the survey data on land 
ownership in 2007-8.  In the survey it is evident that 79% of sampled households that 
are engaged in agriculture have access to less than 1.5 bigh (1 bigh = 0.67 
hectares) of land, while only 9.4% have more than three bigh (see Table 5-2)
10
.  A 
substantial 58% of the total cultivated land amongst sampled farmers in the three 
VDCs of Morang is not owned, but is rented.  47% of cultivating households 
meanwhile are only tenants, 37% are tenants who also own parcels of land, while 
only 16% are purely owner cultivators (see Table 5-3).  The fact that some 
households own land, although plots are small, suggests that a mode of production 
based upon independent peasant cultivation persists in rural Morang.  However, it is 
clear that the majority of households participate predominantly in the semi-feudal 
mode of production.   
 
The village survey reveals that 73% of the holdings rented by sampled households 
belong to absentee landlords and 5% belong to both absentee and local landlords. 
Discussions locally suggest that the absentee landlord class is composed of both the 
descendents of Rana era village functionaries or birt recipients who now reside in 
                                                 
10
 1.5 bigh is the amount of land suggested by respondents to be sufficient to support a typical family 
of 6 people (average family size in sample 5.6).   
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urban areas, as well as professional classes who invested in land more recently.  Rent 
is appropriated in kind.  On some occasions landlords use it directly to meet the grain 
needs of their urban based extended family, while in other cases it may be sold 
immediately and converted into cash.  It is unclear as to what happens to this surplus 
when it is converted into cash, but initial discussions suggest it is used primarily for 
further consumption purposes rather than being reinvested. 
 
The remaining 22% of land belongs to local farmers, family members or religious 
institutions (guthi).  The lack of large land owners who actually reside in the selected 
VDCs is understandable given the decline of the traditional Thru land-owning elite, 
although there are some in nearby villages.  The local households who do lease out 
land do not appear to be big landlords.  For example, out of the sampled households 
only 6% rent out land to poorer farmers.  However, as the average area of land rented 
out is only 1.75 bigh, such households can not be classified as a local landlord class 
of comparable wealth to the jimidrs and other functionaries of the Rana years.  It 
appears that most of these households lease out their land after family members find 
alternative skilled employment outside agriculture or have migrated to the Gulf or 
Malaysia, making investment in cultivation no longer viable or practical.  The rent is 
used to directly meet the subsistence needs of those who remain in the village rather 
than being accumulated.  This practice is particularly common amongst well 
educated Brahmin and Chettri households seeking a path out of agriculture.    
 
A remaining question, however, is the relevance of this trend across the eastern 
Terai.  The sample from Morang can be compared with the sample data for the 
eastern Terai encompassed in the 2003/04 Nepal Living Standards Measurement 
Survey  (LSMS) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004).  Table 5-2 suggests that while 
inequality in the distribution of land within the peasant population is slightly higher 
in the sample from Morang, both data sets suggest that a clear majority of farmers 
own holdings of less than 1.5 bigh.  Meanwhile, a small proportion (9% sampled 
households in the Morang survey and 11% in the NLSS survey) own holdings of 
more than 3 bigh.  Initial evidence thus suggests a highly skewed land ownership 
structure in both the selected study villages and the eastern Terai as a whole.  In 
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terms of landlord-tenant relations, the tenancy situation in the selected VDCs of 
Morang appears to be particularly acute (see Table 5-3).  Nevertheless, the LSMS 
sample for the entire Eastern Terai still suggests that 30% of the total operated land is 
under tenant cultivation, and that 61% of households are involved in tenant farming, 
either on its own, or in combination with owner cultivation.  It is evident therefore 
that through the historical processes outlined above, semi-feudalism remains a 
powerful economic formation not just in Morang district but across the eastern Terai. 
 
Table 5-2: Distribution of agricultural households by holding size 
 
Sample % Households with less 
than 1.5 bigh 
% Households with 
more than 3 bigh 
Average holding size 
(bigh) 















Table 5-3: Percentage of total land under owner and tenant cultivation and percentage of 
households engaged in owner, combined and tenant cultivation 
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Where the study VDCs differ from the remainder of the eastern Terai is in the 
predominance of absentee landlordism.  There is no data directly associated with 
absentee landlords in the LSMS survey.  However, while the percentage of total 
operated land which is under tenant cultivation is 30%, the percentage of total owned 
land rented out by rural Terai respondents is only reported to be 10%.  As the LSMS 
data was collected from rural areas, and assuming the sample is representative, one 
would expect that the shortfall of 20% is a result of urban based absentee landlords 
who are not included in any of the survey sites.  This is, of course, significantly 
lower than the 73% in the surveyed VDCs of Morang.   
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While the survey data suggests that the practice of absentee landlordism is 
particularly high in the selected VDCs of Morang district, why it is less common 
elsewhere in the eastern Terai requires further analysis.  It may be the case that the 
indigenous nobility in other eastern Terai districts were more successful in retaining 
their holdings.  Similarly, the fact that the study area is near Biratnagar, Nepal’s 
second largest urban area, appears to be one of the reasons there were so many 
absentee landlords.  Other Terai districts may not have been subject to the same 
volume of land purchases by urban professionals in recent years, transactions which 
helped precipitate the decline of the indigenous land owning class.  Areas nearer 
urban areas have the greatest agricultural growth potential given their proximity to 
markets, state support services and favourable transport infrastructure. The 
importance of studying the impact of absentee landlordism in these areas is therefore 
all the more important.  The VDCs in this study can therefore be considered a case 
study highlighting the means through which several important aspects of the Terai’s 
land ownership structure and the associated modes of production constrain market 
access.  These include the inequality in access to the means of production and surplus 





It is evident that over the last three centuries, a feudal mode of production has 
become predominant in the agricultural communities of rural Morang, although 
different interventions by the state over the decades have caused it to undergo 
internal transformations and evolution.  From the founding of Kingdom of Nepal to 
the early Rana years, the peasantry were subject to the simultaneous appropriation of 
tax from the state and rent by the local landlords who were themselves part of the 
feudal state apparatus.  However, the development of property rights, monetisation 
and devaluation of land tax, and associated increases in land inequality, have led to 
the emergence of rent as the primary mechanism of surplus appropriation.  There has 
meanwhile been a shift in the structure of the land owning class, with a decline of the 
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indigenous nobility, the entrenchment of the now predominantly absentee Brahmin 
and Chettri landed elite, and the growing ownership of land by urban professionals. 
 
Independent peasant cultivation does exist throughout the eastern Terai.  However, 
despite its internal mutations, semi-feudalism remains the predominant mode of 
production in the study VDCs and large portions of the eastern Terai, although it’s 
internal complexity will be examined in subsequent chapters.  Central to the 
reproduction of semi-feudal relations of production over the generations has been the 
political power of the landlord class within the bureaucracy, which has consistently 
served their interests.  As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the associated 
perpetuation of feudal mechanisms of surplus appropriation has played an important 
role in hindering the emergence of either profitable commodity production or 
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6 Relations of production, surplus appropriation and 




This aim of this chapter is to understand the character of the relations of production 
present in Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha, and how the associated forms of surplus 
appropriation condition households’ capacity to engage in profitable 
commercialisation.  Such a transformation, particularly amongst the middle 
peasantry, would be essential if the APP’s envisaged profitable petty commodity 
production is to emerge.  It would also precede any capitalist development and 
differentiation in agriculture.   
 
The chapter begins in Section 6.2 by examining the character of the contemporary 
relations of production and primary forms of surplus appropriation.  Based upon the 
survey data, three categories of farming household are developed and their market 
participation analysed:  ‘Small farmer’ households represent those unable to meet 
their subsistence needs through agriculture; ‘medium farmers’ can reproduce through 
agriculture but are not accumulating capital, while ‘large farmers’ represent the few 
households showing ‘capitalist’ tendencies.  In Section 6.3 it is argued that the low 
levels of profitable commercialisation amongst ‘small’ and ‘medium’ farmers can be 
explained by the predominant semi-feudal mode of production into which they are 
integrated whereby much of the surplus is appropriated through ground rent.  It is 
argued that while these forms of surplus appropriation combined with the control 
over land by the urban elite hinder households from entering the land market, levels 
of rent remain high as a result of the competition for tenancies in the context of 
industrial stagnation and a lack of alternative viable livelihood options.  The use of 
outside labour represents another component of the relations of production, whereby 
labourers have surplus appropriated by cultivators while simultaneously being 
exploited by landlords.  However, only wealthier producers utilise outside labour to 
facilitate accumulation.   
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Furthermore, although men and women are subject to the same relations or 
production, there are micro-level class processes within the household, whereby 
women perform a disproportionate share of the aggregate necessary and surplus 
labour time.  This further hinders households from increasing productivity and 
yielding a saleable surplus. 
 
Section 6.4 explores whether the enhanced use of productivity boosting agricultural 
inputs to develop the productive forces is able to increase the profitability of 
agriculture.  It is revealed that capacity to do so is intricately tied to the relations of 
production.  In section 6.5 it is suggested that even the use of basic annual inputs of 
fertiliser and labour do not facilitate the development of the forces of production but 
cause ‘small’ and ‘medium’ farmer households to fall into cycles of indebtedness.  
Their subsequent subordination to usury or ‘interest bearing capital’ represents 
another form of surplus appropriation.  Microfinance banks in this context have done 
little to prevent households from turning to private sources of credit.  Indebtedness 
has been worsened by the non-agricultural expenses households are subject to, the 
most notable of which are cultural capital expenses.  They have in many cases even 
impeded the ‘large farmers’ from accumulating capital and expanding their holdings, 
while causing ‘medium’ and ‘small farmers’ households to sell their land and 
become tenants. 
 
Section 6.6 examines how another aspect of the relations of production, the type of 
rental contract, also impacts both the likelihood of households to produce a profitable 
surplus and the development of the productive forces.  It is suggested that tenants 
who rent land through share contracts have fewer incentives to intensify the 
allocation of labour or inputs.  A further question which is explored in section 6.7 
relates to whether or not landlords can play a ‘progressive’ role in developing the 
forces of production through the provision of advice and supervision.  It is suggested 
however, that the absentee nature of most land ownership and the lack of interest in 
agriculture within the landed class mean the supervision costs outweigh the benefits 
in terms of enhanced profits.  
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6.2 Subsistence Priorities, Retention of a surplus and 
Implications for Class Dynamics 
6.2.1 Categorisation of households according to their capacity to retain 
a surplus 
Paddy or dhn, is the most important subsistence crop produced by farming 
households in Morang district.  Not only is it viewed as an essential food staple, but 
its production is central to the culture and way of life of the Nepali plains (See Figure 
6-1).  As it requires large amounts of water, it is planted in the monsoon month of 
Asr (June-July).  When the rains subside and the dry winter months set in the paddy 
is harvested.  The farmers subsequently plant a crop of dhal, mustard or more often 
wheat, the flour of which is used to make roi (bread), another important staple food 
(see Figure 6-2).   For 30% of households, the wheat harvest is followed by a smaller 
harvest of irrigated spring rice or chait dhn.  These staple foods are generally 
threshed in the village before being processed using traditional methods, or more 
commonly by taking it to one of the village rice mills for a small fee.  Grain is then 
kept in mud built storehouses to feed the family until the next harvest.  Long a 
subsistence society, interviews suggest that the production priority for all but the 
wealthiest households is to meet one’s basic food needs through the cultivation of the 
three main grain staples: rice, wheat and pulses.  Many farmers also own livestock, 
fruit trees and small vegetable gardens, the products of which also contribute to 
meeting their nutritional needs, although production is generally marginal in 
comparison to staples.   
 
It is therefore evident that the likelihood for a household to shift to profitable 
commercial production is largely dependant upon their capacity to produce a 
physical surplus beyond what is required for their subsistence.  It is necessary to 
briefly re-examine Marx’s understanding of surplus.  According to Marx, under 
capitalism, individuals perform both necessary and surplus labour.  The ‘necessary 
labour time’ is the time required to produce a product that will meet the subsistence 
needs of the worker and his/her family.  Once they have accomplished their 
necessary labour time, they perform ‘surplus labour time’, and a ‘surplus product’ is 
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generated (Marx, 1974, 208-209).  Under capitalist relations of production, the 
worker who does not own the means of production and therefore has no control over 
the labour process, is only remunerated for their necessary labour time.  The 
capitalist thus extracts the product of the worker’s surplus labour in value form 
(Marx, 1974).   
 
However, in Volume 3 of Capital, Marx occasionally mobilises the concept of 
necessary and surplus labour for the analysis of pre-capitalist modes of production1. 
In the context of a family farm, the combined product of family labour beyond what 
is required for subsistence constitutes the surplus product.  Athreya et al (1987, 159) 
clarifies the definition of ‘surplus’ for a peasant household as “what is available for 
luxury consumption or for accumulation, once the requirements of simple 
reproduction have been met.”  The needs of simple reproduction entail the 
reproduction of labour power through the provision of food and the reproduction of 
the means of production which is necessary to produce these subsistence goods2 
(Athreya et al., 1987).  I have also included cultural capital expenses such as 
weddings as part of the requirements of simple reproduction given  that they are 
viewed as ‘necessary’ expenditures for most households and can play a ‘functional’ 
economic role.  Therefore, in a peasant household, the aggregate household labour 
time in which the needs of simple reproduction are met within a set unit of time, can 
be classified as the households’ ‘necessary labour time’.  ‘Surplus labour time’ refers 




                                                 
1Marx touches upon the division between surplus and necessary labour in a non-value form at several 
points in Volume 3 of Capital.  For example, with regards to communal pre-capitalist modes of 
production a distinction is drawn between: “…that portion of labour whose product is directly 
consumed individually by the producers and their families – aside from the part which is productively 
consumed – that portion of labour which is invariably surplus labour, whose product serves to satisfy 
the general social needs no matter how this surplus product may be divided, and no matter who may 
function as a representative of these social needs.” (Marx, 1974, 877) 
2  Investment in means of production entails the investment in inputs which maintain existing levels of 
productivity.  Under capitalism, the reproduction of the means of production is paid for out of surplus 
value.  However, as labour has not been separated from the means of production in pre-capitalist 
formations, investment in the inputs necessary to produce enough for the family to subsist must be 
paid for with the product of necessary labour time. 
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Figure 6-1: Fields of paddy to the northeast of Thalaha VDC during the monsoon: Rice is by far 








Figure 6-2: Combined field of wheat and mustard in Jhorahat VDC during the dry winter:  As 
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Marx states that the peasant form of production is one “…in which possession of the 
land is a perquisite for the labourer’s ownership of the product of his own labour”  
(Marx, 1967 807).  It can be surmised that under idealised petty commodity 
production based upon the land owning family farm, the household appropriates the 
product of their own surplus labour once they have met the needs of simple 
reproduction.  Such a household can in theory reinvest this surplus to purchase 
outside labour and invest in improved inputs, thus developing the forces of 
production.  The accumulation of profit as capital would eventually allow expanded 
reproduction.  In many ways this appears to be the vision of the rural economy 
implicit in the APP.   
 
The majority of households in Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha also perform much of 
their necessary labour and a large proportion of their surplus labour on their farms, 
with the exception of those households with particularly marginal holdings, who may 
struggle to meet even their minimum needs on their land.  What is crucial however to 
understanding constraints to commercialisation and capital accumulation is the 
degree to which households can actually retain the product of their surplus labour.  
While the idealised model outlined above may be relevant to some owner cultivators 
operating under the independent peasant mode of production, it does not appear 
relevant for those integrated into the predominant semi-feudal mode of production 
who do not own their land, and are thus subject to ground rent.   
 
Before these forms of surplus appropriation are investigated, it is useful for analytical 
purposes, to divide the sample into three household categories according to their 
capacity to retain a surplus from farming, namely ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large’ 
farmers.  This offers initial insights into which farming households have the potential 
to move out of the pre-capitalist mode(s) of production they are part of and become 
profitable petty commodity producers or even ‘capitalist’ farms.  Athreya et al (1987) 
identifies a methodology to measure the degree to which households’ retain a 
surplus.  It seeks to identify whether or not farms yield a per capita grain and cash 
requirement above a set level which is deemed to constitute one’s minimum 
subsistence needs.  However, the data requirements for such a study are large and it 
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is highly problematic to assume that every household has fixed food and cash 
requirements, not to mention cultural expenses which are overlooked in Athreya et 
al’s analysis.   I have therefore developed an alternative form of classification which 
more effectively captures whether or not respondents themselves feel they can retain 
a surplus from agriculture.  
 
The choice of farming individuals to simultaneously engage in menial work is an 
important criterion suggesting that the household is unable to meet the needs of 
simple reproduction from agriculture alone.  Households whose members engage in 
such work are thus classified as ‘small farmers.’  ‘Menial’ work includes farm 
labour, unskilled and semi-skilled casual labour in the bazaar, rickshaw pulling and 
factory work.  Skilled work requiring secondary education and overseas migration 
has not been included in this classification.  Given the higher wages and better 
conditions, it is not likely to be performed purely as a result of the household being 
‘unable to reproduce’ through agriculture, and instead represents an additional 
income generating activity.  It was noted that labour shortfalls as a result of a family 
member taking up skilled employment or migrating are generally compensated for by 
the hiring of non-family labour3.   
 
There are two explanations as to why ‘small farmer’ households may not be able to 
reproduce through agriculture.  At one extreme, the ‘small farmer’ household may 
have property rights to all their land, thus farming within the independent peasant 
mode of production.  However, they may simply not own enough land to meet their 
subsistence needs at current levels of productivity.  Unless they can develop the 
productive forces or increase their hours of work on their land to boost output, they 
must perform the remainder of their necessary labour time and all of their surplus 
labour time off their farms.  They would thus have much of the product of their 
surplus labour appropriated by off-farm employers, often in the capitalist mode of 
                                                 
3 One could argue that a household that can not reproduce through agriculture may still take up skilled 
work or migrate if the opportunity arose.  However, it seems likely that such opportunities are going 
to be restricted primarily to farmers who already have economic security through agriculture in the 
first instance, given that access to skilled employment usually requires educational resources, while 
overseas migration requires considerable financial investment. 
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production.  What appears to be a far more common scenario though, is that the 
‘small farmer’ household operates enough land for family members to perform all 
their necessary labour time on the farm at current levels of productivity.  However, 
they do not own their land and are thus farming under in the ‘semi-feudal’ mode of 
production.  In this context a portion of the product of their aggregate necessary 
labour and the entire product of their surplus labour may be appropriated through 
rent (Patnaik, 1983;  Pearce, 1983).  Once again, unless they can boost productivity 
they must sell their labour power elsewhere.  In this context the household’s total 
necessary and surplus labour time is divided between work on and off their farms 
while the total product of their surplus labour is divided between two separate 
exploiting classes.   
 
There are however, households who perform outside labour but can still reproduce 
through agriculture, and thus can not be classified as ‘small farmers’.  This arises 
from the fact that the relations of production within both the independent peasant and 
feudal mode of production remain highly complex.  Many households, including 
those of small farmers’ themselves, occupy an unusual class position as members 
may labour on other farms but also purchase non-family labour for rop, the labour 
intensive paddy planting process and sometimes for the harvest (See Figure 6-3).  In 
these contexts, although the household may not ‘own’ the land, as the tenant they 
still have the power to control the labour process of their workers and appropriate 
surplus, balancing out any surplus extraction they were subject to working for other 
farms.   
 
The selling of labour power therefore, does not necessarily mean one can not meet 
their subsistence needs on their land.  Respondents reported that this historically took 
the form of a culturally embedded ‘exchange’ of labour during the busy seasons, 
suggesting that it may have been a relic of an older redistributive mode of 
production.  It was evident however that the monetisation of the economy had 
undermined these institutions and most labour is now paid for by a daily rate.  The 
non-monetised system only exists amongst some settlers from the hills, where the 
parma institution of labour exchange is still used (See Figure 6-4).  Nevertheless, as 
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similar amounts of labour is often purchased and sold by many producers and 
labourers are often from within one’s kin group, the monetised use of outside labour 
can be still considered de facto exchange of labour time amongst farms of similar 
economic status.  With regards to categorisation, one must differentiate therefore 
between those ‘exchanging’ their labour and those who are obliged to labour on 
others’ land to meet their minimum subsistence needs.  Therefore those for whom the 
total annual earnings from work on other’s land is equal to or less than the total 
annual sum of payments to workers on their own land were not classified as ‘small 
farmers’. 
 
Therefore, with the exception of those who ‘exchange’ labour with neighbours, the 
remainder of the sampled households do not perform menial labour outside their 
farms.  This group of course represents the ‘medium’ and ‘large’ farmers.  While 
both these household types retain a surplus, they can be divided based upon the size 
of the surplus and its capacity to actually facilitate accumulation.  It is natural to 
assume that accumulating households are able to invest in the means of production 
beyond the basic annual requirements of livestock, irrigation and fertilizer.  Those 
surplus producing households who have invested in high value fixed assets in the last 
ten years, namely land and machinery, are thus classified as ‘large farmers’.  They 
represent the profitable commodity producers who could soon become ‘capitalist’.  
Those who are meeting the needs of simple reproduction (i.e. not performing menial 
work off their farms), but have not invested in high value fixed assets are classified 
as ‘medium farmers’.  Another difference between these two groups that was noticed 
after categorisation, is that all ‘medium farmer’ households still labour on other 
farms as well as employing labour in an ‘exchange’, while the ‘large farmers’ are 
only employers of outside labour.  The ‘medium farmers’ represent a significant 
category of the peasantry as it is within this group in particular one would expect 
differentiation to occur, with the wealthier strata joining the emerging class of 
capitalist farmers and the poorer strata entering the labour force along with those 
‘small farmers’ who have sold their land.  It is also the category envisaged in the 
APP to lead agrarian transformation. 
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Figure 6-3: Terai paddy transplantation in Pidarboni, Jhorahat: Paddy plantation is labour 
intensive and all farms require outside workers.  Although a de facto ‘exchange’ of labour exists 






Figure 6-4: Preparation of hill paddy fields for plantation in Bhojpur district (north of 
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Within the surveyed population, 31% of households are ‘small farmers’, 29% are 
‘medium farmers’, while only 7% are ‘large farmers’.  31% are ‘landless labourers’ 
not engaged in cultivation and the remaining 3% comprise of households who 
although owning land do not farm, but still live in the community, leasing out their 
holdings.  In sum, initial evidence suggests that the ‘middle farmer’ and ‘large 
farmer’ category that was to drive the APP’s envisaged growth, or out of which a 
capitalist class could emerge, represent just a third of the rural population, while two 
thirds are either landless labourers or ‘small farmers’ unable to meet their subsistence 
needs in farming. 
 
Table 6-1: Average per-capita quantity of unprocessed grain retained in the household over 
agricultural last year* 
 
Farmer category Average per-capita quantity of 
unprocessed grain retained in the 
household (paddy + wheat) 
Performance of menial labour off 
their farm 
Small farmer 144kg 
 
Yes 
Medium farmer 361 kg 
 
No 
Large farmer 371 kg 
 
No 
*Reported minimum grain requirements per capita is 357kg 
 
To verify the effectiveness of these categories, an attempt was made to understand 
levels of basic grain security for each household as has been done in Athreya et al’s 
classification system.  In particular, it is important to verify my differentiation 
between ‘small’ and ‘medium’ farmer households who constitute the majority.  A 
selection of ‘small’ and ‘medium’ household members were asked what they felt was 
the minimum grain requirements of a household for a typical family of six4.  The 
response was invariably that such a family would require at least 40 to 45 maund (1 
maund = 40kg) of dhn, or paddy, in a year to subsist.  In addition they reported that 
a household requires at least 10 – 11 maund of wheat.  I have therefore taken the 
average of 42.5 maund or 1700kg of paddy and 11 maund or 440kg of wheat to 
develop an indication of the minimum grain requirement for a family of six. This 
translates as a total of 357 kg of grain for each family member or consumption unit5.   
                                                 
4 Average family size in sample is 5.6. 
5 Athreya et al’s (1987) study from Tamil Nadu placed the minimum subsistence figure at 220-225kg 
of rice and course grains per consumption unit.  The total is understandably lower when one observes 
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Based upon the survey results, the average quantity of grain produced by ‘small 
farmer’ households over the last agricultural year which is retained following the 
deduction of rent, in-kind payments for labour and agricultural sales to meet cash 
requirements, is only 144 kg (See Table 6-1).  This is well below the 357kg 
threshold, supporting the assertion that ‘small farmers’ can not reproduce through 
their cultivation alone.  ‘Medium farmer’ households retained on average 361 kg, 
which is very close to the 357kg threshold.  Giving space for error, annual variations 
and flexibility in what constitutes ‘minimum needs’, the ‘medium farmer’ 
households’ decision not to perform menial labour can be attributed to the fact they 
are able to retain a quantity of grain roughly equivalent to their ‘minimum’ 
requirements.  A two tailed T-test comparing the values for ‘small’ and ‘medium’ 
farmer households at 95% significance level reveals that p=0.000 (< 0.05) suggesting 
that the difference is statistically significant.  Table 6-1 suggests that ‘large’ farmers 
are retaining 371kg per family member.  A similar comparison of means for ‘large’ 
and ‘medium’ farmers reveals that p=0.837 (> 0.05) suggesting that the difference is 
not statistically significant.  One may expect grain security for large farmers to be 
significantly higher than medium farmers.  However, the results may be explained 
when one considers that these figures only refer to grain produced on one’s own 
land.  Large farmers are selling a much greater quantity of grain and in some cases 
may prefer to purchase processed grain from the bazaar for the sake of convenience 
or quality to substitute what is produced on the farm, even if the costs are higher. 
 
6.2.3 Caste composition of farmer categories 
Figure 6-5 and Table 6-2 suggests that the ‘large’ and ‘medium’ farmer and ‘non-
farming landholder’ categories are dominated by the communities who have 
traditionally held the most economic power in the Terai, the Thru, Nepali speaking 
                                                                                                                                          
that Athreya et al were referring to rice in its processed form, while farmers in my own study were 
referring to unprocessed paddy when quoting their annual needs.  If one converts the paddy 
requirements in Morang into their processed equivalent , the figure for total grain needs stands at 
236kg per capita, only marginally higher, thus suggesting some uniformity across the sub-continent. 
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Brahmin/Chettris, and Maithil speaking Terai middle castes6.  The ‘small farmer’ 
and ‘landless labourer’ categories however are dominated by the smaller indigenous 
Terai groups such as the Rajbanshi, Bantar, Jhagar, as well as Terai dalit castes.  
Caste ideologies appear to have weakened in recent years.  Nevertheless, the data 
suggests that that historical legacy of both the Muluki Ain which institutionalised the 
caste system and the state policies which favoured the Thru continue to structure 
households’ economic status and the relations of production under which they 
cultivate.   
 
Figure 6-5: Caste composition of farmer categories 
 
Non-farming resident 













However, the role of caste today in actively reproducing the relations of production 
is questionable when the main surplus appropriating class, the landlords, now reside 
in urban areas, thus weakening the ideological mechanisms which once ensured their 
local authority.  In fact Figure 6-5 and Table 6-2 suggests there is even now some 
Brahmin/Chettri and Thru households in the small farmer and landless labourer 
categories, just as there are some ‘large farmers’ from the Bantar community. 
                                                 
6 This community refers to those whose ancestors were part of the migration of caste Hindus from 
Bihar noted in chapter 5 that preceded the migration of caste Hindus from the hills.  This community 
speaks the Maithil rather than Nepali, and follows a caste system akin to that of the Gangetic plain 
rather than the Nepali hills.  Note that there were no Brahmins/Chettris from this community in the 
sample, only middle castes.  Therefore, reference to Brahmin/Chettri’s refers to Nepali speaking 
settlers from the hills. 
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However, there is still evidence of caste based discrimination against the Terai dalit 
community.  The fact that virtually all of this group are landless labourers and only a 
small number can even be classified as ‘small farmers’ suggests that caste ideologies 
prevent them from accessing tenancies, reproducing village level inequalities. 
 




SMALL FARMER MEDIUM FARMER LARGE FARMER 
 
%  of sample 
 
31% 29% 7% 
Yields a surplus 
 
No Yes Yes 
Investment in 
land/ Machinery 
No No Yes 
% total operated 
land rented 
83% 61% 35% 
% total operated 
land owned 
16% 40% 68% 
Predominant 














Brahmin / Chettri (33%), 




external work by 
type 
Unskilled casual labour 
(36%), 
Agric. labour (31%), 
Factory work (20%), 
Micro-enterprise (15%) 
Semi-skilled work (13%) 
Migrant work (8%) 
Professional work (16%), 
Semi-skilled work (8%) 
Micro-enterprise (6%) 
Professional work (20%), 
Micro-enterprise (20%) 
Semi-skilled work (7%) 
Average 
agricultural sales 





Rs 929 Rs 2339 Rs 33,919 
Mean annual per 
bigh investment 
in labour 
Rs 3143 Rs 4078 Rs 6853 




Rs 4095 Rs 5171 Rs 5955 
Mean value of 
input investment 
per bigh 
Rs 6953 Rs 8808 Rs 12,120 
Mean value of 
annual agric. 
output per bigh 
Rs 24,789 Rs 28,309 Rs 31,347 
Mean value of 
annual non-agric. 
expenses 
Rs 14,392 Rs 34,908 Rs 109,100 
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6.3 Relations of production and Appropriation of Surplus: 
Pre-capitalist ground rent 
6.3.1 Levels of market participation 
Most households must participate in the market to a small degree.  As was discussed 
in chapter 5, historical changes such as the undermining cottage industries by Indian 
imports and the monetisation of tax created a need for cash and encouraged some 
level of commodity production and a loose articulation between modes of 
production.  Even the poorest households therefore have for generations had 
consumption expenses such as salt, cooking oil and utensils which must be bought 
from the capitalist sector.  Furthermore, cultural capital investments such as dowry 
gifts are nowadays purchased from capitalist markets, not to mention productive 
expenses such as fertiliser and agricultural tools.  Furthermore, within the pre-
capitalist agrarian economy, households require money to renew their livestock from 
time to time and pay for the labour power of those who help with rop (rice 
transplantation).  Many of the ‘sales’ are in fact deposits to merchants to repay them 
for loans advanced to buy these inputs, an issue that will be explored in chapter 7.  
Although there is modest commercialisation, the degree to which market 
participation is a route to poverty alleviation varies according to whether households’ 
can yield a profit beyond their simple reproduction needs.   
‘Large farmer’ households are earning a substantial quantity from crop sales, with 
the top quartile in sales having sold between Rs 80,625 and Rs 129,900 of produce in 
the last agricultural year, and the bottom quartile earning between Rs 8400 and Rs 
29615 (See Figure 6-6 and Table 6-2).  The top quartile defined by actual profit has 
generated returns of between Rs 70,693 and 88,388, having deducted production 
costs and the sales to repay merchants for cash advanced prior to harvest (See Figure 
6-7 and Table 6-2).  The bottom quartile of ‘large farmers’ in terms of profits 
meanwhile, have still been able to generate returns of up to Rs 9705 with only one 
household unlucky enough to have bore a loss.  This suggest that ‘large farmers’ as a 
group have had some success in commercialising.  This explains why they have been 
able to expand their means of production through land and machinery purchases. 
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For ‘small’ and ‘medium’ farmer households however, income is significantly lower. 
Amongst the ‘medium farmers’, the top quartile in terms of net sales has earned 
between Rs 24,800 and Rs 87,911 over the last year and the bottom quartile have all 
earned below Rs 1600 (Figure 6-6 and Table 6-2).  Income from sales primarily goes 
towards investment in basic inputs, consumption goods and cultural investments 
rather than being invested in machinery or land.  Annual profits for ‘medium 
farmers’ after deducting loans are between Rs 8236 and Rs 36,536 for the top profit 
quartile, while the bottom quartile have made a net loss of between Rs 6625 and Rs, 
26,922 (see Figure 6-7 and Table 6-2).  It is clear therefore that they seem at this 
stage unlikely to lead a transformation of the agrarian sector as the APP assumes. 
Given that subsistence production of grain staples is the primary economic objective 
of households in Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha, it is understandable that the neo-
liberal notion of the entrepreneurial commercial farmer is meaningless for the ‘small 
farmer’ households who are unable to reproduce from their farms.  The top quartile 
in terms of sales has only sold between Rs 8455 and Rs 28,050, while the bottom 
quartile has earned no cash income from agriculture (See Figure 6-6).  The sales 
which are made are primarily to generate cash for consumable inputs when income 
from labouring is insufficient.  Many can be characterised as ‘distress sales’ whereby 
the farmer enters the market only to meet urgent cash needs or to repay loans, not to 
yield a profit (Bhaduri, 1986;  Bharadwaj, 1985;  Crow & Murshid, 1994;  Harriss-
White, 1996).  Under these circumstances, grain would have to be bought later in the 
year to compensate using labouring income.  Rather than assuming 
commercialisation is a voluntary decision of households to gain economic 
opportunity, such exchanges represent a form of involuntary market participation that 
is detrimental to one’s economic well being (Bhaduri, 1986;  Harriss-White, 1996).  
The top quartile of ‘small farmer’ households in terms of profit has made between 
just Rs 3564 and Rs 28,050 over the last year while the bottom two quartiles have all 
made a loss, with the bottom quartile itself having made losses ranging between Rs 
3236 to a staggering Rs 16,325 (See Figure 6-7 and Table 6-2). 
 
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
Chapter 6: Relations of production, surplus appropriation and agrarian stagnation  176  
Figure 6-6 Sales of agricultural produce over the last agricultural year (Rupees) 






























Figure 6-7 Profit from sales of agricultural produce over the last agricultural year (Rupees) 






























Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
Chapter 6: Relations of production, surplus appropriation and agrarian stagnation  177  
6.3.2 Production of a surplus and ground rent 
Initial findings suggest that the disparities of wealth within the rural population and 
the difficulties many households face in producing an investable surplus are a 
reflection of the semi-feudal mode of production within which many households 
farm whereby much of the surplus is appropriated through rent.  From Table 6-2 it is 
evident that 83% of all land operated by sampled ‘small farmer’ households is rented 
from the (predominantly absentee) landlords, offering some insights into why this 
group is unable to meet the needs of simple reproduction through agriculture.  For 
the ‘medium farmer’ category, 61% of the land is under tenancy (see Table 6-2).  
Conversely, ‘large farmer’ households appear to be the only group with relative land 
security within which one could envisage significant profitable commercialisation.  
Only 35% of the land cultivated by this group is rented (see Table 6-2).   
 
It is important to emphasise that while some ‘small farmers’ do operate holdings 
simply too small to produce a saleable surplus, a vast number of households could 
meet their subsistence needs and produce a surplus were it not appropriated by 
landlords.  This is highly significant as many of the ‘small farmers’ would be 
considered viable farms for commercialisation in the APP in terms of holding size.  
The average cultivated area for this group is 1.42 bigh, comparable to the one and a 
half bigh that local people suggested was sufficient for a typical family of six to 
subsist.  However, the average area that is owned and yields household the full 
product of their labour is only 0.23 bigh (see Figure 6-8).  Furthermore, the holdings 
of many households in the existing ‘medium farmer’ group are generally sufficient to 
produce a significant surplus and accumulate.  The average size of cultivated area for 
this group is 2.55 bigh, while on average, only 1.01 bigh is owned.   This stands in 
stark contrast to the large farmers who operate an average holding size of 4.20 bigh, 
out of which 2.84 bigh on average is owned (see Figure 6-8).   
 
If they owned their land, the medium and many of the ‘small farmers’ could together 
form a dynamic middle peasant class within which widespread capitalist 
differentiation or the APP’s ‘middle farmer’ commodity production could emerge.  
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Instead, ‘small farmers’ can not produce a surplus in the first instance and the 
‘medium farmers’ who do constitute less than a third of the sample and have 
marginal profits. More profitable surplus producing large farms constitute less than a 
tenth of the sample.   
 
Figure 6-8 Average area of land rented versus total area of land operated by farmer category 
(bigh) 

























The predominant form of rent today is adhiyã, a form of sharecropping whereby 50% 
of the annual harvest is given to the landlord, and ekkha, whereby the quantity of 
grain to be given away as rent is fixed in advance.  Whether the ekkharate is more or 
less than what would be given to the landlord through adhiyã depends upon the yield 
of the particular year. For example, crop disease or late monsoon may result in 
ekkha  farmers paying more grain in that year than their adhiyã counterparts.   
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Figure 6-9: Sitpur village, Bhaudaha: Although many villagers cultivate reasonably sized areas 
of land sufficient to meet household subsistence needs, most are tenants and therefore can not 





























Figure 6-10: Winnowing the autumn paddy harvest in Pidarboni, Jhorahat: For most 















Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
Chapter 6: Relations of production, surplus appropriation and agrarian stagnation  180  
The actual proportion of the product of surplus labour which is appropriated as rent 
through either adhiyã or ekkha is difficult to verify due to the division of household 
necessary and surplus labour time between one’s own land, rented land, and other 
enterprises.  However, by examining those households that only cultivate rented land, 
there is evidence that much of the surplus beyond what is required for simple 
reproduction is appropriated.  The fact that there are no ‘large farmers’ who are 
purely tenant cultivators suggests that it is difficult to yield a significant profit when 
all of one’s land is under tenancy.  In fact, calculations show that 43% of ‘small 
farmers’ who are purely tenant cultivator would have been able to retain the 357kg 
‘minimum’ per capita grain requirements had they not been subject to rent.  This 
suggests that rent may even appropriate the product some of these households’ 
necessary labour time. 
 
In addition to tenants having a significant portion of their surplus appropriated 
through rent, tenancy contracts themselves are also insecure.  The 1964 Lands Act 
officially stated that the landlords are obliged to grant the farmers with tenancy 
rights.  Under these rights half of the cultivated land would be granted to them after 
five years and landlords are prohibited from selling the land during that time 
(Adhikari, 2006).  However, lack of government commitment has meant this is rarely 
enforced.  The amendment of the 1964 act in 1996 stated that tenants must provide a 
receipt within 6 months showing the submission of a share of the product to the 
landlords, and after this they would receive rights.   However, Adhikari (2006) notes 
that this information was not submitted to the tenants and few registered their 
tenancy.  In the remote village of Hurhuriya in Thalaha VDC it was estimated by the 
local people that only around 5% of the people are mohi, tenants with legal 
documents.  When I enquired as to why landlords do not give out official documents 
in a discussion, the response by one participant was blunt: “Land is like a hand.  
People are not going to cut off their hand.  That is why landlords are not willing to 
lose their land to a mohi!”  
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Adhiyã and ekkha rental contracts therefore are primarily oral, often being arranged 
through historical family connections with landlords.  As a result, tenancies are often 
insecure as well as being extractive and households can be evicted at any time, 
reducing their bargaining power to set rents.  The lack of enforcement meanwhile re-
emphasises the political role played by the state in reproducing the semi-feudal mode 
of production in parts of the rural Terai such as Morang. 
 
6.3.3 Understanding the reproduction of semi-feudal relations of 
production 
Circumstances which could undermine semi-feudal relations of production 
 
While it is clear that semi-feudal relations of production and their associated forms of 
surplus appropriation have served to constrain profitable commercialisation, it is 
necessary to better understand how these relations have achieved such stability.  In 
order to do so it is useful to identify the potential processes which could undermine 
the semi-feudal production relations, allowing farmers to yield a surplus and 
facilitating transition to a new mode of production.  A first process would require 
that tenant farmers gain access to land so they are can retain a sizeable surplus and 
accumulate.  However, it is evident from chapter 5 that the control over land 
resources by the small urban elite has perpetuated semi-feudal relations of production 
for generations.  This has been reinforced through the landed elite’s political power 
in the bureaucracy which has obstructed the implementation of land reforms and has 
shaped policy in their favour.  So long as they maintain their control over land and 
the farmers’ surplus, households expressed that they simply could not generate the 
capital necessary to purchase land.  This politically mediated control over landed 
property can be understood as a primary mechanism through which the mode of 
production reproduces itself after each productive cycle. 
 
However, a second process which could undermine semi-feudal relations of 
production is a drop in the level of ground rent.  This would allow farmers to yield a 
profit while still paying rent and could even allow households to purchase land from 
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the urban elites, facilitating capitalist development.  However, there is little evidence 
of downwards pressure on rents in rural Morang.  In order to understand the 
perpetuation of high ground rents it is necessary to examine the interactions between 
the semi-feudal and capitalist modes of production.  To do this first requires an 
examination of the classical Marxian theory of ground rent under capitalist 
conditions. 
 
‘Capitalist’ versus ‘pre-capitalist’ ground rent and agrarian transition 
 
To Ricardo, the primary form of ground rent was known as ‘differential rent’.  This 
theory states that under capitalist conditions, the owner of property can appropriate a 
differential rent if due to natural endowments; a parcel of land can yield a profit 
above the average rate of profit for the society as a whole (cf. Patnaik, 1983).  In 
these contexts, the Marxian ‘prices of production’ for commodities produced on a 
parcel of land is less than the society wide price of production7.  The landlord can 
therefore appropriate the surplus profit as a rent, while the capitalist operator 
continues to receive an average rate of profit (Marx, 1967, 641).   
 
However, in Volume 3 of Capital, Marx builds upon Ricardo’s theory to develop a 
new concept, that of absolute rent.  Theories of differential rent assume the worst 
land does not yield rent, while in reality, all land owned by a given landlord can be 
subject to rent.  Marx notes that where there is a class monopoly over landed 
property, rent can be extracted regardless of differences in the fertility of the land 
(Marx, 1967, 751-755).  In the context of capitalist agriculture, the demand by 
landlords for a rent even from the most marginal land, results in a rise in the market 
price of commodities above their ‘price of production’ as the farmers must pay a rent 
while still yielding an average profit comparable with non-agricultural activities.  In 
other words landed property itself, rather than natural endowment, actually ‘creates’ 
                                                 
7 Prices of production constitute the price at which commodities should exchange under ideal market 
conditions.  It is defined by the formula k+p, whereby k is the cost of production, determined by the 
value of labour power (value of necessary labour) plus the value of the means of production, while p 
is determined by an average rate of profit across the economy (Marx, 1967, 165).  Increases in 
productivity can increase the price of production above the ‘value’ of the product yielding a surplus 
profit.    
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rent (Marx, 1967, 751-755).  Absolute ground rent to Marx therefore “forms a 
portion of the value, or more specifically, surplus value, of commodities, and instead 
of falling into the lap of the capitalists, who have extracted it from the labourers, it 
falls to the share of the landlords, who extract it from the capitalists” (Marx, 1967, 
771).  Supply and demand determine whether rent constitutes the entire profit or only 
part of the profit (Marx, 1967, 762)8.   
 
However, the evidence from Morang suggests that absolute ground rent also exists 
under pre-capitalist conditions.  Whether absolute rent is feudal or capitalist does not 
depend upon its form per se, but whether it is appropriated from the coerced peasant 
producer attempting to meet their subsistence needs, or by the capitalist producer 
using wage labour and driven by profit (Patnaik, 1983).  Under capitalism, rent 
represents the surplus which remains after a producer has yielded an average rate of 
profit, whereas under pre-capitalist conditions it represents the surplus over 
subsistence needs and necessary production costs (Marx, 1967, 795).  It may even 
absorb part of some producers’ subsistence requirements, as was suggested to occur 
in Morang.  In pre-capitalist situations where there is relative isolation from market 
forces and low development of the productive forces, Marx emphasises that 
subsistence is the aim of producers, rather than achieving an average rate of profit, 
and farmers often continue to cultivate when subsistence has been forced down to a 
bare physical minimum (Marx, 1967, 805), as was discussed in chapter 2.   
 
To Marx (1967, 794), rent in these circumstances, as in European feudalism, 
represents the primary mode through which the product of surplus labour is 
appropriated.  In other words, rent itself falls under the relations of production, rather 
than simply representing a distribution of already produced surplus.  This more 
realistically reflects the contemporary situation in rural Morang.  It may be 
appropriated by a territorial overlord or a centralised state (Patnaik, 1983), the former 
                                                 
8 Kautsky (1988, 81) however, notes that in the context of an open economy, competition from other 
regions would set a limit on the levels of absolute rent, leading to a trend for absolute rent to fall in the 
long term.  Cheaper commodities would restrict the influence of rent on commodity prices.  The 
landowner can however, still control the price by controlling output.  They will only lease out their 
land if the market price of the product has risen to above the price of production to the point that a 
surplus profit is made to cover cost of rent and yield an average profit (Kautsky, 1988, 80).   
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representing the predominant form of rent in Morang at present, and the latter 
representing the state landlordism from the mid 18th to mid 20th century.   
Marx notes that such pre-capitalist ground rent acts as a considerable barrier to 
capitalist development, stating that it “…may assume dimensions which seriously 
imperil the reproduction of the conditions of labour, the means of production 
themselves, rendering the expansion of production more or less impossible and 
reducing the direct producers to the physical minimum of means of subsistence” 
(Marx, 1967, 796).  Rather than profit representing the limit of rent, rent represents 
the limit of profit (Marx, 1967, 798).   
 
However, the emergence of farmers that are able to obtain a profit beyond what is 
taken as rent who can hire labourers, invest in the land and accumulate, can shift the 
system towards profitable commodity production and eventual capitalist 
development.  There are a number of circumstances which can facilitate such a 
process, most of which could in theory occur in Morang.  For example, producers 
yielding a differential rent as a result of natural endowment may begin making a 
profit and encourage other farmers to compete.  Rising demand for commodities and 
price rises can also facilitate the retention of a profitable surplus (Marx, 1967, 801-
802).  The differentiation of tenants would eventually occur, whereby profit oriented 
tenants replace their more marginal counterparts, releasing a labour force and 
intensifying the process of capitalisation.   
 
Regardless of what these actual processes are, Marx’s analysis of the transition to 
capitalist ground rent assumes that landlords are compelled to maintain rents at levels 
profitable to emerging capitalist farmers if they are to find tenants.  Eventually rent 
where it persists, moves from constituting the normal form of surplus appropriation 
to representing simply an excess of the surplus product over that which is retained by 
the farmer as a profit equivalent to the economy wide average (Marx, 1967, 800).  
The transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist ground rent is now complete.   
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The perpetuation of high ground rent and industrial stagnation  
In the context of Morang therefore, one would assume that a sizeable section of 
tenants would have to develop into profit oriented peasants by retaining a reasonable 
surplus in order to compel landlords to lower rents.  This would be especially likely 
given that rent has a limited influence on commodity prices, which are influenced by 
the wider economy into which Morang district is integrated.  At present however, it 
is clear that for many households, the levels of pre-capitalist rent act as an absolute 
barrier to even meeting the needs of simple reproduction, let alone producing a 
profitable surplus.  While there are some farmers yielding a ‘profit’ in the study 
villages, there is also a vast population of ‘landless peasant’ households and ‘small 
farmers’ who are competing for tenancies, no matter how insecure and exploitative 
they are.  
 
Patnaik (1983) suggests that in many parts of India, the perpetuation of inflated pre-
capitalist ground rent which hinders the production of a saleable surplus can be 
explained by the high levels of under-employment and the large class of destitute 
agricultural labourers.  It is in this context one can understand why farmers are 
willing to accept rents which even absorb some of their minimum subsistence needs 
(Patnaik, 1983;  Pearce, 1983).  The implication is that landlords need not be 
concerned with finding profit orientated farmers willing to rent their land when there 
is a vast impoverished base to the agrarian structure willing to operate the land under 
any circumstances.  There are thus no incentives for them to lower rents.   
 
It is here the significance of the relations between the capitalist and semi-feudal 
mode of production become apparent.  As was suggested in chapter 2, semi-feudal 
relations of production are reinforced in the context of an underdeveloped capitalist 
industrial sector whereby concentration in land ownership and a lack of external 
livelihood options render peasants dependent upon landlords for their subsistence 
(Bharadwaj, 1985).  Similarly, in Nepal, where the capitalist mode of production in 
industry has been weakened by two centuries of alliances between a comprador and 
foreign bourgeoisie (Bhattarai, 2003;  Blaikie et al., 2001), the sector has limited 
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capacity to ‘absorb’ the surplus labour force, as occurred in the European transition 
from feudalism to capitalism.  In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, 
Marx himself notes that the feudal character of ground rent in England was 
undermined by the pull of labour into industry (Marx, 1932).  As Friedman (1980) 
argues, pre-capitalist relations such as sharecropping are primarily undermined by an 
increased mobility of labour following the emergence of a national labour market9, 
something that has clearly not occurred in Nepal.   
 
Articulation between semi-feudalism and industry and the perpetuation of high 
ground rent   
 
In Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha however, is it valid to assert that a lack of 
alternative livelihood options perpetuate high levels of rent and reinforce semi-feudal 
relations of production.  The proximity of Biratnagar does provide alternative 
employment opportunities in the non-farm economy.  Figure 6-11 suggests that 
farmers from all categories have multiple sources of income in both the farm and 
non-farm economy.  These outside opportunities are particularly important for many 
‘small farmers’, who are unable to reproduce through agriculture alone.  In this 
context, individuals occupy multiple class positions, labouring on their land while 
also working for others.  Work in the off-farm economy represents an articulation 
between pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production. 
 
However, while such articulations represent a source of cash income, subsistence 
production still represents the primary aim of ‘small’ and ‘medium’ farming 
households.  Outside employment, although a necessity for ‘small farmers’, was 
generally considered just one element of their livelihood strategy, and demand for 
tenancies remains high.  The articulation of modes of production therefore does not 
represent a transitional phase as capitalism increases its dominance through 
processes of ‘conservation-dissolution’, but appears to have remained stable over 
time with a co-existence of both economic formations.  How therefore does one 
understand why tenancy remains so important, despite alternative livelihood options?  
It is necessary to examine each form of off-farm employment in turn. 
                                                 
9 Friedman suggests for example that this led to the demise of sharecropping in the American South.  
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There are several main forms of outside employment which fall primarily within the 
capitalist mode of production.  Morang is one of the regions where Nepal’s few 
manufacturing industries have located (see Figure 6-12).  The main industrial belt 
extends from Biratnagar along the Koshi highway towards Itahari and the hills in the 
north, an area over an hour’s cycle ride away.  The second smaller but more 
accessible industrial area consists of primarily agro-processing industries and 
stretches east of Biratnagar (See Figure 1-6).  As of 2006-07 there are a total of 295 
manufacturing establishments in registered in Morang, and 216 in neighbouring 
Sunsari district, representing 15% of the national total.  Together they officially 
employ 38,378 individuals (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008). 
 
These manufacturing industries however, appear to have had limited success in 
absorbing the surplus labour force and drawing farmers out of agriculture.  Figure 
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employment in manufacturing enterprises, representing only 28% of the total cash 
earnings of this group.  Landless labourers meanwhile earned on average Rs, 5380, 
representing only 13% of their total earnings over the last year.  The fact that 
industrial employment is so low amongst this group suggests that industrial 
development has not drawn many people owning little land out of tenant agriculture. 
 
In fact, it appears that there is not only a high demand for tenancies but intense 
competition for factory jobs, given the limited development of the industrial sector 
relative to the surplus labour population.  In many cases it is difficult for workers 
from outside the immediate vicinity of factories to find employment.  Furthermore, 
gender ideologies exclude women from factory work, with options restricted 
primarily to the more menial seasonal work in the brick kilns which are set up on the 
clay rich soils between Bhaudaha and Katahari (see Figure 1-7 and Figure 6-13).  
Similarly, caste based exclusion occurs, with few members of dalit communities such 
as the Rishidev (Musahar) securing factory employment.  
 
It is likely in this context that even a small increase in manufacturing jobs will not 
succeed in undermining semi-feudal relations unless competition for jobs is 
substantially reduced to the point that wages begin to rise.  As chapter 2 suggests 
however, substantial industrial growth appears highly unlikely to occur without a 
radical transformation of Nepal’s position within the global division of labour.  The 
average reported wages, at Rs 125 per day, are lower than the average for jobs such 
as rickshaw pulling and construction work (See Table 6-3).  Although factory work 
is favoured over most other labouring jobs as it is more regular and is year round 
(with exception of brick kilns), wages are rarely enough for workers to support all 
but the smallest families10.  The remainder of the households’ aggregate necessary 
labour must be performed either in other jobs, or most commonly in farming.  The 
high competition for factory jobs, as with demand for tenancies, has reduced the 
bargaining power of workers, and appears to have created a ‘reserve army’ of labour 
in rural Morang willing to accept extremely low wages.   
                                                 
10 Some very small households with 3 or less family members felt factory work was also preferable to 
tenant farming.  However, these households were the minority. 
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
Chapter 6: Relations of production, surplus appropriation and agrarian stagnation  189  



















Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
Chapter 6: Relations of production, surplus appropriation and agrarian stagnation  190  
It is evident that the articulation between capitalism and semi-feudalism bring 
benefits to dominant classes from both modes of production.  A 69% majority of 
households whose members work in factories are also engaged in agriculture.  This 
suggests that subsistence agricultural production subsidises the reproduction of 
industrial labour power and supports the current wage regime.  In many cases 
therefore, it could be argued that both modes of production supplement each other.  
Control over land by an urban elite constrains farmers’ from meeting their 
subsistence needs through farming.  This in turn drives farmers to simultaneously 
compete for work in the non-agricultural sector, supplying cheap semi-proletarian 
labour to industry.  Furthermore, the wages and number of industrial jobs remain at 
levels which continue to ensure competition for tenancies does not decline, 
benefiting landlords.  The net surplus produced by households is in this context 
‘shared’ between landlords and capitalist dominant classes, both local and foreign.    
 
However, the pre-capitalist mode of production remains pre-dominant and is by no 
means ‘functional’ and subordinate to capitalism.  Were it ‘functional’ one would 
expect a growing capitalist sector and the persistence of tenant farming as a result of 
a conscious alliance of capitalist and pre-capitalist dominant classes to cheapen 
industrial labour power.  Instead, the industrial sector remains relatively 
underdeveloped as a result of Nepal’s structural position in the global capitalist 
economy, while the semi-feudal mode of production is reproduced independently due 
to the control over land by an urban minority who absorb much of the surplus.   
 
Nevertheless, the interests of landlords and factory owners do coincide.  Landlords 
can maintain rents at extortionate levels due a lack of alternatives, while the 
comprador bourgeoisie continues to benefit from the import-export trade and the 
alliance with foreign capital.  It is thus evident that these two groups will have little 
interest in promoting domestic industrialisation given the collective benefits which 
have been gained by its stagnation.  Could there be loose ‘alliances’ which reproduce 
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both the stagnation of industry, low wages and the predominance of semi-feudal 
relations of production in agriculture?11   
 
At a local level, the convergence of interests between individual landlords and 
industrialists through the perpetuation of high rents and low wages are likely to be 
coincidental.  However, conscious alliances may exist at a broader level within the 
bureaucracy, which has for generations served the needs of both landlords and the 
foreign-comprador alliance12.  This alliance dominates the few manufacturing 
industries present in Nepal.  It is in the interests of all three classes to perpetuate both 
the current industrial structure and semi-feudal relations of production.  The foreign-
comprador alliance benefits from the low wages which emerge due to the 
impoverishment of the peasantry in the context of semi-feudal ground rent, 
increasing profits for the few industries where their capital is invested.  After all, low 
wages are one of the factors which have attracted foreign capital to Nepal in the first 
place (Khanal et al., 2005).  At the same time, this class alliance seeks to maintain 
the current subordinate industrial structure to protect their investments in both 
industry and commerce, even if this hinders long term industrial development.  
Similarly, it would be in the interests of landlords to not only maintain their holdings, 
but to perpetuate the underdeveloped industrial economy, given that limited 
employment opportunities and low wages ensure competition for tenancies (and 
rents) remain high.  This would offer a fascinating avenue for further research. 
 
Other articulations and the perpetuation of high rents 
 
There are alternative livelihood options outside of industry for rural producers, 
representing further articulations between pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of 
                                                 
11 van Binsbergen & Geschiere (1985) warn against functionalist assumptions when examining ‘class 
alliances’.  Although class interests may coincide when pre-capitalist modes of production articulate 
with capitalism, this does not necessarily imply an actual agreement between classes in the conscious 
actions of the individuals and groups involved.  The alliance instead may simply represent an 
“unconscious convergence of interests.” (p255) 
12 Local industrialists may benefit in the short term from low wages which arise in the context of 
semi-feudalism.  However, in the long term, industrial growth would be advantageous for this class, 
even if it undermines semi-feudal relations.  However, industry in Nepal is dominated by a foreign-
comprador bourgeoisie who benefit from the very subordination of Nepali industry. 
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production.  Each morning, the rural road connecting Jhorahat with Biratnagar is 
crowded with workers on bicycles who are travelling to the bazaar to find work.  
Many male household members from the ‘small farmer’ category try to find casual 
work as rickshaw pullers13 or in the construction sector.  In the last year, they have 
earned on average Rs 16,540 from casual labour (See Figure 6-11), representing 34% 
of the ‘small farmer’ household’s total earnings.  Landless labourers have earned on 
average Rs 15,435 from such work, representing 31% of the category’s income.   
 
Again however, opportunities are limited and wages are low, so they by no means 
undermine the power over tenants by the landed class.  As with factories there are 
few jobs for females, and for males the wages are only marginally higher than what 
they would earn as agricultural labourers (see Table 6-3  and Table 6-4)14.  On top of 
this workers require a two hour round trip by bicycle to reach the main bazaar.  The 
jobs are often temporary and insecure, and on some days there may be no work at all.  
The frequent bandhs, or general strikes which frequently bring Biratnagar to a 
standstill cause considerable hardship for those reliant upon casual labour15.  As with 
industry, the semi-feudal mode of production provides cheap labour for the urban 
informal capitalist sector, although there is little evidence of a conscious ‘class 
alliance’ between individual semi-feudal and urban capitalist exploiting classes.   
 
Migration to India is a livelihood option for a small number of landless households, 
primarily to regions such as the Punjab, explaining the remittance income acquired 
by landless labourers in Figure 6-11.  Some Rishidev men from Pidarboni worked in 
Kashmir picking apples in the summer season.  However, work is not guaranteed.  
Migration to India is generally a last resort, often for the poorest landless households 
unable to secure tenancies.  It does not therefore represent a significant pull out of 
agriculture.  Only 4 out of the 179 households sampled (around 2%) had members 
who had migrated to India in the last year.   
                                                 
13 Jobs such as rickshaw pulling are not entirely ‘capitalist’ and instead represent a form of self-
employment.  However, remuneration is equivalent to labouring wages and they provide a service 
necessary for the smooth operation of the urban capitalist economy.   
14 The exceptions are some difficult to find semi-skilled jobs such as carpenters (See Figure 6-11).   
15 Such strikes have been widespread since the end of the civil war as political factions have 
campaigned for influence in the constitution building process.   
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Figure 6-15: The main bazaar in Biratnagar: Many household members from the villages find 
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A growing phenomena in Nepal over recent decades has been the migration to 
countries  such as Malaysia and the Gulf states (Blaikie et al., 2001).  Migration 
represents an international articulation of modes of production whereby 
predominantly male farmers who are integrated into numerous pre-capitalist 
economic formations throughout rural Nepal provide cheap labour to the more 
developed capitalist economies of Asia.  In Morang however, it has had a limited 
impact upon the semi-feudal economic formation.  Levels of migration are by no 
means comparable to some of the hill districts with a long culture of overseas 
migration such as Bhojpur and Sankhuswabha.  While at least one family member 
from 8% of sampled households is overseas, its significance as a pull out of 
agriculture for tenants loses its relevance when one observes that it is primarily the 
wealthier households who are able to send family members beyond South Asia16.  
This perhaps explains why average income from migration remittances for ‘small 
farmers’ as a group as displayed in Figure 6-11 is zero.  Migration may even 
reinforce semi-feudal relations, as many of the farmers who could potentially 
become capitalist instead choose to migrate, often leasing out their land as tenancies 
to poorer households. 
 
Livelihood options within the pre-capitalist economy 
 
The only remaining livelihood opportunities for households unable to meet their 
subsistence needs fall outside the capitalist mode of production.  All categories of 
household had some additional income from non-agricultural micro-enterprises such 
as handicraft production or the running of village tea shops (See Figure 6-11).  
However, although they are a central complement to neo-liberal ideologies of 
poverty alleviation based upon ‘entrepreneurship’, entry barriers are considerable, 
such as generating start up capital.  Furthermore, monthly income is generally low.  
In the last year, micro-enterprises represented on average 50% of the total earnings 
                                                 
16 Overseas migration requires considerable investment and is often an option chosen only by large 
farmers and more prosperous middle farmers with land who are looking for options outside 
agriculture in the face of declining returns.  The income from migration for non-cultivating land 
owners represents 41% of the groups’ income over the last year, perhaps explaining why they have 
given up agriculture.  However, this has been made possible as a result of their pre-existing economic 
security gained from land ownership.   
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
Chapter 6: Relations of production, surplus appropriation and agrarian stagnation  195  
of the ‘large farmer households, while representing only 22% of ‘small farmer’ and 
15% of ‘medium farmer’ household’s cash earnings.  
 
Other than micro-enterprises, the only other ‘non-capitalist’ livelihood option is 
agricultural wage labour under the semi-feudal or independent peasant mode of 
production.  Such labour is only seasonal, and is the lowest paid.  It constitutes 34% 
of small farmers’ total income over the last year, with their average earnings standing 
at only Rs 9642 (See Figure 6-11).  For landless labourers however it represents 53% 
of their income, earning them on average Rs 21,086 in the last year (See Figure 
6-11).    
 
Table 6-3: Average reported wages for typical non agricultural work 
 
Occupation Average reported daily wage 
(Rupees) 
Factory labourer Rs 125 
 
Carpenter Rs 205 
 
Rickshaw puller Rs 141 
 





Table 6-4 Average wages paid by respondents to agricultural workers by VDC 
 
VDC Average daily 
agricultural wage paid 
to men (inc. in kind 
payments)** (Rupees) 
Average daily 
agricultural wage paid 
to women* (inc. in kind 
payments) (Rupees) 
Proportion of farmers 
who rent more than 
50% total operated 
land 
Jhorahat Insufficient data Rs 61.75 41% 
 
Bhaudaha Rs 109 Rs 55.99 75% 
 
Thalaha Rs 106 Rs 51.98  80% 
 
*Men are generally paid considerably higher wages than women both due to a culturally established 
devaluation of women’s labour power as well as the different tasks carried out by male labourers.  
Men generally engage in halo jotne (ploughing), or repairing and building dykes, while women 
primarily are involved in rop (paddy transplantation) and weeding. 
**In kind payments constitute a fixed quantity of cmal, uncooked rice (normally 1.25kg).  The value 
was calculated from the average selling price reported in a survey of shops in the village.   
 
Surplus appropriated in value form through agricultural wage labour is arguably even 
greater than what is appropriated in kind through ground rent.  All respondents 
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expressed that a tenancy was far preferable to working as an agricultural labourer.  
The wages, which have been forced down to a bare minimum are indicative of the 
high local competition for employment and the massive pool of surplus labour 
available in the villages (See Table 6-4).  This assertion can be backed up when one 
compares the differences in average reported agricultural wages between VDCs 
according to the levels of competition in each village.  Table 6-4 suggests that the 
reported agricultural wages become progressively lower in the selected wards of 
Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha VDCs respectively.    
 
Jhorahat has the greatest number of local non-farm employment opportunities in the 
small bazaar, perhaps explaining why agricultural wages are higher than Bhaudaha, 
which is an equal distance from Biratnagar (See Figure 1-6 and Figure 1-7).  The 
even lower wages in Thalaha can be explained by the fact that there is a lack of local 
off-farm employment opportunities, and it is the furthest from Biratnagar, making it 
harder to ‘commute’.  The lower levels of wages and higher competition for jobs in 
Bhaudaha and Thalaha may be also a result of the higher levels of landlessness.  
Table 6-4 demonstrates how in Jhorahat only 41% of the total land cultivated by 
sampled farmers is rented, in contrast to 70% in Bhaudaha and 79% in Thalaha.  
Similarly, in Jhorahat, only 44% of the sample constitutes landless labourers or 
‘small farmers’ who are compelled to labour off their farm to meet their subsistence 
needs.  This contrasts to 55% in Thalaha, and a staggering 77% in Bhaudaha, all of 
whom are competing for work.   
 
Although many household members do of course engage in agricultural wage work 
as a de-facto ‘exchange’ of labour at peak times, many others must perform this 
labour to meet their minimum subsistence needs, although this work is a last resort.  
Many members of the dalit Rishidev community who face difficulties securing both 
tenancies and capitalist employment rely only upon agricultural labouring.  Such 
households were generally forced into extreme poverty, pushing their subsistence 
needs down to the bear physiological subsistence, working for households who are 
themselves in many cases being simultaneously exploited by landlords.  Given that 
many of these workers are from the dalit community while employers are from the 
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Terai indigenous, Maithil speaking middle caste, or Brahmin and Chettri 
communities, one could suggest that caste may play some role in reproducing this 
element of the relations of production. 
 
Aside from the forms of employment outlined above, the only other opportunities 
which could potentially draw households out of semi-feudal relations of production 
are ‘white collar’ jobs in the capitalist sector, which generally require a secondary 
education, such as work in offices and schools.  Figure 6-11 however, suggests that 
these employment opportunities are restricted to households from the ‘large farmer’, 
‘medium farmer’ and ‘non-farming landholder’ categories.  Such employment will 
therefore do little to reduce demand for tenancies within the ‘small farmer’ and 
‘landless labourer’ categories, where much of the competition originates. 
 
Given the high competition for livelihood opportunities and limited development of 
the urban and industrial capitalist sector, farmers therefore remain dependant upon 
landlords.  Most respondents sought to combine tenancy with non-agricultural 
employment, representing a stable articulation of modes of production.  Respondents 
acknowledged that renting land would at least guarantee the household some of their 
minimum grain needs, even if the high rent would still oblige many to supplement 
this with outside income.  Even some of the households who already have parcels of 
land still seek tenancies to make up for shortfalls in their income.  The determination 
of households to secure tenancies is evident in Bhaudaha village, home to the 
indigenous Bantar community, where it was revealed in a discussion that 6 or 7 
households are farming as sub-tenants!  A few ‘enterprising’ individuals have used 
their social networks to rent out some land and then sub-let it to those not fortunate 
enough to have the necessary contacts, making 5 maund (200kg) profit as the 
discussants termed it, “for no extra work”.  They went on to suggest that poor 
farmers were willing to take up sub-tenancies at inflated rates of rent given the high 
unemployment and landlessness, and the tendency for tenants to be “satisfied with 
whatever they can earn”, echoing Marx’s assertion that farmers under pre-capitalist 
conditions are willing to force their subsistence needs down to the physical 
minimum. 
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In sum, the semi-feudal mode of production is not only reproduced over time by the 
landlords’ control over land and political power.  It is perpetuated in the context of 
an underdeveloped form of industrial capitalism, whereby a lack of better paid non-
agricultural livelihood options maintains the competition for tenancies and keeps 
rents at extortionate levels.  So long as there is a continuous supply of willing 
tenants, there are few incentives for landlords to lower rents, change the conditions 
of contracts, or offer the tenants greater security.  This impedes the emergence of a 
profitable middle peasant class from the ‘medium’ and ‘small’ farmer categories 
within which capitalist differentiation could occur.   
 
6.3.5 Ground rent and ‘extension’ of the working day 
As has been established, high pre-capitalist ground rent explains why many ‘small 
farmers’ are unable to reproduce through agriculture.  However it is important to 
note that they are able to exercise some agency within the existing class structure.  
Farmers subject to rent are not entirely ‘compelled’ to search for non-agricultural 
employment to meet their simple reproduction needs and there are other mechanisms 
which can facilitate the production of a surplus without a transformation of the 
relations of production. 
 
Firstly, the household could theoretically decrease their level of subsistence.  
However, levels of consumption are already at a physiological minimum for many 
‘small farmer’ households, and it is unlikely that they would further depress their 
living standards to avoid off-farm employment.  A second alternative however, is for 
households to intensify their use of family labour.  By increasing the hours of 
necessary labour time, yields could be increased and simple reproduction could be 
met through ‘overwork’17, a similar process to that described by Marx whereby the 
capitalist increases “absolute surplus value” by extending the working day of 
labourers and reducing leisure time (Marx, 1974, 222-225).  In the context of the 
                                                 
17 To Kautsky (1988) ‘overwork’ is the one means through which the small farm can compete with 
their larger capitalist counterparts in the market.  In this context however, overwork is not so much to 
‘compete’, but simply to meet the needs of simple reproduction. 
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study villages this would entail the farmers planting extra crops in the dry season.  It 
could also include the cultivation of more labour intensive crops and the more 
intensive use of family labour on a day to day basis in tasks such as weeding and 
field maintenance.  Although causing considerable hardship, this may facilitate the 
production of a surplus.  This process is argued to lie behind the so called 
‘efficiency’ of the small farm often celebrated in neo-liberal development strategy 
(Dyer, 2004). 
 
This ‘overwork’ can explain why many of the poorer strata of ‘medium farmer’ 
households cultivate entirely under semi-feudal relations of production, but unlike 
‘small farmers’, are still able to just meet their minimum subsistence needs through 
agriculture.  These poorer ‘medium farmer’ households appear to have a standard of 
living similar to ‘small farmers’ with access to the same assets.  However, they 
choose to lengthen the hours of necessary labour on their farm so they do not need to 
work outside to compensate for rent payments and meet their subsistence needs.  Had 
they used their labour less intensively they may have fallen into the ‘small farmer’ 
category that must sell their labour outside.   
 
Interestingly however, most farmers who can not meet their subsistence needs at 
current levels of productivity appear to prefer not to lengthen the hours of necessary 
labour on their farms.  Instead they consciously choose to split it between farm and 
off-farm employment if they can, so they fall into the ‘small farmer’ category.  In 
other words, they perform a portion of their necessary labour both on their farm and 
outside, while the product of their surplus labour time is shared between both 
landlords and external employers.  Although there are insufficient employment 
opportunities to draw farmers out of tenant farming, the discussion above has 
suggested that there are some livelihood options in the capitalist sector (excluding 
agricultural labour) which yield comparable returns.  Households are therefore not 
entirely ‘tied’ to the landlords.  Many respondents from the ‘small farmer’ category 
stated that they preferred a combination of non-agricultural labour and tenant 
farming.  Essentially households weigh up the risks of achieving a poor harvest and 
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making a loss on their investment in both labour and inputs and not being able to find 
work in the non-farm economy.   
 
One tenant farmer in Thalaha was asked why households choose to combine 
agricultural and factory employment.  She responded by suggesting: 
 
“If people have agricultural land, family members can work on the land in their 
leisure periods. Females cannot work in factories easily. Males can work in 
factories. Therefore, if farmers have both things, it is supportive.” 
 
The respondent states that during free time, household members can work on their 
own farm and the rest of the time they can work in factories.  Working during what is 
traditionally leisure time represents a classic situation of ‘extension of the working 
day’.  She also notes the point raised above that women’s work in factories is 
restricted, so tenant farming can offer at least some guaranteed employment for the 
entire household.   
 
Table 6-5: Average per bigh input investment and output in last year amongst small farmers 
according to land ownership status. 
 
Land ownership status % of sampled small 
farmers falling into 
each category 
Average total value of 
input investment per 
bigh (Rupees) 
Average total value of 
agricultural output per 
bigh (Rupees)
 * 
Small farmer operating 
more than 50% of land 
as owner cultivator 
28% Rs 7182 Rs 32,822 
Small farmer operating 
more than 50% of land 
as tenant 
72% Rs 6897 Rs 21,881 
(Note: Data also included in Table 6-2) 
 
Nevertheless, there are some ‘small farmers’ who appear to be using their labour 
particularly intensively on their land to boost yields.  However, these predominantly 
include those few ‘small farmers’ who own land and cultivate under the independent 
peasant mode of production.  To examine this further it is useful to divide the small 
farmer category into those operating more than half their land as owner cultivators 
and those operating more than half as tenants.  Table 6-5 suggests that the average 
per bigh investment in agricultural inputs over the last year is roughly similar, at Rs 
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6897 for the 72% of small farmers who are predominantly tenants and Rs 7182 for 
the 28% who are predominantly owner cultivators.  However, the actual average 
value of agricultural output is Rs 32,882 for owner cultivators and Rs 21,881 for 
tenants.  A one tailed T-test comparing these values at 95% significance level reveals 
that p=0.004 (< 0.05) suggesting that the difference is statistically significant.  As 
levels of input investment are similar, one can not explain these differences solely 
with reference to the enhanced investment in inputs amongst small owner cultivators.  
Instead, it suggests that the labour of small owner cultivators is used more 
intensively on a day to day basis.  However, as holdings are generally small (see 
Figure 6-8), production still falls short of their subsistence needs, encouraging them 
to sell their labour elsewhere.   
 
In order to understand why some owner cultivator ‘small farmer’ households invest 
more labour, one must acknowledge the importance of land for subsistence and the 
drive to maintain this land.  As was discussed in chapter 2, ‘overwork’ in the drive to 
maintain one’s land is one of the primary mechanisms through which modes of 
production based upon the land owning peasant unit reproduce over time (Bates, 
1984;  Kautsky, 1988;  Shanin, 1973).  It appears that small owner cultivators will 
intensify their labour by all means to achieve a return sufficient to maintain their 
holdings.  For ‘small farmers’ who are owner cultivators, they achieve a full return 
on their labour investment given that they are not subject to ground rent.  For tenant 
farmers however, this incentive is no longer there, hence their choice to extend their 
hours of work off their land.   
 
In sum therefore, it is clear that the availability of some menial off-farm labour 
means that the majority of ‘small farmers’ who farm under semi-feudal relations of 
production intensify production only up to a point, beyond which work in the non-
farm economy is considered preferable.  However, they are still dependant upon 
tenancies to supplement their off-farm income, which is not well enough paid to pull 
them out of agriculture and force landlords to lower rents. 
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6.3.4 Use of outside labour and accumulation 
As has been mentioned above, the relations of production entail not only the 
appropriation of surplus through ground rent, but the appropriation of surplus from 
agricultural wage labourers in value form.  This is an additional form of exploitation 
under semi-feudalism after ground rent, and is arguably the main mechanism of 
surplus appropriation under the independent peasant mode of production.   
 
The extremely low wages which are barely enough to meet labourers’ subsistence 
needs and the high levels of poverty amongst households who rely purely on 
agricultural wage work suggest that the rate of surplus appropriation they are subject 
to may be greater than what is extracted from tenants through rent.  However, for 
farming households, to what degree can the use of outside labour actually facilitate 
profitable commercialisation?  The labour intensive nature of paddy cultivation often 
requires outside workers for short periods of time for transplantation, explaining the 
‘exchanges’ of labour which occur (see Figure 6-3).  Respondents stated that for a 
bigh (0.67 hectares) of land, an average sized household of 6 usually has no choice 
but to purchase up to thirty five days of non-family labour for the planting and 
weeding of paddy, with additional labour costs during the harvest time.   
 
This may however be balanced out by the labour they go on to complete on other 
farms.  It must be reiterated therefore that the use of outside labour alone does not 
suggest the household is accumulating.  It is the proportion of labour bought by the 
household against the labour sold by the household which determines the degree to 
which outside workers can be a source of accumulation.  By buying more labour than 
is sold, a household can cultivate an area of land greater than what can be farmed by 
family labour.  External workers can also be used to introduce more labour intensive 
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Table 6-6: Annual per-bigh investment in labour by farmer type over last agricultural year: 
 
Farmer category Mean total expenditure 
on labour in last year 
Mean per bigh annual 
investment in labour* 
Mean value of annual 
agricultural output per 
bigh 
Small farmer Rs 5320 Rs 3143 Rs 24,789 
Medium farmer Rs 10,270 Rs 4078 Rs 28,309 
Large farmer Rs 27,530 Rs 6853 Rs 31,347 
 *Includes in-kind payments to workers which have been given a Nepali rupees cash value.  
(Note: Data also included in Table 6-2) 
 
 
However, most households farming under semi-feudal relations of production can 
not generate the cash to employ more outside labour than they themselves sell on 
other farms.  Even when they do, most of the additional surplus it yields is 
diminished by what is simultaneously appropriated by landlords.  In many ways all 
that the enhanced use of outside workers accomplishes is to shift some of the burden 
of exploitation by landlords on to the even poorer outside labourers.   
 
For owner cultivators producing under the independent peasant mode of production 
however, purchasing more outside labour than is sold can in some ways facilitate 
profitable commercialisation.  It is for ‘large farmer’ households that one can most 
clearly observe this process.  This group can afford to employ by far the largest 
amount of non-farm labour, while not selling their labour at all.  With this outside 
labour they can cultivate a far greater area, including rented lands, and increase the 
total mass of surplus produced.  Table 6-6 reveals that over the last year, ‘large 
farmer’ households spent on average Rs 27,530 on labour, including kind payments 
over the last agricultural year.  This stands in contrast to the Rs 10,270 spent by the 
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Figure 6-16: Harvesting paddy near Pidarboni: Jobs such as harvesting and paddy 




Figure 6-17: Ploughman  preparing paddy fields: Ploughing is one of the few jobs restricted to 
male household members. 
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Furthermore, outside labour is also used to intensify production on a per hectare 
basis and can increase the total rate of surplus produced on each unit of land.  Table 
6-6 demonstrates how in the last year, ‘large farmer’ households have invested on 
average Rs 6853 in labour per bigh of land, in contrast to the Rs 4078 invested by 
‘medium farmers’ and Rs 3143 invested by ‘small farmers’.  A few ‘large farmers’ 
had even employed a haruwa, a bonded labourer who works for a whole year, 
providing an exceptional source of surplus18.  The intensified use of non-family 
labour by ‘large farmers’, facilitates the cultivation of labour intensive crops such as 
vegetables or the planting of an extra harvest of chait rice.  It also reduces the 
necessary labour time of family members.  The ‘free time’ can be used for other 
direct and indirect productive purposes such as education and agricultural training 
which can further facilitate the development of the productive forces, an issue which 
will be explored in chapter 8. 
 
6.3.5 Intra-household class relations, gender, and extension of the 
working day 
It is important to acknowledge that class relations do not only occur between 
household members and the owners of the means of production, but occur within 
households themselves (Benholtd-Thomson, 1982;  Deere & Leon de Leal, 1982;  
Gibson-Graham, 1996;  1992).  Folbre (1982) suggests that household members that 
pool their labour, income and product each perform waged and unwaged labour.  
Assuming that each household member consumes a share of what is produced for 
their individual subsistence, the value of this bundle of subsistence goods should 
approximate the value of their labour power.  However, the proportion of value 
consumed relative to what is produced is not necessarily equal between family 
members (Folbre, 1982).  Women for example, generally perform a disproportional 
share of total household labour19.  This stems in particular from their responsibilities 
                                                 
18 This labour relation can be perhaps be interpreted as a feudal ‘survival’ from the days prior to the 
concentration of land ownership shifting from the local to absentee nobility, when local landlords 
yielded considerable power. 
19 While children may also consume more value relative to what they produce, this will often be 
equalised over the life cycle of family members as the younger generation will ‘repay’ their parents 
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to perform both productive as well as reproductive labour, such as tasks within the 
household.  However, despite additional responsibilities their remuneration remains 
the same or even less (Benholtd-Thomson, 1982;  Folbre, 1982;  Gibson-Graham, 
1996;  1992). 
 
In Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha it appears that for all ethnic communities, gender 
ideologies dictate that women perform the most labour intensive agricultural tasks 
such as rice transplanting and weeding, while also being responsible for most 
essential household reproductive tasks.  Men take responsibility primarily for 
ploughing and general ‘supervision’ (see Figure 6-16 and Figure 6-17).  This trend is 
widespread throughout Nepal (Food and Agriculture Organisation, 1997).  In other 
words, a disproportionate share of the family’s aggregate surplus labour time is 
performed by females, while the subsistence goods consumed by females are 
generally the same, or in many cases even less than those consumed by males, 
suggesting there is a flow of surplus between household members, an intra-
household class relation (Gibson-Graham, 1996;  1992).  In the context of semi-
feudal surplus appropriation it is clear that as Folbre (1982, 322) argues, “the burden 
of exploitation is not necessarily shared equally.”   
 
Interestingly, for ‘small farmers’, the difficulties in reproducing through agriculture 
in the context of exploitation through rent actually appears to encourage a slightly 
more equal distribution of the aggregate household labour time.  The discrimination 
against women in the agricultural and non-agricultural labour market and lower wage 
rates means that men and even children have to increase their participation in off-
farm labour if the family is to meet its subsistence needs.  However, women retain 
their responsibility for reproductive as well as agricultural activities and as a result 
they still perform a greater aggregate share of household labour time.  It is only in the 
‘large farmer’ households that the distribution of family labour is more equal. Their 
                                                                                                                                          
through contributing to family income later in their lives and supporting them in old age.  However, 
the proportion of value consumed by female family members relative to what is produced often 
remains unequal throughout a life cycle (Folbre, 1982).   
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use of outside labour reduces the burden on women farmers, allowing them to focus 
their labour on reproductive tasks within the household20.   
 
What therefore is the function of these intra-household class relations within the 
modes of production in rural Morang and how do they shape the capacity of 
households to yield a surplus and accumulate?  The domestic reproductive activities 
women carry out with no remuneration can be understood as a central element of 
both the capitalist, independent peasant and semi-feudal mode of production.  These 
tasks which include child rearing, cooking and the maintenance of the homesteads, 
are essential for the reproduction of family labour power required for agricultural 
production as well as for off farm employment.   
 
However, understanding the disproportionate share of agricultural work that women 
are obliged to perform through an analysis of the imperatives of each mode of 
production proves more difficult.  It appears that the capacity for households to 
intensify labour on their farms would be greater were the distribution of labour more 
equal.  If men and women shared agricultural tasks equally the household could more 
easily utilise labour intensive techniques and plant extra harvests.  This could 
increase the saleable surplus for ‘medium farmers’, while making it easier for ‘small 
farmers’ to meet the needs of simple reproduction through agriculture.  However, it 
could be also argued that the increased output would mean landlords could more 
easily raise rents to even higher levels and outside employers could further depress 
wages.  Either way, the unequal labour allocation in agriculture appears to work 
against the imperatives of each mode of production present in the social formation of 
rural Morang.   
 
This element of gender ideology can therefore be viewed as operating somewhat 
autonomously and generating relations of exploitation in their own right, within the 
household.  As van Binsbergen and Geschiere (1985) argue, ideological formations 
can take an impetus of their own and can not always be understood with reference to 
                                                 
20 When a haruwa is employed they themselves perform reproductive tasks during part of the year, 
thus further increasing the free time of female household members. 
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a given mode of production.  One possibility is that the disproportionate share of 
agricultural labour performed by females is a relic of older modes of production and 
may have had a functional role in the past.   
 
When one looks at class relations outside the household, the one element of gender 
ideology which does appear to have a functional role is the devaluation of female 
labour power.  As Table 6-4 displays, women are paid far lower wages for 
agricultural work.  Gender ideologies in this context serve to legitimise the super-
exploitation of outside female labour by peasant farms in both the semi-feudal and 
independent peasant mode of production.  While this may not be exploitative if 
households are ‘exchanging’ their labour power, for those reliant upon agricultural 
wage labour, gender ideologies lead to their further impoverishment to the benefit of 
the employing household. 
 
 
6.4 The association between the relations of production and 
forces of production 
6.4.1 Surplus appropriation as an impediment to the investment in 
forces of production  
Understanding the forces of production 
The focus of this chapter has so far been on understanding the impact of the relations 
of production on accumulation in rural Morang.  However, there is also a need to 
better understand the forces of production.  As was discussed in chapter 2, they 
represent the relation between the labourer and their means of production and their 
particular character is determined by the technologies and inputs used.  The forces of 
production together with the productive relations constitute the primary components 
of the mode of production.  So far it appears unlikely that landlords will lose their 
grip over landed property, or that rents will drop to the level that farmers can yield a 
profit.  The important question to ask therefore is whether or not semi-feudal 
relations of production can be undermined through development of the forces of 
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production to boost productivity, leading the way for profitable commercialisation 
and capitalist development.   
 
The primary mechanism through which the forces of production are developed is the 
enhanced investment in technologies and inputs.  It was suggested above that farmers 
unable to produce a surplus can increase output by ‘extending the working day’ and 
increasing the hours of necessary labour on their land until a surplus is produced.  
However, by investing to develop the productive forces, households can boost 
production by increasing the returns to their labour and in the process decreasing the 
hours of necessary labour time and facilitating the retention of a surplus after paying 
rent.  To Marx, this would be the equivalent of a capitalist increasing productivity 
through capital investment, decreasing the hours of labour to produce a commodity 
and increasing the rate of “relative” surplus value, (rather than the “absolute” surplus 
value which is produced through ‘overwork’) (Marx, 1974, 299).    
 
Development of the productive forces could open up the potential for some profit 
orientated commodity production in rural Nepal out of which the APP’s middle 
peasant led transformation or capitalist differentiation would occur.  This is 
particularly relevant in the context of the APP’s stated priority inputs which aim to 
boost productivity, namely ‘fertiliser’, ‘irrigation’, and ‘technology’.  However, as 
will be demonstrated, the high levels of rent constrain farmers’ from investing in the 
first instance.  The relations of production are thus a dominant constraining factor in 
developing the forces of production. 
 
Input investment and development of the forces of production 
 
Inputs which can boost productivity and represent a development of the productive 
forces can be divided into two types.  Firstly, there are high value capital investments 
such as machinery, purchases of which are of course, restricted to ‘large farmers’.  
Secondly, there are recurrently used non-labour inputs which are purchased on a 
seasonal basis by all farmers such as nutrients and the occasional rental of 
machinery.  It was generally acknowledged in interviews that for a sufficient harvest, 
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at least one bora (50kg) was required of each of the main fertilisers, DAP and Urea 
per bigh (0.67 hectares) of land.  Many also choose to invest in the rental of 
machinery.  Given that most of these inputs originate in the capitalist sector, this 
represents another articulation between modes of production.  The independent 
peasant and semi-feudal mode of production are both to an extent, dependent upon 
capitalism to reproduce the productive forces.   
 
Table 6-7: Annual investment non-labour inputs and productivity per bigh by farmer type 
over last agricultural year 
 
Farmer Type Mean value of non-labour input 
investment per bigh * 
 
Mean value of annual 
agricultural output per bigh 
Small Farmer Rs 4095 
 
Rs 24,789 
Medium Farmer Rs 5172 
 
Rs 28,309 
Large Farmer Rs 5955 
 
Rs 31,347 
*Annual Value of input use per bigh includes in-kind expenses which have been given 
a Nepali rupees cash value.  It includes basic annual inputs of fertiliser, labour, irrigation 
and rental of machinery.  
(Note: Data also included in Table 6-2) 
 
It is evident however, that levels of expenditure on inputs vary considerably.   In the 
last year, Table 6-7 (see also Table 6-2) shows that ‘small farmers’ invested on 
average Rs 4095 per bigh of land on these basic annual inputs, while ‘medium 
farmers’ invested on average Rs 5172 per bigh.  The ‘large farmers’ invested on 
average Rs 5955 per bigh, suggesting that they are not only cultivating a larger area 




The tendency for investment to increase according to farm category can be explained 
by the relations of production.  ‘Small farmer’ households, many of whom are unable 
to produce a profitable surplus due to lack of access to land and surplus appropriation 
through rent, can not afford to increase their investment in inputs.   Similarly, 
‘medium farmer’ households, although investing more than ‘small farmers’, can only 
increase expenditure up to a point, and are not investing in any machinery.   
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Figure 6-19: Shallow tube well drawing water from canal in Janghrahi: Although tubewell  
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For example, with regards to chemical fertiliser, there are several varieties of 
differing qualities and the type of fertiliser used often depends upon the economic 
status of the farmer.  Some wealthier ‘medium’ and ‘large’ farmer households can 
afford to buy better quality nutrients, not to mention additional inputs such as 
pesticides (see Figure 6-18).  They yield a profit from farming and have non-
agricultural income from skilled work and migration remittances.  Poorer ‘medium’ 
and ‘small farmers’ who can not afford the higher quality brands often unwittingly 
purchase low quality fertiliser brought in illegally over the open border with India.  
For such households, difficulties in accessing quality fertiliser have become more 
acute following the abolition of subsidies and removal of the government distribution 
of inputs under economic liberalisation.  Aside from the higher prices, the 
unregulated flow of illegal fertiliser mean farmers can no longer guarantee the 
quality of what they buy, a point raised by Sharma and Babu (2002).  Referring to 
the withdrawal of subsidies and end to state regulation, one ‘medium’ farmer states: 
 
“The quality of fertilizer provided by Krishi (Agriculture) office was much better. It 
could provide it at a cheaper rate and in substantial amounts.  If there are no 
subsidies then how can farmers access fertiliser at an affordable rate? That is why 
there is no benefit from doing agriculture in Nepal”. 
 
The enhanced ‘choice’ that economic liberalisation was supposed to offer means 
little to this farmer for whom higher quality inputs are out of reach.  
 
Aside from investing in lower quality chemical fertiliser, it is interesting to note that 
many ‘small farmers’ and ‘medium farmers’ also use disproportionately less organic 
fertiliser than their wealthier counterparts.  Organic nutrients are generally produced 
from gobar or dung.  As it is rarely purchased but produced by the household using 
traditional methods, it is not included in the information on input investment listed in 
Table 6-7.  Most households acknowledged the need for an appropriate mix of 
organic dung based fertiliser and chemical fertiliser to maintain soil quality.  
However, accessing dung, the core ingredient of organic fertiliser, is difficult in the 
villages of southern Morang given its additional use value as fuel.  The villages to 
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the north of Jhorahat on the fringe of the vast Charkose jungle (See Figure 1-6) have 
access to forest resources which provide them not only a source of income through 
sales of forest products, but a ready supply of wood for cooking, or duro (see Figure 
6-20).  However, those to the south are reliant upon what fuel can be collected from 
local common lands such as riversides, what is purchased from those to the north, 
and most importantly, they depend upon dung which is dried and burnt (see Figure 
6-21).  This is a particularly acute issue for many poorer ‘medium’ and ‘small 
farmer’ households who own less livestock.  Respondents stressed that all the dung 
available from their farms is used as fuel and as a result, many rely purely on 
chemical fertiliser.  This has implications for soil quality and puts an extra financial 
burden upon many poorer households. 
 
‘Large farmers’ were not only using copious amounts of dung based fertiliser, but 
some were producing hariyo mal, literally ‘green fertiliser’, produced from the leaf 
litter of the small tree Ipil-Ipil (Leucaena leucocephala), a known source of nutrients 
for paddy cultivation (see Abdullah & Hossain, 2007).  One wealthy farmer from 
Katahari VDC’s prosperous Kushuwaha community, a Maithil speaking caste with a 
strong tradition of commercial vegetable production explained how he uses only 
organic manure and hariyo mal, while chemical fertiliser was applied like “acr”, 
the Nepali term for ‘chutney’!  However, he stressed that the use of hariyo mal 
depends upon access to enough land to grow it, excluding smaller landholders. 
 
While it is clear that wealthier producers benefit from enhanced use of these 
recurrently used annual expenses, what are the large scale investments ‘large 
farmers’ profit from?  These investments fall into two categories.  Firstly there are of 
course, land purchases, which increase the total mass of profit.  However, the second 
type of investment is in technology which develops the forces of production and the 
rate of profit to capital advanced.  For example, one high caste ‘large farmer’ from 
Bhaudaha’s Maithil speaking community we spoke to, was planning to purchase a 
small tractor and two had bought mechanical threshers (see Figure 6-22 and Figure 
6-23).  The most common investment though, is in pump sets, which can operate 
shallow tube-wells, or can draw water from nearby rivers.  
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Figure 6-23: Mechanical thresher in Thalaha: This saves time, and wealthier farmers who own a 
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Year round irrigation provided by the purchase of diesel pump sets reduces farmers’ 
reliance upon unreliable canal irrigation21.  It improves yields of the main paddy and 
wheat harvests, and determines whether or not households can cultivate an additional 
crop of spring or chait paddy.  Shallow tube well irrigation was a key proposed input 
of the APP in the Terai.  However, given the withdrawal of government subsidies 
and the lack of organised irrigation user groups, pump sets are out of reach to all but 
the wealthiest ‘large farmers’.  Although renting a pump-set was an option, it is 
expensive, and many ‘small’ and ‘medium’ farmer households were simply 
unwilling to risk making a loss.   
 
6.4.2 The development of the productive forces, labour and possibilities 
for ‘capitalist’ ground rent 
The right column of Table 6-8 (see also Table 6-2) displays notable differences 
between farmer category in the value of the total agricultural output yielded annually 
for each bigh of operated land.  This can be argued to be connected with the greater 
per-bigh investment in both labour and non-labour inputs which develop the 
productive forces for wealthier farmers.  ‘Small farmers’ invest on average Rs 6953 
per bigh and produce an average per bigh yield worth Rs 24,789.  ‘Medium 
farmers’, invest on average Rs 8808 per bigh while producing a yield per bigh 
worth Rs 28,309.  ‘Large farmers’ on the other hand, invest on average Rs 12,120 per 
bigh while producing an average output worth Rs 31,347.  Although the output from 
‘large farmer’ households is higher than their poorer counterparts proportionate to 
the higher level of expenditure, one would have expected it to perhaps be even 
greater still, given the greater use of organic fertiliser and the addtional high value 
investments such as tube wells which are not included in Table 6-8.  The possibility 
                                                 
21 Although the Sunsari-Morang irrigation project built several canals which pass through the study 
VDCs over a decade ago, farmers felt the water was insufficient, particularly in Bhaudaha and 
Thalaha which only has access to smaller feeder canals, (see Figure 1-7).  Furthermore, all the study 
villages are near the end of the canals and reportedly receive relatively less water than those upstream 
to the north, while farmers reported an erratic supply of water and over-silting.  The management 
committee appeared ineffective, and respondents claimed the canals were insufficiently cleaned and 
maintained.  Pump irrigation from shallow tube wells or the rivers was therefore deemed necessary for 
the cultivation of chait paddy in the dry season and even for the cultivation of wheat in parts of 
Bhaudaha and Thalaha.   
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remains that lower figures may have been recorded as a result of error or even under-
reporting due to suspicion, as was discussed in chapter 4.  Similarly, lower reported 
yields may be a result of environmental variations which have limited the 
effectiveness of particular inputs in the year the survey was carried out.  Given that 
the number of cases in the large farmer category is much smaller, ‘one-off’ 
differences are likely to have a greater impact on the mean.   
 
Table 6-8: Annual total mean investment inputs and productivity per bigh by farmer type over 




Mean value of total  input 
investment per bigh, 
including labour 
Mean value of annual 
agricultural output per 
bigh 
Small Farmer Rs 6953 
 
Rs 24,789 
Medium Farmer Rs 8808 
 
Rs 28,309 
Large Farmer Rs 12,120 
 
Rs 31,347 
                                           (Note: Data also included in Table 6-2) 
 
Either way, other evidence suggests that ‘large farmer’ households are producing a 
significantly greater physical yield than their ‘small’ and ‘medium’ counterparts.  
Many still choose to rent in land alongside their private holdings.  As they all have 
economic and food security already, one would expect they would only operate 
additional leased land if it provides them a profit.  This suggests that per-bigh 
production must be significantly greater than the normal output of the ‘small’ and 
‘medium’ farmers who rarely profit from tenancy. 
 
This implies there is a possibility of some profit oriented or even capitalist farming 
for large farmers after they pay rent.  Patnaik (1983), using examples from Gujarat, 
suggests that capitalist tenant farming emerges in the context of pre-capitalist ground 
rent when technical changes allow some farmers to increase yields so only a portion 
of the product of surplus labour is appropriated as rent, leaving a profit for the 
farmer.  However, in Morang, the ‘large farmer’ category for whom this applies is 
very small.  Furthermore, all of these households already own at least some land.  
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
Chapter 6: Relations of production, surplus appropriation and agrarian stagnation  218  
Therefore they already have income from their private plots which allows them to 
increase investment on rented plots to profitable levels.  For the vast majority of 
farmers in southern Morang however, notions of profit oriented production on rented 
land remain meaningless. 
 
 
6.5 Investment, credit and debt and constrained 
accumulation 
6.5.1 Reliance upon credit for renewal of the forces of production 
There are clearly different levels of investment between ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large 
farmer’ households in both labour and non-labour inputs, suggesting that it is 
primarily wealthier producers who are able to develop of the forces of production 
and enhance productivity through investment in technologies and outside workers.  
However, what is equally important to the level of expenditure is the much greater 
financial hardships endured by poorer producers in generating the cash to invest in 
inputs.  The recurrent annual process of renewing the productive forces by 
purchasing fertiliser and labour pushes many poorer households into economic 
insecurity before they can even consider increasing investment to boost yields.  The 
following quotation by one ‘small farmer’ outlines some of these difficulties22: 
 
“The farmers used to hire a person for ploughing the field and do the remaining 
work themselves but now the ploughman has to be paid two thousand rupees.  He 
also has a problem in his house and he has to look after his children.  If we give him 
food also then it costs us four thousand per month. Now it costs about 17 to 18 
                                                 
22 In the above quotation the farmer highlights the struggle necessary to purchase labour and fertiliser, 
while also reminding one of the complexities of class relations in Jhorahat.  The farmers’ empathy 
with the ploughman and his need for higher wages reflects the shared class consciousness the 
marginal farmer feels with his worker.  It is clear here that the circumstance under which the 
ploughman is employed is not one of a capitalist farm appropriating others’ labour to accumulate 
profit.  Many of such households, including that of the quoted farmer, labour for other farms 
simultaneously.  In this case therefore, employing a ploughman is part of an exchange of surplus 
labour that occurs between poor households.  The use of another households’ labour by the 
respondent’s household is necessary as the ploughman owns an asset that they themselves can not 
afford to buy, a pair of bullocks.  Throughout the year such small farmers have to use their income 
from marginal crop sales and labour on others’ farms to invest in inputs such as fertiliser and labour 
for their own farm.   
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thousand rupees to buy our own bulls. Farmers also need to buy the fertilizers which 
are also expensive. So farmers are facing problems … Even larger farmers have left 
farming. The farmers take a loan for everything, for Patuwa (Jute), fish and other 
cultivation, but still, the return is not good.  You have seen the returns for rice also.  
The farmers have to pay loan repayments and wages for the workers.  DAP costs Rs. 
28 per kilo Urea costs Rs. 20 but if we use it twice [in a year] it costs Rs. 100 per 
kilo
23
!  The fertilizers are expensive now. Now you can imagine how the farmers are 
suffering.” 
 
The quotation above, while outlining the frustrations felt by marginal producers, also 
highlights the fact that farmers rely upon loans to purchase their recurrently used 
inputs.  ‘Small’ and ‘medium’ farmers are increasingly forced into cycles of 
indebtedness just to renew the productive forces, ruling out any actual increase in 
investment to develop the productive forces.  There are multiple sources of loans, but 
most farmers borrow from three private sources at high interest rates.  The first two 
sources of private credit include local byapari manche, literally ‘businessmen’, and 
landlords.  A third source is the grain merchants or kahwala.  This normally 
represents a form of tied trade whereby farmers take credit from kahwala to invest 
in fertiliser and labour and repay them in kind after the harvest.  Loans from all three 
sources are generally charged at 3%-5% interest per month until the loan is repaid.  It 
is evident here that it is not only ground rent that appropriates a share of households’ 
surplus or even necessary product.  ‘Interest bearing capital’ or usury, although 
necessary for the reproduction of the productive forces, also extracts surplus through 
interest, both worsening indebtedness and furthering the impoverishment of marginal 
households.  The actual mechanisms determining interest rates will be explored in 
chapter 7, but for now it is necessary to understand why farmers are indebted to 
private lenders in the first instance and its connection to the productive cycle.   
                                                 
23 The changing price of fertiliser will be looked into in chapter 7. 
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6.5.2 Microfinance banks  
Advantages of microfinance as a source of agricultural credit 
 
There has been a mushrooming of microfinance banks in rural Morang in recent 
years. The enhanced supply of credit was another ‘priority input’ of the APP.  
Farmers can now take loans for agricultural investment from the state run 
Agricultural Development Bank or numerous NGOs at much lower interest rates than 
private lenders, varying from 1-2% for each month the loan is outstanding (see Table 
6-9).  As Figure 6-24 suggests, respondents from all household categories have taken 
microfinance loans.  However, to what degree has this reduced farmers’ level of 
indebtedness to usury capital and facilitated the generation of credit to increase 
investment and develop the productive forces?   
 
Table 6-9: Monthly rates in private microfinance banks serving Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and 
Thalaha 
 
Bank Monthly Interest rate* Collateral 
Nerude Microfinance Bank 1.2% per month No 
Forward Microfinance Bank 1.25% per month No 
Jeevan Vikas Bank 1.25% per month No 
Grameen Development Bank 1% per month No 
Grameen Development Bank 1.5% per month Yes 
Data source: Researcher’s own survey of local banks 
*These are based upon the flat annual rates, actual periodical repayments for some banks are calculated according 
to a diminishing rate.   
 
Farmers with land were at an immediate advantage in accessing credit.  Seventy two 
percent of institutional finance schemes in Nepal require some form of collateral, 
which is usually land (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004).  One small farmer from 
the Brahmin community expressed the difficulties they faced in accessing 
institutional credit: 
 
“When we take the loan the bank asks for the collateral from the farmers, they ask 
for land, gold and silver as collateral. They come to our houses and see our 
condition and on that basis we are provided the loan. Instead they should provide the 
loan thinking that a farmer can do something and then will return the money.  In our 
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neighbouring country, India, the government provides loans for the farmers but it is 
not like that in Nepal. The government here should also give the loan with out any 
big collateral”. 
 
This may explain why in Figure 6-24, the average total borrowed by ‘large farmer’ 
households from the Agriculture Development Bank in the last year is highest, at Rs 
5357.  ‘Medium farmers’ have only borrowed on average Rs 1505 and ‘small 
farmers’ a mere Rs 407.  In this context, ‘large farmer’ households often used such 
loans to not only purchase fertiliser and labour, but to make large one-off 
investments such as the purchase of their own threshing machine or irrigation pump 
set.   
 
Figure 6-24: Average value of loans taken in last year by source and farmer category (rupees) 




































Although the quotation by the farmer above stresses the need for collateral free 
loans, smaller loans of this kind are in fact available from private microfinance banks 
at similarly low rates of interest.  This can explain why in contrast to the Agriculture 
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Development Bank, all categories of household have taken private microfinance 
loans, as Figure 6-24 demonstrates.  ‘Small farmers’ as a group have borrowed on 
average Rs 3491, ‘medium farmers’ have taken Rs 2530, while large farmers have 
borrowed Rs 4464.  Private microfinance is also the main source of credit for the 
‘landless labourer’ category which include some of the poorest households in the 
study area.  This group has borrowed on average Rs 4445 in the last year.   
 
Figure 6-25: Rajbanshi women in Sitpur attend a fortnightly credit/savings group meeting 






























Most of these private microfinance loans are part of a scheme whereby loans are 
given to groups of women for either micro-enterprise or agricultural purposes and 
payments are made at fortnightly meetings (see Figure 6-25).  If one member fails to 
pay the required instalment, it must be paid by the rest of the group.  The expectation 
is that ‘peer pressure’ within the group prevents borrowers from defaulting.  Such 
borrowing groups often double up as savings cooperatives, whereby women can 
make small deposits so cash can be released at times of need on a rotating basis.  One 
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woman farmer who ran a rotating savings and credit scheme explained the benefits to 
group members of taking loans from their program over the private money lenders: 
 
“We can use that money when we need it. If we go to businessman or rich people 
then they hesitate to give loan even in 2%.  They make us pay 4% or 5% which is 
calculated at 24% annually, so now we don’t go to them. At banks we don’t have to 
pay that much interest. If there will be more money in our account then we can even 
reduce it to 1% which is 12% per year. No one can stop us within society as its our 
group and money. We don’t need any permission to use that money. If the secretary 
and chairman signs a cheque then it [the money] can be easily withdrawn from the 
bank”. 
 
Disadvantages of microfinance and continued indebtedness to usury capital 
 
However, while micro-finance may in some context facilitate the purchase of inputs, 
it has not stopped households entering usurious lending arrangements with landlords, 
businessmen and kahwala, to meet basic input requirements at the paddy and 
wheat planting season, as Figure 6-24 suggests.  There are a number of explanations 
for this trend, although the deficiencies of microfinance banks for the renewal of the 
productive forces appears to be the most commonly cited reason.  Given the 
increased emphasis upon ‘economically sustainable’ financial institutions in neo-
liberal development discourse (Rankin, 2004), interest rates in microfinance banks 
increase considerably if repayment schedules are not met.  One respondent informed 
me that he felt the Agricultural Development Bank was “out to extort small 
farmers.”  The same small Brahmin farmer quoted above went on to argue:   
 
“If a loan is taken from the local people then even if we can’t repay it within one 
year then we can pay the interest for that year and then the next year we can repay 
the loan along with the interest.  But with the bank what happens is that if we can’t 
repay the loan within the stated time then the interest increases until it is higher than 
the villager’s [village money lender] rate!  In the bank we have to repay within 6 
months.” 
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Furthermore, many argue that the money is not available when required.  ‘Small 
farmer’ households are reliant upon non-agricultural labour for cash during much of 
the time between harvests.  The daily wages only go as far as meeting day to day 
expenses and offer few opportunities to save enough for investment in the next 
harvest.  Similarly, ‘medium’ farmer households often have little money left from 
sales during the previous harvest by the time the next planting season begins.  As a 
result, many households require two loans a year for the two main crops of paddy 
and wheat.  Farmers complained that microfinance loans are not available this 
frequently.  Furthermore, the requirements that periodic repayments be made are 
problematic as cash only becomes available after the harvest.  If repayment schedules 
are not met, then the interest increases to the point that it is often higher than the 
rates charged by local money lenders.  For many farmers therefore, the kahwala, 
not microfinance banks, are the primary source of credit to purchase inputs. 
 
Figure 6-24 demonstrates how the loans taken by ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large 
farmer’ households from the kahwala in the last year far surpass those taken from 
banks.  As one would expect, the average amount borrowed by each category 
increases from small to large farmers, while the two non-cultivating groups have not 
borrowed anything.  ‘Large farmer’ households as a category have borrowed on 
average Rs 13,722, medium farmers have borrowed Rs 12,531, while ‘small farmers’ 
have borrowed Rs 6204.   
 
Even for one-off non-agricultural expenses, farmers could not rely upon 
microfinance loans.  Respondents reported that unless they have a good past 
performance in repayment from the bank in question, the staff are unwilling to grant 
large loans.  Respondents also stressed that the bureaucracy for securing institutional 
loans is time consuming.  These constraints are particularly acute for households 
seeking urgent cash loans, due for example to a family illness.  A small farmer from 
the largely landless Rajbanshi community of Sitpur in Bhaudaha, emphasises the 
convenience of accessing loans from the local businessmen:  
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“We take loans from the merchant because we can get loans easily, only with the 
words! For the process of taking loans from Bank, we have to show them a lot of 
formal paper work and collateral, as well as a recommendation from the VDC 
office.” 
 
There were also several accusations of corruption within the state run Agricultural 
Development Bank.  To obtain a loan, it was reported that commission must be paid 
to a ‘broker’ who has “contacts” inside the bank, even if the applicant has sound 
collateral.  This ‘broker’ would speed up the application process and help to 
guarantee that credit would be made available.  Therefore if farmers require cash for 
a particularly large expense such as medical bills, purchasing new cattle or even 
sending a son abroad, the first point of call is normally the private businessmen.  This 
may explain why ‘medium farmer’ households as a group have borrowed on average 
Rs 4592 from this source over the last year, in contrast to the Rs 2480 taken from 
private microfinance banks. 
 
The difficulties accessing institutional credit and the unrelenting demand for loans 
have even resulted in subversion of the microfinance system by some individuals.  
There were reports of wealthier villagers or money lending businessmen taking out 
large loans from microfinance banks and then lending them out again to their poorer 
counterparts at higher rates of interest.  In the following dialogue, a small farmer 
described the process of taking a loan from a village money lender: 
 
Farmer: “The interest rate is 3% for the farmers.  We do not have to show the 
collateral and show them [the money lender] our assets. When they give [the credit] 
in Ashad and Jestha then they will be repaid in Kartik
24
. The money does not stay 
with them long as they have also borrowed from others. 
 
Interviewer: “So it is not their own money?” 
                                                 
24 Ashad (mid-June to mid-July) and Jestha (mid-May to mid-June) are the Nepali calendar months in 
which the rice is planted.  Kartik (October-November) is the month in which the rice harvest begins.  
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Farmer: “They borrow from various businessmen and from the banks.  They do 
business in that way. If they have built a house which is of Rs. 10 lakh then they 
borrow Rs. 20 lakh and they do their business.  Here the poor are suffering.” 
 
Interestingly the quotation above also suggests that wealthier villagers take out loans 
from private businessmen as well as banks.  This echoes the trend of wealthier 
farmers ‘sub-letting’ land to their poorer counterparts.  It suggests that the severe 
economic insecurity amongst a large section of the peasantry has unleashed a series 
of intermediary feudal class processes whereby wealthier rural households act as 
‘middlemen’ between non-agricultural dominant classes and poorer farmers, 
appropriating a share of the surplus. 
 
The above findings suggest that in the context of economic insecurity stemming from 
semi-feudal relations of production, microfinance has a limited impact on reducing 
farmers’ indebtedness to money lenders and thus is not always an effective tool for 
poverty alleviation or development of the productive forces.  Equally significant 
however, is the fact that recipients are also increasingly locked into ties of 
indebtedness to microfinance banks themselves.  Seven households in the sample 
stated that they had taken new loans to repay outstanding loans from other 
microfinance banks.  This practice which is termed “loan swapping” was also 
observed in Rankin and Shakya’s (2008) village level study of microfinance in Nepal 
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6.5.3 Indebtedness, investment capacity and cultural capital 
In order to better understand the cause of farming households’ indebtedness to banks 
and  private lenders and the barriers to input investment and development of the 
productive forces, one must examine not only the surplus appropriation through the 
relations of production, but the multiple non-agricultural expenses they are required 
to meet.  Interestingly, this affects large farmers as well as medium and small farmer 
households.  Farmers were asked to report large one off expenses over the last year.  
Table 6-10 show how all categories of farmer are investing a significant sum in non-
agricultural expenses.  ‘Small farmer’ households as a category have invested on 
average Rs 14,392 for non-agricultural purposes.  This stands in contrast to the Rs 
8981 spent on the basic annual agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, labour, irrigation 
and machinery rental such as threshers (including in kind payments).  ‘Medium 
farmers’ have spent on average Rs 34,908 on total non-agricultural expenses in 
comparison to the Rs 19,908 spent on agricultural inputs.  Even ‘large farmers’ have 
spent a substantial Rs 109,100 on non-agricultural expenses in contrast to the Rs 
49,206 spent on agricultural inputs.  Figure 6-26 suggests that there is of course 
significant variation within each category, with many households having made no 
large non-agricultural expenses, while others have made expenses far exceeding the 
average.   
 
 




Average total agricultural 
expenses including kind 
payments* (Rupees) 
Average total a non-agric. 
expenses (Rupees) 
Average % of total 
expenditure in non-agric. 
expenses (Rupees) 
Small farmer Rs 8981 
 
Rs 14,392 62% 
Medium farmer Rs 19,908 
 
Rs 34,908 64% 
Large farmer Rs 49,206 
 
Rs 109,100 84% 
*It is important to acknowledge that data on large one off agricultural expenses in the last year alone was not 
included, suggesting that this figure may be slightly higher in reality while the percentages in the third column 
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Figure 6-26: Total non-agricultural expenses over the last agricultural year 
 
































Health expenditures represent a significant portion of the total sum of non-
agricultural expenditure over the last year (See Figure 6-27).  While it constituted 
26% of ‘large farmer’ households’ total expenditure, it represented 15% for ‘small 
farmers’ and 17% for ‘medium farmers’.  Lack of adequate free government health 
services and education, combined with poverty, can explain this trend, particularly 
amongst ‘small’ and ‘medium’ farmers.  Households often have to visit fee charging 
private clinics, while also spending considerable sums of money for the services of 
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Figure 6-27: Proportion of expenditure by farmer category  
Large farmerMedium farmerSmall farmer
Farmer category
Other large expenses  
Household Maintainence




Family events/life cycle 
ceremonies
Households from every socio-economic group in Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha 
are also compelled to make considerable non-economic cultural capital investments 
for life cycle ceremonies and religious events, which primarily include weddings and 
associated payments to in-laws (see Figure 6-28).  Figure 6-27 demonstrates how 
these represent 57% of the sum of non-agricultural expenses made by households in 
the ‘small farmer’ category over the last year and 71% for those in the ‘medium 
farmer’ category.  Although these expenses are deemed essential in the local cultural 
context, they significantly impede small and medium farmers from investing in 
inputs and perpetuate the cycle of indebtedness to banks and private money lenders.   
 
For ‘large farmer’ households, they constitute a significant 67% of the sum of the 
total non-agricultural expenses of this category in the last year.  Although large 
farmers still appear to be accumulating and developing the productive forces, it is 
limited by these expenses which often absorb a large sum of their annual income. 
This may explain why despite them being less affected by semi-feudal production 
relations this group still turns to kahwala to acquire credit for input investment.  
Interestingly, Table 6-11 suggests that out of the ‘large farmer’ category, Thru 
households have by far have spent the most on average on religious events and life 
Religious vents/life  
ycle cer monies 
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cycle ceremonies over the last year.  This ethnic group, who represent 40% of the 
‘large farmers’ have spent on average Rs 136,083 on this type of expenditure.  This 
stands in contrast to the Terai middle castes that comprise 13% of the group and have 
invested less than a third at Rs 63,750.  The hill settler Brahmin and Chettri large 
farmers, who comprise of 33% of the category, have invested only Rs 16,000 on 
average.  While there is no notable difference between Thrus from the ‘small 
farmer’ category and other ethnic groups, the expenditures for ‘medium farmer’ 
households from the Thru community are like the ‘large farmers’, considerably 
higher, suggesting that they are subject to the same cultural norms.  The one medium 
farmer household that appears to have significant non-agricultural expenses in Figure 
6-26 had spent a staggering Rs 300,000 on a wedding. 
 
Table 6-11: Average expenditure on religious events and life cycle ceremonies over last year by 
















Rs 19,318 Rs 4647 Rs 27,500 Rs 22,500 No expenses 
in last year 
No expenses 
in last year 
Medium 
farmer 
Rs 40656 Rs 18,794 No expenses 
in last year 




Rs 136,083 No expenses 
in last year 
Rs 63,750 N/A Rs 16,000 N/A 
*Indigenous ethnic group other than Thru (e.g. Rajbanshi, Bantar etc.) 
**No medium or large farmer in this category 
 
One can perhaps shed some light on the heavy cultural capital requirements for 
wealthier Thru households by investigating the mode of production of the past.  
Under the earlier semi-feudal mode of production where local landlords played a 
more prominent role, the large cultural investments by wealthier members of the 
Thru landed elite had a clearer ideological function in reproducing the relations of 
production their tenants were subject to.  For example, funding community events 
such as pujas (religious ceremonies) and hosting lavish wedding feasts increased 
their social status, further legitimising their economic and political dominance on an 
ideological level.   
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The dowry payments associated with weddings make up a large proportion of the life 
cycle ceremony/religious event expenditure and may also have been historically 
connected with the class structure.  In Thru marriages, although gifts are still given 
to the family of the bride (brideprice), it is gifts and payments to that of the groom 
(dowry), which are most significant25.  From an economic perspective, many 
societies, particularly in South Asia, have been argued to make a transition from 
bride price to dowry as class stratification increases (Anderson, 2007;  Randeria & 
Visaria, 1984).  While it was not easy to identify the original marriage system, the 
high dowry payments by wealthier segments of the Thru do appear to be connected 
with their former position as rural landed elite.   
 
Studies on the dowry institution suggest payments increase according to one’s wealth 
as it is essential for reproducing household class status.  Families pay to ensure their 
daughters marry into a family with similar economic prospects (Anderson, 2007).  
Dowry is also argued to be important in societies where females have fewer 
agricultural work responsibilities and therefore are not valued on an economic level 
for their labour participation (Anderson, 2007)26.  Although in the study villages as a 
whole, women bear responsibility for the greatest proportion of labour, the greater 
wealth of many Thru in the past would have meant that women have far fewer 
labouring commitments and were therefore valued less for their economic 
contribution, offering some possible insights into the development of dowry.  After 
all, the evidence discussed above suggests that women’s labour commitments today 






                                                 
25 For the marriage of the son of one wealthy Thru respondent we met, the bride’s family had spent 
Rs 1,500,000 ($20,270) on the wedding while the groom’s had spent only Rs 500,000 ($6757).  This 
was a result of the much higher expense on gifts to the groom’s family. 
26 Conversely, bride-price is argued to be more important in societies where women perform a greater 
proportion of household labour (Anderson, 2007, ; Randeria & Visaria, 1984).  
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Figure 6-28: Thru wedding band: Weddings are a considerable non-agricultural expense most 

















However, despite the fact that the Thru elite’s economic and political power has 
declined considerably as absentee landlords have become the new feudal class, 
wealthier Thru households were still expected to invest considerable sums of money 
in both village religious ceremonies and lavish weddings.  Although one’s current 
economic status does play some role in determining how much one is expected to 
spend, it seems that cultural capital requirements for wealthier households have not 
declined at the same rate as their actual material wealth.  With respect to dowry in 
particular, the former nobility are still expected to make high payments to ensure 
they access a groom from another elite family, even if both households’ actual 
material wealth had declined significantly and women’s labour requirements had 
increased. 
 
In one discussion in Pidarboni, we were informed of a Thru household in a nearby 
village whose ancestors were patuwaris and once had considerable wealth, but had 
lost a lot of land supposedly due to wedding expenses.  The respondent we spoke to 
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who was from the ‘large farmer’ category, initially mocked the circumstances of the 
former patuwari’s family.  However, he went on to admit that even relatively more 
prosperous Thru households who did not hail from aristocratic backgrounds 
(themselves included), felt compelled to copy the spending habits of the descendents 
of the former nobility if they were to maintain their cultural status in the community, 
impeding the productive use of their agricultural profits.  He even displayed some 
anger that these elite families were “distorting our customs”, and compelling the rest 
of the community to copy.  This remains the case despite the fact that the economic 
and political power of the wealthiest Thru households is only a fraction of what was 
held by their ancestors.   
 
In fact, cultural capital expenses may have even increased as improved 
telecommunications and overseas migration has widened the diffusion of a modern 
culture of consumerism in Nepal and traditional exchange regimes have been 
monetised  (see Liechty, 2003).  Wealthy Thru households were now generally 
expected to provide a motorbike as dowry when their daughters marry, alongside 
expensive imported Japanese electronic goods and other luxuries.  It was normal for 
weddings to cost households up to Rs 300,000 and more, and guests were also 
expected to spend considerable amounts on gifts.  One interviewee described the 
marriage customs of the village: 
 
Interviewer: “What are the greatest expenses?” 
 
Farmer: “It’s in the dowry. Many people spend money on home appliances and other 
things. Motorbikes are normal nowadays. As the people don’t have cash they even 
sell their land. Dani lal [pseudonym] spent a lot during his daughters’ marriage as 
he is one of the rich men!” 
 
The interviewee above thus cites how expenses have increased and undermined local 
families’ economic status, while referring to a prosperous family who due to their 
wealth were expected to spend considerable sums on their daughters wedding.  
Rankin (2004) cites similar processes occurring amongst the Newar merchant castes 
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of the Kathmandu valley, whereby the cultural capital requirements have increased 
while real incomes have declined, weakening their economic power.  Ironically the 
lower castes are not faced with the same obligations, leading to reduced inter-caste 
inequalities.   
 
With regards  to the Brahmin and Chettri, their very different history of settlement 
may explain their low expenditure on marriages when compared to the Thru (See 
Figure 6-26).  While many absentee landlords often hail from the Brahmin and 
Chettri castes, it is clear that in the study villages, this community is likely to hold a 
quite different cultural worldview from both the urban landlords and wealthy Thru 
farmers.  In Jhorahat bazaar, most of the Nepali speaking Brahmin farmers initially 
migrated to the village as enterprising settlers around 60 years ago.  Although their 
economic status is arguably one of the most secure of all the ethnic communities and 
they are at the top of the caste hierarchy, not all are from prosperous backgrounds.  
They do not share the same aristocratic past as many wealthier Thru families and do 
not have such strong local kin networks to whom they are expected to display their 
wealth symbolically.  This may better explain why out of the wealthier farmers, the 
Brahmin’s economic behaviour appears to more closely characterise that of the 
‘rational entrepreneur’ envisaged in neo-liberal development strategy27.   
 
The issues outlined above with regards to the Thru also reinforce Althusser’s (1969) 
assertion that although political-ideological systems, or the ‘superstructure’, emerge 
in the context of particular modes of production, they still have their own logic, and 
can persist as ‘survivals’, even in the context of economic change and new 
ideologies, such as those of neo-liberalism.  It is clear in this context that the 
emergence of large farmer households as a capitalist class (and differentiation) is 
being hindered by the persistence of cultural elements of an earlier economic 
formation. These cultural capital investments both increase levels of indebtedness as 
well as further impeding investment to develop the forces of production.   
                                                 
27 This explanation is preferable to some of the ideas which were unfortunately hinted at locally based 
upon racialised discourses asserting the ‘backwardness’ of indigenous peoples such as the Thru. 
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It could even be suggested that the profusion of microfinance banks and the new 
sources of credit which have emerged have sustained the continual cycle of non-
productive expenditure.  This seems altogether more likely when one acknowledges 
the unsuitability of microfinance loans for day to day agricultural purposes.  Rankin 
and Shakya (2008) have suggested that easily available microfinance have worsened 
cycles of indebtedness and have encouraged a culture of borrowing for consumption 
purposes.  During a focus group discussion in Bhaudaha, one villager joked about the 
impact of bank loans on spending habits and economic security. 
 
“In our community we have land but no other source of income. We don’t have a 
brain. All of us keep the land as collateral and take the loan. We enjoy with that loan 
and when we can’t pay the loan then we sell our land.” 
 
Another farmer went on to suggest: 
 
“Once a bank releases 10,000 rupees, it is usually wasted on a celebration. People 
are happy to receive money!  They also use them to buy cattle or big one-off 
expenses.  Although these are necessary expenses, they will not yield instant returns 
to repay the 10,000.  For that reason, people turn to the Marwaris to repay their 
bank loans.  Eventually people may be compelled to sell their house or something to 
repay the loan.  Banks have made things a little easier though, as people are not 
totally dependant upon Marwaris
28
.”   
 
Although both the above respondents suggest that credit availability encourage non-
productive expenses on family events, the second respondent did also suggest that 
productive expenses such as cattle are bought with loans.  He went on to argue that 
this was intensifying indebtedness, encouraging households to take loans from 
businessmen to service bank debts, and often leading to sales of land.  This suggests 
that microfinance is not only fuelling unproductive expenditure, but encourages more 
                                                 
28 Powerful business community of Indian origin who own many rural businesses (including money 
lending and grain trading) and factories in Morang. 
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risky productive expenditures.  This finding was also supported in Rankin and 
Shakya’s (2008) study. 
 
6.5.4 Indebtedness, sales of assets and differentiation 
Thus far the processes which are grounded in the relations of production and lead to 
cycles of indebtedness both to money lenders and the banks have been identified.  
This can help to explain the transfer of assets which appears to be occurring.  Many 
of the ‘small’ and poorer ‘medium’ farmers already impoverished by semi-feudal 
production relations are often pushed over the edge by indebtedness arising from 
both productive and non-productive expenditures.  This can explain why many 
households who own some land while simultaneously participating in tenant 
agriculture have been selling their properties and becoming purely tenant farmers.  
The ‘small farmer’ households have on average bought only 0.07 bigh over the last 
ten years, while having sold 0.12 bigh.  ‘Medium farmer’ households have bought 
on average only 0.03 bigh but have sold 0.21 bigh.  This is noteworthy as the 
medium farmers are the most significant group out of which one would expect 
capitalist differentiation or the APP’s envisaged growth to occur. 
 
Large farmer households have bought on average 0.22 bigh of land while having 
sold 0.13 bigh.  This suggests that they are still accumulating some wealth, given 
that net purchases still exceed sales.  However, it is questionable how long this will 
last.  These purchases are still marginal for an entire ten years and the evidence 
above suggests that cultural capital expenditures are also forcing this group into debt.  
Although some sales may have been to consolidate holdings, it was reported that 
distress sales of land were common amongst the wealthier farmers as well as poorer 
farmers.  This casts doubt upon the likelihood that they are evolving into a capitalist 
class.  Furthermore, in the sample, an equal amount of land was reported to have 
been bought from absentee landlords (34% of reported transactions) as was sold to 
landlords (36% of total transactions).  This suggests that the absentee landlord’s 
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control over property is by no means falling, and in the near future this may even 
increase.   
 
The land reform office did report an increase in transactions of land in remote VDCs 
such as Thalaha in the context of political unrest and fear of Maoist land reforms.  
On hearing this we thought there may be a rising class of more prosperous farmers 
taking advantage of the situation, and some differentiation.  However, on visiting the 
villages it seemed that most transactions were within different sections of the 
absentee landlord class.  These included for example, the larger landed elite selling 
off portions of their estates to smaller absentee landlords such as successful migrants 
who have returned from overseas.  Semi-feudal rent combined with the growing 
indebtedness of much of the rural population, including ‘large farmers’, means that 
accessing the land market is extremely challenging, and the power of absentee 
landlords has not declined, although once again, the composition of this class is 
shifting.  This process is summed up by one farmer in Thalaha, who referring to 
today’s absentee landlords suggested: 
 
“If people had sold 10 Kathha in highway site, they can buy 3 bigh in this area [in 
Thalaha]. Some people from the hilly area and some people who returned from 
abroad bought the land. To buy land, either they have to go abroad or they should 
have good employment. However, local farmers are facing many troubles.  They 
have to pay back their loans for fertilizers.  That's why they really cannot buy land”.  
 
Furthermore, it was suggested by some government officers that in the less remote 
regions nearer the roads such as Jhorahat, where incidentally the most valuable land 
is located, the traditional landed elites are in fact able to maintain their estates as this 
land is closer to state power and a bureaucracy which supports their interests. 
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6.6 Tenure and Allocative Efficiency 
6.6.1 Classical approaches to tenure and resource allocation 
Sharecropping as inefficient 
 
It has been established how the relations of production not only hinder the production 
of a surplus and increase levels of poverty, but also constrain households from 
boosting productivity.  For small farmers who are tenants, the practicalities of risk 
management oblige them to perform additional labour in the non-farm economy 
rather than intensifying their labour on their land, and they can not afford to employ 
outside labourers.  Furthermore, rent paying farmers face difficulties raising the 
capital to invest in agricultural inputs and develop the forces of production and even 
existing expenditures lead to indebtedness.   
 
In sum, this suggests that relations of production play an important role in 
determining how both labour and inputs are allocated.  However, an element of the 
relations of production which has thus far been overlooked is the conditions of rental 
contracts, which also play an important role in conditioning whether resources will 
(or can) be allocated in a way which will boost productivity.  Neoclassical analyses 
such as those of Marshall, state that the allocation of labour and inputs is lower on 
sharecropped land than on land which is rented through a fixed rate contract 
(Marshall, 1907;  Nabi, 1986).  Under share contracts such as the adhiyã system in 
Morang, the cultivator must give the landlord a fixed share (usually half) of the 
returns to each unit of capital or labour invested in the land (Marshall, 1907).  
However, for fixed rent tenants such as those renting land through the ekkha system 
(and owner cultivators), the entire incremental product accrued from enhanced 
allocation of capital and labour, will be retained by the tiller.  In other words, “the 
sharecropping tenant will not invest resources beyond the level where the marginal 
cost of output is equal to half the value of the marginal product” (Marshall, 1907, 
644).   
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In contrast, Adams and Rask (1969) suggest that sharecropping is not necessarily 
inefficient when competition for tenancy is high.  In regions where there are few 
alternative opportunities, tenants are willing to accept higher rents, even without 
additional input contributions by landlords.  They will be obliged to intensify their 
investment in labour and inputs in order to meet their subsistence needs.  Aside from 
raising rents, landowners can also maximise their income by dividing their 
landholdings into smaller parcels and leasing it out to more tenants, each of whom 
have less land from which to subsist, so must intensify the allocation of inputs and 
labour (Adams & Rask, 1969).  Pearce (1983) backs up these assertions by stating 
that the combination of intensified production with share tenancies can yield 
landlords a greater proportion of surplus than they would through fixed rents.   
Sharecropping in Morang and Allocative efficiency 
Interestingly, discussions in the field however, generally support Marshall’s 
hypothesis.  Most farmers expressed that they prefer ekkha to adhiyã as one can 
retain any additional crop produced once they have paid the rent.  One farmer, who 
rented land through both systems of tenancy, stated that: 
 
“Thekka is a better option. In adhiyã, we have to take the crops to the landlords' 
home. To make them believe, we have to leave the crops in front of them. However, 
in Thekka, after giving the agreed amount of paddy, we can do what we like with the 
remaining crops.  Therefore, if we can get it, Thekka is always better. We do not 
have our own land and that is why we are compelled to work as adhiyã as well. If I 
have agreed to give them 22 maund dhn, then it's done. We do not have to share any 
extra production such as Mushuri and Alash
29
 with them … Adhiyã workers are not 
motivated like thekka workers. Whatever they grow, adhiyã farmers have to share 
with their landlords. Thekka workers can do hard labour.” 
 
When asked about the livelihood security of adhiyã farmers, the respondent went on 
to suggest: 
                                                 
29 Mushuri and Alash are varieties of dhal. 
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“Adhiyã is not sufficient to join hand to mouth. Some people are going India, 
Bombay. And some people are doing extra work in a brick factory or elsewhere”.  
 
This suggests that farmers have fewer incentives to maximise output under adhiyã 
contracts, especially given the risks of increasing the allocation of labour and inputs 
on the land and not yielding a return.  It has nevertheless been argued that differences 
in productivity can be reduced if the landlord provides half of the financial cost of 
inputs, therefore sharing some of the risk (Marshall, 1907;  Nabi, 1986).  Landlords 
renting out land as adhiyã in the study villages normally contribute to the cost of 
inputs.  However, it is normally restricted to paying half the price of fertiliser, and 
not labour or other capital investments that can improve productivity.  One may 
therefore assume that farmers renting land through the adhiyã system still have less 
of an incentive to intensify resource allocation than ekkha farmers. 
 
A brief model can now be developed to test these assertions statistically.  Rather than 
investigating investment of inputs per bigh, the model will be based upon 
productivity per unit of land30.  There are two measures of productivity.  Firstly, the 
value of total output for each bigh of land for the main autumn paddy harvest offers 
insights into the levels of resources such as fertiliser and labour which are allocated 
for a single comparable crop which is cultivated by all households.  Secondly, the 
value of total annual agricultural output for each bigh of land meanwhile gives an 
overall indication into the levels of resources being allocated to the land each year, 
accounting for households who choose to invest in multiple harvests. 
 
The first null hypothesis for this model thus states that share contract tenants do not 
produce any less of the main autumn paddy harvest than fixed rate tenants.  The 
second states that share contract tenants do not yield a lower total agricultural output 
                                                 
30 This should reflect not only the level of investment in inputs which must be bought, such as outside 
labour and fertiliser, but the allocation of non-purchased inputs originating within the farm such as 
organic fertiliser, and most importantly, the allocation of family labour.   
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per bigh than fixed rate tenants.  Either of the null hypotheses can be rejected if with 
a 95% confidence interval, the probability of accepting it is less than 0.05.   
 
Table 6-12: T test for differences in mean value of total output for main autumn paddy season 
per bigh according to primary rental contract 







F Value T value 1 tail 
probability 
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More than 50% operated 
land rented through 









More than 50% operated 
land rented through 















Table 6-13: T test for differences in mean of total annual agricultural output per bigh of land 
according to primary rental contract 
 







F Value T value 1 tail 
probability 
More than 50% operated 
land rented through 









More than 50% operated 
land rented through 



















Table 6-12 demonstrates that those households who operate over 50% of their land 
through ekkha tenure produce on each bigh a yield of paddy valued at Rs 18,890 
during the main autumn season.  The mean value of per bigh paddy yield for 
households operating over 50% of their land through adhiyã tenure is only Rs 
14,472.  The p-value is 0.037 (p<0.05) and thus the first null hypothesis can be 
rejected.  Table 6-13 demonstrates that the total annual agricultural output per bigh 
for households operating over half their land through ekkha is valued at Rs 26,578.  
It is lower, at only Rs 20,287 for households who primarily operate their land 
through adhiyã tenure.  The p-value is 0.016 (p<0.05), suggesting that the second 
null hypothesis can also be rejected.   
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It can therefore be surmised that within the tenant population, those who operate land 
through share contracts on the whole have a lower productivity and a reduced 
incentive to invest resources on their land.  This highlights another means through 
which the relations of production constrain commercialisation for farmers in rural 
Morang. 
 
These results require some discussion however given some of the alternative 
arguments regarding the allocative efficiency of sharecropping by Adams and Rask 
(1969).  One may expect that in the study site in Morang, even adhiyã farmers would 
try to intensify resource allocation given the high competition for tenancies.  This is 
backed up when one observes that 70% of households who operate over half of their 
land as adhiyã are from the ‘small farmer’ group who can not reproduce through 
agriculture alone.  One could argue that they would have an incentive to intensify 
labour and input investment even under adhiyã contracts so they can come closer to 
meeting their subsistence needs.   
 
However, Adam and Rask’s (1969) hypothesis assumes a complete lack of 
alternative livelihood options.  As was discussed earlier however, there are 
alternative casual labour opportunities in Morang and small tenant farmers only 
intensify production up to a certain threshold, beyond which they prefer to allocate 
family labour time in outside employment in order to meet their minimum needs.  
Table 6-5 suggests that taken together, ‘small farmer’ households who rent through 
adhiyã contracts and those who rent through ekkha contracts are both likely to have 
fewer incentives to intensify their labour than owner cultivators.  Therefore, just the 
economic insecurity of being a tenant acts as a disincentive to intensify production.  
However, if half of one’s entire annual produce is extracted as rent, the incentives to 
labour elsewhere rather than on one’s land are going to be even greater.  This point 
can be supported by one dialogue which implies that poor adhiyã households are 
more likely to leave their land fallow once the main crop is harvested rather than 
continuing to work on their farms to produce new crops. 
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“Adhiyã farmers, once they have produced, they go abroad, to Delhi or Mumbai etc.  
They work in factories, rather than increasing their labour on the land.  Thekka 
farmers however prefer to do more work on their land as there are greater 
incentives”.   
 
This does not of course mean that landlords do not continue to yield economic power 
over the tenants.  Landlords still often appropriate households’ entire surplus product 
and some of the product of necessary labour time, even under ekkha rents.  It must 
be reiterated that farmers remain reliant upon tenancy, even under adhiyã, but often 
prefer to combine it with other sources of income.  There are not enough well paid 
off-farm opportunities to draw farmers out of agriculture and force landlords to either 
lower the rental share of adhiyã tenancies or reduce fixed rents of ekkha 
 tenancies so farmers can more easily produce a saleable surplus. 
 
 
6.7 Landlordism and Productivity 
6.7.1 Landlords, investment and innovation 
A final question associated with the relations of production is whether or not 
landlords can facilitate the development of the productive forces for tenants.  
Referring to the establishment of the jimidri system in the Terai during the Rana 
years, Regmi (1977b) states that:  
 
“The importance of this measure appears to have been to tighten land-tax collection 
arrangements while simultaneously creating a rural aristocracy capable of injecting 
capital investment and entrepreneurial ability into the field of agriculture”. 
 
This quotation is interesting as it suggests that Rana administrators believed a 
landlord class would play a role in encouraging investment and innovation in Terai 
agriculture.  This vision was never realised in the reality.  As Regmi (1977b) goes on 
to acknowledge, they remained a rent seeking class largely unconcerned with rural 
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development.  The Rana’s objectives were to maximise tax revenue rather than 
encourage capitalist development. 
 
However, do landlords play a more ‘progressive’ role today in facilitating 
technological change?  While the discussion in chapter 5 emphasised the powerful 
mechanisms through which landlords have sought to preserve semi-feudalism, could 
it be in the interests of some landlords to encourage innovation under the existing 
relations of production?  Returning to the debate on sharecropping and allocative 
efficiency, Nabi (1986), suggests that landlords can offer technical advice and 
supervision to tenants to compensate for the lack of incentives for farmers to increase 
labour and input allocation.  Such assistance allows the tenant to boost yields without 
incurring extra costs.  This would of course, apply to fixed rate tenancies as well.  
Newbery (1975), suggests that encouraging innovation is in the landlords interest as 
they are able to profit by increasing rents or adapting the conditions of the contract in 
their favour.  So long as there is competition for tenancies, it seems unlikely that 
landlords will be compelled to lower rents.  In fact, landlords could actually increase 
rents further if they actively encourage innovation amongst the peasantry.  However, 
the long term development of the productive forces could of course facilitate the 
production of a surplus and capitalist development.   
 
Advice may include recommending and encouraging use of the most suitable inputs 
(Nabi, 1986).  This would of course benefit fixed rate ekkha farmers in particular, 
who have a greater incentive to invest.  In addition landlords can offer general non-
economic production advice such as advising farmers on new techniques as well as 
supervising production (Nabi, 1986), something that will benefit both adhiyã and 
ekkha farmers.  In the European agrarian transition there was evidence of landlords 
playing a ‘progressive’ role in promoting innovation in ways which could promote 
the development of the productive forces and capitalist development on their estates.  
For example in rural Aberdeenshire in early 18th century Scotland, landed property 
took a form which would promote capitalist development through the introduction of 
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new cropping systems and improved technology (Carter, 1977)31.  Similarly, Nabi 
(1986) offers examples of effective landlord engagement in Pakistan. 
 
6.7.2 Landlord engagement in Morang 
Contrary to the literature above however, the data from Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and 
Thalaha suggest that landlords play very little role in encouraging innovation and 
supervising production.  23% of farmers who rent land stated that the landlord has 
made no visits to their land in the last year and their only interaction with them is 
through a kamtiya, a locally based agent who comes once a year to collect the crop.  
A substantial 54% of farmers who were renting land stated that the landlord has 
made one or two visits in the last year, mostly with the sole purpose of collecting the 
rent.  Meanwhile 55% of farmers stated that landlords had never offered any 
agricultural advice, while 78% claimed the landlords had not even had an influence 
in deciding what was to be produced. 
 
Bhaduri (1977) suggests that under the semi-feudal conditions which characterise 
many parts of South Asia, landlords will actually endeavour to restrict the 
introduction of technological improvements and innovations.  As farmers are in 
perpetual indebtedness to landlords, usury or ‘interest bearing’ capital represents an 
important source of income alongside rent.  Innovations may undermine this source 
of revenue by increasing the tenants’ financial security.  This reluctance results in an 
equilibrium situation, whereby landlords seek to keep technological development at a 
level that does not disturb the need for tenants to take consumption loans (Bhaduri, 
1977).  While the dependence of the peasantry upon landlords as a result of 
stagnation in industry has been established, Bhaduri’s thesis does not seem a likely 
scenario in rural Morang.  Bhaduri assumes that there is an inter-linkage of landlord 
                                                 
31 The role of landlords in promoting capitalist development in the British Isles of course, culminated 
in Marx’s ‘primitive accumulation’ whereby capitalism was unleashed through the eviction of 
marginal peasants from the land to become wage labourers, while many landlords represented the new 
agrarian bourgeoisie.  This path to agrarian capitalism, whereby a capitalist class emerges out of the 
feudal landed class rather than from within the peasantry itself, was known to Marx as the ‘English 
path’, and to Lenin as the ‘Prussian path’ (Roy, 2006).  
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and usury capital.  However, the evidence outlined earlier in this chapter suggested 
that landlords play only a marginal role in money lending32.   Therefore, although 
most tenants are subject to surplus appropriation through usury, the money lenders 
are from a separate class that takes advantage of the impoverishment resulting from 
the dominant semi-feudal relations of production.  While most landlords are wealthy 
hill settlers residing in Biratnagar and Kathmandu, village money lenders and 
kahwala are often from the Marwari community.  Although members of this 
Indian business community excel in business, they generally have less interest in 
land. 
 
There are therefore a number of alternative, more complex explanations for 
landlord’s lack of incentives to encourage investment and innovation.  The 
predominance of absentee landlordism provides some answers.  Indeed while the 
small number of local landlords visited the land on average four times a year, the 
absentee landlords visited only once.  Discussions in the village and in Biratnagar 
suggest that most of the landlords are not themselves farmers and often have little 
interest in agriculture.  Furthermore, the large size of many of the holdings and the 
distance of them from the landlords’ place of residence would make supervision and 
the promotion of innovations impractical to the point that they may outweigh the 
benefits of higher yields.  It was even claimed by villagers that one of their landlords 
now is based in the USA, and all transactions with villagers are through the kamtiya.  
This contrasts starkly with Nabi’s (1986) study in Pakistan, where it is noted that 
47% of landlords, most of whom reside locally, visit their tenants at least every 
second day during the peak season while 22% report weekly visits.   This explains 
the conclusions of Nabi’s (1986) study that landlord supervision and advice to 
sharecroppers encourages resource use which is comparable to that of owner 
cultivators. 
 
                                                 
32 Out of those operating more than half their land as tenants, only 3% of the total sum of loans taken 
by the sample in the last year was from landlords, in contrast to the 32% taken from kahwala and 
27% from private businessmen and the combined 39% from banks, friends and family.   
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The lack of landlord engagement in Morang was also aggravated during the civil war 
from 1996-2006, which made travel in rural areas more risky.  More recent unrest 
during the 2007 and 2008 Madheshi ndolan saw a political uprising led by the 
ethnic communities of the plains against continued hill dominance.  This has deterred 
many landlords of hill origin from visiting the rural hinterland of Morang for fear of 
ethno-racial harassment.  It was expressed locally however that landlords still have 
political power through their connections to party politics and the patron-client 
relationships which have been established with constituents.  However, given that 
they were spending less time in communities, it is possible to envisage their 
influence falling.  Furthermore, it was reported that their reduced engagement with 
tenants in recent years is one of the reasons why their role as a money lender has 
declined substantially.  This also helps to explain another shift, an increasing 
preference by landlords for fixed rate contracts over share contracts.  Fixed rate 
ekkha contracts require minimum supervision and it is likely that landlords 
themselves have caught on to the fact that such farmers have a greater incentive to 
invest, thus allowing them to maximise revenue without having to visit the villages.  
ekkh contracts at least guarantee the landlord a fixed amount, no matter how many 
inputs or days of labour the farmer invests in the land.33  
 
It is evident therefore that both the economic and non-economic costs of engagement 
with tenants outweigh the financial benefits.  Interestingly, these costs may have 
been considered less if land was the sole source of prosperity for the landlord’s 
household.  Many already have a secure income from professional employment and 
some are already in positions of great wealth and privilege.  Furthermore, discussions 
revealed that one of the primary economic incentives for urban dwellers to purchase 
or retain large holdings is the speculative value of land rather than income from rent.  
The land can potentially be sold in the future at a higher price, as well as being a 
source of ‘insurance’ for households during difficult times.   
 
                                                 
33 An alternative would be for landlords to shift to what Adams and Rask (1969, 935) term “ideal 
leases”, whereby all investment on the land is shared equally.  The sharing of risks may encourage 
efficient resource use.   However, these would also require supervision and tenant engagement. 
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Aside from this, the ownership of large land holdings is favoured as much for 
cultural as well as economic reasons.  As Regmi (1977b) emphasises, land ownership 
in Nepal was historically utilised as a system through which state power was 
mobilised in rural areas.  This was manifested in practices such as the assignment of 
birt grants to the political elite and jirayat holdings for tax collectors.  It is therefore 
understandable that its association with political privilege means that land ownership 
continues to confer social status for families on an ideological level.  An interview 
with a landlord in Biratnagar and with officials at the land revenue office backed up 
these sentiments.  Furthermore, it is also viewed as a means through which urban 
professionals can maintain an emotional attachment with the countryside.  It was 
however suggested in the same interviews that these sentiments are declining 





It has been demonstrated how the semi-feudal mode of production in Jhorahat, 
Bhaudaha and Thalaha have served to impede profitable commercialisation in 
agriculture.  This both blocks the emergence of the profitable petty commodity 
production envisaged in the APP and also prevents the emergence of capitalist 
differentiation as envisaged in classical Marxian theory.   
 
Unequal access to the means of production and the associated form of surplus 
appropriation: pre-capitalist ground rent, constrain ‘small farmer’ households from 
meeting their minimum subsistence needs, let alone retaining a surplus which can 
yield a profit, even when their cultivated area is sufficient to do so.  Many ‘medium 
farmer’ households, the group within which one would expect capitalist 
differentiation are unable to retain a surplus which goes far beyond the needs of 
simple reproduction.  As a consequence, profitable commercialisation is restricted 
primarily to ‘large farmer’ households.  Semi-feudal relations of production are 
reproduced firstly by the political and ideological practices of landlords both 
nationally and locally which have maintained their control over land.  Secondly, they 
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have been perpetuated in the context of industrial stagnation.  The lack of 
alternatives outside agriculture have rendered a vast segment of the rural population 
dependent upon tenancies, thus giving landlords no incentives to lower rents, with 
implications for farmers from all wealth groups.   
 
The evidence in this research suggests that the relations of production also block any 
development of the productive forces in agriculture which may improve farmers’ 
capacity to retain a surplus under existing conditions.  Only ‘large farmers’ can 
afford to invest in yield boosting higher quality inputs and machinery, a capability 
which is  facilitated by easy access to institutional credit.  However, this is being 
undermined nowadays by the necessity for extensive cultural capital investments.  
Small and medium farmers however are often forced into cycles of indebtedness not 
just for cultural capital investments, but to purchase the most basic inputs for their 
land, often being subject to further surplus appropriation through usury in the 
process.  This has driven an increase in sales of the small amounts of land remaining 
in the hands of these poorer producers.   
 
At the conceptual level it was also demonstrated how profitable commercialisation 
and capital accumulation is further hindered by semi-feudal tenancy contract types 
such as sharecropping, which act as a disincentive for households to increase 
investment or labour intensity on their land, alongside direct economic constraints.  
Furthermore, landlords themselves have little interest in improving productivity 
given that most of them live in urban areas and take little interest in agriculture.   
 
In sum it can be concluded that the monopoly over landed property and the 
associated relations of production have a powerful impact on all aspects of the 
agrarian economy.  It can thus be suggested that the semi-feudal mode of production 
remains pre-dominant in structuring the trajectory of agrarian change in Jhorahat, 
Bhaudaha and Thalaha. 
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7 The dynamics of price formation and surplus 




It has been established thus far that profitable commodity production in Jhorahat, 
Bhaudaha and Thalaha remains limited.  A large segment of accumulating farmers 
would be necessary if one is to envisage either capitalist differentiation or the APP’s 
dynamic middle peasant led commodity production to emerge from within the 
current pre-capitalist modes of production.  At present, while many farmers sell 
commodities up to a certain level, they are not necessarily yielding a ‘profit’ at the 
end of the agricultural year.   
 
What therefore are the primary constraints hindering farmers from profiting from 
their agricultural sales?  For those farmers cultivating under production relations 
characteristic of the predominant semi-feudal mode of production, it was established 
in chapter 6 that a large portion of the total product of their surplus labour time is 
appropriated through rent.  In fact for many ‘small farmers’ much of their necessary 
labour time is lost to rent, driving them to work in other sectors.  Such households 
still participate in the market to meet cash needs, but notions of profit are 
meaningless as they sell commodities on a distress basis to release money to repay 
loans, meet urgent one-off cash needs, or to purchase inputs for the next harvest.   
 
While rent paying households are unable to yield a profit in the first instance, does 
this imply that those farming under productive relations characteristic of the 
independent peasant mode of production are able to yield a profit through market 
participation?  They are not subject to the rent burden and are producing a more 
secure surplus.  The evidence from the field however, suggests that the relations of 
production are not the only mechanism through which the product of households’ 
surplus labour is appropriated.  Surplus can also be appropriated through the sphere 
of circulation.  In this context however, it is extracted not as physical product but in 
a monetised form.   
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This can occur not only through high rates of interest on loans, which was briefly 
discussed above but through unfavourable prices for the commodities sold by 
producers.  In these contexts, prices which are depressed relative to the price of 
commodities purchased (or consumed
1
), namely the means of production and means 
of subsistence represent an appropriation of surplus through the price mechanism 
(Deere & de-Janvry, 1979).  They further reduce the rates of profit for wealthier 
independent producers
2
 while causing poorer farmers subject to semi-feudal relations 
of production to face further difficulties in meeting the needs of simple reproduction.  
It is here the significance of articulations of modes of production again emerges.  As 
was suggested in chapter 2, peasant producers can produce for the market but with 
limited capital accumulation, as much of the surplus is appropriated through the 
pricing mechanism (Banaji, 1977;  de Janvry, 1981).  It would therefore suggest that 
capitalism could potentially be increasing its dominance through articulations with 
the semi-feudal and independent peasant mode of production.  
 
This chapter investigates these processes of surplus appropriation with a focus on 
price formation in grain markets.   While section 7.2 briefly examines the marketing 
systems in rural Morang, section 7.3 goes on to examine the associated circuits of 
capital in the sphere of circulation between which farmers’ surplus is shared, 
beginning with ‘merchant capital’, which encompasses both ‘commercial’ and 
‘interest bearing’ capital.  In pre-capitalist conditions such as in rural Morang it is 
argued that each of these two forms of merchant capital are able to appropriate a 
disproportionate share of farming households’ surplus product.  Initial evidence does 
not suggest significant articulations with capitalism as most of the surplus 
appropriated through the sphere of circulation appears to be absorbed by this class, 
the imperatives of which are semi-feudal in character.   
 
With regards to the buying and selling of commodities or ‘commercial capital’, it is 
argued that oligopsony power can be used to manipulate prices.  This occurs through 
                                                 
1
 Much of the means of subsistence is of course produced on the farm. 
2
 To Deere and de Janvry (1979), this is the predominant form of surplus extraction for independent 
peasant producers.   
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the relative concentration of the grain market and immobility of capital, facilitating 
collusive activity.  However, while there is evidence of price fixing, there appears to 
be additional unexplained variation in the prices reported by producers.  The chapter 
thus goes on to look at the second process through which merchant capital can yield 
a surplus profit, the unequal bargaining power in exchange relations which are in 
turn rooted in production relations.  Although all households are subject to surplus 
appropriation through the market, it is particularly acute for poorer producers subject 
to semi-feudal relations of production. 
 
Two processes are identified in this context.  Firstly, there is evidence that many 
‘small’ and ‘medium’ farmer households, many of whom are semi-feudal tenants and 
are subject to distress commerce, are not viewed as valuable customers by 
merchants, have little bargaining power, and thus are compelled to accept a low 
price.  Wealthier independent peasant producers meanwhile, such as many of the 
‘large farmers’ are viewed as valuable customers, can cultivate ‘trust’ based 
relationships with merchants, and thus are offered more attractive rates to retain their 
loyalty in trade.  Secondly, the phenomenon of interlinked markets appears to further 
enhance the merchants’ capacity to depress prices.  It is argued that those 
predominantly ‘small’ and ‘medium’ producers, who are heavily in debt to 
merchants, must sell to the same trader, regardless of the price received, enhancing 
the buyers capacity to extract surplus.  With regards to interest bearing capital, it is 
argued that interest rates themselves on both loans from grain merchants and private 
businessmen are inflated through both oligopoly power over credit markets and 
unequal bargaining power.  Through intensifying indebtedness and impoverishment 
of poorer farmers, this drain of surplus out of agriculture by merchant capital 
facilitates the further reproduction of the semi-feudal mode of production. 
 
Section 7.5 goes on to examine how a disproportionate share of the total surplus 
produced in agriculture can be appropriated elsewhere in the sphere of circulation by 
industrial capital, suggesting a loose articulation of capitalist and pre-capitalist 
modes of production.  This section outlines evidence that factories are, like 
merchants, able to manipulate prices through oligopsony power and collusion.  
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In the final part of this chapter, section 7.6, a more indirect cause of depressed prices 
is examined.  It is argued that the comparatively weak state in Nepal as compared to 
India has resulted in significantly different production conditions.  Indian farmers 
receive more effective agricultural services and can produce at higher levels of 
productivity than their Nepalese counterparts.  They also have access to subsidies.  
Both factors allow Indian farmers to sell more cheaply.  In the context of an open 
market, imports of grain from the south have depressed prices in Nepal, further 
depressing profit rates for local farmers.  
 
 
7.2 Commodity chain in rural Morang 
 
There are essentially two parallel agricultural marketing systems in rural Morang.  
Firstly, there is the informal marketing system whereby produce is sold by farmers 
directly to consumers.  This represents a sphere of circulation which although 
monetised, primarily entails exchange between pre-capitalist units of production.  
The crops which are predominantly sold through this mechanism include potatoes 
and other vegetables, fruits and livestock products (See Table 7-1 and Figure 7-1).  
Livestock products are often sold when local consumers visit farmers’ households 
directly to buy commodities at times of need.  Vegetables and fruit meanwhile are 
sold to rural consumers in periodic markets or htiyas, primarily by women farmers 
who take control over the production of these commodities (see Figure 7-2).  Htiyas 
occur in communities on a weekly or twice weekly basis.  The system of rotation 
between villages ensures that most communities are within easy walking distance of 
a periodic market on any given day.  They play an important social as well as 
economic role within the community.  Few of the commodities bought and sold 
through this sphere of circulation are sold to the enterprises in the capitalist mode of 
production.  However, occasionally larger traders buy up crops in rural htiyas and 
sell them to urban consumers in Biratnagar’s two larger htiyas or in Gudri bazaar, 
the central vegetable market, providing relatively cheap wage foods for the urban 
working class (see Figure 7-3). 
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Table 7-1: Marketing outlets for main crops produced in Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha 
 
Crop Primary marketing outlet 
Autumn Paddy (varieties include knchi, 
mansuli and basmati) 
Kahwala 
Spring paddy (primarily chait variety)  
 
Kahwala 








Periodic market  
Vegetables (tomato, pumpkin, cauliflower, 
onion, bitter gourd) 
Periodic market  




Direct sales to consumers from homestead 
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Figure 7-3: Biratnagar’s Gudri bazaar where surplus fruit and vegetables bought by larger 
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Figure 7-4: A kahwala shop in Jhorahat.  Kahwalas are the grain merchants who purchase 
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The second and most important marketing system entails farmers selling their 
produce to kahwala or grain merchants (see Figure 7-4).  This is the main 
marketing channel for the main commodities produced in rural Morang, namely, 
paddy, wheat, jute and pulses (See Table 7-1 and Figure 7-1).  In the months 
following the harvest, male household members from throughout rural Morang rent 
bullock carts or rickshaws which are loaded with sacks of grain, and lead them to the 
kahwala in the most conveniently located bazaar(see Figure 7-5).  In the 
merchants’ yards, the paddy is weighed and purchased according to the daily market 
rates.   Every few weeks, merchants go on to sell the grain or jute to larger traders, or 
more often, directly to the rice, wheat and jute mills to the east and north of 
Biratnagar.  It is here processed before being transported to the markets of 
Kathmandu, Biratnagar and occasionally India (see Figure 7-1).  The kahwala in 
this context act as intermediaries in the supply of commodities from the rural pre-
capitalist to capitalist modes of production. 
 
 
7.3 Price manipulation by merchant capital 
 
7.3.1 Division of total surplus between different capitals 
 
To Marx the sphere of circulation is composed of several interconnected circuits of 
capital.  It is in many ways an extension of the mode of production given that it is 
necessary for the reproduction of the forces of production after each productive 
cycle.  As was suggested in chapter 2, it brings together isolated units of production 
into a systemic relationship.  It can also however, lie between modes of production, 
as a mechanism through which pre-capitalist and capitalist economic formations are 
articulated. 
 
There are two primary circuits.  The first is that of merchant capital and entails the 
purchase of commodities which are sold on at a higher price.   Marx (1974, 155) 
denotes the circuit as M-C-M’, whereby the merchant advances money (M) to 
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purchase a commodity (C) which is sold on at a higher price (M’).  This also includes 
an abridged circuit (M-M’), whereby money is lent (M) to be returned with interest 
(M’).  Marx refers to this circuit of merchant capital as ‘interest bearing capital’ and 
the terms the latter variant engaged in buying and selling of commodities 
‘commercial capital’ (Marx, 1967, 267).   
 
The second circuit is that of productive capital, whereby a capitalist purchases inputs 
and labour to yield a commodity with profit.  Marx (1956, 25) denotes this as                    
M-C…P...C’-M’.  The capitalist uses money (M) to buy the commodity (C).  The 
process of circulation is interrupted while the commodity goes through the process of 
production (P) releasing a new commodity which embodies surplus value, or 
‘commodity capital’ (C’).  This is returned to the circuit being sold and yielding a 
profit, so money capital becomes M’.  The renewal of the circuit allows reproduction 
of the mode of production and accumulation.   
 
In rural Morang, peasant farms under the independent peasant and semi-feudal mode 
of production represent a pre-capitalist form of productive capital.  They receive 
loans primarily from money lenders through the circuit of ‘interest bearing capital’ to 
purchase inputs and then sell their produce either through formal or informal 
channels.  While in informal channels it is sold directly to consumers, in formal 
marketing channels commodities are sold to kahwala, who represent ‘commercial 
capital’.  The kahwala sell it to the processing industries, supplying raw materials 
to a form of productive capital under a capitalist mode of production which can 
better be termed ‘industrial capital’.  Kahwala also sell inputs to farmers, most of 
which are produced in the capitalist sector.  Merchant capital therefore, in both its 
interest bearing and commercial forms, is essential for the reproduction of the pre-
capitalist and capitalist mode of production in Morang.  However, it must be re-
emphasised that it does not represent a simple extension of just one of these 
economic formations in an isolated pre-capitalist or capitalist economic system but 
instead mediates articulations between them in the sphere of circulation. 
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To Marx, the portion of the total ‘profit’ or surplus across the economy which 
accrues to each capital is an outcome of competition.  However, there is evidence 
that competitive impulses in the market of rural Morang are restricted by the unequal 
relations of exchange between farmers and merchant capital, and merchant and 
industrial capital respectively.  Through the power relations behind price formation 
in the sphere of circulation, there is evidence that these two forms of capital are able 
to appropriate a disproportionate share of the total surplus product realised by 
farmers under the pre-capitalist modes of production.  This has the potential to 
further reduce rates of profit for those larger farms able to yield a surplus at the stage 
of production.  Furthermore, for poorer farmers who enter the market on a distress 
basis, the low prices received for commodities and usurious interest rates on loans 
further constrain them from meeting the needs of simple reproduction. 
 
 
7.3.2 Division of total surplus between producer and merchant capital 
 
Necessary function of merchant capital 
 
Under capitalism, Marx states that surplus value produced by an enterprise is divided 
between the different forms of capital outlined above into various types of ‘revenue’, 
through the process of circulation.  Part of the surplus value is realised as profit, 
known to Marx as “profit of enterprise” and represents the money capital generated 
by the owner of the means of production, by productive capital itself (Marx, 1967, 
373).  Other portions are divided between forms of capital outside of the production 
process, some of which do not produce surplus.  The most notable of these is of 
course merchant capital, which as has been established, includes both ‘commercial’ 
and ‘interest bearing’ elements. Merchant capital does not therefore create new 
surplus value, but absorbs a share of the total surplus value already appropriated at 
the stage of production.  
 
Although Marx considers merchant capital ‘unproductive’, he believes some of its 
activities are necessary for the circulation of commodities and realisation of profit.  
Under idealised capitalist conditions, it is therefore suggested that the share of 
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surplus falling to these different capitals is included in the average rate of profit 
produced in an economy (Marx, 1967, 285-290).  To Marx therefore, both the share 
of the surplus appropriated through interest rates on loans and the share taken by 
merchants for the buying and selling of commodities is determined according to 
competitive market forces.  It should not therefore act as a ‘constraint’ to profitable 
production. 
 
Surplus profits by merchant capital under pre-capitalist conditions 
 
However, under pre-capitalist conditions, merchant capital can play a quite different 
role whereby merchant profits are determined not by competitive market forces, but 
by extra-economic means driven by the principle of “buying cheap and selling dear” 
(Nagatani, 2004, 73).  This is made possible by two forms of unequal market power 
between merchants and farmers which will be examined throughout this section.  
Firstly, in pre-capitalist conditions such as Morang there is less mobility of capital 
and thus greater market concentration.  This allows merchants to yield greater 
monopoly or monopsony power in agricultural markets, thus appropriating a 
significant share of the surplus.  Secondly, the presence of distress commercialisation 
reduces the bargaining power of sellers.  Nagatani (2004) argues that relations of 
exchange based upon ‘buying cheap and selling dear’ allow merchants to appropriate 
the products of surplus labour left behind after the subtraction of rent and other 
obligations, and like rent itself, can even appropriate part of the product of necessary 
labour.   
 
 
7.3.4 Oligopsony power by commercial capital 
 
Oligopsony power and market structure 
 
There is evidence that the exercise of class power by ‘commercial capital’ in the 
buying of agricultural produce can have a considerable influence over the process of 
price formation, representing one of the primary mechanisms of surplus 
appropriation through the market.  Commercial capital can also extract surplus 
through the commodities sold to farmers such as fertiliser and consumer goods.  The 
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Chapter 7: The dynamics of price formation and surplus appropriation through 
the market 
261 
focus of this chapter however, is on the process of price formation for commodities 
sold by farmers, as crop sales represent a pre-condition for profitable 
commercialisation and capitalist development.  There is a further focus on those 
crops sold to the kahwala, namely (in order of importance), paddy, wheat, jute and 
pulses.  While informal marketing channels are important, sales of crops through 
such channels comprise of only 14% of the value of total household agricultural 
income in the sample.  Furthermore, sales to the kahwala who sell to capitalist 
enterprises represent the only mode through which farmers can realistically sell in 
large enough amounts to accumulate capital or meet urgent cash needs.  The grain 
staples which are sold through these channels are the primary commodities promoted 




To begin it is useful to examine the first mechanism through which merchants 
achieve disproportionately high profits, the exercise of monopsony or oligopsony 
power, a relation of exchange rooted in the market structure itself of pre-capitalist 
(and arguably many capitalist) social formations.  Oligopsony is made possible in the 
context of immobility of capital.  Marx argues that under idealised capitalist 
conditions whereby capital maintains full mobility, if the rate of profit in the 
producing sector is greater than that of the commercial sector, capital will leave the 
commercial sector until profit rates are equalised (Marx, 1967, 282).  The rate of 
profit to capital advanced in a set unit of time will therefore be the same in the 
commercial and productive sector.  In conditions of capital immobility however, 
Marx suggests that commercial capital has the power to absorb a much greater 
proportion of the surplus value realised by the producer (Marx, 1967, 308).   
 
The immobility of capital characterises many pre-capitalist peasant economies 
(Friedman, 1980).  In this context other capitals can not easily move into the 
commercial sector and increase competition, facilitating the exercise of oligopsony 
power by merchants to manipulate prices through processes such as collusion.  Under 
                                                 
3
 Selected high value commodities such as vegetables are also mentioned in the APP, but the selected 
field sites are not suitable for extensive vegetable production.   
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such conditions, the ‘necessary’ function of merchant capital is superseded by its 
parasitic character, with little pressure to invest productively (Milonakis, 1995).  For 
poorer peasant producers in Morang, many of whom are subject to semi-feudal 
relations of production, this may result in an even greater proportion of the product 
of their surplus labour time being appropriated, making it even more difficult to 
make a profit.  Meanwhile, for the few profit orientated large farmers, many of 
whom are independent peasant producers, this acts as another constraint which 
reduces their rate of profit.  Both processes hinder the emergence of capitalism from 
within the pre-capitalist economic formation. 
 
Measuring the structure of agricultural markets in Morang: The Structure-Conduct-
Performance paradigm 
 
It is therefore necessary to examine the relevant agricultural produce markets in the 
study region to identify whether there is indeed evidence of oligopsony by 
commercial capital which allows it to yield a disproportionately large profit at the 
expense of farmers.  Measuring the potential for oligopsony in markets is by no 
means simplistic, yet attempts have been made using the neo-classical Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm (Bain, 1950;  Bain, 1941;  1951;  Caves, 
1972;  Dessalegn et al., 1998;  Nyoro et al., 1999).  While the approach can be 
criticised from a political-economic perspective, as will be done below, there are 
some useful elements of the paradigm that offer indications as to whether or not 
merchant capital is able to yield an oligopsony rent through price manipulation.   
 
The primary utility of this framework is that it identifies how oligopsony power is 
actually exercised in context of capital immobility through an analysis of the 
associated market structure.  The SCP framework suggests a relationship exists 
between market structure and the behaviour of actors or ‘conduct’, which affects 
market performance and price formation (Bain, 1950;  Caves, 1972;  Nyoro et al., 
1999).  Nyoro et al (1999) and Dessalegn et al (1998) have applied the SCP 
framework for analysing the structure of agricultural markets where farmers sell their 
goods in Kenya and Ethiopia respectively.  Variables to determine the market 
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structure typically include the entry conditions for a particular trade, which of course 
refer to the mobility of capital, the degree of seller and buyer concentration and the 
degree of product differentiation.  Market conduct is measured by an examination of 
the behaviour of firms and the means through which they determine their buying or 
selling prices.  Market performance on the other hand, is measured by variables such 
as profit rates, evidence of competitive innovation and the relation between 
production and marketing costs (Dessalegn et al., 1998). 
 
To analyse of the structure of the rural markets in which farmers in Jhorahat, 
Bhaudaha and Thalaha sell their produce, a useful starting point is identifying the 
entry barriers to the trade, or in line with my Marxian framework, the ‘mobility’ of 
capital.  Although this could not be quantified, interviews revealed that entry into 
new trades by the cultivating majority is not easy.  Most agricultural buying and 
selling trades are monopolised by certain ethnic communities such as the Marwaris 
and certain Maithili speaking middle castes such as the Baniy 
4
 who have migrated 
to the region as the economy has become increasingly monetised and rural markets 
have expanded.  Over the years, the close knit community of kahwala have 
inherited expertise and market knowledge as well as valuable business connections 
further up the commodity chain which are essential for their mercantile operations
5
.  
Most of the local people who are predominantly from other ethnic groups do not 
have access to these networks or knowledges.  In fact we only met three grain traders 
(out of the 35 who were surveyed) who were not either Marwari or Baniy.  Most of 
the grain traders we spoke to had originally migrated to the area from elsewhere, 
particularly in Jhorahat and Tetariya.  These caste based entry barriers suggest there 
is limited mobility of capital in the grain trading sector. 
 
The second measure of market structure, which is likely to reflect these high entry 
barriers, is the level of market concentration, and it is this which facilitates price 
manipulation.  A market characterised by high entry barriers is likely to be more 
                                                 
4
 The Baniy are a caste traditionally engaged in business activities throughout rural Northern India 
and the Nepal Terai. 
5
 Harriss-White (1996, 2005) has written considerably on caste based networks as an entry barrier to 
agricultural marketing activities. 
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concentrated with a smaller number of firms dominating a greater share of key 
activities.  In these contexts one would expect more ‘uncompetitive activity’ such as 
collusion over prices.  The most commonly used variable is the 4 firm concentration 
ratio (CR4) representing the proportion of total trade within a particular market 
handled by the largest four traders (Caves, 1972;  Dessalegn et al., 1998;  Nyoro et 
al., 1999)
6
.  To calculate this ratio, the volume of total trade by each firm for a set 
period of time must be recorded so firms can be rank ordered by total turnover.  The 
level of market concentration can then be calculated using the following equation: 
 
CR4=VT4 / VT 
 
VT4 = the annual volume (kg) of total trade in a crop by the largest four traders in the sample. 
VT = the annual volume (kg) of total trade in a crop by the entire population of the sample. 
 
In the study area, there are two main marketing regions where farmers sell their 
produce.  A farmers’ choice of bazaar depends upon its distance from one’s 
homestead and the transport infrastructure.  Farmers of Thalaha and the sampled 
segment of Bhaudaha VDC east of the Judi khola generally take their produce to the 
merchants in Naya Bazaar or Katahari to the east of Biratnagar (See Figure 1-6 and 
Figure 1-7).  Farmers in Jhorahat VDC and western parts of Bhaudaha meanwhile, 
generally sell to merchants in Jhorahat bazaar and its surrounding settlements, or the 
smaller market of Tetariya to the north.  
 
To calculate the volume of trade by commodity, kahwala were asked to report the 
approximate net quantities of each crop they had purchased over the last year.  
Merchants generally calculated this in quintals (100kg) according to the number of 
truckloads or tractor loads they had sent to the mill.  As they would only send a truck 
to the mill once completely full, and merchants knew the approximate capacity of the 
                                                 
6
 Harriss-White’s (1996) study of agrarian markets in Tamil Nadu also measures concentration by the 
control of assets and number of transactions (in this case by the top 1% of traders rather than top 4 
firms).  Both these variables were considered, but in the current political context merchants would 
have been unlikely to reveal information about the value of their assets to strangers.  Meanwhile, they 
were generally unable to recall the number of transactions in the last year or even month.  Therefore 
we settled on the total volume of trade to measure concentration. 
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trucks or trailers they used, this appeared a suitably accurate measure.   The survey 
was restricted to the three primary commodities sold by farmers, namely paddy, 
wheat and jute.  Table 7-2 displays the data gathered and the 4 firm concentration 
ratio, calculated by the formula CR4=VT4 / VT. 
 





















Paddy 20 191,875 105,000 55% 
Wheat 17 62,200 35,000 56% 
Naya bazaar 
and Katahari 
Jute 17 59,218 36,875 62% 
Paddy 15 116,425 70,125 60% 
Wheat 14 29,075 17,175 59% 
Jhorahat and 
Tetariya 
 Jute 11 7975 5750 72% 
*Largest four firms in total trade in the commodity 
 
The results suggest that around 55% of the paddy market in Naya Bazaar and 
Katahari and 60% in Jhorahat and Katahari are controlled by the largest four 
kahwala.  Similarly, 56% and 59% of the wheat market respectively, and 62% and 
72% of the jute market are controlled by the largest four traders.  Kohls and Uhl 
suggest that a four firm concentration ratio of less than 33% indicates a competitive 
structure for agricultural markets, while above 50% is indicative of concentrated 
oligopolistic conditions (cf. Dessalegn et al., 1998).  It can thus be suggested that 
there is a significant level of concentration in the agricultural markets in which the 
farmers of Bhaudaha, Thalaha and Jhorahat sell their produce.   
 
While the structure has been established, what is the reported conduct of the traders 
in the two marketing regions?  Oral testimonies by farmers suggest they have little 
bargaining power with the merchants.  If they complained about the price and went 
to a different merchant, they would generally be offered the same rate.  One medium 
Brahmin farmer we spoke to complained: 
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“We take our crops to the kahwala and ask them the price and they buy our crops 
at a rate which fixed by them. There is no other alternative.  We can not fix the price 
our self.  When we go to sell our crops to the katawalas they are the ones who fix the 
price. And when we need rice to buy from the mill then we also have to pay them in 
their price which is very high. We don’t have right to fix the price for our own 
crops”. 
 
In this context the farmer also expressed the feeling of powerlessness not only in his 
participation in markets to sell grain, but also in the purchase of grain from the mills 
for consumption purposes.   
 
One large farmer from a Maithili speaking caste complained that for certain crops in 
particular; the merchants have enhanced power to lower the price they offer the 
farmers.  The farmer we spoke to suggested that as it is harvested in the monsoon and 
can not be stored due to the damp climate, they are compelled to sell it immediately, 
even if the price is low: 
 
“We grow chait rice with so much hard work but when we harvest, we can not 
receive a fair price. The kahwala fix the price themselves and we get a low rate. 
They fix the price for example at Rs. 300, but as the chait can not be stored for a long 
time we are compelled to sell it”.  
 
The above testimonies suggest that farmers have limited bargaining power in the 
market and farmers frequently claimed there was collusion between traders to 
maximise their profits, whereby merchants collectively decide a maximum buying 
price.  Indeed the moderate level of market concentration would greatly facilitate 
such activity.  It is argued in the SCP literature that profit rates increase in 
accordance with the level of market concentration (Bain, 1941;  1951;  Caves, 1972).  
This is because processes of collusion made possible by a concentrated market 
structure will allow firms to maximise profit rates by buying at a low price and 
selling at a high price (Bain, 1951).  This is of course in line with Marxian theories of 
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merchant capital under pre-capitalist conditions, which assert that immobility of 
capital leads to unequal relations of exchange.   
 
Nevertheless, local merchants themselves stated that the competition had increased in 
recent years and that this had compelled them to sell their grain at a lower rate, 
pushing down their profit margins.  Although the trade is still controlled by the same 
ethnic communities, it was expressed that the number of traders had increased 
significantly, giving the farmers greater choice.  For example, the merchants in Naya 
Bazaar and Katahari reported that just over a decade ago they had control over a 
much greater area, including Jhorahat.  The only other kahwala were in Biratnagar 
itself or in Dhubi, far to the west on the main North-South highway.  However, the 
establishment of kahwala shops in VDCs such as Jhorahat and Tetariya has now 
reduced their control over the market.  This point is interesting.  While it can be read 
as an admission from the merchants that they do have some capacity to 
independently control the prices, it seems this power has been reduced in recent 
years.  The increase in mercantile competition may be attributed to improvements in 
transportation.   
 
Table 7-3: Average difference between reported buying price and selling price by commodity 








and selling price 
Knchi paddy Rs 1423 Rs 1469 3.1% 
Mansuli paddy Rs 1611 Rs 1655 2.7% 
Basmati paddy Rs 2187 Rs 2273 3.8% 
Naya bazaar and 
Katahari 
Jute Rs 1798 Rs  1866 3.7% 
Knchi paddy Rs 1387 Rs 1454 4.6% 
Mansuli paddy Rs 1577 Rs 1644 4.1% 




Jute Rs 1625 Rs 1679 2.8% 
*Given the risk of bias in comparison due to price fluctuations, we endeavoured to complete all 
surveys with merchants within a two week period from 15
th
 March – 1
st
 April.  Fortunately there were 
no significant price fluctuations during this period. 
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What therefore is the actual measured performance of the market in the study area?  
Do the profit rates suggest that merchants are yielding an ‘oligopsony rent’ through 
the pricing mechanism?  As the levels of concentration for different crop markets are 
somewhat similar, it is not possible to see if there is an actual ‘relationship’ between 
concentration and profit rates.  However, observing the profit rates alone provides 
some insights.  The data in Table 7-3 records differences between the kahwala 
reported price at which they buy from farmers and the price at which they sell to the 
mills for the commodities being bought and sold while the survey was underway in 
March 2008.  The difference ranges from only 2.8% to 4.6%.  When transport and 
brokerage costs are accounted for one would expect only marginal rates of profit for 
each transaction.   
 
However, although the kahwalas’ reported buying and selling prices displayed in 
Table 7-3 suggest very low rates of profit, it is difficult to prove whether or not these 
prices actually correspond to what is offered to farmers.  It is natural that the 
merchants would intentionally report what they feel is an ‘official’ competitive price 
while in reality, farmers are offered something considerably lower.  When one listens 
to farmers’ testimonies and observes the prices they were given for their paddy, the 
data appears to contradict the reports of merchants.  Table 7-3 suggests that the 
average buying price for paddy and jute is on average 5.5% higher in Naya 
bazaar/Katahari than in Jhorahat/Tetariya while the selling prices are 3.7% higher.  
One would expect this small difference given the lower transport costs to reach the 
former.   Naya bazaar and Katahari are at the edge of the industrial belt where many 
mills are located and on a newly resurfaced road to Biratnagar, while Jhorahat and 
Tetariya are far from the mills and only have a rough road linking them to the town.  
However, contradictions emerged when farmers were asked to report the highest and 
lowest price they received for the main knchi 
7
 variety of paddy from the 2007 
harvest, generating an ‘average’ figure.   
                                                 
7
 knchi paddy (and the similar Rdh 12 which sells for the same price) is by the main crop 
consumed and sold by farmers to katawalas.  86% of the 76 households who have sold crops to the 
katawalas have included some knchi paddy.  It represents 40% of the total recorded grain sales over 
the last year, as opposed to 18% for wheat, 18% for Chait paddy, 14% for Mansuli paddy and 11%  
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Figure 7-6:  Reported prices offered for knchi paddy in Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha 
 


































































The results in Figure 7-6 suggest that although there is considerable variation in the 
prices received, contrary to the data in , farmers selling knchi paddy in Naya bazaar 
and Katahari actually report a lower average price than those who sold their crop in 
Jhorahat and Bhaudaha!  The bottom quartile of recorded prices in Jhorahat and 
Tetariya ranged from Rs 6.75 to Rs 8.75 per kg while the top quartile ranged from Rs 
10.24 to Rs 12.5 per kg.  This contrasts with Naya bazaar and Katahari whereby the 
bottom quartile in reported price ranges from Rs 6.25 to Rs 7.19 while the top 
quartile only ranged from Rs 8.75 to Rs 10.23.  The difference between the average 
prices was 16%.  We asked farmers repeatedly about why those who sell in Naya 
bazaar and Katahari receive a lower price, despite the fact that they are less remote.  
                                                                                                                                          
for basmati paddy.  Its popularity means there is sufficient data on price variations for reliable data 
analysis.  
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We were given several explanations.  Some respondents suggested that in Naya 
Bazaar, the kahwala have to pay taxes to the government, thus lowering the price, 
while in Jhorahat and Tetariya it is too remote, so the tax officials rarely bother 
visiting, to the benefit of both farmers and merchants.  Others suggested that the 
quality of the rice was better in Jhorahat due to the cultivation methods and 
environmental factors.  However, one would have expected the merchants to have 
also accounted for these factors in their ‘official’ reported buying prices. 
 
The third explanation for price divergences appears most viable and brings us back to 
the issue of collusion and price manipulation.  Although Table 7-2 suggests that the 
two market areas have a similar concentration ratio, this alone can not explain market 
‘performance’.  It was reported by farmers that although competition has increased in 
recent years, the enterprises in Katahari and Naya bazaar remained larger
8
 and much 
better organised than those in Jhorahat and Tetariya.  Most of the Naya Bazaar and 
Katahari kahwala had been there for a much longer period, allowing them to build 
up strong collective ties over the decades.  Furthermore, most enterprises were 
permanent, while many of their counterparts in Jhorahat and Tetariya would come to 
set up their shops only during the harvest season.   
 
The evidence thus suggests that the greater permanence of the enterprises in Naya 
bazaar and Katahari and their long history of trade in the region has given traders a 
greater capacity for collective action such as collusion over prices.  There is therefore 
evidence that in the Naya bazaar and Katahari market region in particular, the high 
market concentration, immobility of capital and high level of organisation between 
the merchants facilitates collusive price formation.  This extraction of surplus 
through the market is likely to make it even more difficult for the ‘small farmers’ and 
poorer ‘medium farmers’ who farm predominantly under the semi-feudal relations of 
production and  sell on a distress basis, to meet the needs of simple reproduction.  It 
                                                 
8
 The average turnover in Naya Bazaar and Katahari was 12,703 quintals of grain in the last year as 
opposed to 9700 in Jhorahat and Tetariya. 
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also depresses the profit rates for wealthier ‘medium’ and ‘large’ farmers who 
cultivate under independent peasant relations of production.   
 
 
7.3.5 Price differences and class 
Class and bargaining power 
Despite the discrepancies outlined above, not all kahwala were prospering at the 
expense of farmers.  Some kahwala in both market regions claimed they bore a 
loss.  One merchant we met had stored some jute before selling it to the mill in 
anticipation of a price rise which never transpired and was then forced to sell it at a 
rate lower than what he bought it for.  Similarly, many farmers felt that they did have 
bargaining power and could shift between traders to maximise their profit while 
some kahwala even claimed that farmers had ‘cheated’ them.  It is thus clear that 
while on the one hand many farmers claim to have a lack of power in the market, 
some other farmers and merchants themselves feel that the local agricultural market 
is competitive and they receive a ‘fair’ price.  There appears therefore to be 
contradictory reports regarding the terms of trade between merchant capital and 
producers.   
 
The evidence above does suggest that merchants have some capacity to depress 
prices through collective mobilisation, taking advantage of the moderate levels of 
market concentration, particularly in Naya bazaar and Katahari.  However, Figure 
7-6 demonstrates considerable variation in the reported average price received by 
farmers in rural Morang for the 2007 harvest within each marketing region.  This 
implies that while many farmers appear to be offered an unfavourable price which is 
likely to yield the kahwala a surplus profit, many also get a much higher 
competitive rate, likely to yield the kahwala only a small profit9.   
                                                 
9
 Note that the prices reported by farmers will be lower than those reported by merchants Table 7-3 as 
it represents current prices, while the prices reported by farmers are from the previous season so 
unfortunately can not be compared. 
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Chapter 7: The dynamics of price formation and surplus appropriation through 
the market 
272 
The variations suggest that while the merchants may collude to fix some kind of 
‘maximum’ selling price, particularly in Naya bazaar, there is variation around this 
rate, with some farmers receiving a far lower price, and some obtaining a much 
higher price closer to what the merchants receive from the rice mills.  It is thus clear 
that there are a vast series of more complex mechanisms which determine whether 
merchants can yield a surplus profit at the expense of producers.  Understanding 
these processes require an analysis of individual relations of exchange in market 
transactions. 
 
To explain these divergences it is necessary to firstly categorise the price data in new 
ways.  Figure 7-7 examines the price received for knchi paddy again, but this time 
divides the data according to household category.  The most notable observation is 
that in the Jhorahat and Tetariya markets, the ‘large farmer’ households on the whole 
appear to report a more favourable price than the ‘medium farmers’ and the ‘small’ 
farmer households report the lowest price.  An indication of the level of variation can 
be observed when one notes that the bottom quartile of reported paddy prices within 
the small farmer category in Jhorahat market region ranges from Rs 6.75 per kg to Rs 
8.1, while the top quartile of prices recorded by large farmers in the region ranges 
from Rs 11.37 to Rs 12.5 per kg.  As one would expect, in the Naya bazaar and 
Katahari market region it appears the prices are lower across all farmer categories.  
This is understandable given the evidence that the Naya bazaar and Katahari 
merchants yield comparatively greater economic and organisational power to collude 
over prices.  Nevertheless, it appears that even here the prices vary according to 
farmer category.  The bottom quartile of prices reported by small farmers ranges 
between Rs 6.25 to Rs 6.8 per kg while the top quartile of ‘medium farmers’ earns 
between Rs 9.2 to 9.88 per kg.  Unexpectedly, the large farmers appear to have 
received a lower price.   However, the data gathered on large farmers in these two 
market regions is not reliable in estimating the role of economic status in determining 
bargaining power.  Only three ‘large farmers’ sampled from this market region had 
sold knchi paddy in the 2007 harvest, two of which were under exceptional 
circumstances.  These two households received a particularly low price as a result of 
them being heavily in debt to the merchants, an issue which will be explored below.  
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A larger sample is thus required for a more representative assessment of the ‘large’ 
farmers in this market region. 
 
The variations according to farmer category outlined so far point to weaknesses in 
the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm.  Harriss-White (1996) criticises the 
SCP approach, arguing that the measures of market structure traditionally used are 
insufficient in explaining the process of price formation.  The paradigm fails to 
analyse the specific power relations between exchange partners and how this impacts 
the process of price formation (Harriss-White, 1996).  The analysis of market 
structure offers initial and useful insights into the dynamics of price formation.  
However, in order to understand the variations in reported prices it is necessary to 
shift the approach back to political economy, and focus the analysis once again on 
the mode(s) of production.  
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This brings us to the second mechanism through which market prices are depressed 
by commercial capital, the bargaining power in relations between market actors.  To 
Marx, the relations of exchange, which represent just one ‘moment’ in the process of 
capital circulation, are intricately connected with the relations of production.  As 
Marx (1993. 99) in Grundrisse argues:  “Exchange in all its moments thus appears as 
either directly comprised in production or determined by it.” 
   
These thoughts are echoed by Bharadwaj (1985), who suggests that in much of rural 
South Asia, the terms of exchange between farmers and traders vary according to the 
type of market involvement, which in turn is rooted in their position in the rural class 
structure.  Large cultivators who enter the market with the incentive to achieve a 
profit have a much greater capacity to set the conditions of exchange on their own 
terms when they sell their produce.  Marginal producers on the other hand, many of 
whom commercialise on a distress basis, are often compelled to participate in the 
market on highly unfavourable terms of exchange (Bharadwaj, 1985).  The process 
through which the price is agreed between merchants and farmers therefore, varies 
according to the relative economic power relations between the two parties (Harriss-
White, 1996).  In the markets of Morang, this would suggest that while all farmers 
suffer to a degree from merchant price manipulations through collusion, poorer 
producers, many of whom are farming under semi-feudal relations of production, 
suffer disproportionately.   
 
This can explain why the price for paddy reported by producers in Jhorahat, 
Bhaudaha and Thalaha varies according to household category.  Many of the ‘small’ 
and even some ‘medium’ farmers do not enter the market to yield a profit, but on a 
compulsive basis to meet urgent cash needs.  As a result, discussions revealed that 
they suffer a much lower bargaining power.  Not only are they subject to surplus 
appropriation through rent, but the economic insecurity that ensues renders them 
vulnerable to further extraction of surplus through the pricing mechanism. 
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Although kahwala can appropriate a surplus profit from poorer farmers through 
outright deception, most farmers appeared quite aware that they were being offered a 
price far below the rate at which the mills buy from the merchants.  However, given 
these farmers’ often urgent needs for cash, they were obliged to accept that rate.  
Even if they move on to a different trader, poorer farmers remarked that they would 
probably still be offered the same low price. 
 
In contrast, the wealthier farmers who produce a secure saleable surplus, are 
generally viewed by kahwala as ‘valuable’ customers, given that they sell in large 
quantities each year, even out of season when business is scarce.  It was even 
remarked that merchants come to the house of such producers to see if they have any 
commodities to sell.  Wealthier producers can bargain with the merchants to a much 
greater extent (see Figure 7-8), shifting the economic power back to the farmer and 
reducing the difference between the merchant’s buying and selling price.   
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Poorer farmers however, not only have more urgent cash needs, but generally sell in 
small amounts and are thus not viewed as such ‘valuable’ customers by the 
kahwala.  Losing their custom due to overpricing therefore, was not considered 
such a ‘problem’, especially when other merchants follow similar practices.  There 
thus almost appears to be a dual pricing structure.  Merchants compete with each 
other for the custom of the larger producers, offering these farmers a more 
competitive price, while poorer producers are often forced to accept a price which 
has been depressed far below what the merchant is offered by the mills.  One 
medium farmer we spoke to argued that even if he sells paddy off-season when the 
price is highest, he still receives a rate below what many of the more prosperous 
farmers receive.  Another farmer reported frankly that “…if we sell greater 
quantities, and on regular basis then we might get a better price but if we sell less we 
get lower price.”  Oya (2001) observes similar processes in the Senegal groundnut 
sector, whereby traders discriminate in favour of producers with a high output when 
agreeing upon a price. 
 
It appears therefore that the merchants have two strategies for maximising the 
profitability of their firm.  Firstly, they can manipulate the price to maximise the rate 
of profit through small transactions with multiple poorer producers where the buying 
price is lowered.  Secondly, they simultaneously compete to gain the custom of the 
larger producers.  Although they can not necessarily increase the rate of profit given 
the greater bargaining power of these farmers, they can benefit from the generation 
of a greater mass of profit in a single transaction. 
Markets and Trust 
The processes through which merchants compete for the custom of wealthier 
producers include building up a long term trust based ‘relationship’ or sambhanda 
with such producers.  Many wealthier ‘medium farmers’ and ‘large farmers’ stated 
such ‘special’ relationships guaranteed them a more profitable price for their crops, 
while assuring the merchants that they would continue to sell to them.  A Tharu 
respondent we met from a ‘large farmer’ household spoke very warmly of a 
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particular kahwala, reporting that he had been trading with him for many years 
and had maintained a relationship which had spanned generations, having been 
cultivated by his father.   
 
As Figure 7-7 suggests, merchants still appear to offer a lower price on the whole in 
Naya Bazaar and Katahari to all farmer categories, most likely as a result of collusive 
activity.  Nevertheless, there is evidence that while a maximum selling price may be 
fixed by merchants, the greater bargaining power of larger producers as a result of 
their higher output and trust based ‘relationships’ means kahwala are often 
compelled to offer them prices well above this maximum.  A ‘large farmer’ we spoke 
to in Bhaudaha reported that although merchants in Naya Bazaar do collude to ‘fix’ 
the prices, exceptions can be made to those with whom they have a ‘special’ trading 
relationship: 
 
“Actually all the kahwala offer the same price.  There is no difference in the price 
on a given day between all the kahwala. Sometimes however, if the relationship 
between the farmer and the kahwala is good then the kahwala offers the farmer 
a better price … this is the secret of Business.” 
 
He went on to state that: 
 
“If they [the kahwala] have a good relationship with the farmers they give 10 
rupees more [per maund (40kg)] and they don’t tell this to any other farmers with 
whom they do not share this relation.  The farmers who have a good relationship sell 
again to the same kahwala. In this way it is good for them [the kahwala], as 
with more business they can make more money.  If they give ten rupees more the 
farmers do not go to other kahwala.” 
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To better understand how these relationships are reproduced on a long term basis, 
another short theoretical diversion is necessary into the field of New Institutional 
Economics.  A body of literature within this discipline has examined the role of 
informal ‘social institutions’ in improving the equity and efficiency of marketing 
systems (Gabre-Madhin, 2001;  Grabowski, 1998;  Granovetter, 1985;  Hayami & 
Kawagoe, 2001;  Platteau, 1994).  Development studies generally regards the term 
‘institution’, as the mechanisms of social regulation or ‘rules’ embedded within a 
society that govern co-operation between individuals (Hodgson, 1998;  Nabli & 
Nugent, 1989;  North, 1991).  North (1991) refers to institutions as “the humanly 
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction.”   
 
Formal institutions include concrete regulation mechanisms such as laws, 
constitutions and property rights.  Informal institutions are generally understood to 
include the more general constraints that regulate behaviour stemming from social 
norms, taboos and customs (North, 1991).  The development of informal institutions 
are normally understood in an evolutionary game theoretical framework whereby  
repeated transactions or “games” through time encourage ‘rational’ individuals to 
mutually develop norms and routines that maximise personal utility and harmonise 
the social order (Hodgson, 1998;  Kammersgand, 1999).   
 
In the context of market exchange, the risk of immoral behaviour, deception or 
‘cheating’ is always present, presenting a significant transaction cost
10
 for market 
actors (Gabre-Madhin, 2001;  Grabowski, 1998;  Nabli & Nugent, 1989).  As a 
consequence, mutually beneficial institutional mechanisms evolve through time 
through repeated transactions to reduce this risk of moral hazard (Grabowski 1998).  
Although formal institutions such as state laws can enforce contract rules, outside 
enforcement is not easy to implement, especially in less developed countries.  
Transactions in agricultural markets are small and buyers and sellers are often too 
poor to take court action in the case of a breach of contract (Fafchamps, 2002;  
                                                 
10
 Transaction costs are understood as being different from physical marketing costs such as 
production and transport expenses.  They refer to the costs of co-ordinating transactions between 
market actors. Transaction costs involve for example, the costs of negotiating and enforcing contracts 
and obtaining marketing information (Gabre-Madhin, 2001). 
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Chapter 7: The dynamics of price formation and surplus appropriation through 
the market 
279 
Platteau, 1994).  It is therefore informal institutions that are of particular interest to 
development policy makers (Grabowski 1998).   
 
Platteau (1994)  and Auitiero (2000) investigate the role of such institutions in rural 
agricultural markets.  Rules and moral norms termed by Platteau (1994) as 
“multilateral reputation mechanisms” are followed as actors seek to maintain their 
reputation in order to guarantee future transactions.  In Indonesia for example, 
Hayami and Kwagoe (2001) demonstrate how merchants buying farmers’ goods are 
compelled to act morally and offer a fair price.  If one was found to have bought 
goods below the market rate, the merchant’s reputation would be damaged and other 
farmers would avoid trading with them.  The social order in such situations is thus 
maintained spontaneously through ‘rational’ utility maximisation (Platteau, 1994).   
 
There is strong evidence of similar trust based mechanisms in rural Morang as 
kahwala endeavour to maintain the loyalty of particular producers.  Merchants 
make a strong effort to maintain a good reputation with the wealthier producers.  
This not only entails allowing the farmer to bargain for a higher price, but avoiding 
behaviour which could be considered ‘immoral’.  Although larger producers expect 
to receive a more favourable rate for their produce than their poorer counterparts, the 
risk of deception, whereby merchants exaggerate market conditions, is always 
present.  Merchants therefore balance short term gain with the maintenance of their 
relationship with the farmer in question.   
 
This process is exemplified by one transaction we observed on a hot afternoon during 
the chait paddy harvest.  My field assistant and I travelled with the sister and servant 
of a wealthy farmer with whom we were acquainted to a local kahwala to sell the 
recently threshed paddy.  Following the paddy being weighed, and considerable 
bargaining, the merchant insisted that the ‘market rate’ was 330 rupees per maund, 
while subtracting a kilogram from each sack to account for grain ‘drying’ en route to 
the mill.  Later that day, the farmer himself discovered that some nearby kahwala 
had been offering Rs 350 per maund.  He returned immediately to the merchant 
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where we had sold his paddy to complain, feeling we had been cheated.  Eventually 
the merchant agreed to pay back the difference in price as he wanted to maintain the 
farmer’s custom for future transactions, a situation facilitated by the comparative 
wealth of the household and their high agricultural output. 
 
For larger producers who farm predominantly under independent peasant relations of 
production; trust based institutions, along with their high annual sales, ensure that 
they receive a ‘fair’ price from the merchants.  However, whether or not these 
institutional norms operate is intricately connected with the class position of the 
farmer.  Poorer producers such as ‘small’ and many ‘medium’ farmer households 
who mostly cultivate under semi-feudal relations of production are not viewed as 
‘valuable’ clients given their lower sales.  Notions of ‘trust’ and moral norms appear 
somewhat meaningless for these sellers.  This point is of increased importance given 
that there is much interest in ‘trust’ based social associations in development policy 
given their compatibility with the neo-liberal ideologies of ‘social capital’ which will 
be discussed in chapter 8 (Narayan, 1997;  Putnam, 1993;  World Bank, 2003).  
However, just as discourses of ‘social capital’ are flawed given their tendency to 
divert attention from class relations, a similar argument can be placed against 
institutional theories of trust.  Bardhan (1989) argues that new institutional norms do 
not necessarily materialise if they reduce the control of surplus by a particular class.   
Class, grain security and seasonal price fluctuations 
Another factor associated with one’s class position relates to the seasonal variations 
in price.  Competitive market prices fluctuate on a seasonal basis, being lowest 
immediately after the harvest, while rising gradually in subsequent months as supply 
decreases, only to drop again at the next harvest.  By storing grain and selling it in 
the season when prices are higher, farmers can yield a much greater profit.  The 
timing of crop sales are unlikely to significantly alter the average reported prices for 
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knchi paddy in Figure 7-7
11
, but it is likely to impact the overall rate of profit from a 
given harvest. 
 
Figure 7-9:  A raised grain larder.  These are typical in Tharu villages and can be used to store 




Most farmers sell some grain immediately after the harvest and sell again at various 
stages later in the year.  Nevertheless, the wealthier producers sell a much greater 
proportion of their grain when the price is higher.  Those households with grain 
security such as ‘large farmers’ and some wealthier ‘medium farmers’ who farm 
predominantly under independent peasant relations of production store much of their 
surplus grain product in raised, mud built larders in their homesteads (see Figure 
7-9).  They then sell it on to the kahwala several months later when the price is at 
its peak, giving them a greater net profit.  As one wealthy Tharu farmer explained:  
 
                                                 
11
 The average reported price represents the difference between the reported lowest price (normally 
straight after harvest) and the highest price (normally later in the year).  Given that farmers generally 
sell some grain in both seasons, the timing of sales will only affect the average price if a farmer sells 
only in one season. 
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“ If we need money then we sell it [the paddy] immediately otherwise we sell later on 
… sometimes in Jestha or Ashadh
12
 as we might get a better price.  This year I sold it 
at 400 rupees during the [harvest] season while a few days ago I sold for 600 
rupees.” 
 
Poorer producers such as those from ‘small farmer’ households must sell a far greater 
proportion of their grain immediately after the harvest to meet urgent cash needs, 
buying grain later at a higher price for consumption.  They therefore can not take 
advantage of seasonal price fluctuations.   
Interlinked markets 
While it has been established that merchant’s can manipulate prices through 
collusive activity and take advantage of those with a weaker bargaining power, there 
are other more direct mechanisms through which this can occur, maximising the 
share of surplus which is appropriated.  Friedman (1980) suggests that in pre-
capitalist peasant economies, ‘naked monopoly’ by traders is difficult to enforce on 
its own in the long run and therefore debt can be used to enforce sales below market 
rate.  As was discussed in chapter 6, kahwala are not simply engaged in buying 
and selling commodities but are the primary source of credit for farmers, as Figure 6-
6 displays.  This represents an interlinkage of commercial and ‘interest bearing 
capital’, better described as ‘usury capital’ under pre-capitalist conditions.  As 
chapter 6 also suggests, poorer farmers are most dependent upon loans, and are often 
trapped into an endless cycle of indebtedness, taking credit from the kahwala each 
season to purchase inputs, only to repay them in crop at the harvest time, as one 
interviewee from Jhorahat reported:  
 
“The farmers who have little income have to take a loan. The loan is taken when the 
crop is planted and when the crop is ready we repay the loan.  After paying the 
                                                 
12
 Jestha (May-June) and Ashadh (June-July) are Nepalese months half a year after the rice harvest 
when the price is at its highest. 
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entire loan the farmers are empty handed so they have to take a loan again and start 
farming. 
 
There is evidence however that farmers who have taken loans from kahwala 
receive a de facto lower price for their commodities when debt is settled through 
grain sales.  Firstly, given that interest accumulates each month the loan is 
outstanding, farmers who have taken loans must sell immediately after the harvest.  
They can not therefore take advantage of seasonal variations in the price, as was 
discussed above.   Secondly and most significantly is how the interlinkage of interest 
bearing and commercial capital enhances the kahwalas’ power to manipulate 
prices and further depress bargaining power.  
 
Studies by Crow and Murshid (1994) in Bangladesh and Harriss-White (1996) in 
Tamil Nadu have examined the phenomena of interlinked contracts.  Crow and 
Murshid (1994) demonstrate how merchants increase their local power by achieving 
dominance in markets for land and credit.  By taking credit from merchants in 
advance, farmers are compelled to sell their produce to the same buyer at a price far 
below the competitive market rate (Crow & Murshid, 1994).  Similar processes are 
evident in rural Morang. During a discussion with a group of farmers in Bhaudaha 
they explained the situation in the Naya Bazaar market: 
 
“If we have not taken a loan and have good quality crops, they [the kahwalas] 
provide us a good price. However, if we have taken a loan then we are not provided 
with a good price even if we have good quality goods ... We take in accordance to 
our needs, on average 5 to 6 thousand rupees for one bigh. We borrow money from 
the merchants for fertilizers, pesticides and labourers also.” 
 
Those who have taken loans in the planting season must sell their grain to a 
particular merchant to repay an equivalent in grain to what was borrowed in cash.  A 
price for a borrowers crop is sometimes fixed in advance at the time the loan is taken 
(as in Crow and Murshid’s study), but normally it is agreed upon after the harvest 
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during repayment.  Either way, the farmer’s bargaining power remains low.  Given 
their lack of choice, the price at which repayment in grain is calculated is often 
depressed to abnormally low levels on top of the deductions already made as interest 
on the loan.  This process of price formation to Bhaduri (1973) represents an 
additional form of ‘concealed’ interest.  A respondent from a ‘large farmer’ 
household, also in Bhaudaha explained this process: 
 
“If you have taken a loan from the kahwalas then you are compelled to sell to the 
same kahwala as you have to repay the loan, even if the price is low.  In this case 
the kahwala has the power.  However if the farmer has not taken the loan then he 
can sell the crops to a different kahwala where he can get better price, so in this 
case the farmers will have the power.” 
 
Interestingly even the ‘large farmers’ and wealthier ‘medium farmers’ are not exempt 
from such price manipulations, further limiting the profitability of grain sales.  The 
two large farmers who have sold knchi paddy in Bhaudaha in Figure 7-7 had both 
taken substantial long overdue loans which had reduced their bargaining power, 
explaining the low price they had received.  Nevertheless, it still appears to be the 
poorer households who suffer from the greatest price manipulations.  Many of these 
producers already suffer chronic grain insecurity as a result of semi-feudal rent 
payments.  Loans therefore generally comprise of a much larger portion of their total 
agricultural sales and on many occasions their only market involvement is to settle 
debts with the kahwala.  For 54% of small farmers, loan repayment constitutes 
more than half of their total sales in the last year, and for 45% it absorbs their entire 
income from crop sales.  This figure stands at 44% and 11% respectively for medium 
farmers.  For all large farmers however, loans constitute less than half of their total 
annual sales.   
 
As one would expect however, more prosperous producers do not feel quite so bound 
to sell the remainder of their paddy crop to a particular merchant.  This offers an 
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insight into why the top quartile in Figure 7-10 for whom loan repayments constitute 
less than 25% of their total agricultural income receive a much higher price.  The 
value of loans are small compared to their annual agricultural income and thus a 
large portion of the crop can be sold elsewhere at a better rate, explaining why their 
average reported price is higher.  Furthermore, as these households are wealthier they 
are less reliant upon credit from kahwalas, and only take loans occasionally.   
 
Figure 7-10: Average price received for knchi paddy in the last year according to % of 
agricultural income comprising of pre-harvest loan repayments 
 
Loan is 76%-100% of 
total agricultural income 
Loan is 51-75% of total 
agricultural income 
Loan is 26-50% of total 
agricultural income 
Loan is 0-25% of total 
agricultural income 


































































Figure 7-10 displays the average reported price received for knchi paddy in the 
2007 season once again, but this time divides the results into quartiles according to 
the percentage of total agricultural income which constituted loan repayment over the 
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 





.  As one would expect from the discussion, the lowest prices were 
reported by those (primarily poorer producers) for whom loan repayments constitute 
more than three quarters of their annual income.  For this bottom quartile, most if not 
all of their harvest must be sold to the same merchant.  They had reported on average 
only Rs 8.09 per kg, with a maximum of just Rs 8.75 per kg and a minimum of only 
Rs 6.25.  On the other hand, the top quartile, for whom loan repayments comprise 
only 0-25% of the total agricultural income receive on average Rs 10.18 per kg for 
knchi paddy with a maximum of Rs 12.13, equivalent to the highest price received 
by many large farmers in Figure 7-7.  Meanwhile for households that fall into the 
middle two quartiles whereby loans constitute 26-50% and 51%-75% of their total 
agricultural sales the average price received is Rs 8.66, and Rs 9.06 respectively.   
 
The depressed price for knchi paddy for the middle two quartiles is surprising.  
Exactly half of the households falling into these two quartiles have over the last year 
sold knchi paddy only to service their debt to kahwalas, explaining the low 
reported prices. However, the remaining half sold more knchi paddy than was 
required to repay their loans, or repaid using a different crop.   One may question 
whether this group can sell the remainder of their crop elsewhere for a better price, 
raising the reported average price.  Although this occurred on some occasions, most 
loan taking farmers maintained that they would sell any excess to the same merchant, 
even at the same low price.  In this way they could be sure they would still be offered 
credit next year.  Their bargaining power therefore remains diminished.  Harriss-
White (1996, 204) observes similar ‘non-contractual’ elements in interlinked credit 
and cotton markets in Tamil Nadu, whereby  producers feel an obligation to sell the 
entire marketed surplus to the creditor to secure future contracts.  When we asked 
one male farmer if he could sell any remaining paddy to a different merchant for a 
better price once the debt had been settled, he replied as follows: 
 
                                                 
13
 The prices are for the 2007 season, while the data on the proportion of agricultural income 
comprising of loan repayments is for the last agricultural year, which for the first batch of surveys was 
2007, while for the second batch was 2008.  This discrepancy should not present any serious data 
validity limitations, as there appeared to be considerable regularity over the size of loans taken each 
year. 
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“Yes, if we get a better price we can go to different merchant but we normally don’t 
do that so as to maintain a good relationship …  The relationship will be bad [if we 
don’t sell to the same merchant] and they won’t help the farmers next time with a 
loan when they need it. 
 
Similarly, one ‘medium farmer’ explained the need to maintain a trust based 
relationship through continued trade with the kahwalas. 
 
“The main thing is trust. If you do business with the same person then you can ask 
for a loan when you are in need. If you do not do business with the same person then 
you do not get help when in need as they [the kahwala] do not trust us. Therefore 
we have to do business with the same person.” 
 
Throughout our discussions with less prosperous farmers, they spoke of the need to 
maintain a ‘relationship’ with a particular merchant.  From the merchants perspective 
if is useful for them to lend to farmers they are familiar with as they have a better 
knowledge of their likelihood to repay the loan.  However, it appears that the 
merchants use the risk of default to justify threats that they will not give loans at all, 
even to farmers with a long history of trading with them.  This in turn ensures the 
farmer sells them their entire crop, even at a depressed price, informally tying them 
into an unequal relation of exchange.   
 
This institutionalised dependence also explains why centrally located producers in 
Thalaha and Bhaudaha who could just as easily travel to either market region have a 
tendency to prefer Naya bazaar.  The system of lending is more institutionalised in 
Naya bazaar and Katahari, perhaps given that they are more established markets and 
the merchants are wealthier, with capital to lend.  Many households therefore have 
built up relations with particular merchants there to receive credit.  Even though the 
less organised merchants of Jhorahat tend to offer a more favourable price, they do 
not have a ‘relationship’ with them and thus find it difficult to access credit.  They 
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therefore prefer to sell in Naya bazaar or Katahari, even if it involves a longer 
journey. 
 
This notion of a ‘trusting relationship’ for poorer producers is interesting, as although 
on the surface it appears similar to the mutually beneficial relations maintained 
between wealthier producers and kahwalas, in reality it is highly unequal.  The 
relationship is often framed in benevolent terms; with farmers stating that the 
merchant is doing them a ‘favour’ by giving them a loan and that they must 
endeavour not to lose the traders goodwill.  However, it appears closer to a patron-
client relationship, an ideological mechanism which effectively disguises and 
reproduces an exploitative form of exchange (see Rankin, 2004).   
 
As one would expect however, more prosperous producers do not feel quite so bound 
to sell the remainder of their paddy crop to a particular merchant.  This offers an 
insight into why the top quartile in Figure 7-10 for whom loan repayments constitute 
less than 25% of their total agricultural income receive a much higher price.  The 
value of loans are small compared to their annual agricultural income and thus a 
large portion of the crop can be sold elsewhere at a better rate.  Furthermore, as these 
households are wealthier they are less reliant upon credit from kahwalas and only 
take loans occasionally.   
 
Even the sales by wealthier farmers which are made to repay loans do not necessarily 
fetch a low price.  In line with the argument above regarding ‘valuable’ customers, it 
is evident that many of these wealthier households retain a sizeable surplus after 
repaying loans.  The kahwalas have an interest in buying this surplus.  It is 
therefore not always in their best interest to depress the price.  They are after all 
endeavouring to maintain a long term trading relationships with these producers, at 
least in the Jhorahat and Tetariya region where the merchants’ market power appears 
to be lower.  However, the low price received by the two ‘large farmers’ from the 
Naya Bazaar market region suggest that in this context, the sheer market power 
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yielded by indebtedness and oligopsonistic collusion outweigh any personalised ties 
the merchants may have with these producers. 
 
In sum, three factors thus influence the price offered to farmers by merchant capital.  
These include collusive activities by merchants, the economic status of the farmer in 
question and the associated interlinkage of interest bearing and commercial capital.  
A model which is outlined in Appendix 7 tests the relationship between these three 
explanatory variables and finds that they all play a statistically significant role in 
determining the price each household receives from the kahwalas for paddy. 
 
7.3.6 Interest bearing capital, oligopoly and bargaining power 
 
The focus so far has been on the ‘commercial’ element of merchant capital.  It is now 
necessary to examine interest bearing capital in greater detail.  It has been 
demonstrated how many farmers depend upon credit from private lenders and when 
loans are interlinked with commercial capital, farmers are subject to greater price 
manipulations.  However, how does one understand the actual interest rates on loans?  
These include interest on not only the loans from the kahwalas, but on those taken 
from village money lenders which were discussed in chapter 6.   
 
As with prices for commodities, the farmers who borrow money from village money 
lenders and kahwalas are subject to interest rates determined not by ‘competitive’ 
market forces but by power relations rooted once again in oligopsony and the 
unequal bargaining positions between market actors.  To begin, there is some 
evidence in Morang that the control over informal credit markets by a small number 
of businesspeople drives up rates of interest.  Farmers felt they had little choice of 
lender.  Interest rates never appeared to drop below 2% per month, suggesting a 
minimum rate has been ‘fixed’ by lenders.  Hatlebakk (2009) identifies interesting 
findings based  upon LSMS data, including many villages in Morang.  The study 
suggests that high initial information costs hinder the entry of new lenders, pointing 
once again to an immobility of capital and the potential for collusive oligopsony. 
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 




Hatlebakk (2009) concludes that interest rates decrease according to the lending 
capacity of the village, suggesting there is decreased collusion when competition is  
higher.  However, it is argued that the greatest differences in interest rates occur 
within villages themselves.  This suggests a form of ‘fragmented oligopoly’, whereby 
lenders collude on an interest rate for different segments of the market (Hatlebakk, 
2009).  Similarly, the evidence from Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha suggests that 
as with commodity prices, interest rates are determined simultaneously by the 
bargaining power between market actors, which in turn is rooted in one’s class 
position.  Interest rates are usually around 3% per month the loan is outstanding.  
However, if a kahwala feels he has a ‘good relationship’ with a particular farmer, 
it appears they charge farmers a lower interest rate.  In some cases they waive the 
interest all together so long as the loan is repaid quickly, a process we observed 
while conducting participant observation in a kahwala’s shop in Naya Bazaar.  
However, these special lending relationships, as with favourable prices, appeared to 
benefit primarily the wealthier producers whose patronage is valued by the 
merchants.  One ‘large farmer’ from Bhaudaha explained how the interest rate 
depends upon the relationship one has with the merchant: 
 
“The kahwala sometimes even doesn’t charge the interest to the old farmers who 
have good relationship who they trust, so when buying the crops they charge lower 
interest.  However, when they have to lend to new farmers they charge 10 to 12 
percent interest.  
 
Although 10-12% appears to be an exaggerated monthly rate, the general trend is 
evident.  When I asked how farmers are able to build such a relationship, the 
respondent replied:  
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“It’s difficult. If you sell your crops this year and again next year to the same 
kahwala then the relationship starts.  For small farmers who produce smaller 
quantities it is difficult to have a relationship with the kahwalas”. 
 
One merchant we interviewed even admitted that if a farmer appears ‘desperate’ for 
cash they will ask for a higher rate of interest, normally 5%.  The compulsion to take 
loans at higher interest is particularly acute for landless farmers who can not even 
leave collateral such as land to guarantee credit.  High interest rates however, are 
sometimes even charged to some of the merchant’s ‘special’ clients if they need 
money urgently, as the following quote by a ‘large farmer’ suggests: 
 
“It [the interest rate] is 3 to 5 percent.  If the farmer has a good relationship it is 3 
percent while others are charged 5 percent.  However, if farmers need money 
immediately even the familiar farmers are charged five percent … If anyone is sick 
or if we need money then we tell [the merchant] our problems. At that time the 
merchant tells us that he does not have money. He tells us that if we give him more 
interest than he will get the money from others and then lend to us.  So in this way 
they increase the interest rate.” 
 
However, as has been stressed throughout this section, the wealthier producers do 
maintain a much greater capacity to negotiate, as merchants balance out short term 
profit with maintaining long term custom.  The same ‘large farmer’ explained what 
happened on one occasion when the merchant with whom he had traded for many 
years refused to give him a loan: 
 
“During that time we were in need of money to harvest the crop in the field.  
However, we asked [the merchant] for money and they would not provide it to us.  
We became angry and told him that we would not sell any crops to him.  We even 
threatened him that we would blast one bomb in his shop!  But after two or three 
months that kahwala came to our house and said sorry that he did not provide us 
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money.  He asked us not to stop selling to him.  He wanted us to again go and sell the 
crops to him.  He wanted to maintain the relationship with us.” 
 
The threats of violence can be understood in the context of political violence and 
unrest in the Terai following the end of the People’s War and beginning of the 
Madeshi andolan.  Although these threats were not expressed in a serious manner, 
the merchant still appeared to submit to the will of the farmer to a level which would 
have been difficult to conceive of poorer producers achieving.   
 
 
7.3.7 Role of merchant capital and the mode of production 
 
To Kautsky and Marx, merchant capital can play a ‘progressive’ role in the transition 
from pre-capitalist to capitalist agriculture.  Merchants’ commercial activities 
facilitate the emergence of commodity production, while money lending and 
indebtedness speed up the process of differentiation and development of a proletariat.  
However, in the context of high pre-capitalist ground rent and an underdeveloped 
industrial sector, the pricing system imposed by merchant capital for both 
commodities and loans by no means encourages ‘differentiation’.  Given the lack of 
alternative livelihood options for tenants which could draw people out of agriculture, 
it simply has the effect of forcing some farmers into further economic insecurity.  It 
represents a further form of surplus appropriation which reproduces the 
impoverishment of a vast segment of the rural population. 
 
One avenue for further analysis however, is to examine whether merchant capital can 
play a beneficial role in the broader process of capitalist development if the profits 
are re-invested productively.  To Marx however, merchant activities are 
predominantly parasitic.  This is backed up by initial evidence from the field which 
suggests that merchants rarely diversify out of agro-trading and the profits are used 
primarily for consumption purposes and expanding their trade and money lending 
capabilities rather than for productive reinvestment in industrial ventures.  It thus 
essentially represents a flow of surplus out of the agricultural sector that does not 
‘reappear’ elsewhere in the economy.   
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Surplus appropriation by merchant capital in this context is not directly part of the 
semi-feudal mode of production as it exists primarily in the sphere of circulation, 
unlike in Bhaduri’s (1973) analysis of semi-feudalism in India, whereby merchants 
are also the landlords and use indebtedness to reproduce the relations of production. 
As was suggested in chapter 6, landlords and money lenders in Morang are from 
different caste communities and engage in quite different economic activities.  
However, merchant activities can be considered an extension of each of the modes of 
production in Morang in so far as they are necessary for the reproduction of the 
productive forces for all farming households.  Furthermore, merchant activities are 
arguable driven by similar imperatives as landlords whereby surplus is appropriated 
for elite consumption rather than productive investment.  Merchant capital can even 
be argued to play a role reproducing and even reinforcing semi-feudal relations of 
production.  High interest and price manipulation further reinforces households’ 
dependence upon not only merchants but landlords.  It drives up the rate of 
indebtedness and drives those households who do still retain some land to sell their 
assets and become tenants. 
 
 
7.4 Oligopsony by industrial capital and articulation of modes 
of production? 
 
7.4.1 Oligopoly and oligopsony in agricultural industries 
 
It is not only merchant capital which can manipulate prices to receive high rates of 
profit at the expense of producers.  There is evidence of such processes occurring 
further up the commodity chain in the circuit of industrial capital whereby mills 
purchase grain from the kahwalas and sell it in processed form.  In the relations of 
exchange between the mills and merchants, the mill owners can use their control 
over markets for unprocessed grain to enforce sales of products below the prevailing 
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market rate.  This further depresses the collusive price already offered to farmers 
alongside the further manipulations on the grounds of individual bargaining power.   
 
This increases profits for processing mills, facilitating a supply of cheap raw 
materials at the expense of producers.  This is significant as it points to another 
‘articulation’ between the pre-capitalist and capitalist mode of production.  It 
represents an additional transfer of surplus between the two sectors alongside the 
supply of subsidised labour provided by semi-proletarian producers.  This can offer 
some insights into why many  ‘large farmer’ household respondents, although 
subjected to less surplus appropriation through rent, usury and price manipulations, 
still felt that their returns were falling and agriculture was becoming less profitable.  
It can also help to explain why the many ‘medium farmers’ who own all of their land 
and have access to institutional credit are still unable to yield a large enough profit to 
expand their landholdings or invest in machinery. 
 
Collusion on prices in agricultural processing industries represent one mechanism 
through which capitalist firms can depress market buying rates for commodities 
(Banerji, 2004;  Palaskas & Harriss-White, 1993).  In the context of Morang, it has 
been suggested that a form of oligopsony exists in the industries which process 
paddy, wheat and jute.    Unfortunately, it is difficult to access data on agricultural 
industries, making a full Structure-Conduct-Performance analysis to identify the 
potential for oligopsonistic activity problematic.  Nevertheless, some insights into the 
structure of the market for agricultural raw materials as a whole can be gained 
through an examination of the category ‘food product and beverage industries’ 
(which includes grain processing) in the 2006/7 Nepal Census of Manufacturing 
Establishments (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008).  The data format precludes an 
analysis of the proportion of trade controlled by the top 4 firms.  However the census 
does contain useful data on the volume of inputs purchased by these industries 
according to the level of assets invested in each enterprise.  Although the inputs to 
food product and beverage industries are likely to include non-agricultural products 
as well, one would expect inputs to be predominantly composed of agricultural raw 
materials such as grain. 
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Table 7-4: Structure of input market for food product and beverage industries in Morang and 
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Morang 49 912,973 12 801,363 7 1,916,446 68% 68 3,630,812 
Sunsari 74 1,688,767 8 472,613 4 2,729,115 50% 86 4,890,495 
Total 123 2,601,740 20 1,273,976 11 4,645,561 84% 155 8,521,307 
Source: Census of Manufacturing Establishments, Nepal , 2006/7 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008)  
  
In Table 7-4 it is evident that 7 food product industries in Morang have assets worth 
over 10 crore (10,000,000) representing 10% of the total.  These seven top firms 
control 68% of the market for inputs.  In neighbouring Sunsari district where many 
merchants also sell their grain there are 4 industries with assets worth over 10 crore, 
representing 5% of the total number of enterprises.  These top four firms control 50% 
of the market for inputs.  The data for both districts suggest that the input market for 
food and beverage industries is highly concentrated amongst a few large firms.  As 
with the kahwalas at a village level, this would certainly suggest the potential for 
collusive activity. 
 
The process of price formation is complex.  Merchants or kahwalas who buy grain 
from the farmers and sell to the mills generally agree on a price through a broker.  
Merchants explained how they would call once or twice each day to enquire about 
different prices being offered by the mills, and when they want to make a transaction, 
the broker would finalise the deal between both parties in return for a small share of 
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Figure 7-11: Grain being loaded at a kahwala shop near Naya Bazaar.  The price for a 




From our discussion with farmers and merchants however, it was suggested that the 
negotiation process is not necessarily equal.  Business organisations such as the 
Morang Byapaar Sangh produce daily recommended price lists for different products 
based upon current market conditions for the reference of mill owners and 
merchants.  However, there were many complaints by both farmers and traders that 
the prices offered to them were determined not just by external market forces but 
also by the personal collusion of the mill owners.  It was alleged that agricultural mill 
owners operate in a oligopsonistic manner, colluding with each other to fix a 
maximum buying price below the competitive market rate.  The industrial 
community of Morang who run the few agricultural processing mills in the district 
are primarily from a well connected Marwari business community who settled in 
Nepal over the last fifty years.  The kahwalas explained that they have little choice 
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often, but to sell at a reduced price.   The following quote illustrates the frustration 
felt by one merchant towards the mill operators: 
 
“I take the goods to the mill and I have to sell my goods at whatever price they offer 
me.  I have no other option. I am compelled to sell. The price here is fixed by most of 
these big businessmen, a monopoly exists.” 
 
Many also reported cheating in the processing mills once the price has already been 
agreed.  Mill operators would sometimes claim that the rice was ‘poor quality’ or had 
‘dust’ in it, and thus would subtract some kilograms from the total sale when 
calculating the re-payment.   
 
It was suggested that price manipulation also occurs in the distribution of grain 
whereby the processed rice is sold back to local retailers at an inflated price through 
practices such as ‘hoarding’.  One farmer explained the situation:     
 
There are many mill owners from other countries and they fix price in their favour, 
then the profit they earn is taken back to their country. They should be punished as 
they do whatever they want. They buy the crops and then create an artificial 
shortage, then they fix a higher price and sell the rice back to the villagers. In this 
case farmers sell their crops in a cheap price but buy at a higher rate. 
 
Here the respondent is most likely referring to Indian citizens who run many of the 
mills.  He also emphasises that farmers are compelled to pay more for processed rice 
but sell their own grain at an unfavourable rate.  High prices for processed rice are of 
course most likely to impact the ‘small farmer’ and ‘landless labourer’ households 
who can not meet their subsistence needs through their land and are thus obliged to 
buy grain staples from local retailers.  The surplus profits meanwhile which are 
generated through price manipulation are appropriated by the mill owners. 
 
Of course, it is difficult to prove whether or not cartels and price manipulation do 
exist based purely upon oral testimonies by farmers and local businessmen.  In the 
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few interactions I had with mill owners I was treated with suspicion and was unable 
to gather much information on the process of price formation.  Nevertheless, 
Gautam’s (2005) report for the Ministry of Local Development points out that ‘anti-
competitive’ practices such as collusion over prices and cartels are widespread in 
Nepal, suggesting that they are facilitated by business and trade societies
14
.  This 
stimulated the government to draft a ‘Fair Competition Bill’ in 2004.  The problem 
of cartel formation in agricultural processing industries more specifically is raised in 
Nepal’s 2004/2005 economic survey (Nepal Ministry of Finance, 2006).  With 
regards to the ‘hoarding’ of commodities, this was discussed in Nepal’s post-conflict 
Three Year Interim Plan as one of the problems which must be dealt with by the new 
government (Nepal National Planning Commission, 2007), while a number of reports 
have noted that such practices are widespread (Gautam, 2005;  Sedhain, 2005;  
World Food Program, 2008a)
15
.   
 
 
7.5 The state and distribution of surplus 
 
7.5.1 Impact of cheaper Indian grain on Nepalese market prices 
 
It has been established that class power exercised by merchant and industrial capital 
has facilitated an appropriation of a large portion of the saleable surplus through the 
pricing mechanism.  However, there is evidence that the unfavourable production 
conditions in Nepal when compared to India have served to further depress prices.  
This offers additional insights into why even wealthier producers farming under the 
independent peasant mode of production are finding agriculture less profitable. 
 
Discounting manipulations by merchant and industrial capital, the ‘competitive’ 
market price for rice, wheat and jute, the main commodities sold in Jhorahat, 
                                                 
14
 This would parallel Harriss-White’s (2005) findings that suggest elite business associations in 
Tamil Nadu can be used to increase rates of profit at the expense of small producers and labourers by 
colluding to fix prices and wages.   
15
 What is unclear though is whether or not this is practiced by industries themselves, or distribution 
companies.  Sedhain (2005) suggests that a large supply of rice, flour, oils and sugar distribution in 
Nepal is controlled by a small number of powerful business houses.  Sedhain points to the lack of an 
adequate competition law in Nepal. 
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Bhaudaha and Thalaha, is determined by the rate being offered by the processing 
mills, which is in turn associated with the wholesale and retail price for processed 
grain and jute products in Biratnagar and Kathmandu.  Biratnagar lies on an open 
border with India and both legal and illegal imports of processed and unprocessed 
agricultural commodities across the border are widespread and have intensified since 
liberalisation.  This has been perpetuated by a continued deficit of staples in Nepal.  
As of 2002 it was estimated that 9.6% of the rice in the country was imported from 
India (Sharma & Babu, 2002).  As of 2006/07, imports continued as Nepal’s grain 
deficit stood at 200,000 megatons (World Food Program, 2008b).  Although there are 
still differences in prices between regions, commodity prices in Nepal are heavily 
influenced by those to the south, not to mention global fluctuations.  These 
influences are particularly high in the border towns such as Biratnagar.  Shifts in 
price due to imports are transmitted back to the farmers, impacting the price they 
receive for their commodities at the farm gate (Sharma & Babu, 2002;  World Food 
Program, 2008b).  The APP Implementation Status Report raises this issue, reporting 
that the average retail price for rice in India is on average 12% lower than in Nepal, 
and when it is imported it to depresses the local rate.  Although cheaper grain 
benefits landless labourers, it has a negative impact upon those who sell grain (IDL 
Group, 2006, 65).   
 
In interviews with farmers, grain merchants and local government officials, the 
import of rice from the South was a cause of considerable concern.  Even large 
farmers felt they could simply not give away their crop at the rates the Indian grain 
was selling for and yield a profit able to facilitate accumulation.  A ban on non-
Basmati rice exports in India in 2008 as a result of grain shortages caused some relief 
for local farmers.  Even with the differences in price, the situation for Terai farmers 
is aggravated even further during occasional ‘import surges’ from India such as in 
2000, when imports rose by 800% during a de-stocking of public grain reserves by 
the Food Corporation of India (Action Aid, 2008).  This caused a 17% drop in grain 
prices in the Terai districts to the disadvantage of local farmers (Action Aid, 2008).   
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7.5.2 State weaknesses, productivity and market prices 
 
It is challenging to understand the complex root cause for the lower average price of 
Indian grain and why Morang’s farmers feel they can not compete.  However, there 
are some possibilities which would merit further study.  As was discussed in chapter 
2, Nepal is far from establishing a developmentalist state which can guide national 
capitalist development.  This is arguably associated with the limited development of 
a national bourgeoisie committed to state led development and a bureaucracy 
predominantly serving the interests of comprador classes in alliance with Indian and 
foreign capital and landlords (Blaikie et al., 2001;  Mishra, 2007).  Although the 
Indian beuraucratic alliance is not altogether different in the interests it serves 
(Ghosh, 1988), India has historically maintained a stronger interventionist state that 
can stimulate capitalist development.  Although also subject to severe cut backs 
under neo-liberal restructuring (see Patnaik, 2007).  India’s stronger political position 
within the world economy has offered it comparatively greater control over its 
economic policy.  Nepal on the other hand has been subject to greater coercion by 
international financiers from the imperialist core.  As was discussed in chapter 3, the 
pressure to reduce fiscal deficits has led to the abolition of subsidies and cut backs on 
agricultural service provision.  These cross border differences it will be 
demonstrated, impact the price received for commodities by producers in Nepal, thus 
further reducing the profitability of agriculture. 
 
This occurs firstly, as a result of weaknesses in agricultural service provision, and the 
resulting impact upon productivity.  As was discussed in chapter 3, many of the 
‘priority inputs’ promoted in the APP were not sufficiently implemented.  
Meanwhile, there have been cut-backs on agricultural services such as extension 
since the liberalisation of the economy, issues which will be further discussed in 
chapter 8.  There is evidence that such weaknesses have impeded profit oriented 
farmers from boosting production to levels comparative to their counterparts south of 
the border who enjoy greater levels of state support. 
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What therefore is the relevance of these regional differences for market prices?  A 
classical Marxian approach would expect prices to be associated with the average 
levels of productivity across the economy both in agriculture and processing, while 
fluctuating in the short term according to shifts in demand from consumers.  Under 
abstract competitive capitalist conditions, Marx uses the concept of ‘prices of 
production’, which was touched upon in chapter 6, to explain market rates.  The 
prices of production is determined by the sum of the value of labour power (value of 
necessary labour) plus the value of the means of production, and an average rate of 
profit (Marx, 1967, 165).  The ‘average rate of profit’ is significant in that although 
the rate of profit may in the first instance differ between enterprises in a branch of 
production, Marx (1967, 158) emphasises that they are “equalised by competition”.  
As was discussed with regards to industry, if an enterprise increases the productivity 
of labour above the society wide average, less labour hours are required to produce a 
given commodity.  This allows a greater proportion of surplus value to be produced 
on a relative basis.  As the market price still reflects the average level of productivity, 
a surplus profit is realised.  However, competition within branches of production 
ensures that each enterprise seeks to enhance their productivity to match the other 
firms’ surplus profits for the given commodity (Marx, 1967, 197-198).  The increase 
in supply results in the market price falling towards a new value, resulting in an 
equalisation in the rate of profit to an economy wide average.   
 
Marx himself never intended to be able to ‘measure’ the economy wide ‘prices of 
production’, which remains an abstract concept.  Furthermore, under the pre-
capitalist conditions of rural Morang where many farms are not driven by profit and 
are subject to multiple forms of surplus appropriation through production and 
exchange, it is of limited relevance in understanding the price they receive for their 
commodities.  Nevertheless, the dynamics of productivity differences and profit rates 
may be of some relevance to those few ‘large’ and wealthier ‘medium’ farmers who 
are independent peasant producers, subject to lower levels of surplus appropriation 
by rent and merchant capital, and who sell with a profit incentive.   
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Although data on agricultural productivity is difficult to verify, the World Food 
Program (2008b) estimates that Nepal has the lowest rice and wheat yield in South 
Asia.  Table 7-5 demonstrates how according to Asian Development Bank statistics, 
Nepal lags behind India in terms of per hectare yields of paddy and as of 2000, 
average yields stood at 2600 kg/ha in Nepal and 3008 kg/ha in India, a difference of 
around 16%. 
 
Table 7-5: Per hectare Yields of paddy in Nepal and India 
 
Year 1985 1990 2000 
Nepal 2016 kg / ha 
 
2407 kg / ha 2600 kg / ha 
India 2329 kg / ha 
 
2612 kg / ha 3008 kg / ha 
(Source: Asian Development Bank, 2001) 
 
However, given the open market between the two countries, the market price is likely 
to be influenced by the average levels of productivity or ‘prices of production’ across 
both countries, resulting in lower rates of profit for Nepalese producers.  To 
compensate for a fall in the market price relative to production costs as a result of 
imports from higher productivity regions, Marx would assume enterprises could 
develop the forces of production to compete (Milonakis, 1995)
16
.  However, given 
the weaknesses of the Nepalese state, rates of profit can not be easily equalised by a 
competitive drive to develop the productive forces.  Wealthy, profit oriented farmers 
in Jhorahat expressed dismay at the perception that they must compete with Indian 
producers in regions with a long history of agricultural commercialisation.  Indian 
producers were felt to have greater access to knowledge of productivity boosting 
techniques and inputs, partially as a result of the much stronger state extension 
services and better transport infrastructure.  In Marxian terms, such differences in 
productivity which impact the price received would in theory constitute a transfer of 
                                                 
16
 This would decrease the value of labour power and increases the rate of surplus value on a relative 
basis, allowing the farm to maintain an average rate of profit while selling the commodity at a lower 
value.   
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surplus value from the (predominantly Indian) enterprises with above average 
productivity to the (predominantly Nepali) enterprises with rates below the average
17
.   
 
7.5.3 State weakness, subsidies and market prices 
 
What is perhaps a far more significant cause for differing rates of profit and ‘prices 
of production’ between Morang and India however, is not associated with 
productivity levels, but with changes in the cost of the means of production.  It is 
here the withdrawal of subsidies becomes relevant.  Many government officials and 
merchants felt the lack of subsidies was deeply disadvantageous to Nepalese 
producers as it also allowed Indian farmers to sell at a lower price, thus impacting 
local market rates in the context of an open border.  This represents another indirect 
transfer of surplus through the price mechanism from Nepalese to Indian producers.  
Figure 7-12 displays substantial contrasts in the prices for the main three fertilisers 
between the Indian and Nepalese border towns, differences which can be explained 
by the fact it is subsidised in India.  The price of urea is 68% more expensive in 
Nepal, the price of DAP is 41% higher, while potash is 48% higher.   
 
One farmer described how jute production had declined in recent years, blaming it on 
the inability of local producers to compete with subsidised Indian farmers.   
 
“People stopped growing jute as the investment requirements are higher than the 
income.  The price farmers get is very low in the market while the effort the farmers 
have to put in is high. For that reason jute now is imported from Bihar, although jute 
can be grown in Nepal … It is cheaper in India because the government provides the 
subsidies.” 
 
A Tharu respondent from the ‘large farmer’ category meanwhile complained that: 
                                                 
17
 However, Friedman (1980) emphasises that unlike price manipulations through the exercise of class 
power, such differences in productivity which impact the price do not constitute ‘exploitation’ through 
the market.  As was outlined in chapter 2 with regards to unequal exchange between states as a result 
of productivity differences, it represents the normal functioning of the Marxian law of value whereby 
the more competitive firm is rewarded and the less competitive firm penalised through the price 
mechanism. 
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“The government should understand the condition of the farmers. If the price of the 
fertilizer is high then the government should understand that the farmers are 
suffering and fix the price of the crops so farmers do not have to bear losses.” 
 
Sedhain (2005) suggests that the unrestricted flow of commodities produced by 
subsidised Indian farmers presents a serious impediment for Nepalese producers 
while also ruling out any likelihood that farmers can competitively export grain to 
India, an objective in the APP. 
 





























*Nepalese border town rate refers to average retail prices for Biratnagar, Birganj, Bhairawa and 
Nepalganj.  Indian border town rate refers to average retail prices for Purnia & Muzzaffpur in Bihar, 
and Gorakhpur & Baharaich in Uttar Pradesh.   
Source of Data (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2008) 
 
The situation has been made particularly difficult for Nepalese farmers given the 
disproportionate rise in fertiliser prices to those of agricultural commodities in recent 
years.  Figure 7-13 outlines the official government recommended price of fertiliser 
against the farm gate post-harvest price for the main grain products, as recorded by 
the Morang Merchants Association.  This suggests that while the price for the two 
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main fertilisers, DAP and Urea has risen considerably, only the price of wheat has 
risen at the same rate.  The price of the main Knchi and Naya Mansuli paddy 
meanwhile has been increasing only modestly. 
 
Figure 7-13 Official price of fertiliser* against farm gate price of key grain crops** over last 18 




























































































Bas Kanchi Paddy Naya Mansuli Paddy Wheat DAP Urea
 
*This represents the official recommended price for Biratnagar by the government’s Agricultural 
Inputs Corporation which are fixed annually. 
**These are the farm gate prices recorded in a daily survey of grain merchants by to Morang 
Merchant’s Association (Morang Bypr Sangh).   Unfortunately data was only available on a day by 
day basis and data sets were not digitised making an annual average difficult to generate.  I therefore 
took the daily price for the first of Kartik each year (around 22
nd
 October) at the peak rice harvest 
season.  I am extremely grateful to both the Morang Merchants Association and the Biratnagar branch 
of the Agricultural Inputs Corporation for the co-operation and time they offered me in reviewing 
their archival data.  
 
 
The issue of subsidies for inputs highlights that the average production costs for 
Nepalese farmers must remain below those south of the border, a situation which is 
likely to hinder even the most progressive Nepalese farmers from achieving a profit 
on their sales comparable to their Indian counterparts. 
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7.5.4 Lack of mobility of capital between sectors 
 
If there are regional wide disadvantages for producers of a commodity, the Marxian 
‘law of value’ would state that profit rates would be equalised by the mobility of 
capital between sectors (Friedman, 1980).  One may expect in the context of rural 
Morang that those few households for whom the ‘profit’ category has any meaning 
would move out of agriculture into other more profitable sectors.  To Marx, this 
would continue until the falling supply of agricultural commodities stimulates a local 
price rise, once again yielding an average rate of profit for those producers remaining 
in agriculture.  This theory however, loses its relevance when one acknowledges the 
immobility of capital in rural Morang, even for those who could qualify as profit 
oriented or early ‘capitalist’ farmers.  Profit oriented farmers in this context can not 
easily shift into new trades, many of which are dominated by particular ethnic and 
caste groups and require considerable prior knowledge. 
 
The strongest evidence of the immobility of capital in the local economy is the fact 
that for many wealthier ‘medium’ and ‘large farmers’ seeking to leave agriculture, 
the preference was to migrate overseas.  This is why many households who have 
their own land now lease it out as male family members work abroad.  While such a 
movement out of agriculture may differ from that described in classical Marxism, 
would a fall in supply result in a rise in profits?  This also seems unlikely.  Those 
households making a profit such as those from the ‘large farmer’ category are small 
in number.  Their movement out of agriculture is unlikely to have a significant 
impact on local supply and market price, especially when one considers the 
continuous supply of agricultural commodities by the majority who are 





It can be concluded that there are a series of mechanisms through which the product 
of households’ surplus labour is appropriated in Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha 
through the sphere of circulation.  For those commercialising on a distress basis, this 
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further impedes households from meeting their minimum subsistence needs, while 
for those producing a secure surplus, these market relations reduce the profitability of 
agriculture.  This also constrains the emergence capitalist development and 
differentiation from within the pre-capitalist modes of production. 
 
The first process observed is that whereby a disproportionate share of the total 
surplus produced is appropriated through the market power yielded by different 
forms of capital in the sphere of circulation.  The appropriation of surplus by interest 
bearing and commercial capital is particularly significant.  With regards to 
commercial capital, it was demonstrated how collusive activity in a relatively 
concentrated mercantile sector has allowed traders to collectively depress prices, 
particularly in the Naya Bazaar and Katahari region.  Furthermore, this chapter 
identified further differences in the price received, rooted in the bargaining power 
and class position of market actors.  Wealthier producers maintain some level of 
bargaining power which ensures they receive a more favourable rate while building 
up long term relations of trust with the kahwalas.  Poorer producers however, 
many of whom are integrated into semi-feudal relations of production and who 
commercialise largely on a distress basis, are often compelled to accept highly 
unfavourable rates for their commodities.  The manipulation of prices by merchants 
is made more acute through the interlinkage of commercial and interest bearing 
capital in contracts.  When farmers are in debt to the kahwala they have a greater 
power to depress prices as a form of ‘concealed interest’.  With regards to interest 
rates on loans, it is evident that like prices themselves, the rates are determined by 
both the exercise of oligopsony power and the class position and bargaining power of 
the household, which is again, rooted in production relations. These two forms of 
merchant capital represent a drain of surplus out of agriculture which is consumed 
and does not reappear elsewhere in the economy. 
 
Another form of capital however, which was shown to extract surplus through the 
sphere of circulation is industrial capital.  Unlike merchant capital which can be 
considered in many ways part of the semi-feudal mode of production, industrial 
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capital is part of a capitalist mode of production and thus suggests another loose 
articulation between pre-capitalist and capitalist economic formations.  Although 
further research is necessary, there is evidence that in exchange between merchants 
and industry, the grain processing mills are able to collude to further depress prices, 
securing a cheap supply of raw materials.   
 
There is however, a less direct mechanism through which prices are depressed, 
associated with trade between Nepal and India and the differing role of state 
institutions.  While market prices are arguably influenced by production conditions 
in both countries, the better state support services in India which improve agricultural 
productivity and provide farmers with subsidies depress the local prices in Morang at 
the expense of Nepalese producers.  Meanwhile, there is little mobility between 
sectors which may raise local prices to compensate for the relatively high costs of 
production in Nepal.  This is of course intricately connected with the Nepalese social 
formations’ position in the global economy and the associated class alliances which 
historically hindered the emergence of a developmentalist state and rendered Nepal 
more vulnerable to state cut backs under neo-liberal restructuring. 
 
One of the most important conclusions from this chapter is that for those who 
participate in the market, the size of one’s profit on agricultural sales and indeed 
whether or not they can achieve a profit at all, is intricately connected with the 
relations of production they farm under.  The burden of ground rent severely reduces 
the profit rates of households integrated into semi-feudal production relations.  
Merchant capitalists can take advantage of the associated economic insecurity of 
such producers and extract a further portion of their surplus through manipulations of 
the market price, often enforced by debt bondage.  This serves in the long term to 
further reproduce the semi-feudal mode of production.  However, one must not lose 
sight of the processes which appear to occur relatively independently in the sphere of 
circulation, explaining why even wealthier farmers producing under independent 
peasant relations of production find it difficult to accumulate capital.  These include 
the lower state support and less favourable production conditions in Nepal and the 
collusive price fixing by both industrial and merchant capital. 
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Thus far it is evident that the APP is far from meeting its goals in achieving the 
envisaged transformation in agriculture from subsistence production to profitable 
petty commodity production.  The same underlying processes which have hindered 
the success of the APP have blocked the development of capitalism in agriculture out 
of the existing independent peasant and semi-feudal mode of production.  In chapter 
6 it was established that farmers face severe difficulties in developing the forces of 
production to facilitate the production of a surplus.  Poorer producers such as ‘small’ 
and many ‘medium’ farmers are unable to invest in inputs, primarily as a result of the 
rent burden, while there are few incentives given the poor returns, particularly for 
those on sharecropping tenures.  A further set of investment constraints relate to high 
cultural capital expenses and surplus appropriation by merchant capital driven by 
indebtedness and price manipulation.  
 
However, enhanced use of inputs is not the only means through which households 
can develop the forces of production.  As was outlined in chapter 2, Althusser and 
Balibar (1968 215) define the ‘forces of production’ as the relation between the 
labourer and the means of production.  The development of the productive forces 
thus entails not only the use of new inputs but the building up of other more subtle 
relations between producers and the land through the introduction of new cultivation 
techniques which enhance the productivity of their labour.  This brings us back to the 
APP and its ‘priority inputs’, four of which may facilitate the development of the 
productive forces, helping farmers produce a surplus to undermine the semi-feudal 
production relations.  Three of these, ‘credit’, ‘irrigation’ (primarily from tubewells) 
and ‘fertiliser’ have had limited impact given the difficulties farmers face in 
increasing input expenditure and accessing credit.  However, does a fourth priority 
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input, ‘technology’, which can boost yields without necessarily entailing increased 
expenditure, have some potential to facilitate the production of a saleable surplus? 
 
The APP’s ‘technology’ section promotes intensified research and extension 
initiatives aimed at facilitating multiple cropping, productivity enhancement and 
more efficient use of inputs.  Some of the new techniques being promoted in Morang 
in this context, such as the innovative System of Rice Intensification have a real 
potential to significantly increase yields while actually requiring a net decrease in the 
levels of inputs used.  The introduction of new techniques is however, dependent 
upon farmers gaining access to an important non-economic resource, namely 
agricultural knowledge.  This was already touched upon in chapter 6 where one 
potential source of knowledge within the semi-feudal mode of production, the 
absentee landlords was discussed.  It was concluded that they have little interest in 
boosting productivity on their estates and thus play a marginal role in the transfer of 
innovations.  However, there are alternative sources of agricultural knowledge.  
Firstly there are government and NGO run agricultural training programs.  Secondly, 
there are pre-existing agricultural knowledges which have been inherited over the 
generations.   Both new and old knowledges can be diffused through informal social 
networks within communities.  However, as will be argued, both participation in 
training programs and access to social networks is intricately connected with the 
relations of production.  This chapter seeks to identify these relationships and casts 
further doubt upon the likelihood that poorer producers can develop the productive 
forces through new techniques to facilitate transition to a new mode of production. 
 
Following a brief overview of agricultural extension initiatives in section 8.2, section 
8.3 examines the neo-liberal ideologies of ‘social capital’ which have had a 
considerable influence on the ways in which agricultural services are delivered 
throughout the world.  It is assumed that informal social networks and associations 
can be harnessed both during the implementation of agricultural training programs 
and for the long term diffusion of knowledge into the community.  However, these 
theories of social capital have come under considerable scrutiny for their failure to 
engage with social structures such as class, caste and gender.   
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Based upon this critique there is evidence of considerable structural constraints 
which hinder the utility of informal social networks and associations in Jhorahat, 
Bhaudaha and Thalaha for knowledge dissemination.  Section 8.4 examines instances 
whereby certain communities are directly excluded from training programs.  As 
initiatives themselves tend to utilise existing social connections in providing training 
through ‘farmer groups’, there is evidence that the existing cultural and political 
divisions in the community structure farmers’ participation.  Such divisions also 
hinder the natural dissemination of agricultural knowledge between households. 
 
However, it is argued in section 8.5 that exclusion from both training programs and 
informal networks is not actually a result of ideological divisions, but is associated 
more directly with the relations of production and its impact upon the economics of 
time management for labouring household members.  It is also demonstrated how the 
concentration of poverty and landlessness in certain communities further isolates 
many of the poorer strata of the peasantry from information sharing networks. 
 
Section 8.6 is concerned with the unequal access to agricultural knowledge within 
the household.  There is evidence that the majority of farmer groups and training 
programs oriented to boosting grain production are dominated by men.  This is both a 
result of direct discrimination as a consequence of gender ideologies and exclusion 
which is directly linked to the much greater labouring commitments of women 
farmers.  The exclusion of female producers has a particularly negative impact given 
that women do most of the agricultural labour in grain production and thus can most 
effectively mobilise new techniques.  This in turn leads to intra-household conflict 





Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Chapter 8: The political economy of agricultural knowledge diffusion 312 
8.2 Developing the forces of production through improved 
techniques and the diffusion of knowledge 
 
8.2.1 Innovations in rural Morang 
 
Agricultural extension is the primary source of new agricultural knowledge in rural 
Morang.  Extension initiatives are implemented primarily by the district agricultural 
office and occasionally by local NGOs, and include the promotion of both new 
commodities and improved techniques to boost production of existing crops.  Given 
the suitable soils, Katahari VDC, along with the neighbouring VDC of Sisabani 
Jahada to the south of Bhaudaha and Thalaha, have been designated by the 
government as proposed agricultural development ‘pockets’ where intensive 
vegetable production is to be promoted (DADO, 2005).  Nevertheless, in Jhorahat, 
Bhaudaha and Thalaha, the focus of initiatives is to improve the productivity of grain 
staples, in line with the primary Terai strategy of the APP.  Indeed this is the focus 
for much of Morang district, which remains an important source of grain for Nepal’s 
urban areas, particularly the Kathmandu valley. 
 
Initiatives which potentially can allow farmers to develop the forces of production 
and increase labour productivity include for example Integrated Pest Management 
(IPM) and most notably, the System of Rice Intensification (SRI).  SRI has the 
potential to double paddy yields through changes to the plantation technique such as 
early transplantation from nursery plots, widening the space between seedlings, 
reducing the levels of irrigation and frequent weeding (Uprety, 2005).  The technique 
is particularly suitable for smaller producers.  Not only does it improve their grain 
security, but field studies in Morang suggest it requires fewer seeds
1
, less fertiliser 
and lower levels of irrigation.  In addition it was reported to require 7-30 days less 
time to mature when compared with conventional techniques (Uprety, 2005).  A 
                                                 
1
 SRI cultivation requires just 5 to 10 kg of seeds per hectare in contrast with conventional methods 
which require 80 – 120 kg (Uprety, 2005). 
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farmer we spoke to who had utilised SRI reported yields which had increased from 4 
maund to 8-10 maund per kah 2. 
 
8.1.1. Neo-liberal downsizing, civil society institutions and extension 
 
While it is clear that some of the initiatives which are being promoted locally have 
the potential to significantly develop the productive forces and facilitate the 
production of a saleable surplus, what are the mechanisms through which these 
innovations are diffused?   An institutionalised agricultural extension system was 
first introduced in Nepal in 1951 soon after the collapse of the Ranas (K.C et al., 
2003) and each district has a central office and numerous local level agricultural 
service centres responsible for extension activities.  The Morang Agricultural Office 
that is responsible for most extension work clearly has a lot of potential to promote 
agricultural growth in the district.  It has been the first district office in Nepal to 
promote the SRI method, something that has given its staff much acclaim in 
international development circles and I met enthusiastic and committed staff when 
visiting the office.   
 
However, the outreach of the Agricultural Office is limited given that it appears to 
receive inadequate support from the central government for its programs, despite the 
emphasis on extension in the APP.  As was outlined in chapter 2 and 7, Nepal is far 
from establishing a ‘developmentalist state’ such as that which drove India’s so 
called Green Revolution, and this appears even more remote in a neo-liberal era.  In 
recent years, as economic restructuring has forced the government to cut expenditure 
for an already weak public sector, there have been massive budgetary cuts in 
extension services in Morang.  There had initially been seventeen agricultural service 
centres in rural areas of the district, which implemented extension schemes at the 
village level.  Several years ago this was cut to four centres and three sub-centres, 
and the staff numbers were cut from 79 to 49.  Furthermore, staff of the district office 
complained that the field workers who have the most contact with farmers, were 
                                                 
2
 1 kah = 0.05 bigh or 0.035 hectares. 
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severely under resourced and had huge responsibilities.  For example, the farmers in 
Bhaudaha were expected to seek support from the agricultural service centre in 
Katahari VDC to the south.  The staff of this service centre are responsible for all 
extension work in ten of the surrounding VDCs.  It was remarked locally that many 
field staff in the district are poorly paid and suffer from low morale. 
 
However, in the context of state cut-backs under neo-liberal restructuring, 
government service providers have been able to compensate partially through the 
increased reliance upon civil society institutions for service provision.  Between the 
1980s and 1990s there was a shift to a more decentralised ‘group approach’ to 
extension in Nepal with an increased focus on utilising farmers organisations for 
technology verification and transfer (IDL Group, 2006;  K.C et al., 2003).  The 
public sector has moved to become more of a “service provisioner” than “service 
provider” (K.C et al., 2003).  This shift in recent years is by no means restricted to 
agricultural extension but represents a trend towards decentralisation and 
privatisation of service delivery across Nepal’s development sector (Dhakal, 2008).  
The Local Self Government Act of 1999 represented a landmark intervention in the 
decentralisation process.  Aside from attempting to increase the governing 
responsibilities of local units of administration such as the VDC and DDC the act 
sought through these institutions to support local NGOs and Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs) in implementing ‘participatory’ programs in rural Nepal  
(Shakya, 2008).  While the role of locally based participatory institutions in Nepal’s 
rural development have been examined in sectors such as community forestry 
(Nightingale, 2005) and microfinance (Rankin, 2004;  Rankin & Shakya, 2007), little 
work has examined the role they play in agricultural development.   
 
There has been a proliferation of ‘farmer groups’ in recent years in rural Morang, 
composed of informal associations of producers.  Some are concerned primarily with 
agriculture while others maintain other functions such as small scale credit and 
saving schemes.  Government and NGO agricultural service providers will frequently 
implement programs through training members of these CBOs with the anticipation 
that techniques will be then be taught to the rest of the community, either informally 
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or formally.  The entire group may be trained, or the group will send representatives, 
who will then report back at the next meeting.  The groups utilised for service 
delivery are generally composed of farmers from the same community and usually 
exist prior to training programs.  Nevertheless, development service providers 
sometimes intervene in excluded communities to form groups or bring together 
‘leader farmers’ for training, representing different wards of the VDC (see Figure 
8-1). Through such decentralised training methods, many households have been able 
to adopt new techniques such as SRI.  Between 2003 when the first SRI experimental 
plot was established, the area under SRI cultivation in Morang had increased to 200 
hectares, involving over 2000 households (Uprety, 2006b) (see Figure 8-2).   
 
Inherent in the approach based upon farmer groups is the assumption that by teaching 
a few ‘progressive’ well organised farmers, they can offer each other mutual support 
in the implementation of innovations.  Most importantly however is the anticipation 
that knowledge can then be spread to the remainder of the community through social 
networks.  In interviews with farmers it was remarked that agricultural knowledge 
was often picked up from neighbours or friends informally through day to day 
interactions.  In fact, this does not only apply to knowledge diffused through the 
farmer groups.  There is a diversity of agricultural knowledges in rural Morang.  For 
example, although Katahari VDC has been promoted as a ‘pocket area’ for intensive 
vegetable cultivation, castes such as the Kushuwaha have been producing vegetables 
for the market for generations and have extensive indigenous knowledge.  New 
knowledges are also imported from farmers who have worked in other districts of 
Nepal or in India.  Furthermore, women often bring different agricultural knowledge 
from their maternal homes in distant villages following their marriage. 
 
However, how effective are both farmer groups which build upon pre-existing social 
associations and the wider social networks of the community for the diffusion of 
knowledges with the potential to boost productivity?  In the context of state 
restructuring, neo-liberal policies have championed the utilisation of such pre-
existing social connections in development initiatives, and it is to these ideologies 
this chapter now turns.  
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Figure 8-1:  Leader farmers representing each ward of the VDC taking Integrated Pest 





Figure 8-2: System of Rice Intensification (SRI) nursery plots near Jhorahat: SRI has the 
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8.3 ‘Social Capital’ in Agricultural Programs 
 
8.3.1 Social capital  
 
The trend towards decentralisation of service delivery is in many ways influenced by 
the renewed emphasis in a neo-liberal era of the roles that “civil society” and 
“community” should play in development initiatives (Harriss, 2002;  Rankin, 2004).  
This approach, which promotes a greater participation of ‘the people’ arguably has 
much in common with the new ‘self-help’ subjectivity that is increasingly imposed 
upon citizens (Rankin, 2004).  Civil society and community are increasingly 
recognized as the third element of an economic system alongside the state and 
market (Aoki & Hayami, 2001).  It is assumed they can fill the vacuum left by the 
state in the context of reduced public spending under economic liberalisation 
(Harriss, 2002;  Rankin, 2004).  There is often much ambiguity as to what exactly 
‘social capital’ constitutes (Fine, 2001).  Nevertheless, it is commonly understood to 
refer to the social connections between individuals in civil society that encourage 
collective action from which individuals mutually benefit (Ostrom, 1999;  Putnam, 
1993;  Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).   
 
Early use of the term was associated with the work of Putnam (1993), whereby 
greater ‘social capital’ was suggested to be responsible for the superior economic 
development in Northern Italy over that of the South.  Putnam suggested that dense 
networks of horizontal associations between members of civil society in the north 
fostered more effective governance and enhanced economic growth.  His work has 
been applied throughout the world to apparently ‘explain’ poor economic 
performance, and the associated debates surrounding the concept of ‘social capital’ 
have become highly influential in development thinking recent years (Narayan, 1997;  
Narayan & Pritchett, 1999;  Woolcock & Narayan, 2000;  World Bank, 2003).  It is 
claimed by policy makers that the informal networks and associations ‘social capital’ 
consist of can facilitate co-operation and co-ordination between different ‘self 
maximizing individuals’, reducing costs of doing business and improving efficiency 
(World Bank, 2003).  In line with neo-liberal ideologies of self-help, it suggests that 
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individuals can look after themselves through their own social connections rather 
than through state support and it is a crucial element in the process of further 
integrating previously isolate regions into capitalist markets (Rankin, 2004).   
 
What however, is the relevance of the concept for agricultural extension in Morang?  
While the term ‘social capital’ is not explicitly used in the APP, its ideological 
influence is evident in the models of agricultural extension mobilised by 
development institutions locally.  Firstly by utilising groups of well organised 
farmers to introduce new techniques, initiatives could be interpreted as attempting to 
‘harness’ existing ‘social capital’.  The strong often pre-existing social connections 
between participants, allow them to offer each other mutual support and ensure the 
smooth operation of the program.  Secondly, the assumption that the broader social 
networks of the village will allow the dissemination of new knowledge would also be 
interpreted as constituting another use of ‘social capital’. 
 
A number of studies have investigated the use of ‘farmer groups’ for knowledge 
diffusion  through the lens of this concept (de Haan, 2001;  Isham, 2000;  Reid & 
Salmen, 2000).  Using examples from Mali, Reid and Salmen (2000) note that as in 
Nepal, development institutions seek to both harness existing ‘social capital’ in 
creating ‘contact groups’ of close-knit farmers who can be taught new technologies 
by extension agents.  It is anticipated that the wider social networks of the 
community will be valuable for the dissemination of the new agricultural knowledge 
to other farmers who have not directly participated (Reid & Salmen, 2000).   
 
 
8.3.2 Critique of social capital 
 
Despite the increased influence of the concept of ‘social capital’ in development 
theory, it has been subject to a considerable critique, casting doubt upon the capacity 
of pre-existing social associations to facilitate the dissemination of agricultural 
innovations in Morang.  At first glance, the increased attention to social capital in 
development strategy could be interpreted as a ‘progressive’ move, as it moves 
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beyond neo-classical notions of the economy as an abstract sphere of exchange set 
apart from social relations.  However, a closer examination of the concept reveals 
that it actually reinforces this artificial division between the social and economic 
(Fine, 2001;  Harriss, 2002).  Fine (2001) argues that all capital is indeed ‘social,’ as 
by its nature it is embedded within particular socio-economic systems.  For example, 
under capitalism, the accumulation of capital is dependant upon the production of a 
surplus through class relations.  The term ‘social capital’ suggests however, that 
there is a separation between the ‘social’ and ‘capital’, implying that the economic is 
otherwise non-social, thus glossing over class relations (Fine, 2001). 
 
In a similar vein, one could argue that the neo-liberal rhetoric of social capital in 
rural Morang, alongside ideologies of entrepreneurship, can divert attention from the 
exploitative impact of capitalist expansion.  However, as was argued in chapter 3, the 
ideology also overlooks deeply entrenched pre-capitalist class relations and their 
ideological and political manifestations which impede capitalist expansion in the first 
instance.  Therefore the limitations of the social networks and associations which 
supposedly constitute ‘social capital’ echo the broader constraints presented by pre-
capitalist class relations to profitable commercialisation and capitalist transition.   
 
 
8.4 Accessing agricultural knowledge and identity based 
divisions  
 
8.4.1 Identity based exclusion from self-organised farmer groups 
 
Before examining the impact of the relations of production on the dissemination of 
agricultural knowledge, it is useful to examine the non-economic divisions within the 
community around which there is considerable literature (Cleaver, 2001;  de Filippis, 
2001;  Rankin, 2004;  Romani, 2003).  These identity based divisions, which 
facilitate the reproduction of particular economic relations, play a role in structuring 
the dissemination of knowledge.  Cleaver (1999) suggests that development 
programs frequently tend to assume there exists a single cohesive ‘community’ 
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prepared to engage in collective action for the mutual benefit of all while under-
estimating the salience of power relations and divisions.  It is argued that 
‘community’ can be defined more realistically as a “site of both solidarity and 
conflict, shifting alliances, power and social structures” (Cleaver, 1999, 604).  
Interviews suggested that the communities of Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha are by 
no means cohesive.  In the context of deeply entrenched divisions, there is evidence 
that the farmer contact groups through which agricultural training is organised and 
innovations are introduced are by no means open to all social groups. 
 
To understand what structures exclusion or inclusion in training programs it is useful 
to examine the observed social divisions which shape the day to day social 
interactions of local people, and how these go on to determine one’s participation in 
farmer groups.  As was argued in chapter 5, caste relations have never been as strong 
in Morang as compared to some of the regions further West where a greater 
composition of the population include Maithili speaking caste Hindus with a deeply 
entrenched hierarchy.  Nevertheless, as was also suggested in chapter 5 an informal 
sense of hierarchy has emerged within these communities over the decades given the 
history of their subordination to feudalism and the rise of a functionary class.  Even 
the indigenous peoples have achieved a position in the hierarchy.   
 
The strength of caste relations had certainly declined during the People’s War, where 
there were extensive Maoist campaigns against practices of untouchability.  
Nevertheless, while most villagers expressed in theory that they do not believe in 
casteism, in practice it appears that caste remains significant in structuring day to day 
social relations.  I rarely observed social interactions between members of the Dalit 
community and indigenous groups.  Meanwhile, casteist perceptions of the 
‘backwardness’ of so called ‘low caste’ communities (including non-Thru 
indigenous groups) were still mobilised by respondents during discussions.  Ethnicity 
alone also plays a role in structuring social relations, most notably between Nepali 
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speaking Hindus of hill origin such as the Brahmin and Chettris, the indigenous 
groups such as Thru, Jhagar and Rajbanshi, and the Maithili speaking castes
3
.   
 
As has already been established, to implement agricultural training, service providers 
sometimes develop their own farmer groups, but more often than not build upon pre-
existing community organisations to implement programs.  However, contrary to the 
assumptions in ‘social capital’ ideology, Prezeworski (1985) argues that social 
connections do not simply develop out of a society composed of undifferentiated 
individuals.  There is evidence that the pre-existing ‘farmer groups’ which are 
harnessed by development agencies are often composed of individuals from the same 
castes.  This parallels Romani’s (2003) study in Cotê d’Ivoire,  whereby it was found 
that households from ethnic minorities were less likely to be a member of an 
extension group.   
 
In Morang however, this does not necessarily reflect conscious exclusion of 
particular ethnicities or lower castes by group organisers.  Given that such groups are 
usually established in the first instance by farmers themselves rather than by service 
providers, they reflect the shared cultural and familial bonds between members of the 
same ethnic and caste community.  As one farmer group organiser remarked:   
 
“In theory in a [farmers] group there should be people from different castes and 
classes. However, the reality is that in a group, if there are people with similar 
interests, then the group can work for a long time effectively.” 
 
We were informed that in many cases, when a new farmer group is established, they 
develop it from within their immediate social circle which generally reflects one’s 
pre-existing caste and kin networks.  Those from outside this circle are often not 
informed about initiatives.  When we asked one Thru farmer in Pidarboni, Jhorahat, 
                                                 
3
 These divisions were further entrenched during the 2007 and 2008 Madheshi Andolan when 
divisions between hill settlers and Maithili speaking and Terai indigenous communities were tested.  
This was complicated further by a 2009 agitation by the Thru, who claimed separate identity and 
political rights from the other plains based ethnicities.  
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why they had not participated in farmer groups they simply responded that the 
organisers only inform those to whom they share close relations. 
 
“They only tell their relatives.  For example if the RRN
4
 organizes the training they 
don’t tell us but they only inform the people they know… we all have a right to 
participate but we are not informed.” 
 
The exclusivity of many of these groups could seem unproblematic were each ethnic 
or caste based community to have its own active farmer groups through which they 
could receive training.  However, most groups are composed of Brahmins and 
Chettris, the Terai middle castes and the Thru.  76% of sampled households who 
had participated in agricultural training programs were from these three 
communities, despite the fact that they comprise of only 44% of the total sample.  
Given the historical privileges accrued to the Thru and Brahmin/Chettri, they 
generally have a greater political power and a wider network of ‘contacts’ with the 
local state and development institutions.  This of course improves their capacity to 
harness the benefits of new training opportunities which arise through the medium of 
farmer groups.  Furthermore, the higher level of education and organisation within 
this community makes it easier for them to form ‘farmer groups’ in the first instance.   
 
Of course, some farmer groups do still include members of other caste or ethnic 
communities, however, this does not imply they are becoming more inclusive, but 
instead appears to reflect separate bonds of solidarity which are emerging in rural 
Morang.  In this context, members of even the more dominant castes can be 
excluded.  There are a number of further divisions which have become increasingly 
pronounced in recent years, such as the rise of Christian conversions, particularly 
amongst the indigenous communities
5
.  Some of the Christian converts felt excluded 
                                                 
4
 RRN refers to Rural Reconstruction Nepal, a Nepali NGO with an office nearby. 
5
 Singh (2007) suggests that the rise in Christian conversion amongst Indian adivasi communities is 
associated again with the undermining of communal norms in the context of their subordination to 
capitalism and feudalism.  New religions often represent a break with the communitarian principles of 
the older adivasi social formation by advocating the veneration of external deities and individual 
liberation. 
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from farmer groups on the grounds of their religion.  When we asked one farmer if 
there were any training programs locally or farmer groups he could join he replied: 
 
“I don’t know. They don’t inform us and don’t include us because we are Christian.  
It has been 57-58 years.  I have not even participated in any political parties.  I don’t 




The quotation above also raises the issue of political party membership, which 
represents another significant division in the study VDC and has been strengthened 
by the recent People’s War, the upsurge in ethnic politics and the post-conflict 
Constituent Assembly elections which took place during this study.  Dhakal’s (2008) 
study from nearby Kaseni VDC suggests that participation in community 
organisations is influenced considerably by political party affiliation.  This does not 
necessarily imply deliberate exclusion but often represents voluntary non-
participation by individuals to boycott organisations run by rival political factions 
(Dhakal, 2008).   
 
 
8.4.2 Identity based exclusion from social networks 
 
Just as ‘farmer groups’ emerge from existing social associations which form along 
the axes of caste, religion and political affiliation, these social divisions also appear 
to influence the spread of agricultural knowledge between households within the 
community.  While all community members are integrated into a variety of social 
networks on a day to day basis through which knowledges diffuse, these associations 
themselves appear to develop along the lines of the structural divisions outlined 
above.  This echoes Prezeworski’s (1985) arguement that although individuals may 
all organize into particular groups and engage in collective action, the utility 
                                                 
6
 Nevertheless, some of such households could compensate through forming their own farmer groups 
and receiving support from primarily Christian oriented NGOs.  We met one church leader who had 
travelled to Kathmandu to take SRI training.  He subsequently returned to the community to form a 
farmers group. 
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maximising benefits that collective action can bring is dependant upon one’s 
structural position.   
 
In the context of the study villages, just as ‘farmer groups’ themselves emerge along 
the lines of existing social divisions, new knowledge does not then go on to diffuse 
unproblematically through word of mouth to the rest of the community.   This casts 
doubt upon the capacity for development institutions to rely on knowledge sharing 
networks for the diffusion of agricultural innovations beyond the immediate social 
circle of the farmer group members.  It appears that the lower levels of social 
interactions between members of different social groups and the strong internal 
bonds of cohesion hinder the informal transfers of information taught during training 
programs.  For example, the Jhagar and Rishidev (Musahar) communities in Jhorahat 
VDC not only fail to participate in many training programs, but as they rarely 
interact with the castes that dominate the farmer groups, they are less likely to pick 
up knowledge on an informal basis.  Some had not even heard of the initiatives such 
as SRI. 
 
The dissemination of information through restricted social networks of course does 
not just refer to innovations introduced from outside, but to long established 
indigenous agricultural knowledges.  For example, in chapter 6, the success of 
Katahari’s Kushuwaha caste in utilising organic techniques was briefly discussed.  
They are traditionally vegetable cultivators by occupation and have a long history of 
market orientated livelihoods.  Within the networks of this closely knit group, skills 
and techniques for vegetable cultivation have been transmitted from households to 
household and generation to generation, thus giving them an advantage over other 
communities.  They also have strong links with ‘progressive’ farmers on both sides 
of the international border.  However, discussions with members of this community 
suggested that much of the expertise remains strongly within the caste group and 
many of the indigenous farmers surrounding the Kushuwaha settlements in Katahari 
remain extremely poor. 
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8.5 Access to agricultural knowledge and relations of 
production 
 
8.5.1 Importance of class in structuring social identity 
 
It is evident that cultural and political division within the community have hindered 
the dissemination of knowledge, exposing the inherent weaknesses of ‘social capital’ 
ideology.  This occurs as a result of the multiple cultural and political identities 
which determine a given individual’s social circle and the likelihood that the will be 
invited to join a group.  These include one’s caste or religious group, one’s ethnicity 
or one’s political party affiliation.  What appears however to be the most significant 
division which structures group participation and access to knowledge sharing 
networks is that of class.  With regards to participation in training programs alone, 
Figure 8-3 shows that only 16% of small farmer and 24% of medium farmer 
respondents reported that household members have taken agricultural training, 
despite these poorer households being the target of many extension initiatives.  
Meanwhile, 47% of large farmers stated that they had participated in training.   
 
There are a number of explanations as to the lower participation of ‘small’ and 
‘medium’ farmer households in training programs and unequal access to knowledge 
sharing networks.  Firstly, the three castes that dominate farmer groups, namely the 
Thru, Brahmin/Chettri and the Terai middle castes, also have the highest proportion 
of wealthier households, as was discussed in chapter 6.  Out of the ‘large farmers’ 
87% are from these three caste groups, while 74% of the ‘small farmers’ and 
‘landless labourers’ are either dalit or from one of the other indigenous groups such 
as the Rajbanshi, Bantar or Jhagar. By noting that most wealthy farmers are also 
higher caste, one would assume they are also more likely to have access to a more 
exclusive caste based social circle out of which farmer groups can be formed, while 
also being integrated into knowledge sharing networks which develop along the lines 




Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Chapter 8: The political economy of agricultural knowledge diffusion 326 
Figure 8-3: Proportion of households who have participated in agricultural training in last year 
by household category 
Large farmerMedium farmerSmall farmer
Farmer category






However, there were some wealthy farmers from traditionally ‘lower’ castes, who 
still participate in farmer groups alongside their higher caste counterparts, while also 
appearing to be much more strongly integrated into the wider social networks of the 
community.  Similarly we met many poor higher caste households who rarely 
participate in farmer groups and appear relatively isolated from the village social 
networks.  This can be understood by acknowledging that cultural identity based 
upon one’s caste is often blurred by class based social status.  There was evidence 
that some prosperous households from ethnic groups considered ‘lower’ caste such 
as the Bantar have developed strong bonding relations with other wealthy farmers 
with a higher caste status and thus frequently participate in farmer training programs.  
While notions of caste based cultural status and identity facilitate the reproduction on 
an ideological level of local level relations of production such as the relations 
between labourers and large farmers, they can be replaced by class based identities in 
the context of shifting economic fortunes
7
.  This points to trends across South Asia 
whereby the economic logics of the market mean identities and ideologies based 
upon caste and ethnicity have been blurred by those of class (Jeffrey, 2001;  
Mendholson, 1993;  Rankin, 2004;  Vasavi, 1998).  In Nepal for example it has been 
                                                 
7
 For example the ideologically loaded relations between Thru labourers for wealthier Thru farmers 
appeared to replicate those described between castes as described in Rankin’s (2004) study.  Poor 
Thru farmers often appeared to demonstrate reverence to those for whom they labour, often referring 
to them as mlik, implying someone in a position of authority on whom one is dependent. 
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argued that there is an emergence of a new class based cultural status founded on 
consumerism that has diluted caste divisions within Nepal (Liechty, 2003;  Rankin, 
2004).   
 
However, this explanation which is grounded in a cultural understanding of class, 
still assumes that exclusion from agricultural knowledge is a consequence of one’s 
status and identity on an ideological level, which goes on to influence one’s day to 
day social associations.  Direct exclusion as a result of one’s cultural or political 
identity is of course still important and has been well researched in critiques of social 
capital discourse (de Filippis, 2001;  Harriss, 2002;  Romani, 2003).  In line with 
Althusser’s conceptualisation of determination in the last instance by the economic 
level, such culturally grounded identity based divisions can be argued to arise in the 
context of the ideological reproduction of particular relations of production.  
However thus far, few critiques of ‘social capital’ have identified more direct 
mechanisms through which production relations structure access to social 
associations and networks.  It is necessary to look at the material impact of 
households’ integration into semi-feudal, independent peasant, and capitalist 
relations of production in order to understand their capacity to either participate in 
training programs or access knowledge sharing social networks.  
 
 
8.5.2 Relations of production, time management and access to 
agricultural knowledge 
 
‘Free time’ and participation and farmer groups and training 
 
There is evidence that perhaps the most significant factor in determining one’s access 
to agricultural knowledge is the labouring commitments necessary to reproduce 
one’s household and the hours of ‘free time’ household members have.  By using the 
labour of other households rather than the labour of their own family members, and 
through the investments in productivity boosting inputs, larger producers can reduce 
family labour commitments.  The time which is subsequently made available can be 
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used to both form farmer groups and participate in training programs through these 
organisations.   
 
More marginal farmers on the other hand, generally have the greatest workload.  
Unlike their wealthier counterparts poorer producers use less technology and employ 
far fewer outside workers.  They are thus more reliant on fully utilising their family’s 
labour on their farms to meet their subsistence needs.  Family labour itself 
meanwhile, must be used intensively.  As was discussed in chapter 6, a large portion 
of the product of such households’ aggregate ‘surplus’ and even ‘necessary’ labour 
time is appropriated through rent, interest and price manipulation on crop sales.  
‘Small farmers’ in particular, have to intensify their household labour to meet the 
needs of simple reproduction, ‘extending the working day’ on their farms or more 
often, in the off farm economy.  One large farmer, who had himself chaired a farmer 
group, illustrates the benefits they hold over smaller producers with regards to time 
management: 
 
 “What is happening here is there are many farmers with small amounts of land. 
Farmers spend most of the time cultivating these small holdings and waste time. 
Instead what we can do is farm using tractors and modern techniques and finish the 
work quickly in the field.  In that way time can be saved and farmers can be involved 
in other activities also.” 
 
Even when poorer producers are members of farmer groups, or are invited to join 
training schemes, many of them actually opt out or give up as a result of time 
constraints.  This can explain why participation of poorer households in agricultural 
extension programs remains low even when service providers seek to specifically 
target poorer and traditionally excluded households to form ‘inclusive’ farmer 
groups
8
.  Dhakal (2008) notes that members of the dalit community in nearby Kaseni 
VDC prioritise work over membership in community groups.  Work yields instant 
results, whereby participation in a group yields only indirect longer term benefits.  In 
                                                 
8
 There are a few examples of farmer groups being set up which specifically target groups of poorer 
producers to train them in productivity boosting techniques or vegetable production. 
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the context of Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha, it is therefore understandable why 
households such as those from the ‘small farmer’ category who struggle to meet their 
minimum subsistence needs, can not be easily persuaded to give up valuable labour 
time to take part in farmer group activities.  One Thru man from a ‘medium farmer’ 
household who had participated in a program through a farmer group explained how 
the time constraints combined with the lack of perceived immediate results led him 
to quit the training after just a day: 
 
“I went for one day and left … This time what happened was I was planting rice 
when the training was going on so could not participate.  When I had gone there, 
they taught us how to use certain fertilizers but I do not think it worked well so I just 
left the training.  I thought it was useless.” 
 
The exclusion of poorer producers from training programs is particularly ironic given 
that techniques such as SRI are in fact more suitable for smaller producers than 
larger more commercial producers, given the need for extensive careful weeding 




Lack of free time does not only constrain farmers from participating in training 
programs, but hinders the educational development of younger family members, with 
implications for agricultural productivity.  In The Agrarian Question, Kautsky (1988, 
111) observes that the ‘overwork’ smaller farms are compelled to engage in draws a 
greater amount of young people’s labour into agricultural activities.  This prevents 
them from developing their agricultural knowledge through education, with 
implications for the household’s future.  This certainly appears to be the case in the 
study villages, whereby most of the poorer producers take their children out of 
school at an early age to help on the farm and contribute to household income.  On 
the other hand, young people from wealthier households have a much higher level of 
education and I even met some who had been specifically educated in agricultural 
                                                 
9
 Field study by Uprety (2006) notes the local perception that hired-in labourers used by larger 
producers are more likely to be careless in weeding.  
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sciences when they were younger.  One of these individuals was a large Kushuwaha 
farmer in Katahari who has a degree from an Indian university.   
 
While direct training in agricultural science has obvious benefits, the advantages of 
education for the utilisation of new knowledge was on the whole far more subtle.  
Respondents suggested that given their greater economic security, farmer group 
members who take up training opportunities are composed predominantly of more 
educated farmers.  Not all training programs involve practical demonstrations and 
they are often based upon teaching farmers ‘theoretically’, often in schools or the 
village development office.  It was suggested that those who possess less education 
find it more difficult to understand what is being taught during the training programs, 
discouraging them from participating (see Figure 8-4).  One Brahmin man from a 
‘small farmer’ household in Jhorahat bazaar explained why he had given up one 
training program:  
 
“Most of the time I do not have time to take the training from home. Also, in the 
training many things are discussed and taught but they are not demonstrated 
practically. If you can read and write it is easy to learn things. I also had gone there 
but I was not happy as it was theoretical training only so I quit because I believe in 
practical knowledge.” 
 
The respondent is thus constrained from participating, both because of lack of time 
and because he felt his level of education made it difficult to understand what was 
being taught, something which is of course linked to the relations of production they 
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Figure 8-4: SRI posters in NGO office near Rangeli: Although useful, they only directly benefit 







Figure 8-5: Local people meet at chautara in Mangalhaat bazaar: Village resting places such as 
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‘Free time’ and access to social networks 
 
The lack of free time for poorer producers not only restricts households from 
participating in farmer groups and the associated training programs or other 
educational activities.  It isolates them from many of the knowledge sharing 
networks within the community.  There are other informal mechanisms through 
which farmers can pick up agricultural knowledge, even if they are not integrated 
into elite social circles.  For example, we frequently observed farmers informally 
discussing cropping techniques or warning of pests which are circulating while 
sitting in the village teashop or chautara (traditional resting place) (see Figure 8-5).  
However, poorer producers have much less time to engage in such informal 
interactions, a constraint particularly critical for those who combine subsistence 
farming under the semi-feudal mode of production with work in the capitalist sector.  
Most factory employment for example, is yearlong, unlike agricultural work which is 
subject to slack periods in the post harvest season.  Furthermore, factories are often 
some distance from communities in the industrial belt near Biratnagar, resulting in 
lengthy journeys to and from work in the early morning and late evening alongside 
an eight hour day.  These male factory workers spend less time engaging in informal 
interaction and thus miss out on many of the valuable exchanges of knowledge which 
occur, including ideas taught through training programs.  Although factory workers 
do of course have their own social networks, these associations are not likely to 
include the wealthier producers who dominate farmer groups from whom knowledge 
could be learned.     
 
In contexts whereby agricultural service providers themselves seek to create farmer 
groups from scratch rather than using pre-existing associations, many poor producers 
are often not even aware such programs are taking place.  When we asked why it was 
so difficult to guarantee the participation of poorer producers in training programs, 
one responded replied:  
 
“Many people are working in factories and furniture making, so they leave for work 
early in the morning and come back only in the evening, that is why many people 
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don’t get information about the training programs.  Many people from this VDC are 
working in Biratnagar, in factories, in furniture making etc.” 
 
In sum, this discussion points to another mechanism through which the class 
divisions associated with the pre-capitalist mode of production (and its articulation 
with capitalism) continue to constrain households from developing the forces of 
production.   
 
Geography and social networks 
 
A final point which must be made is that the geographical isolation of many poorer 
communities further isolate them from knowledge sharing networks as it reduces the 
chance that household members will interact with innovating farmers.  For example, 
in the villages of Bhaudaha and Thalaha VDC which are both classified as ‘least 
developed’ by the District Development Office
10
, there are concentrated levels of 
poverty.  Table 8-1 demonstrates that 51% of the sample in Bhaudaha for example is 
from the ‘small farmer’ category and 28% is from ‘landless labourer’ category.  In 
Thalaha 28% of the sample is represented by ‘small farmers’ and 35% is represented 
by landless labourers.  In Jhorahat VDC on the other hand, which is classified as 
‘most developed’ by the district development office there is a reasonably equal 
distribution of wealthier Brahmin and Thru farmers and poorer producers from 
traditionally marginalised castes.  In the sample, 34% and 12% were from the 
‘medium farmer’ or ‘large farmer’ category respectively.   
 
There are also stark contrasts in the levels of education.  In Bhaudaha VDC as a 
whole, adult literacy is 26%, the lowest in Morang, while in Thalaha it is 31%.  This 
stands in stark contrast to Jhorahat, whereby it stands at 64% (District Development 
Office, 2007).  Given the greater concentration of poverty and lack of education in 
Bhaudaha and Thalaha it is understandable that only 9% of the sample in Bhaudaha 
and 10% in Thalaha reported that they had participated in agricultural training.  This 
                                                 
10
 The District development office has classified VDCs into three categories to facilitate service 
delivery, ‘least developed’, ‘medium’ and ‘most developed’ (District Development Office, 2007). 
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stands in contrast to the 30% of respondents in Jhorahat who had directly taken 
agricultural training (See Table 8-1).  
 
Table 8-1: Percentage of household who have taken training and farmer categories by VDC 
 





HH member has taken 
training 
30% 9% 10% 
HH member has not 
taken training 
70% 89% 90% 
Landless labourers 
 
26% 28% 33% 
Small farmers 
 
24% 51% 28% 
Medium farmers 
 
34% 16% 31% 
Large farmers 
 
12% 5% 6% 
Non-farming land 
owner 
4% 0% 2% 
 
Wealthier villages such as Jhorahat bazaar have a greater proportion of more 
educated, innovating farmers.  In such contexts even those poorer producers who are 
relatively isolated from both training programs and social networks have a higher 
chance of picking up new agricultural knowledges informally than their counterparts 
in poorer communities.  They are able to actively observe new techniques such as 
SRI, often while working for wealthier farmers.  This not only helps them learn the 
new skills, but by witnessing the improved yields directly across the community, the 
perceived ‘risk’ of innovating declines.  As the number of households adopting new 
techniques increases, other farmers who observe the production process and the 
higher output are encouraged to follow suit.  An example is chait dhn, or Spring 
rice, which was rare a decade ago, but has now spread rapidly throughout Jhorahat 
over the last few years.  As one respondent explained: 
 
“Farmers have been cultivating using primitive methods and to adopt modern 
techniques it is expensive.  Still, they have not been realizing that at the beginning 
there is a loss but they will benefit in the future.  So the main thing which has to be 
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changed is their mind. Some people have started growing chait after observing the 
production process.  If one person starts then ten other farmers will start adopting.” 
 
Similarly, one ‘small farmer’ from the Brahmin community who had been 
encouraged to use a new type of seed explained how his counterparts were swift to 
follow him: 
 
“It has been 4-5 years that I have been involved in farming the fields owned by the 
landlords.  When I first started I bought the B44 rice and then planted it and the 
output was nice. So the farmers around were impressed and they came to me to ask 
for the seeds.  I got 250 maund from 2 bigh of land.  That was great.” 
 
However, the situation is markedly different in the more remote villages in Bhaudaha 
and Thalaha VDC where there is a higher concentration of landlessness and levels of 
education are much lower.  For example, in the Bantar village of Hurhuriya in 
Thalaha, only one sampled household reported that members had participated in any 
training programs and the vast majority of the population are landless tenants.  It was 
remarked that few people have time to form farmer groups or even know where to 
seek support to do so.  The village is also isolated geographically, with no through 
road, only a tiny haatiya, and minimal contact with the outside world (see Figure 
8-6).  In Hurhuriya, few households had even heard of new techniques such as SRI.  
This stands in contrast to villages such as Jhorahat bazaar and Pidarboni where most 
of the SRI plots are located and can be observed.  These two villages are located 
along a road and have several large vibrant haatiyas attended by a diversity of both 
wealthier and poorer producers (see Figure 8-7).  Their accessibility also means the 
villages are frequently visited by development workers.  In sum, it is evident that the 
geographic concentration class relations play a further role in determining whether or 
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Figure 8-6: Hurhuriya haatiya, Thalaha VDC.  This remote market attracts only a small 
number of traders and is visited mostly by local people  
 
 
Figure 8-7: Jhorahat haatiya: Unlike in Hurhuriya, this large twice weekly market attracts 
traders and farmers from a wide catchment, and is a valuable site for social interaction and the 














Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Chapter 8: The political economy of agricultural knowledge diffusion 337 
8.6 Gender and class 
Gender exclusion and participation in farmer groups 
 
It has been established that farmer groups emerge along the lines of existing social 
divisions, and thus comprise primarily of close knit members of similar social 
groups.  This challenges the assumption that the harnessing of so called ‘social 
capital’ through community organisations is beneficial to all.  However, a further 
axis of exclusion that has been omitted is gender.  Women’s capacity to form and 
participate in farmer groups appears to be considerably lower than men’s.  There are 
some small scale training programs which are oriented specifically to women 
farmers, usually tied up with savings and credit schemes.  These are focussed 
primarily upon vegetable and livestock production, the activities that women have 
the most control over in terms of production decisions and distribution of income.  
The focus on these activities by the development sector is understandable given that 
they yield the greatest potential for women’s empowerment.  However, production of 
these commodities is usually limited to common land in the case of livestock and 
small kitchen gardens in the case of vegetables, and levels of production are marginal 
when compared to grain cultivation.  It is the main grain crop however, which meets 
most of the households’ subsistence needs and most farmer training programs are 
focussed on developing the productivity of these staples.  Observations in the field 
suggest that most of the farmer groups which receive such training are dominated by 
male farmers.  This parallels national level concerns in the APP-ISR which report 
that less than 40% of participants in farmer groups are women, out of which only one 
in four occupy roles in their executive committees (IDL Group, 2006). 
 
The dominance of males in training programs with the potential to boost grain 
production is ironic given that while decisions regarding its production and 
marketing are largely the domain of males; females carry out most agricultural work 
such as the labour intensive rop or paddy plantation, weeding and harvest.  This 
discrepancy was highlighted in a report by the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(1997).   
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There are a number of processes behind women’s lack of involvement.  Firstly, 
gender ideologies which restrict women from participating in public life and 
interacting with men discourage them from joining male dominated farmer groups 
and the associated training programs.  We were informed that women “…feel shy to 
take the training with the men”.  However, even when women expressed an interest 
in the groups, they rarely appeared to be invited by (usually male) organisers to 
participate.  We asked one female Thru respondent whether women farmers 
participate in training programs and farmer groups.  She responded angrily, stating 
that: 
 
“No one knows about the training. As we are not educated we are busy only with the 
household” 
. 
Another Thru woman meanwhile, argued that: 
 
“We are not informed and men don’t care about us participating in the training.” 
 
Most women felt that it was immediately assumed by farmer group organisers that 
they were ‘less educated’ and thus not suitable candidates to participate in programs, 
whether or not this was the case.  The exclusion of women however appears 
particularly pronounced in the Thru community and less so in the Brahmin and 
Chettri community.  A junior agricultural extension worker, referring to women’s 
involvement in training programs through farmer groups, informed us that:  
 
“Participation is good, but in the Pahadi
11
 [Brahmin and Chettri] community. The 
women from the Terai community may also participate more in some places… But 
basically the women’s participation from Thru, Rajbansi and other ethnic group is 
less.  
 
                                                 
11
 Pahadi refers generically to ethnic groups from the hills, the vast majority of ‘hill’ groups in the 
study area are Brahmin and Chettri. 
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He went on to argue that 
 
“…because of their culture they are bound to work inside the house. Men are the one 
who are active and work outside. So the women cannot participate in many things.  
But it is improving gradually.”   
 
The higher level of participation for the Brahmin and Chettri community is perhaps a 
consequence of the better education across this ethnic group.  Not only has this 
reduced the salience of gender ideologies but in the wealthier households, more men 
have skilled jobs in Biratnagar, and male migration is much higher.  This has given 
women a greater independence and control over grain production decisions and 
agricultural affairs. 
 
Gender, intra-household class relations, and participation in farmer groups 
 
In the cases outlined above, it is clear that women are excluded as a consequence of 
their social identity, in the same way that individuals can be excluded as a result of 
their caste, religious or political affiliation.  However, there is also a material element 
to gender exclusion, a phenomenon which is again associated with labouring 
commitments and time management.  As was argued in chapter 6, women’s 
propensity to perform a disproportionate quantity of the aggregate household labour 
time represents an intra-household class relation.  They are both responsible for the 
most labour intensive agricultural tasks as well as household reproductive activities 
such as cooking, cleaning and collecting firewood or daura.  In interviews, one of the 
prime explanations given for women’s lack of participation in farmer groups and 
training programs was simply that they could not take time off their household and 
farm responsibilities to participate in programs, many of which may take several 
days. 
 
Interestingly however, the broader relations of production the household is integrated 
into retain their importance, even in determining the degree to which labour 
commitments constrain women from accessing agricultural knowledge.  In 
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interviews with women farmers we were informed that it is primarily the women 
from the ‘richer’ households who participate in farmer groups and training programs.  
As was discussed in chapter 6, the labouring burden for females is significantly 
lower in wealthier families as they employ many outside workers for the most labour 
intensive jobs.  In many ‘large farmer’ households, women’s jobs were restricted to 
work within the home.  Most of the women we met who had been active in farmer 
training programs were thus from this category.  We even met one Thru woman in 
Pidarboni, Jhorahat, who had learnt SRI from her father.  After her marriage and 
migration to the village, she had gone on to teach it to neighbours, and was herself 
active in organising programs.  However, most of the recipients of her training 
appeared to be also from wealthier households. 
 
Agricultural training, intra-household class relations and gender conflicts 
 
The paradoxical situation whereby women perform the greatest proportion of 
agricultural work while being less likely to participate in training programs appears 
to make it more difficult for recipients of training to actually implement what is 
learnt.  This applies to SRI in particular, given that the key component of the 
technique is the radically different plantation method and intensified weeding, both 
of which are regarded as female tasks.  Men were often uninterested in helping with 
these tasks to implement the SRI method.  As one male farmer group member joked, 
the men participate in the farmer training programs, and “give nice speeches”, but 
can not actually apply what has been learnt as they do much less agricultural work.  
Although husbands normally did teach their wives what was learnt in the programs, 
some women respondents found it difficult to apply the new techniques without the 
practical experience of training.  
 
The fact that women could not participate in training programs, gain practical 
experience and share their needs with service providers has led to conflict in some 
situations.   Given that the SRI method requires much more intensive weeding, it 
places an extra work burden upon women, particularly for those households who can 
not afford to employ extensive outside labour.  This was one of the primary 
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criticisms of the method raised by female respondents.  Male household members 
who normally take the training sometimes failed to fully understand this and faced 
difficulties persuading female family members to take up the new techniques.  We 
heard of a quarrel which emerged between a husband and wife following the 
households’ shift to the SRI method.  Incensed by the extra weeding work, the wife 
had even come to one of the agricultural trainers to complain, accusing him of 
‘ruining’ their rice crop.  This highlights how intra-household class relations (which 
themselves are influenced by the relations of production) serve to further block 
women’s access to agricultural knowledge and its successful utilisation.  This 
constrains the development of the productive forces and the transition to a new mode 






It is clear from the above discussion that there are numerous innovations which can 
potentially facilitate the development of the forces of production.  However, it 
appears that the benefits of these techniques are reaped predominantly by ‘large 
farmers’ and wealthier ‘medium farmer’ households.  The majority of ‘small 
farmers’ and many poorer ‘medium farmer’ households are faced with severe 
constraints in accessing and utilising the necessary agricultural knowledge(s).  Caste 
and gender play an additional role in structuring access to agricultural knowledge in 
ways which often reflect class divisions. 
 
It was demonstrated that neo-liberal theories of social capital assume agricultural 
knowledge can be diffused through the harnessing of existing social associations to 
implement training through farmer groups.  It is also anticipated that innovations will 
be further disseminated through the knowledge sharing networks of the wider 
community.  However, these theories have been criticised, as with all neo-liberal 
ideologies, for their depoliticisation and failure to engage with structural inequalities. 
 
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Chapter 8: The political economy of agricultural knowledge diffusion 342 
Firstly, farmer groups develop along the structural lines of cultural and political 
identities including caste, ethnicity, religion and political affiliation.  These divisions 
also shape the wider social networks of the community thus restricting the natural 
dissemination of agricultural knowledge to those who are not members of these 
farmer groups.  However, while identity based exclusion is associated with the 
ideologies behind production relations, it has been argued that production relations 
themselves can play a more direct material role in structuring the dissemination of 
agricultural knowledge.  Rent paying poorer farmers are obliged to work for long 
hours to meet the needs of simple reproduction and thus rarely have time to 
participate in training programs or in educational activities which will facilitate the 
utilisation of new knowledge.  This also isolates them from many of the social 
networks of the community through which knowledge circulates.  The geographical 
isolation of many of the poorest tenant communities further cuts off households from 
flows of agricultural knowledge, preventing them from being able to learn through 
everyday observation. 
 
There is further evidence that gender ideologies exclude women farmers from 
training programs, despite the fact that they perform most of the agricultural work.  
Furthermore, the production relations associated with these ideologies intensify the 
labour burden and further limit their capacity to participate in initiatives and utilise 
new knowledges. 
 
The conclusions which can be drawn from this chapter are that although cultural and 
political identities play a powerful role, it is class relations which represent the 
primary constraint to the dissemination of agricultural knowledge.  The relations of 
production continue to constrain the development of the productive forces through 
conditioning access to knowledge, even in the context of innovations which do not 
require increased expenditure.  This suggests that even the emphasis in Nepal’s APP 
on ‘extension’ is unlikely to significantly affect farmers’ capacity to produce a 
surplus and facilitate the emergence of petty commodity production or capitalist 
differentiation from within the pre-capitalist economic formations. 
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9 Conclusion 
 
9.1 Modes of production, structures of dominance and 
transition 
 
9.1.1 Modes of production in rural Morang 
 
Despite Nepal’s neo-liberal restructuring and the implementation of policies such as 
the APP, there is little evidence of profitable agricultural commodity production 
emerging in the villages of Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha.  This puts the 
possibilities of the APP’s envisaged mode of production based upon middle farm led 
commercialisation into immediate doubt.  It also challenges the developmentalist 
Marxian theories of agrarian change which assume the inevitable transition to a 
capitalist mode of production.  There is little evidence of capitalist differentiation and 
pre-capitalist modes of production appear predominant.   
 
It is necessary now to engage once again with the research questions identified at the 
outset of this study to understand the trajectory of agrarian change in rural Morang, 
before going on to examine the broader implications of this study.  The first research 
question sought to identify the modes of production present in rural Morang.  Thus 
far, three primary co-existing modes of production have been identified, within 
which each household is integrated to a greater or lesser extent.  Although 
articulations exist, each modes of production can be understood to have relative 
autonomy, rather than being dependent or functional to others. 
 
The overwhelming evidence suggests that semi-feudalism is the predominant mode 
of production in rural Morang, involving both ‘small farmers’ and ‘medium’ farmers 
as tenants
1
.  Question 1a seeks to understand how the modes of production present in 
Morang and the shifting relations of dominance have evolved over time.  The semi-
feudal mode of production has evolved from the policies of the Ranas, who provided 
                                                 
1
 It is debateable whether the participation of some ‘large farmers’ as tenants constitutes a ‘semi-
feudal’ relation of production given that tenancy can still be profitable for this group, although they 
are still far from becoming capitalist farmers. 
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land grants to political elites from the hills and set up a tax collection apparatus in 
rural areas, leading to stratification within indigenous communities and the 
development of a powerful land owning class.   
 
The only shift in recent years has been the decline of the indigenous landlords who 
had lost much of their estates during the land reforms of the 1960s and have fallen 
into cycles of indebtedness.  This was supplemented by the simultaneous rise of an 
absentee landlord class.  These landlords, many of whom descended from the hill 
origin land owning elites, were able to maintain control over their holdings primarily 
due to their power within the state apparatus.  Today, the semi-feudal mode of 
production appears dominant in Bhaudaha and Thalaha, whereby in the sample, 75% 
and 80% of operated land respectively is under tenancy to predominantly urban 
landlords.  Semi-feudalism is less dominant in Jhorahat, where only 41% of the land 
is under tenancy. 
 
Question 1b seeks to understand the character of each mode of production with a 
focus on the relations of production and the primary forms of surplus appropriation.  
The semi-feudal ‘relations of production’ include separation from the means of 
production and the associated form of surplus appropriation is the extraction of a 
large portion of the surplus as rent in kind by larger land owners.  Additional 
relations of production however exist at the micro level, whereby rent paying tenant 
households appropriate other households’ surplus when they purchase outside labour.  
Furthermore, there are flows of surplus within the household in the sphere of 
production between men and women.  The other component of the mode of 
production is the ‘productive forces’.  Within the semi-feudal mode of production, 
these include primarily family labour and limited outside labour that cultivates 
utilising minimal technology.   
 
An ‘extended’ understanding of a mode of production requires an analysis of its 
reproductive mechanisms on an economic, political and ideological level.  These 
mechanisms allow its continued functioning after one productive cycle.  The first 
element of the forces of production, tenant labour power, is reproduced on an 
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economic level through subsistence production and work within the home, primarily 
by female household members, as well as mostly capitalist wages from males.  The 
reproduction of the means of production is reliant upon the sphere of circulation, 
whereby households purchase low technology inputs originating in capitalist firms.  
The partial reliance upon the capitalist sector for the reproduction of the forces of 
production represents a loose articulation of modes of production.   
 
It is the reproductive mechanisms of the relations of production however, which are 
most significant in reproducing the semi-feudal mode of production and its forms of 
surplus appropriation after each productive cycle.  This primarily occurs on a 
political level, not just through legal property rights to land, but through the power of 
absentee landlords within the bureaucracy.  This has ensured they retain their control 
over landed property and their interests are not interrupted on a policy level.  
Furthermore, caste ideologies play a limited role in legitimising the class power of 
the high caste Brahmin and Chettri landed elites.  Caste also facilitates the 
reproduction of the additional relations of production between low caste agricultural 
labourers and rent paying tenants.   
 
The second ‘mode of production’ which is present in the Thru and Brahmin/Chettri 
villages of Jhorahat and less so in Bhaudaha and Thalaha is one based upon 
independent peasant production that involves ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large farmers’.  
This evolved from the emergence of property rights for land in the later Rana years 
and the simultaneous fall in the value of taxation which allowed some households to 
retain a large portion of their own surplus.  The independent peasant mode of 
production includes ‘relations of production’ whereby land is owned by the 
household.  Household members appropriate the product of their own necessary and 
surplus labour while simultaneously extracting surplus from the outside workers they 
employ.  The ‘forces of production’ include the use of primarily family labour and 
some outside labour with the help of minimal technology.   
 
The forces of production are reproduced once again, by subsistence production and 
wages from outside employment.  The means of production are renewed through the 
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market purchases of inputs produced by capitalist firms.  Once again, the processes 
preserving the relations of production appear to be dominant in explaining the 
reproduction of the independent peasant mode of production as a whole.  These 
include the property rights of households to land, but also the desire by peasants to 
hold on to this land through ‘overwork’.  Chapter 5 suggested that many of such 
households, especially those with only marginal holdings, intensify or ‘extend the 
working day’ on their farms in order to ensure they maintain their holdings.   
 
Finally, there is the capitalist mode of production of the urban and industrial sector 
which is articulated with both pre-capitalist modes of production.  This has evolved 
gradually following the end of the Rana years when manufacturing establishments 
were set up in rural Morang, and remains subordinate to Indian capitalism.   
 
Not only do many ‘small farmer’ households simultaneously labour in this mode of 
production, but all three categories of farmer sell crops which end up being sold to 
agricultural industries.  A capitalist mode is of course characterised by relations of 
production based upon the separation of labour and the means of production, while 
the forces of production include wage labour working with modern machinery.  In 
the context of rural Morang, labour power is reproduced not only through wages but 
by the pre-capitalist subsistence farming performed by many workers.  The means of 
production in capitalist enterprises are reproduced through the purchase of machinery 
and equipment from the capitalist mode of production and raw materials, often from 
the pre-capitalist economy.  The mechanisms through which the relations of 
production are reproduced are the property rights to the means of production and its 
ideological support mechanisms.  This preserves the relations of production and 
facilitates capital accumulation and the development of the productive forces.   
 
Question 1c seeks to understand the forms of surplus appropriation in the sphere of 
circulation and identify which mode of production they are associated with.  
Merchant capital, which was discussed in chapter 7, is particularly significant in this 
context.  It is important for the reproduction of the semi-feudal, independent peasant 
and capitalist mode of production after each productive cycle, by providing an outlet 
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for the sales of commodities and renewal of the productive forces.  However, it is 
evident that merchant capital plays a parasitic role, appropriating surplus from 
households through price manipulation and usury.   
 
Although merchant capital is not associated directly with one mode of production, 
instead linking the semi-feudal and independent peasant economy with the capitalist 
industrial and urban economy, its parasitic role suggests it can be more strongly 
considered an extension of the semi-feudal mode of production.  Not only does 
merchant capital, like rent, represent another extraction of surplus which is drained 
off for elite consumption rather than capital accumulation, its very existence is driven 
by the economic insecurity created by semi-feudal production relations.  For this 
reason, poorer tenant households are subject to the greatest levels of price 
manipulation by merchant capital.  However, independent peasant cultivators are not 
exempt from exploitative market exchanges, particularly those from the ‘small 
farmer’ category. 
 
The other forms of surplus appropriation through the sphere of circulation identified 
in chapter 7 are associated with capitalist industries, whereby oligopsony power 
within the rice mills facilitates the further manipulation of prices.   Prices are also 
depressed as a result of competition with Indian producers, representing another way 
surplus is absorbed through the market mechanism.  These latter two forms of 
surplus appropriation affect all farmers, including wealthier independent peasant 
cultivators. 
 
9.1.2 Relations between modes of production and transition 
 
Semi-feudal reproduction  
 
The second and most important research question seeks to examine how these forms 
of surplus appropriation through the relations of production and circulation have 
shaped the capacity of farms to engage in profitable commercialisation, identifying 
the implications for agrarian transition.  It is evident that they both hinder the 
emergence of either the middle-peasant led petty commodity production envisaged in 
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the APP, or the more likely scenario of profitable commodity production giving way 
to differentiation and the development of a capitalist class structure.  
 
It is clear from chapter 6 that those households integrated into the semi-feudal mode 
of production have limited opportunities to engage in profitable commercialisation 
without a fundamental change to the production relations.  Much of the product of 
surplus labour time is appropriated through pre-capitalist ground rent, and for many 
‘small farmers’, a portion of the product of necessary labour time is also extracted.  
This makes it virtually impossible for farmers to make profitable sales.  Farmers 
could in theory yield a surplus if they are able to purchase land, but this seems highly 
unlikely given the economic burden of rent which hinders accumulation.  The control 
over land by the absentee landlord class and the associated political support 
mechanism has therefore reproduced semi-feudal relations of production over time.   
 
The remaining question is whether tenant households could yield a surplus while still 
farming under semi-feudal production relations, possibly paving the way for them to 
access the land market in the future.  However, this also appears highly unlikely as 
rents remain so high.  In chapter 6 it was demonstrated how the levels of rent are 
connected with the underdeveloped character of the industrial sector.  This has 
further reinforced the class power of landlords whose control over land is already 
supported on a political and ideological level.  Farmers simply lack alternative 
livelihood options and are thus reliant upon tenancies to meet at least part of their 
subsistence needs.  There is competition for tenancies amongst poorer medium 
farmers, small farmers, and even landless labourers, who all seek some enhanced 
livelihood security.  This dependence gives the landlords few incentives to lower 
rents in ways which may facilitate tenants in yielding a surplus.  This impacts all 
categories of farmer, including the ‘medium farmers’ within which one would expect 
capitalist differentiation to begin.  Interestingly, landlords are themselves integrated 
into a bureaucracy that for generations has served the interests of a domestic 
comprador bourgeoisie and foreign capital, impeding the development of industrial 
capitalism in Nepal (Bhattarai, 2003;  Blaikie et al., 2001).  The presence of 
landlords within the state apparatus can perhaps be better understood when one 
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acknowledges that industrial stagnation benefits landlords as well as the comprador 
and foreign bourgeoisie.  
 
‘Small farmers’ do choose to combine tenancy with non-farm employment in order 
to manage the risks associated with both forms of labour, in effect ‘raiding’ the 
capitalist sector periodically to meet their subsistence shortfalls.  However the 
capitalist industrial sector and informal urban employment is by no means well 
enough developed to draw farmers out of agriculture to form a proletariat and reduce 
the levels of surplus appropriation for the remaining tenants.  The need to labour in 
both sectors to survive appears thus to have created an equilibrium and articulation of 
modes of production whereby the surplus labour of the peasantry is shared by both 
capitalists and landlords.  Rather than capitalist development expanding to 
undermine the power of landlords, the two modes of production support each other. 
 
Aside from rent, the further surplus appropriation by merchant capital discussed in 
chapter 7 further constrains households from accumulating.  This is particularly 
pertinent given that extraction through price manipulation and interest on loans are 
both intricately connected with the economic insecurity which, in the first instance, is 
derived from the relations of production.  Semi-feudal rent reduces incomes and 
increases the demand for credit, driving farmers to merchants for loans.  Economic 
insecurity and debt decreases producer’s bargaining power, driving them to accept 
high interest rates and low commodity prices.  
 
However, could households retain a surplus in the context of the existing forms of 
surplus appropriation by developing the forces of production through investment in 
yield increasing inputs?  Chapter 6 suggested that the economic insecurity which 
arises in the first instance from surplus appropriation in both the relations of 
production and circulation, constrain tenant farmers from investing in new 
technology.  In fact, even purchasing basic inputs such as fertilisers, pushes many 
households further into debt.  Furthermore, for those on share tenancies there are few 
incentives to invest on one’s land given that half of each unit of labour or capital is 
appropriated by landlords.   
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Nevertheless, increased expenditure on inputs is not the only means through which 
the forces of production can be developed.  Chapter 8 suggested that new agricultural 
knowledges may have the potential to develop the productive forces without 
requiring new technologies.  Once again, however, poorer households face severe 
difficulties accessing these ‘non-economic’ resources.  The semi-feudal landlord 
class who have little interest in agriculture play a limited role in encouraging 
innovation.  Meanwhile the intense labouring commitments for those already subject 
to multiple forms of surplus appropriation and exclusionary caste and class 
ideologies limit their participation in farmer groups and training programs.  In 
addition, they isolate many households from the restricted knowledge sharing social 
networks of the village.  Furthermore, given that gender ideologies dictate that 
women bear a disproportionate share of the burden of labour in production and 
household reproduction, they have little time to participate in farmer groups.  This 
has implications for the successful utilisation of any new knowledge, given the 
important role that women play in the grain cultivation process. 
 
Independent peasant mode of production and potential for transition? 
 
While it is clear that the semi-feudal mode of production and its associated forms of 
surplus appropriation is persisting alongside the underdeveloped capitalist sector and 
appears unlikely to be undermined, is it possible that profitable commodity 
production or even capitalist class relations may emerge from within the independent 
peasant mode of production?  There is evidence that this mode of production 
maintains a degree of resistance against both feudalism and also capitalism, as even 
the smallest producers intensify their labour to maintain control over their land.  
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that capitalism will develop from within this 
economic formation to a significant level.   
 
Firstly, it appears that semi-feudalism is gradually increasing its dominance.  A 
significant 20% of households participate in the independent peasant as well as the 
semi-feudal mode of production; cultivating rented land as well as their own land 
simultaneously.  The evidence suggests that this practice may be increasing as small 
Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 351 
owner cultivators sell their land.  Secondly, owner cultivating ‘small’ and ‘medium’ 
farmers must still endure many of the forms of surplus appropriation which have 
flourished in the context of semi-feudalism such as usury and price manipulation by 
merchants.  Although they are subjugated to merchant capital to a lesser extent than 
those primarily ‘small farmers’ who are purely tenants, many are heavily in debt to 
merchants and money lenders, especially in the context of the high cultural capital 
investments they are required to make.  Many are even in debt to microfinance 
institutions.  The economic circumstances of ‘small farmers’ who own land in this 
context is often similar to their tenant counterparts.   
 
Growing cycles of indebtedness can explain why within the ‘small’ and ‘medium’ 
category there have been more land sales than purchases.  However, it is also 
important to acknowledge the sheer degree to which urban based landlords have 
class control over land resources.  Even those few ‘medium farmers’ who one would 
expect could expand and display capitalist tendencies are severely constrained by the 
difficulties they face in accessing a land market monopolised by an urban elite.  It is 
thus evident that the semi-feudal mode of production has a degree of dominance in 
that its control over land limits the extent to which holdings can expand. 
 
Although many owner cultivator households from the ‘medium farmer’ group do 
have access to new agricultural knowledges which could boost production through 
training programmes, the intra-household class relations whereby there is a limited 
participation of women, once again, obstruct their successful utilisation. 
 
The one group of owner cultivators who do display early signs that they could 
potentially shift from being independent peasant producers to becoming capitalist 
cultivators are the ‘large farmers’.  Although many also rent some land, this 
supplements larger personal holdings and still appears to yield a profit.  This group 
are driven on the whole by profit, employ relatively more outside labour, and are 
developing the productive forces through the use of improved technologies, while 
many have increased their landholdings.  However, the ‘large farmers’ are small in 
number, comprising only 8% of the sample.  For widespread profitable development 
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as envisaged in the APP, or capitalist differentiation; one would expect the process to 
begin from a majority population of commercialised middle peasants, which was not 
found in the fieldwork for this research. 
 
Furthermore, even the ‘large farmers’ are facing declining financial returns from 
agriculture.  It is in this context one can understand why many are in fact choosing to 
migrate overseas and give up cultivation altogether.  In chapter 6 it was demonstrated 
how the Thru community in particular, are required to invest extensively in cultural 
capital driving many into debt.  The ideology this supports is not necessarily 
associated with the reproduction of the current mode of production, but originates in 
an older economic formation when wealthier Thrus were a powerful feudal class.  
 
Chapter 7 also suggests that large farmers are not immune from surplus appropriation 
by merchant capital.  They have a stronger bargaining power in lieu of their 
economic status which makes them valued customers, while fewer are in debt to 
merchants.  However, in the context of high capital immobility in the commercial 
sector they are on the whole still subject to commodity prices determined by 
oligopsonistic collusion, especially in Naya Bazaar, although the manipulations are 
less than for their poorer counterparts.  Furthermore, there is some evidence of price 
manipulation further up the commodity chain in the circuit of industrial capital.  It 
was reported that grain processing industries also collude to fix prices, impacting the 
profitability of sales by farming households from all wealth categories.  This 
represents another loose articulation between the pre-capitalist mode of production 
and capitalist industrial sector.  In addition to price manipulations, it is evident that 
all producers in Morang, including profit oriented ‘large farmers’, face difficulties 
competing with Indian farmers as a result of the better levels of government support 
in India such as subsidies.  Imports of Indian rice in this context depress the rates for 
Nepalese producers.   
 
A final point worth making is that even when ‘large farmers’ are able to expand their 
holdings, there is a limit to how large they can become so long as the semi-feudal 
landlord class maintain their control over land resources.  Thus far there is little 
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evidence of absentee landlords selling up to profitable farmers, with most 
transactions occurring within the landlords class itself. 
 
Productive use of ‘surplus’ 
 
While it is clear that the surplus appropriated from the peasantry has blocked 
agrarian transformation, an avenue for further study is a further exploration of how 
the surplus is actually used.  Is surplus reinvested ‘productively’, producing growth 
elsewhere in the economy, which in the long term may strengthen livelihoods and 
undermine farmers’ reliance upon tenancies?  The long history of parasitic activities 
by landlords in Nepal casts doubt on the possibility that surplus is used 
‘productively’, particularly when many of the landlords are political elites from 
within the bureaucracy rather than being from an industrialist bourgeoisie.  
Furthermore, land ownership is prized as a source of social status as much as it is 
used as a source of material wealth.  As for merchants, chapter 7 suggested that the 
surplus appropriated after one cycle of buying and selling (C-M-C’) does not appear 
to be reinvested in ‘production’, but is used for consumption purposes, or to further 
their money lending or trading capacity.   
 
The exact use of surplus appropriated by landlords and merchant capital requires 
further analysis and verification.  However a remaining question is what happens to 
the surplus appropriated by manufacturing industries both through the use of semi-
proletarian peasant labour or monopolistic activities.  This represents a form of 
productive capital, and capitalist industries, unlike merchants and landlords, are by 
their very nature driven by expanded rather than simple reproduction, appropriating 
surplus for reinvestment and capital accumulation
2
.   
 
                                                 
2
Under simple reproduction, which arguably characterises many semi-feudal forms of surplus 
appropriation, the dominant class utilises the surplus product primarily for individual consumption or 
to renew the production or trading cycle at current levels of output (Marx, 1974, 566-578; 1956, 329).  
However, under expanded reproduction, one part of the surplus value produced during a single cycle 
of production (M-C-M’) is used to reproduce the means of production and labour power required for 
current levels of output.  Another part is accumulated, and can be used to increase investment in the 
means of production above what is required to replace the capital advanced (and any increased labour 
required to operate it) at existing levels of productivity (Marx, 1974, 580-582, 1956, 493).   
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Arguably however, it would be wrong to suggest that the high profits these industries 
yield from the peasantry facilitate the broader process of industrialisation.  As was 
discussed in chapter 2, in the context of the long running comprador-imperialist 
alliance, Nepal’s industrial sector remains subordinate to foreign (primarily Indian) 
capital (Bhattarai, 2003;  Blaikie et al., 2001).  Given this dominance, the expanded 
reproduction which does occur is arguably of a deformed nature whereby a portion of 
the total surplus enters expanded reproduction not locally but abroad.  This would 
suggest that any surplus profit extracted by the industrial sector is likely to enrich 
local comprador and Indian capital rather than a domestic capitalist class who could 
engage in expanded reproduction across the Nepalese economy.  Even if increases in 
levels of production do occur, they will by no means facilitate independent 
industrialisation given that neo-liberal policies and competition from India mean that 
industrial enterprises in Morang (as in much of Nepal), remain restricted to  agro-
processing and small scale manufacturing, with most capital goods being imported 
(Bhattarai, 2003).  Although further analysis on the use of the ‘surplus’ appropriated 
from farmers is necessary, initial evidence suggests that it represents an unproductive 




9.2 Policy Implications, class struggle and visions for the 
future 
 
9.2.1 Fundamental flaws of the APP 
 
It is clear that Nepal is far from developing agrarian capitalism as understood by 
Marx.  There is little evidence of an emerging sector of profitable competing middle-
peasants from which differentiation would occur, even amongst owner cultivators, 
and the absence of widespread accumulation suggests it is unlikely to occur in the 
near future.  Furthermore, two thirds of the rural population is integrated into semi-
feudal production relations as tenants, or is part of a rural labouring class working for 
tenants, owner cultivators or in an insecure underdeveloped capitalist sector.     
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This not only casts doubt upon the emergence of agrarian capitalism but on the 
APP’s vision of a dynamic middle-peasant led transformation.  The pro-poor vision it 
was promoting appears highly unlikely to ever be realised in reality.  Even if 
significant profitable commercialisation had emerged, to assume it will enrich the 
middle farmers appears naïve.  It neglects to account for possibilities of class 
differentiation through land consolidation which would have succeeded in destroying 
a peasantry and opening up new sources of profit for an expanding global capitalism.  
Nevertheless, the fundamental paradox is that the APP not only diverted attention 
from such possibilities, it also inadvertently glossed over persistent pre-capitalist 
modes of production.  These economic formations have impeded any expansion of 
capitalist social relations in the first instance.  Instead they have perpetuated relations 
of production and circulation which have impoverished vast strata of the rural 
population, but without any of the ‘positive’ impacts of capitalism such as the 
development of the productive forces. 
 
9.2.2 Lessons for the future 
 
Engagement with class in development policy and paths of development 
 
What lessons can be learnt from this analysis?  Firstly, it is crucial that state led 
policies seeking poverty alleviation and economic development in low income 
countries move away from a disembedded neo-liberal view of the social world and 
instead actively engage with the class relations through which surplus is 
appropriated.  Identification of such class processes however, suggests that small 
scale technocratic interventions such as access to infrastructure and extension 
services will by no means be sufficient to encourage agrarian transformation and 
poverty alleviation.  It instead requires radical structural transformations which can 
directly undermine both exploitative pre-capitalist relations of production and 
Nepal’s unequal integration into a global capitalist economy. 
 
Unfortunately, despite the dramatic political changes in Nepal over the last three 
years, support for neo-liberal policies such as the APP has not declined and the 
governments post-conflict interim development plan expressed commitment to its 
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‘full implementation’ (Nepal National Planning Commission, 2007).  Furthermore, 
the CPN(M), the one party from whom one would expect an engagement with issues 
of class and surplus appropriation, resigned from the government in May 2009.  This 
was a culmination of growing fissures in the alliance between the radical left and the 
mainstream parties who led the government.  Nevertheless, the Maoists may well 
return to the government in the near future, and they have certainly put radical 
structural change on the agenda as Nepal re-writes its constitution. 
 
There are currently two paths of structural transformation which could in theory be 
pursued by progressive political forces to drive long term rural development and 
poverty alleviation in post-conflict Nepal.  The first path would include reforms to 
facilitate short term capitalist development in agriculture and undermine feudalism.  
Under orthodox Marxian understandings of the social world, the development of the 
productive forces through capitalism is in fact necessary for future socialist 
transformation (Peet, 2007).  The second path however, would be for present and 
future governments to identify alternative courses of transition to a more equitable 
economic formation.  Peet (2007) stresses that the CPN(M) must not attempt to 
replicate the European experience of capitalist development seeking the development 
of an industrial working class.  It is instead necessary to consider alternative paths to 
socialism more appropriate to the Nepalese political-economic context where the 
peasantry and rural economy play a more active role.  Insights could be learned from 
efforts by the Maoists themselves to introduce more equitable economic formations 
at the village level during the conflict time in some of their rural ‘base areas’.  Aside 
from land redistribution, co-operatives were established as well as experiments with 
communal forms of production (Manadhar, 2004;  Sharma, 2004).  Such initiatives 
must be examined in greater detail if one is to identify paths to a uniquely Nepalese 
form of socialism. 
 
At the present conjuncture however, it appears that the main political parties, 
including the CPN (M) appear to be following the first path, broadly seeking national 
capitalist development.  At this point it is not appropriate to enter debate over which 
path is desirable in the distant future, but to outline the ways in which capitalist 
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development could be achieved in the current political context based upon the rural 
case study in this thesis.  In the short term, capitalist transformations in agriculture in 
regions such as Morang are certainly preferable to the current social formation 
dominated by semi-feudalism.     
 
What political interventions would be necessary to stimulate capitalist development 
in agriculture?  The implementation of land reforms is once again on the agenda of 
the post-conflict government, and certainly would have the potential to undermine 
semi-feudal relations of production in many Terai districts.  However, land reform 
alone is not sufficient to bring about poverty alleviation and capitalist development.  
It is also necessary for example, to introduce reforms to the agricultural marketing 
system such as the introduction of marketing cooperatives to reduce the power of 
merchants.  Furthermore, the blocked development of industry also means that any 
‘capitalist’ development which could occur following agrarian reform would 
arguably lead to differentiation and the release of a burgeoning under-employed 
‘reserve army’ of cheap labour, providing exceptional profits for capital.  In order for 
independent capitalist agriculture to emerge where the labouring majority enjoys 
increased living standards and capacity for collective mobilisation, there must be 
simultaneous growth in both industry and agriculture.  Development policy would 
therefore have to simultaneously address issues associated with Nepal’s position 
within global and regional trade regimes.   
 
Unfortunately, the likelihood that the new coalition government can successfully 
introduce such reforms appears overly optimistic at the current conjuncture.  The 
success of land reforms would depend upon a transformation of the bureaucracy and 
political landscape so it no longer serves the needs of the older establishment.  This 
appears particularly important when one considers previous failed attempts at 
redistribution.  However, there is little evidence of such a transformation in the 
Nepali state and parties such as the Nepali Congress that have long served the local 
interests of landed classes, retain considerable power in both parliament and the 
bureaucracy.  The semi-feudal mode of production in agriculture is reproduced 
through the party and state apparatus itself, as was discussed in chapter 5.  Similarly, 
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reforms which may reverse Nepal’s subordination to Indian and foreign capitalism 
and promote domestic industrialisation appear utopian.  Not only is it unlikely that 
the power of an imperialist-comprador bourgeoisie within the bureaucracy can be 
undermined overnight, most crucially, Nepal remains dependent upon international 
financiers.  The neo-liberal economic policies they promote are openly hostile to any 
form of protectionism which could undermine the dominance of foreign (particularly 
Indian) capital in Nepal.   
 
The difficulties outlined above suggest that any transformation to a dynamic national 
capitalist or even socialist economy would require radical state restructuring, 
whereby landlords, the comprador-imperialist alliance and international financiers 
would be challenged on a political level.  This seems an unlikely outcome under the 
current regime.  Nevertheless, are there reforms which will be possible in the short 
term to promote limited poverty alleviation and capitalist development in the context 
of the current political structure?   
 
In the agrarian sector it is pertinent to identify possible policies which can at least 
reduce the levels of surplus appropriation without the necessity for an actual 
redistribution of assets.  These could include for example tenancy reforms and the 
regulation of levels of rent which may be easier to implement on a practical basis, as 
Besley and Burgess (2000) suggest, based upon Indian data.  Chapter 6 also suggests 
that fixed rents are most effective at encouraging investment, suggesting that the 
prohibition of sharecropping may have a limited impact on agricultural development 
and poverty alleviation.  The establishment of marketing co-operatives may also be 
practically viable, an example of which is a ‘grain bank’ in Tanki Sinuwari VDC to 
the east of Jhorahat which was both an outlet for grain sales and source of credit 
which was controlled by farmers.  Locals reported that this significantly increased 
the bargaining power of cultivators and reduced their dependence upon and 
indebtedness to the kahwalas.  While such initiatives alone are unlikely to 
encourage significant capitalist development, there may be a short term poverty 
alleviation impact for cultivating classes. 
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9.2.3 Identification of sites of class struggle  
 
The conclusions of this research are not only significant through their contribution to 
debate on the policies which can undermine Nepal’s entrenched class inequalities 
and forms of surplus appropriation.  This research has perhaps most crucially, 
offered progressive political actors an insight into the character of the class alliances 
which can potentially mobilise for political-economic transformation.  It is after all, 
not the role of the academic to ‘prescribe’ change and come up with solutions but to 
inform debate as to political possibilities.  Both the radical long term and short term 
political-economic solutions outlined above require the support of the rural majority 
in a committed political movement.  Transformations therefore must be brought forth 
not only through policy prescriptions and political intervention from above, but from 
below through class struggle.   
 
Whatever the program of change sought by the current or future governments, this 
study has identified the multiple contradictions of the social formation against which 
class struggle in the ‘New Nepal’ can be directed.  It has identified contradictions 
both at a local level associated with pre-capitalist forms of surplus appropriation, and 
those occurring at an international scale with regards to imperialism.  Most crucially, 
this research has identified the complex ways in which individuals are subject to 
multiple forms of oppression, fused together through the broader structures of the 
social  formation and its three ‘modes of production’.  This research has therefore 
asserted that movements for political change will require complex class alliances 
between different segments of the peasantry subject to multiple forms of surplus 
appropriation, women, and the proletariat of landless workers.  In this context, 
mobilisation also requires struggle on an ideological level against the oppressive 
ideologies of caste, class and gender which have reproduced exploitative economic 
relations over the centuries.  Only by simultaneously challenging the multiple 
contractions of the Nepali social formation through such means can one envisage the 
radical changes necessary for an alternative more dynamic and equitable economic 
formation on the Nepali plains, capable of raising living standards for the majority. 
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Appendix 1: Record of Interviews and Surveys completed 
Appendix 1-1: Quantitative Farmer Surveys completed by VDC, Ward 
No. and village 
 
VDC, Ward and Village Proposed sample (20% of hh 
population) 
Completed sample 
Jhorahat – 2, Jhorahat and 
Janghrahi villages 
46 46 
Jhorahat – 7, Pidarboni 
village 
10 10 
Jhorahat – 8, Pidarboni 
village 
8 8 
Jhorahat – 9, Pidarboni 
village 
19 17 
Bhaudaha – 6, Bhaudaha 
village 
22 22 
Bhaudaha – 7, Sitpur village 21 19 
 
Thalaha – 1, Thalaha village 29 29 
 




Appendix 1-2: Semi-structured Qualitative Interviews and focus groups 
by VDC and farmer category 
 






Small farmer 8 
Medium farmer 9 
Large farmer 5 










*As these households were not included in the survey they could not be 
 classified by farmer type 
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Appendix 1-3: Additional interviews:  
 
Women farmer focus 
groups/interviews 
4 
Absentee Landlords 1 
Merchants 1* 
Local development workers 3 
Land revenue office staff 1 




* A number of qualitative interviews were also carried out with Katahari and Naya Bazaar merchants 
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Appendix 2: Farmer Survey Form 
 




Name of head of household (optional)________ 
Sex of interviewee_________ 
Caste/Ethnic Group ___________ 
No. of people in household ____________ 
 
1a) How much land do you operate and what type of land is it? 
 
Land Type Owned and self 
cultivated (hectares)  
Owned by household 
cultivated by others 
(hectares) (state payment 
form) 
Owned by others and cultivated by 




   
Rain-fed 
 
   
Fish pond 
 
   
 
b) For rented land: 
 
    What is form of payment  
____________________________________________ 
 
    Who is the landlord? 
 
Local farmer  






     
 
    Who makes decisions? 
_____________________________________________ 
 
    What agricultural advice does landlord offer? 
____________________________     
 
  Does landlord invest in fertiliser? 
______________________________________ 
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2) What livestock do you own? 
 




































in last year 































































     



































     

































































     
 
 
4) How many different merchants have you sold your crops to in the last five 
years? ________________ 
 
5) In the last year, when you sold your crops, was any of the sale taken by 
the merchant as payment for any other service (eg. Loans, rental of 
equipment, land rent) 
 
Crop Payment for which service Interest rate Amount given as 
payment (kg) 
Paddy (Kanchi)  
 
  
Paddy (Mansuli)   
 
 
Paddy (Basmati)   
 
 
Paddy (Chaiti)   
 
 
Other Paddy   
 
 
































8) How much did you invest in farm production in the last year? 
 
Investment Wheat /pulse crop Chaite paddy crop Main autumn 
paddy crop 
 
Cost per unit 
(rupees) 

































































9a) In the last year, did you employ labour on your farm?  
_____________________ 
 










Cash rate   
 
Kind rate   
 





Wheat / dal crop 
Planting  
 
   
Weeding 
 




   





c) If a contract was used for the harvest, what was the rate? 
___________________ 
 




10a) In the last five years, did you buy or sell any land, livestock or 
equipment? 
 


















11) In the last year, did you make any large non agricultural investments over 
Rs10,000?  If so, what were the investments and how much did they cost? 
 











13) What other work are members of your household involved in? 
 
Work All year or seasonal Average no. of hours 
worked per day 
Annual income (Rupees- 
unless otherwise stated) 
Working in others’ fields   
 
 
Factories   
 
 
Rickshaw   
 
 
Handicrafts   
 
 
Migrant remittances  
(from which country 
____________________) 
   










14) Have you received a loan in the last five years?  Who was it from and 
what was the interest? 
 
Loan Source Year of loan                Amount                      Interest Purpose 
 
 
    


















15) Have you received assistance from NGOs or government services to 
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Name of retailer___________ 
 
1) How many buyers were there for the following crops over the last year and 
what is their current buying and selling price. 
 
Crop No. of buyers Buying Price (Rs/kg)  Selling Price (Rs/Kg) 
Kanchi    
Mansuli    
Chaiti    
Basmati    
Rada Bara    
Wheat    
Mustard    
Kesari    
Musuri    
Alas    
Jute    
 
2) Roughly how many maund of the following crop was bought in the last 
year? 
 






















Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Appendices 384 
Appendix 4: Example sampling map 
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Have you increased production for the market in recent years? Gayako 
barsha-haru-maa bechna kolaagi banera utpadaan baDhaauna kehi garnu 
bhaeko chha? 
 
What do you think needs to change for you to increase production for the 
market and achieve a better income from agriculture?  What prevents you 
from increasing production? Bechna kolagi bhanera utpadaan baDhaauna ke 
pariwartin hunu parcha? 
 
Ask about Chait rice?  When did the production begin? Chaite dhaan 





Why do you choose to sell when you do? Aaphno baali kahile bechne 





Tell us about the process when you sell crops to the Katawala.  How is the 
price decided?  Can you bargain and receive a reduction? Katawalaa lai 
bechdhaakeri bhau kasari tokinchha? 
 
How do you choose which Kata to sell to?  Kun kata lai bechne bhanne 
nirnaya kasari garnuhuncha? 
 
If you are offered a poor price, can you easily move to a different Katawala? 
Euta katale ramrod bhau diena bhane arko kata-maa bechna saknuhuncha?  
 
Do you have a particularly good relationship with one Kata? 
Kunai eutaa katawala sanga aru kata bhandaa bishes ramrod sambanda cha 
ki chaina? 
 
What do you think prevents you from receiving a favourable price for your 
crops? 
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Training and innovation 
 
Have you taken any agricultural training in the last few years?  If so, have 
you made use of the techniques taught to you?  Tapai gaeko barshamaa 
kunai naya taalim linubhaeko chha? 
 
How have these new techniques changed your production decisions? Naya 
tarika sikepachi utpadaan sambandhi nirnaya-maa kasto pariwartin bhaeko 
chha? 
 
Do you regularly share and learn about new agricultural techniques from 
other people in the community?  Ke tapai gaau-ko manche sanga krishi ko 
naya tarikaaharu baremaa niyamit rupmaa kurakani chalfal garnuhuncha? 
 
Do you know about SRI?  If so, are you interested in learning to adopt the 
new technique? 
SRI baremaa sunnu bhaeko chha? 
 
Are you members of any farmers groups?  What do you do in these groups? 
Tapai kunai Krishaak samuhako sadhasya hunuhuncha? 
 
 
Land ownership relations  
 
How often do you meet your landlords?  What kind of support do they offer 
you? Tapai afno malik lai ek barsha ma kati patak bhetnuhuncha?  Zamindar 
bata kasto sahayog pahunuhuncha? 
 
How did these landlords come to own so much land?   
Tapaiko bicharma zamindarsanga haru kasari dherai jagajamin bhayo? 
 
How has your families economic status changed over the last 10 years? 
Gaeko das barshama tapaiko pariwarko aartik awastha ma kasto pariwartin 
ayo?  
 
What was the economic status of your family during your 
grandfather/grandmother’s time. 









Fraser Sugden: Agrarian change and pre-capitalist reproduction on the Nepal Terai 
 
Appendices 387 
Appendix 6: Sample interview transcript 
 
Large farmer, Pidarboni, Jhorahat VDC (interviewee identifiers omitted from 
transcript): 
 
RA = Research Assistant, F = Fraser, I = Interviewee 
 
RA: In last two to three years what have you done to increase the production for 
the market. 
I: As the number of people in our family is high and for our use we have to do 
something to increase production. We use different kinds of compost and 
fertilizers. I have been involved myself in agriculture to increase production 
and supply for the market. 
RA: How do you think production will be increased?  
I: For that much training is required on what to grow, how to grow, the use of 
fertilizers, irrigation and methods. 
 For example this time the training was provided on Chaite.  Exactly 12 days 
were used to learn how to sow.  The distance was fixed and the farmers were 
taken to the field from time to time to observe. The production has increased 
from 4 maan per kattha to 8-10 maan. But to cultivate in that way it is 
difficult. It needs more effort.  However, if it can be done in that way 
production can be greater in a small area of land. The main thing we need is 
training on how we can grow more on little land. 
RA: Besides training, what else can be done? 
I: Irrigation, but training is more important. There has to be sufficient water and 
the weather should be favourable. There should be enough manpower. There 
has to be enough money. Everything has to be available. We look for 
technicians but they are not there sometimes. 
RA: How have you been growing Chaiti? 
I: It has been two years. Before that we didn’t knew about it. Chaite is planted 
from the last week of Falgun to the first week of Chaitra......it is harvested in 
Jestha and it can be started again in Ashad. 
F:  Chaiti was not grown before two years? 
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I: No it was not grown. The farmers had stopped planting other rice. The 
production have gone down and the expenses were high for other rice so now 
people have focused on Chaite. Because of Chaite farmers get money which 
helps farmers recover losses from other crops. That is why the cultivation of 
Chaiti is increasing. 
F: How is the JTA Center? 
I: It is in Jhorahaat, they are effective. As the people do not have any awareness 
about calling the JTA they have not been able to call him.   The JTA is trying 
to help and they themselves even take the initiative to help farmers, but 
people are not taking the service. 
RA: Are you using the SRI method mama? 
I: Not in my own land, but other people have been using it. The farmers are 
encouraged by the JTA. If farmers use this method the production is high, but 
it is not so useful if you have more than two bighas of land. 
RA:  Mama why are you not applying this method? 
I: Because I do not have anyone to work on the field and most of the time I am 
busy at the school so I hardly go to my field. 
RA: Does this method take long time? 
I: Yes it does take long time. The farmers have to be educated and they should 
be given training and should be taught clearly. As it is the new method the 
farmers do not trust this method. They should be assured about the change it 
will bring. 
RA: Mama you told us that the SRI method is not good for the farmers with more 
land but it is better for the farmers who have less land. Why is it like that? Is 
it because it takes much effort and consumes more time? 
I:  Yes it is difficult. It takes a lot of time. Weeding is also difficult, it requires 
more manpower and effort during planting and weeding but the production is 
high at the end. 
F: So weeding is difficult? 
I: Yes, sometimes the machine is also used for weeding, 
F: Do you have those machines in this village? 
I: Yes there are two now which the villagers are using. 
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RA: Is it provided by the Agriculture office? 
I:  Yes. It has to be used manually but it is very effective. It does the work of 10 
people at a time. 
RA: So weeding is easy with the machine? 
I: Yes  
F: Are all the people provided with this kind of machine? 
I: Now only two have been provided it to experiment in the field. It was given 
during the training. It saves a lot of time also. But the SRI method is time 
consuming. 
RA: On which basis do you decide to sell in the market? How do you decide when 
to sell? 
I: The main basis is the market price. Another basis is the requirement.  
Whenever the price is higher we sell during that time. 
RA: Do you store the crops to wait for a better price? 
I: Yes we store and sell whenever the price is better. 
RA: Mama you sell the crops to the katawala. What is the process of selling it to 
the katawala? 
I: We take it to the katawala. They tell us the price and we sell. We can not 
bargain over the price. 
RA: Do you bargain sometimes? 
I: Not always but sometimes for Rs. 5-10 (per maund). 
RA: When you go to sell the crops, with how many katawala do you sell? 
I: To one katawala. If we have only smaller amounts of crops then we sell to 
different katawalas but when one has more to sell then the crops are sold to 
only one or two  katawalas. 
RA: why do you sell to only one or two katawala when you have more crops? 
I: Because when we sell more to only one or two katawalas then we can get 
money on time and we can ask for money whenever we want. 
RA: So that means there are one or two big businessman? 
I: Yes 
RA: do they charge you interest when you borrow money from them? 
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I: No they don’t charge if it is for a short time, even for 2- 3 months they do not 
charge any interest. 
RA: So they pay you a better price than others? 
I: No, the price is fixed and they give us the market price. But sometimes when 
we make a loan agreement in Baishak and Jestha, in Falgun when we will sell 
our crops the price they charge us will be the price of Baishak. Even if the 
price has increased by Falgun. 
RA: Mama, when you sell crops in Magh, Falgun, you said they pay money in 
Baishak, don’t they give you money immediately? 
I: Yes, they pay at that time. 
RA: How is your relationship with the Katawalas? 
I:  It is good. 
RA: When one katawala do not give you good price then is it easy to switch to 
another katawala? 
I:  Yes, we sell to other katawalas too and we sell the crops and take the money 
so it’s our choice. 
RA: Are you a member of a farmers’ groups? 
I: No 
RA: Why? 
I: It has formed recently, and I could not give it time. They have kept me as 
member but I never have time. I am busy with school. 
RA: Have you attended the SRI training? 
I: No I have not attended it but I have observed when there was holiday in the 
school. 
RA: What are the mediums of learning new agricultural methods? 
I: The medium are the NGOs and INGOs, they have formed the farmers group. 
They go to the agriculture office and get registered and then they become the 
main medium. 
RA: Are there possibilities of farmers getting together and bargain for a better 
price? 
I: No, because of their poor economic condition. The farmers are illiterate. They 
have been selling their land to meet most of their expenses. When they take 
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loans the interest is very high and to pay the loan and the interest it is difficult 
for the farmers as they don’t have any other income source. So they start 
selling their land. 
RA: Has the land reform act has changed the ownership of land for the people who 
had up to 50 Bigas of land? 
I: Yes it did, but because of illiteracy and economic conditions, most of the 
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Appendix 7: Model to examine price formation in exchange 
between merchants and farmers 
Appendix 7-1: Model  
In chapter 7 it was suggested that three factors influence the price offered to farmers 
by merchants.  These include firstly, the behaviour of merchants in the market where 
farmers sell.  In Naya bazaar and Katahari markets there is evidence of collusive 
activity which depress prices.  This local oligopsony further hinders ‘large farmers’ 
and wealthier ‘medium farmers’ from yielding anything close to an average profit, 
while it makes it even more difficult for poorer ‘medium’ and ‘small’ farmers to 
meet their subsistence needs through agriculture.  The considerable variations in 
price which still occur in both market regions can be explained by two further 
factors, the economic status of the farmer and their resultant capacity to develop 
mutually beneficial relations with merchants, and the degree to which farmers are 
indebted to merchants.  
 
It is useful to statistically test the proportionate role of these three factors through a 
multiple linear regression analysis.  This can both back up qualitative testimonies and 
provide richer insights into the relative influence each factor has upon the price 
received by the producer.  Before producing a statistical model it is necessary to 
identify and ensure the suitability of variables.  For the dependant variable measuring 
the price received, it is natural to once again use the average price received for 
kanchi paddy in the 2007 harvest, given its importance as a crop and the large 
amount of data available.  It is a continuous variable and is thus suitable for a linear 
regression analysis.   
 
The first independent variable which will be entered into the model is the market 
region.  This variable is problematic as it is categorical, and is thus not suitable in its 
current form for linear regression.  However, one can get around this problem by 
converting it into a dummy variable, whereby sales in Jhorahat and Tetariya = 1, and 
sales in Bhaudaha and Nayabazaar = 0. 
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The second variable which may impact variations in the prices received is the 
economic status of the household.  Thus far the focus has been on the household 
categories identified in chapter 6.  Although the categories of this variable can be 
ordered and ranked, the data remains ordinal i.e. the distance between each category 
is not known.  This can be problematic as linear regression assumes that each 
variable contains data which is either interval, whereby the distance between 
categories are known, or continuous.  I therefore chose an alternative continuous 
variable, namely the total value of produce sold to katawalas over the last year
1
.  
After all, the qualitative evidence suggests merchants build up mutually beneficial 
relationships with farmers who sell in the greatest quantities.  This variable is highly 
skewed, as can be seen in Appendix 7-2.  A log transformation of this variable 
however, produces something much closer to a normal distribution as can be seen in 
Appendix 7-3, and produced stronger results.  The log of this variable is therefore 
used in the analysis. 
 
The final independent variable which will be entered into the model is the level of 
indebtedness of farmers to merchants.  It was established that the impact of debt 
upon price received is particularly acute for households whereby the loan constitutes 
a large proportion of their total annual income.  This variable has already been used 
in Figure 7-10, and as it is a continuous variable, it presents no specific problems and 
can be entered into the model as it is.  However, an examination of the box plots in 
Figure 7-10 suggest it is not a simple linear relationship whereby the reported price 
for paddy falls in relation with the proportion of total sales which comprise of loan 
repayments.  Instead, it seems that below a certain threshold whereby loans 
constitute more than a quarter of their income, the price received drops significantly, 
but without an obvious linear trend.  It is therefore most important for the sake of a 
regression to analyse whether or not households have taken loans which constitute 
more than 25% of one’s total agricultural income, and whether this affects the price.  
                                                 
1
 The value of the total of each commodity sold was calculated according to average reported per unit 
prices for the commodity in question across the entire sample to make the totals comparable.  Had the 
actual reported price for each farmer been used to calculate the total value of sales, the results may 
have been biased as those who had reported higher prices would have appeared to have sold a greater 
quantity than had been sold in reality.  




The final linear regression model yields an r
2
 of 0.49, suggesting that around half of 
the total variance in the average price received for kanchi paddy can be explained by 
the factors outlined above.  This represents a satisfactory figure given that this model 
did not seek to determine all the factors affecting the variation in prices offered by 
merchants, and the considerable potential for error from respondents in recalling 
price information.  All relationships are statistically significant (p=<0.05) at a 95% 
confidence interval. 
 
One potential limitation of these results is that of multicollinearity, whereby some of 
the independent variables predict one another, thus exaggerating the fit of the model.  
For example, the wealth category of a farmer is likely to impact one’s indebtedness 
to merchants, while regional price differences may be a result of the lower 
concentration of landlessness in some of the villages in the Jhorahat market region.  
To Meyers et al.  (2006), a tolerance of less than 0.1 indicates a multicollinearity 
problem as does a variance inflation factor (VIF) of greater than 10.  Given that the 
tolerance levels and VIF in Appendix 7-4 are well within these limits, it can be 
surmised that multicollinearity is not a serious problem for this model.  
 
It can thus be concluded that the variations in the price offered to households by 
merchant capital can be explained primarily by the market region in which they sell, 
which in turn reflects the oligopsonistic potential of traders.  Meanwhile, both the 
value of crop sales to the merchants and indebtedness to merchants both explain 
variations in price received within each region.  What is most striking about the latter 
two variables is that they represent merchant capital taking advantage of the 
economic insecurity of rural producers which follows from their integration into the 
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Appendix 7-2: Distribution of total agricultural income 
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Appendix 7-3: Distribution of log of total agricultural income 
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Appendix 7-4: Merchant capital price formation: regression coefficients  
Coefficients examining the variables which explain the variance in the average price received 
for kanchi paddy from the 2007 harvest (rupees per kg) 
 
Variable B Std. Error Beta () t  Sig.  Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 




1.519 .357 .492 4.261 .000 .788 1.269 















-1.083 .472 -.264 -2.296 .026 .795 1.258 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
